Opinion
J-S11045-18 No. 2117 EDA 2016
05-01-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. OZOD MANSUROV, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 10, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008729-2015 BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Ozod Mansurov ("Mansurov") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of criminal trespass. We affirm.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1) (providing, in relevant part, that "[a] person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he ... breaks into any building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof.").
In its Opinion, the trial court adeptly detailed the relevant factual and procedural history, which we incorporate as though fully set forth herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 1-6.
After the trial court sentenced Mansurov, he filed a timely post-sentence Motion challenging, inter alia, the weight and sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. The trial court denied this Motion by an Order entered on June 3, 2016.
In this timely appeal, Mansurov presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter [of] law to find ... Mansurov guilty of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503, criminal trespass of a building and/or occupied structure[,] as the evidence failed to establish Mansurov was not privileged to enter the complainant's apartment[?] Likewise, the evidence was insufficient to prove he gained entry to complainant's home "by force, breaking, intimidation, unauthorized opening of locks or through an opening not designed for human access."Brief for Appellant at 12-13.
2. Whether the jury's finding of guilt[] on the charge of criminal trespass was against the great weight of the evidence presented at trial[,] as the testimony of the complainant was simply not credible and should not have been accepted by the jury[?] The Complainant did not testify that she told Mansurov to leave.
3. Whether the trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Motion to Admit ... Mansurov's prior bad acts[,] pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)[,] involving an incident in Montgomery County[,] as it was prejudicial and was sought to show [Mansurov's] propensity to commit the acts alleged in the case before this Court[?]
4. Whether the trial court erred in granting a "stay away order" as to three [] individuals and against [] Mansurov[,] as the court was without the legal authority to do so and the court issued stay away order(s) for individuals who had no real relationship to the action[?] This part of the sentence imposed by the court was illegal.
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing [Mansurov] well outside the Pennsylvania Sentencing guidelines[,] and giving him a sentence of three (3) to six (6) years, when the guideline calculation was []restorative sanctions to nine (9) months[,] plus or minus three (3) months[,] on the singular charge of criminal trespass[,] and [the court] failed to articulate the reason for [] sentencing well outside of the guidelines[,] which was excessive[,] and there was no rational basis for the sentences as well as being unreasonable[?]
In his first issue, Mansurov argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence for the jury to properly find that all of the elements of criminal trespass were met beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 20-22. Mansurov asserts as follows:
The Commonwealth was required to show that [Mansurov] knew he was not licensed or privileged to go into the apartment of complainant[, i.e., Olena [M]orenska (hereinafter, the "complainant")]. The evidence was insufficient to establish [that] Mansurov was not privileged to enter the complainant's apartment. Likewise, the evidence was insufficient to prove he gained entry to [c]omplainant's home "by force, breaking, intimidation, unauthorized opening of locks or through an opening not designed for human access."Id. at 21-22 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(3) (setting forth the statutory definition of "breaks into")); see also Brief for Appellant at 22 (asserting that "[i]t was never communicated to Mansurov that he was not permitted to enter the apartment[,] as his girlfriend[, whom Mansurov had suspected was in the complainant's residence at the time of his forced entry,] would stay there and [Mansurov] had been there before to see her.").
We apply the following standard of review when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:
The standard we apply ... is whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that[,] as a matter of law[,] no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Melvin , 103 A.3d 1, 39-40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court concisely addressed Mansurov's issue, set forth the applicable law, and determined that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the Commonwealth had proved all elements of criminal trespass beyond a reasonable doubt. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 8-9. As we agree with the trial court's rationale and determination, which is supported by the record, we affirm on this basis concerning Mansurov's sufficiency challenge. See id.
In his next issue, Mansurov contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his post-sentence Motion for a new trial, where the jury's verdict of guilty on the criminal trespass charge was against the weight of the evidence and shocks one's sense of justice. See Brief for Appellant at 22-23. According to Mansurov, "[t]he testimony of the complainant was simply not credible and should not have been accepted by the jury." Id. at 22. Mansurov further argues that "[t]he [c]omplainant did not testify that she told Mansurov to leave[,]" and she "did not see Mansurov enter the apartment, [and] did not see him damage the apartment[.]" Id. Finally, Mansurov points out that the defense "presented a witness[, namely, Inobat Ramazonova ("Ramazonova"),] who stated [that] the [complainant's] apartment door sustained no noticeable damage. Further, [an additional defense witness, Nukmanzhan Khalilov ("Khalilov"),] testified [that Mansurov] had a key to the apartment[,] which would have allowed [Mansurov] to lawfully enter the apartment." Id. at 22-23; see also N.T., 3/11/16, at 28-38.
Mansurov fails to cite the place in the record containing the testimony he references, nor does he even identify these two witnesses by name. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (stating that "[i]f reference is made to ... any [] matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears[.]"). We caution Mansurov that it is not the responsibility of this court to "scour the record to find evidence to support an argument." Commonwealth v. Beshore , 916 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc).
Our standard of review of a weight of the evidence claim is as follows:
The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.Commonwealth v. Gonzalez , 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Rabold , 920 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that "[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence.") (citation omitted).
On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim consists of a review of the trial court's exercise of discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Initially, concerning Mansurov's assertion that the jury should not have credited the testimony of the complainant and weighed it in the fashion it did, this Court may not reassess the credibility of the witnesses and reweigh the evidence presented at trial, which was within the sole purview of the jury. See Gonzalez , supra.
Moreover, concerning the testimony of Ramazonova and Khalilov, the trial court noted in its Opinion as follows:
Although [Mansurov] proffered a witness[, Ramazonova,] who stated that the apartment door sustained no noticeable damage, it was unclear whether [Ramazonova] fully understood the questions that were asked during either direct or cross examination. [Concerning the testimony of Khalilov, a]lthough [Khalilov] initially stated that he had observed [Mansurov] entering the unit with a key on several occasions, cross-examination and redirect examination revealed that [Khalilov] was referring to [Mansurov's] key to the front door of the multi-unit apartment building. Given the fact that [Mansurov's] family also lived in the building, this was not probative of [Mansurov's] rightful access to [the complainant's] apartment.Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 10-11. Our review discloses that the trial court's foregoing rationale is supported by the record, and we discern no abuse of its discretion. Accordingly, none of Mansurov's contentions under his weight challenge entitle him to relief, and the jury's verdict does not shock our collective conscience. Mansurov's second issue thus fails.
In his third issue, Mansurov asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Commonwealth's Motion in limine, which sought to introduce at trial evidence of Mansurov's prior bad acts (namely, his prior conviction for breaking into another ex-girlfriend's residence in August 2014 - hereinafter, "the prior bad act evidence"). See Brief for Appellant at 23-30. According to Mansurov, the prior bad act evidence was irrelevant to the instant charges, unduly prejudicial, and improperly introduced to prove that he had a bad character and propensity to commit crimes. Id. at 28, 30. Mansurov contends that, contrary to the Commonwealth's assertion in its Motion in limine, the prior bad act evidence was not relevant to establish motive, intent or absence of mistake. Id. at 26-28. Mansurov protests that "[h]ere, the Commonwealth has done nothing more than identify the similarities between the prior conviction and the charges" filed in the instant case. Id. at 29; see also id. at 28 (asserting that any similarities were "tenuous").
When reviewing an order granting a motion in limine, we apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. Commonwealth v. Stokes , 78 A.3d 644, 654 (Pa. Super. 2013). "The admissibility of evidence is a matter directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court may reverse only upon a showing that the trial court abused that discretion." Id. (citation omitted).
"Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence." Commonwealth v. Tyson , 119 A.3d 353, 358 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc); see also Pa.R.E. 402. "Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence[,] and the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Pa.R.E. 401. However, "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Pa.R.E. 403.
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However,
"evidence of prior bad acts, while generally not admissible to prove bad character or criminal propensity, is admissible when proffered for some other relevant purpose so long as the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect." [ Commonwealth v.] Boczkowski , 846 A.2d [75,] 88 [(Pa. 2014)]. See also [ Commonwealth v.] Arrington , 86 A.3d [831,] 842 [(Pa. 2014)], citing Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Morris , 493 Pa. 164, 425 A.2d 715, 720 (Pa. 1981) (law does not allow use of evidence which tends solely to prove accused has "criminal disposition"). Such evidence may be admitted to show motive, identity, lack of accident or common plan or scheme. Arrington , 86 A.3d at 842, citing Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2); Commonwealth v. Briggs , 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291, 337 (Pa. 2011) (Rule 404(b)(2) permits other acts evidence to prove motive, lack of accident, common plan or scheme and identity). In order for other crimes evidence to be admissible, its probative value must outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice against the defendant, Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), and a comparison of the crimes proffered must
show a logical connection between them and the crime currently charged. Arrington , 86 A.3d at 842.Commonwealth v. Hicks , 156 A.3d 1114, 1125 (Pa. 2017).
Moreover, evidence of prior bad acts/crimes may also be "admitted to show a defendant's actions were not the result of a mistake or accident, where the manner and circumstances of two crimes are remarkably similar." Tyson , 119 A.3d at 359 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Sherwood , 982 A.2d 483, 497 (Pa. 2009) (holding that evidence of defendant's prior physical assaults of his child was admissible to show absence of mistake or accident in prosecution for intentional beating death of the child).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Mansurov's claim and determined that the court did not err in admitting the prior bad act evidence, as (1) its probative value substantially outweighed any potential for prejudice; and (2) it was admitted to establish Mansurov's lack of mistake, not his propensity to commit crimes. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 12-13. We agree with the trial court's reasoning and determination, and therefore affirm with regard to this issue based on the trial court's Opinion. See id.
In his fourth issue, Mansurov argues that the trial court erred and imposed an illegal sentence insofar as it imposed a "stay away Order" in connection with the sentence. See Brief for Appellant at 30-33. Mansurov urges that "the trial court was initially without authority to order the stay away from any of the [three] individuals [at issue], but more importantly[,] ... [the court] ordered Mansurov to stay away, not only from the complainant in this case, but to also two [] other individuals who were not complainants, not victims and had only a tangential relationship to the case itself." Id. at 31 (footnote added, emphasis omitted). According to Mansurov, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the stay away order, "to the extent that ... [such] order may be construed as a condition of parole[.]" Id. at 32; see also id. at 33 n.4 (stating that "[a]t sentencing, the trial court indicated that it would issue 'stay away orders.' It [did] not state the stay away orders are a condition of probation." (citing N.T., 5/10/16, at 4) (emphasis added)).
The individuals were the complainant and two of Mansurov's ex-girlfriends, Luiza Ramazanova ("Ramazanova") and Magdalena Zielinska ("Zielinska").
In support of his claim, Mansurov cites the decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Mears , 972 A.2d 1210 (Pa. Super. 2009), wherein the panel held that "the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole has exclusive authority to determine parole when the offender is sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two or more years[.] Therefore, any condition the sentencing court purported to impose on Appellant's state parole is advisory only." Id. at 1212 (emphasis added, citation and quotation marks omitted).
"The determination as to whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law; our standard of review in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary." Commonwealth v. Atanasio , 997 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and brackets omitted)). "If no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction." Commonwealth v. Hughes , 986 A.2d 159, 160 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Sentencing Code provides that, as a condition of probation, a trial court may require a defendant to "satisfy any [] conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty ...." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(c)(13); see also Commonwealth v. McBride , 433 A.2d 509, 510 (Pa. Super. 1981) (citing to subsection 9754(c)(13) and explaining that an offender placed on probation "does not enjoy the full panoply of constitutional rights otherwise enjoyed by those who have not run afoul of the law.") (citation and brackets omitted); Commonwealth v. Carver , 923 A.2d 495, 497 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that probation is rehabilitative in design, protecting the interests of the public as well as the defendant).
Initially, there is no merit to Mansurov's claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the stay-away Order. Mansurov refers to the trial judge's remark made in imposing sentence that "when [Mansurov] comes out on parole, he will need a stay away order." Brief for Appellant at 33 n.4 (emphasis added by Mansurov) (purporting to quote the transcript from the sentencing hearing, N.T., 5/10/16, at 49). However, regardless of this purported passing remark, the written sentencing Order, which states that the court imposed the stay-away condition as part of Mansurov's probation, controls. See Commonwealth v. Borrin , 80 A.3d 1219, 1226-27 (Pa. 2013) (stating that "[i]n Pennsylvania, the text of the sentencing order, and not the statements a trial court makes about a defendant's sentence, is determinative of the court's sentencing intentions and the sentence imposed.").
The transcript from the sentencing hearing is not contained in the electronic record certified to this Court. See Commonwealth v. Lesko , 15 A.3d 345, 410 (Pa. 2011) (explaining that it is the responsibility of the appellant, not the trial court, to provide a complete record for review, including any necessary transcripts). Moreover, though Mansurov purports to have included a copy of this transcript in his reproduced record, it is not contained therein.
Additionally, the stay-away condition of Mansurov's probation was not unduly restrictive, and was designed to rehabilitate him. In imposing the stay-away Order, the trial court was mindful of Mansurov's pattern of stalking and invading the personal space of women, which included his two ex-girlfriends (i.e., Ramazanova and Zielinska) who were covered under the stay-away Order. Accordingly, the stay-away Order was reasonable, and specifically tailored to (a) facilitate Mansurov's recovery and rehabilitation; and (b) provide for the safety of the public by preventing him from further harassing the subject women. See , e.g., McBride , 433 A.2d at 510-11 (upholding the trial court's order that the defendant have no contact with the juvenile victim whose morals he was convicted of corrupting, where it was reasonable and necessary to rehabilitate the defendant). Accordingly, Mansurov's fourth issue does not entitle him to relief.
In his final issue, Mansurov contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence. See Brief for Appellant at 33-42. According to Mansurov, the trial court, in imposing a sentence that is above the applicable sentencing guidelines, failed to (a) consider Mansurov's circumstances and rehabilitative needs; and (b) state on the record reasons for the sentence imposed. See id. at 34-35.
Mansurov challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, from which there is no absolute right to appeal. See Commonwealth v. Hill , 66 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013). Rather, where, as here, the appellant has preserved the sentencing challenge for appellate review by raising it at sentencing or in a timely post-sentence motion, the appellant must (1) include in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (2) show that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. Hill , 66 A.3d at 363-64.
Here, Mansurov included a Rule 2119(f) Statement in his brief. See Brief for Appellant at 33-35. Moreover, his above-mentioned claims present a substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Macias , 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2009) (observing that "[t]he failure to set forth adequate reasons for the sentence imposed has been held to raise a substantial question. Likewise, an averment that the court ... failed to consider all relevant factors raises a substantial question.") (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Holiday , 954 A.2d 6, 10 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that "[a] claim that the sentencing court imposed a sentence outside of the guidelines without specifying sufficient reasons presents a substantial question for our review.").
Mansurov challenges as manifestly excessive the court's sentence of three to six years in prison, where the guideline range was restorative sanctions to nine months. See Brief for Appellant at 37. But see also id. (pointing out that the statutory maximum for a conviction of criminal trespass is five to ten years in prison). Additionally, Mansurov maintains that "[d]uring the [sentencing] hearing, the court failed to cite a single reason for its sentence[.]" Id. at 39; see also id. at 42. Finally, Mansurov argues that the sentencing court failed to take into account his particular circumstances, character, and rehabilitative needs. Id. at 37.
We review discretionary aspects of sentence claims under the following standard: "[S]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Fullin , 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006). Moreover, the sentencing court has broad discretion in choosing the range of permissible confinement that best suits a particular defendant and the circumstances surrounding his crime. Commonwealth v. Walls , 846 A.2d 152, 154-55 (Pa. Super. 2004).
The Sentencing Code sets forth the considerations a trial court must take into account when formulating a sentence, stating that "the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Additionally, in every case where a sentencing court imposes a sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines, the court must provide in open court a contemporaneous statement of reasons in support of its sentence. Id. When doing so,
a trial judge ... [must] demonstrate on the record, as a proper starting point, its awareness of the sentencing guidelines. Having done so, the sentencing court may deviate from the guidelines, if necessary, to fashion a sentence which takes into account the protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the gravity of the particular offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and the community, so long as it also states of record the factual basis and specific reasons which compelled it to deviate from the guideline range.Commonwealth v. Bowen , 55 A.3d 1254, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation and brackets omitted). However, "[a] sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence[.]" Commonwealth v. Crump , 995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Finally, when evaluating a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence, it is important to remember that the sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature. Commonwealth v. Yuhasz , 923 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Pa. 2007); see also Commonwealth v. Walls , 926 A.2d 957, 963 (Pa. 2007) (stating that "rather than cabin the exercise of a sentencing court's discretion, the [sentencing] guidelines merely inform the sentencing decision.").
Mansurov's claim that the sentencing court did not state any reasons for the sentence it imposed is belied by the record. In its Opinion, the trial court explains that, at sentencing, it stated, inter alia, as follows prior to sentencing Mansurov:
I'll certainly put on the record the history of [Mansurov] and the ... the testimony of the officers[, and] the testimony of [Mansurov's] past domestic violence incidents that were presented are an aggravating factor. I think the nature of this case, the Prior Bad Acts that the [c]ourt admitted into evidence, and witnesses -- I believe two witnesses that testified to Prior Bad Acts, that certainly is a consideration. All of the testimony presented at trial I think make the sentence appropriate. The Prior Bad Acts, the testimony at trial, the testimony we heard today from the officers, as well as [Mansurov's] juvenile incidents[,] and the other domestic violence incidents presented that show a pattern by [Mansurov] of violating women and physically attacking women and stalking women, has been abundantly shown based on what was presented here today.Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 15 (quoting N.T., 5/10/16, at 47). The trial court further stated in its Opinion as follows: "Based on the findings of the court, the aggravating factors grossly outweighed any mitigation. A standard range sentence was not appropriate for the conduct of [Mansurov]. Therefore the imposition of sentence in this case was proper and was adequately explained on the record." Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 15-16. We agree with the trial court's rationale and discern no abuse of its discretion in imposing a sentence, above the guideline range, which was commensurate with the seriousness of the crime, Mansurov's criminal history, and the danger he posed to women and the community.
Moreover, the sentencing court had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report ("PSI"). It is well settled that where a sentencing court is informed by a PSI, "it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed." Commonwealth v. Ventura , 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Devers , 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988)). Additionally, "[t]he sentencing judge can satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the [PSI]; thus properly considering and weighing all relevant factors." Ventura , 975 A.2d at 1135 (citation omitted).
Because the sentencing court in the instant case had reviewed Mansurov's PSI, it is presumed that the court considered, inter alia, his individualized circumstances and character. See Ventura , supra ; see also Commonwealth v. Sheller , 961 A.2d 187, 191-92 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence beyond the aggravated range where the court considered the pre-sentence investigation report, sentencing guidelines, protection of the public, and the appellant's rehabilitative needs). Thus, Mansurov's final issue entitles him to no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 5/1/18
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