Opinion
11-P-74
03-19-2012
COMMONWEALTH v. JAMES JORDAN.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Following a jury trial in Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 19(b). The evidence showed that the defendant took a pair of pants from a third party he was assaulting, and the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant later took money from a wallet that was in the pants. On appeal, the defendant correctly concedes that there was sufficient evidence that he intended to steal the pants (containing the money) at the time he took them. However, he was charged with stealing only the money, not the pants. He argues only that there was insufficient proof that he intended to steal the money (or was even aware of its presence) at the time he stole the pants. We affirm.
He was also convicted of assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A, but raises no issues on appeal with respect to that conviction.
There was ample evidence upon which the jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had the intent to steal the pants at the time he took them. Contrast Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 646 (1982) ('[W]here the intent to steal is no more than an afterthought to a previous assault, there is no robbery').
The jury readily could have concluded on the evidence before them that -- at the time the defendant stole the pants -- he intended to steal a wallet, money, or other objects that are ordinarily contained in pants pockets. That reasonable inference is sufficient to sustain his conviction. See Commonwealth v. Schraffa, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 808, 809 (1974) (rejecting argument that judge erred in refusing to instruct jury that defendant could not be convicted of stealing contents of truck if he was unaware of the existence of such contents).
The Commonwealth argues that whenever someone intends to steal any object, he by definition has the intent to steal whatever that object might contain (in the words used by the Commonwealth at oral argument, the thief 'assumes the risk'). We need not rest on that theory in this case. Even though the victim was not wearing the pants at the time they were stolen from him, it would have been reasonable for the jury to infer that the defendant had knowledge that the pants might well contain money, especially where, as here, the pants had a wallet chain attached to them.
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Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Grasso, Kafker & Milkey, JJ.),