Opinion
J-S78023-18 No. 3438 EDA 2017
04-08-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOHN C. GUERRA Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 4, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011956-2014 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
John C. Guerra appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his convictions for numerous charges relating to his running a prostitution ring involving adult women and a minor. Guerra argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to admit certain evidence, and that the court abused its discretion in sentencing Guerra. We affirm.
In December 2010, the Commonwealth filed charges against Guerra. He evaded arrest until his apprehension in August 2014. Guerra waived his right to a jury trial, and proceeded to a bench trial in June 2016.
The trial court thoroughly recounted the evidence presented at Guerra's bench trial. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 4/11/18, at 1-7. In short, the Commonwealth presented evidence that between 2008 and 2010, Guerra recruited young women to work for him as prostitutes, and assisted them in posting advertisements online to solicit customers for sex. He also provided cell phones for the women to use to contact customers, and hotel rooms; received money the customers paid the women in exchange for sex; and provided the women with drugs and money. Guerra knew the women were addicted to drugs, and he supplied them with large amounts of crack cocaine and heroin. He made the women work for days at a time without sleep, used violence and sexual violence to keep them from leaving or withholding money, and prohibited them from seeking medical attention. Several other men assisted Guerra, including Elton Cromwell, Eddie Mendez, and Dwayne Thomas.
Three victims, M.S., T.W., and A.H., testified at trial. Of note, A.H. testified that she was a minor when she began working for Guerra, and that when Cromwell and Guerra discovered she was a minor, she stayed at Guerra's family home until Guerra made the decision that she would continue working. A.H. also testified that Cromwell went to her parents' house after charges were filed against him, and that this made her feel scared.
The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Detective Derrick Stigerts, whom the Commonwealth offered as an expert in human trafficking, and Trooper Michael Peterson. Trooper Peterson testified that during the course of his investigation, he viewed the contents of a laptop found at the hotel where A.H. was found, which contained images and advertisements, some of which were introduced into evidence. Trooper Peterson said he interviewed five women who had worked for Guerra in two different hotel rooms, including M.S., T.W., and A.H. Trooper Peterson stated that, through the investigation, he was able to identify the extent of Guerra's involvement in trafficking and prostitution, as well as the three other men in the organization. Trooper Peterson testified that based upon his investigation, he had concluded that Guerra "was in charge of an illegal, corrupt organization[.]" N.T., 6/29/16, at 97.
Guerra objected on the basis that the testimony was a legal conclusion. The court agreed that the ultimate issue was for the court, but stated it would allow Trooper Peterson to testify as to the basis for his conclusion. Id. at 97-98. Trooper Peterson testified that "through interviewing witnesses that testified and did not testify, all of their statements were clearly identifying each individual's roles in this organization. Some ladies put [Guerra] at the top of the pyramid." Id. at 98. Trooper Peterson stated he "concluded that [Guerra's] role was a leader of a corrupt organization, including prostitution." Id. Guerra again objected, and the court overruled the objection. Id. at 99. The Commonwealth confirmed that it was not offering Trooper Peterson as an expert witness. Id. The prosecutor then asked Trooper Peterson about his training and experience in the Organized Crime Unit, and his opinion as to why there was no financial trail implicating Guerra in the crimes. Trooper Peterson answered, "The head[s] of corrupt organizations always attempt to insulate themselves from their underlings . . . because they don't want to be implicated as being the ring leader." Id. at 101.
Guerra presented the testimony of M.T. and R.H., the mothers of children by Guerra and Cromwell, respectively, who had worked as prostitutes. Both women testified that A.H. had worked for Cromwell, and not Guerra; that Guerra had never threatened or assaulted any of the women working for him; and that Guerra did not force anyone to stay against their will. M.T. further testified that Guerra and Cromwell were friends, but did not work together or share employees, computers, phones, or money, and that M.S. would steal from Guerra to support her drug habit.
Guerra testified in his own defense. He admitted he had sex with A.H. on the first night of her arrival, but denied that A.H. had ever worked for him, and asserted that A.H. had worked for Cromwell, who had decided to take her back to work after discovering her minor status. Guerra denied working jointly with Cromwell or anyone else. He admitted that T.W. and M.S. had both worked for him, and that he would buy drugs in bulk to supply to his employees. But he denied that he had forced any of the women to work, or had threatened them. He denied that he was violent toward T.W. or had raped M.S., and stated that he had only slapped M.S. with an open fist on one occasion, because she owed him money.
The trial court convicted Guerra of trafficking of a minor, trafficking of persons, conspiracy to traffic persons, corrupt organizations, promoting prostitution, sexual exploitation of a child, unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of a minor, simple assault, criminal use of a communication facility, and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The court sentenced Guerra to an aggregate of 37 to 74 years' confinement, with sentences on seven charges running consecutively, and four charges running concurrently.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3002(b), 3002(a), 903, 911(b)(1), 5902(b)(1), 6320(a), 6318(a)(5), 6301(a)(1)(i), 2701(a), 7512(a) and P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.
Guerra filed a post-sentence motion. The motion was denied by operation of law in September 2017, and Guerra filed a timely notice of appeal.
Guerra raises the following issues:
1. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to find [Guerra] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?Guerra's Br. at 4.
2. Did the [c]ourt abuse its discretion in [s]entencing [Guerra] to an aggregate period of 37 to 74 years?
3. Did the [c]ourt [err] in permitting the investigating officer to testify as to his opinion that [Guerra] was the head of a corrupt organization thereby depriving [Guerra] of a fair trial?
4. Did the [c]ourt [err] in allowing testimony, elicited by the Commonwealth, involving an alleged threat by Elton Cromwell against a witness testifying against [Guerra] without establishing any connective link to [Guerra]?
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, Guerra argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Specifically, related to the charge of corrupt organizations, Guerra argues that there was insufficient evidence that he was involved in an enterprise. Guerra asserts that the trial testimony established that he operated separately from Cromwell, Mendez, and Thomas. Guerra also argues that there was no evidence establishing that income he earned from trafficking persons or distributing drugs was reinvested in that pursuit, such as financial records showing Guerra paid for hotel rooms, telephones, or online advertisements.
Guerra also argues that there was insufficient evidence he committed sexual exploitation of a child, unlawful contact with a minor, or trafficking of a minor. Guerra asserts A.H. testified she worked exclusively for Cromwell; there was no testimony or forensic computer evidence indicating that Guerra took photographs of A.H. or posted her advertisements; and there was no evidence that Guerra conspired with Cromwell to traffic A.H.
Regarding trafficking of the other two women, Guerra contends that M.S. testified she came to Philadelphia seeking to work as a prostitute. After voluntarily working for Guerra, she started working for Guerra's brother, Jason, after Jason threatened Guerra by showing him a firearm. Guerra contends that the testimony indicates he hit M.S. not to prevent her from leaving his employment, but in response to her stealing money to feed her drug habit.
Guerra argues that T.W. testified that she autonomously worked for Mendez, and then for Guerra, and then for Guerra's brother, Jason. Guerra asserts that T.W. testified that Guerra was only violent towards her during the times she was working for one of the other men. Guerra adds that defense witnesses testified that he did not force any of the women to work for him, and that they could come and go as they pleased.
Guerra further argues that as he did not engage in trafficking, no conspiracy to commit trafficking existed.
Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "we must determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences therefrom are sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each element of the crime charged is established beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Green , 2019 PA Super 39 (Feb. 12, 2019). "The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence." Id. (citation omitted).
The trial court discussed the elements of the contested charges, and the evidence presented by the Commonwealth that met each element of those crimes. See Tr. Ct. Op. at 12-18 (corrupt organizations); 18-23 (conspiracy to traffic persons); 23-25 (sexual exploitation of a child); 30-32 (corruption of minors); 33-38, 44-45 (trafficking of a minor); 33-35, 38-45 (trafficking of persons); 45-50 (unlawful contact with a minor). After a review of the record, the applicable law, and the parties' briefs, we affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Sean F. Kennedy, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See id.
II. Sentencing
Guerra argues that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an aggregate period of 37 to 74 years' incarceration. As Guerra challenges discretionary aspects of his sentence, we must first determine whether we will allow the appeal. Commonwealth v. Heaster , 171 A.3d 268, 271 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 181 A.3d 1078 (Pa. 2018). We will only do so if: (1) the appeal is timely; (2) the issue was preserved; (3) the brief includes a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement; and (4) the statement raises a "substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code." Id. at 271-72 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moury , 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010)). "A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process." Commonwealth v. White , 193 A.3d 977, 982 (Pa.Super. 2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Griffin , 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013)).
In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Guerra argues that the court's sentence was contrary to fundamental sentencing norms because (1) the sentence was excessive, and the court stated at sentencing that it did not find any evidence supported a mitigated sentence, even though Guerra presented mitigating evidence, and (2) the trial court erred when it calculated Guerra's prior record score. See Guerra's Br. at 14-15.
Guerra's appeal is timely. Guerra preserved the claim that his sentence was excessive because the court failed to consider mitigating evidence, as he raised that issue in his post-sentence motion, in which he contended that his sentence was excessive and highlighted reasons supporting a mitigated the sentence. We have previously held that an excessive sentence claim in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors raises a substantial question. White , 193 A.3d at 983 (quoting Commonwealth v. Caldwell , 117 A.3d 763, 769-70 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc)). Guerra has therefore raised a substantial question warranting our review, and we will allow the appeal.
We have also noted that "prior decisions from this Court involving whether a substantial question has been raised by claims that the sentencing court 'failed to consider' or 'failed to adequately consider' sentencing factors has been less than a model of clarity and consistency." White , 193 A.3d at 983 (quoting Caldwell , 117 A.3d at 769-70).
However, in relation to Guerra's claim that the sentencing court abused its discretion by employing an incorrect prior record score when calculating the Sentencing Guidelines ranges, we find the claim to be waived. In his Rule 1925(b) statement of errors raised on appeal, Guerra framed his sentencing issue simply as, "Whether the Court abused its discretion in Sentencing the Defendant to an aggregate period of incarceration of 37 to 74 years." Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 11/27/17, at 2 (unpaginated). Although in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court acknowledged that it departed from the Sentencing Guidelines when sentencing Guerra, and that it calculated the Guidelines ranges based on a prior record score of 5, the court did not address Guerra's claim that the prior record score was incorrect.
We conclude that the trial court's failure to address the calculation of Guerra's prior record score was a direct result of Guerra's failure to specify that issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement. When a vague Rule 1925(b) statement leaves a trial court to speculate as to the bases for relief, a finding of waiver is warranted. Commonwealth v. Hodges , 193 A.3d 428, 432 (Pa.Super. 2018); see also Commonwealth v. Pukowsky , 147 A.3d 1229, 1236 (Pa.Super. 2016) ("A Rule 1925(b) statement 'which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no [Rule 1925(b)] Statement at all,' and will result in waiver") (citation omitted). The absence of the trial court's opinion on the issue has hindered our review, and therefore we will not consider the waived issue of Guerra's prior record score.
Returning to Guerra's preserved sentencing issue, Guerra argues that his sentence of 37-74 years' incarceration, consisting of consecutive sentences above the Guidelines ranges, was excessive in light of the mitigating evidence, which the court ignored. Specifically, Guerra contends that the following factors should have mitigated his sentence: he chose to be tried without a jury; he admitted to committing several of the crimes charged, "essentially only contesting his involvement in a corrupt organization and his involvement with the minor victim"; and, during allocution, he took responsibility for his actions and apologized for being short-sighted and selfish, and stated that he completed the WINGS program while in prison. Guerra's Br. at 43. Guerra also argues that the sentence is excessive because its length "will ensure the likelihood that [Guerra will] probably never be released from incarceration." Id. at 41.
"Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge." Commonwealth v. Peck , 2019 PA Super 8 (Jan. 8, 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sheller , 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa.Super. 2008)). The Sentencing Guidelines offer recommended ranges for sentence lengths, and a court may depart from the sentence recommended by the Guidelines if necessary. Id. An appellate court must vacate a sentence outside the Guidelines if the sentence is "unreasonable." Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3).
In its opinion, the court stated that it explained on the record at the time of sentencing its reasons for sentencing Guerra above the Guidelines, including the effect of the crimes on the victims, the danger Guerra poses to the community, and Guerra's four-year flight from police. See Tr. Ct. Op. at 61 (quoting N.T., 5/4/17 (Sentencing), at 28-29). The court further commented that it considered all relevant factors in imposing an above Guidelines sentence, including Guerra's personal characteristics, such as his contrition and potential for rehabilitation; the court specifically noted Guerra's laughter during the testimony of a Commonwealth witness. Id. at 63. The court also reviewed the gravity of the offenses, and explained that it purposefully sentenced Guerra to consecutive sentences, as Guerra was not entitled to a "volume discount" for the quantity of crimes he committed. Id. at 61-62, 64-65. Moreover, the trial court had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report at the time of sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Finnecy , 135 A.3d 1028, 1038 (Pa.Super. 2016) (we presume court was aware of relevant sentencing information when it had the benefit of a presentence investigation report).
We therefore find no basis to Guerra's claim that his sentence was excessive or that the court failed to consider mitigating evidence. We perceive no abuse of discretion or unreasonableness in the court's sentence, and affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion. See Tr. Ct. Op. at 58-65.
III. Trooper Peterson's Testimony
In his third issue, Guerra argues that the court erred in overruling his objection when Trooper Peterson testified he believed Guerra was the head of an organization. Guerra's Br. at 47. Guerra points out that the Commonwealth asked Trooper Peterson about his training and experience in the Organized Crime Unit before asking his opinion as to why there was no financial trail implicating Guerra in the crimes. According to Guerra, Trooper Peterson's testimony was not sufficient to allow a lay person to conclude that Guerra was the head of an organization, but was instead based on the Trooper's specialized knowledge, and therefore constituted impermissible expert testimony. Id.
"A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is admissible and a trial court's ruling on an evidentiary issue will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion." Commonwealth v. Huggins , 68 A.3d 962, 966 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cook , 676 A.2d 639, 647 (Pa. 1996). We do not disturb a ruling admitting evidence "unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Minich , 4 A.3d 1063, 1068 (Pa.Super. 2010)). As our scope of review over an evidentiary question is plenary, we may review the ruling within the context of the entire record. Id.
Here, the trial court admitted the evidence because it was "rationally based on the witness's perception" rather than his technical knowledge. Tr. Ct. Op. at 67 (quoting Pa.R.E. 701(a)). The court likened the case to Commonwealth v. Blessitt , 852 A.2d 1215 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v . O'Berg , 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005). In Blessitt , a Pennsylvania State Trooper who purchased drugs from the defendant in a controlled drug purchase opined at trial that the defendant had handed off the purchase-money to another individual before being arrested, because in the trooper's experience with controlled drug purchases, an individual selling drugs only "sometimes" still has that money when he is arrested. Id. at 1218. On appeal, we affirmed the admission of the lay testimony regarding controlled drug purchases. Id.
While a lay witness may not testify based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge beyond that of a layperson, see Pa.R.E. 701, 702, "[a] witness may state relevant facts known to him, because of experience, even though he is not regarded as an expert whose opinion would be admissible on a hypothetical inquiry." Commonwealth v. Bennett , 370 A.2d 373, 375 (Pa. 1977); see , e.g., Commonwealth. v. Grabowski , 549 A.2d 145, 151 (Pa.Super. 1988) (holding lay witness who operated auto body shop competent to testify to his conclusion drawn from personal experience operating a body shop).
We agree with the trial court that Trooper Peterson's testimony did not rely on specialized or technical knowledge, and was within the realm of understanding of a layperson. Trooper Peterson's opinion that Guerra was the head of an organization was rationally based on his interviews with five women who had worked for Guerra, three of whom testified at trial. Likewise, his testimony that a head of an organization would not leave a financial trail was based on his personal experience, rather than technical knowledge.
We note Guerra has not appealed on the basis that Trooper Peterson's testimony was based in part upon inadmissible hearsay. Regardless, we presume that a judge, sitting as finder of fact in a non-jury trial, disregards inadmissible hearsay testimony. Commonwealth v. Dent , 837 A.2d 571, 582 (Pa.Super. 2003). We therefore affirm the trial court's ruling on Guerra's objection to Trooper Peterson's testimony.
IV. Testimony that Cromwell Threatened A.H.
In his final issue, Guerra argues the court erred in admitting A.H.'s testimony that Cromwell threatened her. Guerra's Br. at 50. While A.H. did not testify to any specific statements made by Cromwell, Guerra complains that A.H. testified that Cromwell visited her parents, which scared her. Guerra contends that the testimony about Cromwell's actions was inadmissible because it was not relevant to the charges against Guerra, as there was no evidence establishing any conspiracy between Guerra and Cromwell existed at the time. Guerra also argues that A.H's testimony constituted double hearsay.
Guerra has waived review of this issue by failing to make a timely objection to the testimony at the time of trial. See Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1); Commonwealth v. Bryant , 855 A.2d 726, 740 (Pa. 2004). Were the issue not waived, we would agree with the trial court's analysis that the statements were properly admitted as statements by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy. See Tr. Ct. Op. at 68-72. We add that A.H.'s testimony did not contain hearsay, as she did not testify as to any direct statements, or even the content of the statements, made by Cromwell to her parents. In addition, A.H.'s testimony was cumulative of the testimony of Trooper Peterson, who testified regarding Cromwell's visit to A.H.'s parents, testimony which Guerra does not challenge. See N.T., 6/29/16, at 76-77, 81-82, 91-93.
As none of Guerra's issues merit relief, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/8/19
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