Opinion
20-P-862
06-01-2021
COMMONWEALTH v. Christopher GOSS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
A District Court jury found the defendant guilty of negligent operation of a motor vehicle, while acquitting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI). On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
The jury also found the defendant guilty of disorderly conduct. That conviction was placed on file and is not at issue in this appeal.
The defendant was arrested after he failed to bring his car to a complete stop at two stop signs in the parking lot of the Plainridge gaming facility. On appeal, the defendant does not contest that he was operating a motor vehicle, and that the parking lot qualifies as a "public way" within the meaning of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a ). He focuses instead on whether there was sufficient proof of the third element of the offense, namely that he drove his car negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered. In essence, the defendant argues that in light of the relatively minor nature of the traffic violations and the setting and time that they occurred (4:30 A.M. ), the Commonwealth failed to prove the requisite endangerment to the public. See Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1021-1022 (2019).
One such infraction was observed by the State trooper who arrested him; the other was shown on a video surveillance recording.
However, "[t]he question is whether the defendant's driving had the potential to cause danger to the public, not whether it actually did." Commonwealth v. Sousa, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 51 (2015). Moreover, the "defendant's driving need not have been erratic to support a conviction of negligent operation, so long as the conduct, taken as a whole, might have endangered the lives and safety of the public." Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 370 (2019). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we of course view the evidence -- including all reasonable inferences therefrom -- in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979). Applying that standard, we conclude that the evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficient.
The defendant came to the attention of the troopers working at the Plainridge facility some three hours before he was stopped and arrested. Specifically, he was among a group of rowdy individuals that the trooper had come across in a parking area at the facility. Members of the group were drinking, pretending to fight, and apparently smashing beer bottles. The defendant himself appeared intoxicated, and he was belligerent and uncooperative. In view of his apparent intoxication, the troopers specifically advised the defendant not to operate his vehicle. At that point, the defendant left the area in a car driven by someone else. The record does not make clear when or how he returned.
A few hours later, casino surveillance advised the troopers that the defendant had returned and was attempting to drive away in his own vehicle. After observing the defendant run a stop sign, the troopers activated their siren and lights in order to pull the defendant over. It nevertheless took the defendant another thirty seconds to come to a stop at the intersection of the casino's driveway and Route One. Once he was stopped, the defendant exhibited multiple signs of intoxication: bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, unsteadiness on his feet, and an odor of alcohol. The defendant also was unable to complete field sobriety tests administered to him. Although the jury acquitted the defendant of the OUI charge, the evidence of intoxication still can be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence of negligent driving. See Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 380 (2017). Based on such evidence of the defendant's intoxication, his two traffic infractions, the slowness with which he stopped for the police, and the fact that he was driving towards the highway when stopped, a rational jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was driving negligently in a manner that might endanger the public. Contrast Zagwyn, 482 Mass. at 1022 (vacating conviction for negligent driving where only proof was of intoxication and "scant evidence of a broken headlight and a broken license plate light"). The evidence thus was sufficient.
Judgment affirmed.