Opinion
J-S37031-17 No. 1552 MDA 2016
06-27-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CARLOS R. GARCIA, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on August 23, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-36-CR-0001382-2014 BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Carlos R. Garcia ("Garcia") appeals from the Order denying his first Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
This Court set forth the relevant underlying facts as follows:
On February 22, 2014, Garcia was driving at high rate of speed (over sixty-five miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone) near the 1300 block of East King Street in Lancaster Township. Garcia was driving erratically, weaving in and out of traffic without signaling and cutting off vehicles as he passed them. When the gray Honda in front of Garcia slowed for a vehicle that was turning left from the left lane of traffic, Garcia suddenly swerved into the oncoming lane of traffic to avoid the Honda and hit a Subaru driven by Lisa Stamper ("Stamper"). The crash resulted in the death of Stamper's daughter, Kaitlyn Berry, serious bodily injury to Stamper, and serious bodily injury to Garcia's seven-year-old son, who was the front seat passenger of Garcia's vehicle. Blood testing revealed that Garcia's blood alcohol content was .144[%] at the time of the crash.
Consequently, Garcia was charged with several violations of the Motor Vehicle and Crimes Codes, including one count each
(unless otherwise specified) of the following: homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence [], aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence [], three counts of accidents involving death or personal injury while not properly licensed, endangering the welfare of a child, three counts of recklessly endangering another person [], DUI—general impairment, DUI—high rate of alcohol, reckless driving, driving while operating privilege suspended or revoked—DUI related, driving at an unsafe speed, failing to drive within a single lane, and failure to yield the right of way.Commonwealth v. Garcia , 131 A.3d 106 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum at 1-3) (citations and footnotes omitted).
On July 15, 2014, Garcia entered an open guilty plea to all of the above-referenced crimes.
The trial court imposed an aggregate prison sentence of nineteen years and ninety days to thirty-eight years. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See id.
On November 30, 2015, Garcia filed a pro se PCRA Petition. The PCRA court appointed Garcia counsel, who filed an amended PCRA Petition. Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied Garcia's Petition. Garcia filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise Statement.
On appeal, Garcia raises the following questions for our review:
A. Whether the PCRA court's determination was supported in the record and free from legal error in that the guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because of a defective guilty plea colloquy wherein [Garcia] was not apprised that the sentences could be run consecutively[,] and he was not apprised of the maximum aggregate sentence that could be imposed when defense counsel did not object to [the]
defective guilty plea colloquy or seek to withdraw [the] guilty plea before or after sentencing[?]Brief for Appellant at 4 (some capitalization omitted).
B. Whether the PCRA court's determination was supported in the record and free from legal error in that defense counsel unlawfully induced [Garcia] to plead guilty by his misrepresentations as to the sentence [Garcia] would receive or probably receive[?]
"Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the court's rulings are supported by the evidence of record and free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Volk , 138 A.3d 659, 661 (Pa. Super. 2016). Further, "[a] PCRA court passes on witness credibility at PCRA hearings, and its credibility determinations should be provided great deference by reviewing courts." Commonwealth v. Johnson , 966 A.2d 523, 539 (Pa. 2009).
In his first claim, Garcia contends that his plea counsel was ineffective. Brief for Appellant at 22. Garcia argues that counsel failed to file a motion challenging the validity of the plea. Id. Garcia further argues that his plea was not voluntarily or knowingly entered, as he was unaware of the maximum cumulative sentence that could be imposed. Id. at 22, 26. Garcia specifically asserts that he was not informed that the sentences could be run consecutively. Id. at 22, 25-26; see also id. at 25 (arguing that while Garcia was informed of the statutory maximum sentence for each conviction, he was not informed of the aggregate maximum sentence). Garcia claims that his plea counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to object to the absence of this information at the colloquy, and that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure. Id. at 26-27. Garcia thus seeks to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 27.
The PCRA court set forth the relevant law, addressed Garcia's ineffectiveness claim and determined that it is without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 8/23/16, at 3-11; see also Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 7/15/14, at 4 (wherein Garcia acknowledged that the sentences could be imposed consecutively to one another); id. at 3 (wherein Garcia stated that he understood that the trial court could impose a maximum sentence of 53 years in prison, if the court sentenced him to the maximum sentence for each crime and imposed the sentences consecutively). We adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court for the purpose of this appeal, and affirm on this basis. See PCRA Court Opinion, 8/23/16, at 3-11; see also Commonwealth v. Yeomans , 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that a person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he made during the plea colloquy, and may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict those statements); Commonwealth v. Shekerko , 639 A.2d 810, 815 (Pa. Super. 1994) (concluding that because appellant's plea was knowingly entered, plea counsel was not ineffective).
In his second claim, Garcia contends that he involuntarily entered the guilty plea based upon plea counsel's misrepresentations regarding the length of sentences he could receive. Brief for Appellant at 27, 34. Garcia argues that his plea counsel indicated that the best-case scenario at sentencing would be five to ten years in prison, and the worst-case scenario would be ten to twenty years in prison. Id. at 31-32, 33. Garcia further asserts that plea counsel indicated that the trial court would be lenient if he pled guilty and showed remorse. Id. at 32-33. Garcia thus claims that plea counsel was ineffective, and that he should be permitted to withdraw the plea. Id. at 33-34.
The PCRA court set forth the relevant law, addressed Garcia's ineffectiveness claim and determined that it is without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 8/23/16, at 11-14; see also Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 7/15/14, at 4 (wherein Garcia acknowledged that the judge would determine his sentence). Thus, we adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court for the purpose of this appeal, and conclude that plea counsel was not ineffective and did not induce an involuntary guilty plea. See PCRA Court Opinion, 8/23/16, at 11-14; see also Commonwealth v. Muhammad , 794 A.2d 378, 383 (Pa. Super. 2002) (stating that "disappointment by a defendant in the sentence actually imposed does not represent manifest injustice.").
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/27/2017
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