Opinion
689 MDA 2021 J-A05013-22
04-08-2022
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. CHRISTOPHER JAMES FALBO
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered May 25, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0001032-2019
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
OLSON, J.
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the Commonwealth), appeals from an order at trial entered on May 25, 2021, which precluded the Commonwealth from introducing certain incriminating statements made by the defendant pursuant to the corpus delicti rule. The Commonwealth appealed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) and certified that the order substantially handicapped the prosecution. For the reasons that follow, we are constrained to quash the appeal.
As gleaned from the certified record, the facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. The Commonwealth charged Christopher James Falbo (Falbo) with driving under the influence of alcohol/controlled substance, endangering the welfare of a child, resisting arrest, and two counts of disorderly conduct in conjunction with an incident that occurred at his parents' residence on May 1, 2019. According to the affidavit of probable cause attached to the criminal complaint, Falbo contacted police to request a welfare check on his mother when she did not respond after Falbo knocked repeatedly on the front door of the residence. When police arrived at the residence, Falbo alighted from the driver's side of a silver Mini Cooper automobile that was parked in the driveway of the residence. Police noticed that Falbo was staggering, so they asked Falbo to perform field sobriety tests. When the police determined that Falbo failed portions of the tests, and observed other indicia of intoxication, they advised Falbo that he was under arrest. Falbo allegedly refused verbal commands to enter the police vehicle, screamed profanities, and was eventually subdued after being tased by police. In a search subsequent to arrest, the police discovered car keys in Falbo's pocket. Ultimately, police handcuffed Falbo, placed him in a police car, and transported him to Chambersburg Hospital where Falbo refused to consent to a blood test.
75 P.S. § 3802(d)(2) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4304(a)(1), 5104, 5503(a)(1), 5503(a)(2), respectively.
Falbo's girlfriend was in the passenger's seat. In addition, Falbo's one-year-old son was in the backseat.
On May 25, 2021, a jury trial commenced. The Commonwealth called Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Kyler Hull, one of the arresting officers, as a witness. Trooper Hull testified about arriving on the scene, the field sobriety tests he administered, and Falbo's demeanor and performance on the tests. When Trooper Hull began to testify about statements that Falbo allegedly made to him, defense counsel objected. See N.T., 5/25/2021, at 42. Defense counsel argued that there was a "corpus delicti issue" and that before Falbo's statements to Trooper Hull could be introduced, the Commonwealth was required to prove that a crime was committed. Id. Defense counsel argued that the Commonwealth had not offered evidence that Falbo operated, or was in control of, the vehicle on a roadway or a highway. Id. at 43-46. The trial court determined that before the Commonwealth could admit Falbo's allegedly incriminating statements into evidence, the Commonwealth needed to introduce evidence that Falbo was driving or in actual physical control of the automobile. Id. at 50. The court stated that the Commonwealth had only offered evidence that Falbo "was observed by this officer exiting the driver's side of a Mini Cooper, and that he walked with a staggered gait" and that such evidence "did not meet the prima facie standard" of independently showing a crime was committed before defendant's statements to police could be introduced. Id.; see also id. at 45 (wherein the trial court stated, "Just driving is not a crime. Presumably sitting in your driveway or a driveway is not necessarily a crime. Walking with a staggered gait on private property is not necessarily a crime.").
This Court has explained:
The corpus delecti [sic] rule places the burden on the prosecution to establish that a crime has actually occurred before a confession or admission of the accused connecting him to the crime can be admitted. The corpus delecti [sic] is literally the body of the crime; it consists of proof that a loss or injury has occurred as a result of the criminal conduct of someone. The criminal responsibility of the accused for the loss or injury is not a component of the rule. The historical purpose of the rule is to prevent a conviction based solely upon a confession or admission, where in fact no crime has been committed.
Hence, the Commonwealth is required to corroborate a confession with independent evidence that the circumstances are more consistent with the commission of a crime than an accident. Simply put, the Commonwealth cannot convict a person solely based upon a defendant's confession.In re T.B., 11 A.3d 500, 504-505 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
As such, the trial court gave the Commonwealth the opportunity to offer additional evidence before allowing Falbo's statements to be entered as evidence. Id. at 50-51. The Commonwealth then elicited evidence that the police recovered the keys to the vehicle in question from "Falbo's front pants pocket." Id. at 53. Trooper Hull further testified about Falbo's performance on the field sobriety test administered. Id. at 53-61. Troper Hull also testified about Falbo's refusal to submit to a blood test at Chambersburg Hospital. Id. at 62-65. After admitting the aforementioned additional evidence at trial, the Commonwealth requested a sidebar to again permit the trial court to consider whether Falbo's statements would be admitted. Id. at 65.
Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:
The Court: […] I'm granting the defense motion [to preclude Falbo's statements]. There is no corpus delicti here sufficient on each element. There is certainly a lot of evidence about intoxication, but evidence at this point to establish corpus delicti is not sufficient as to the charge of driving under the influence, I
believe for the admissibility of statements regarding that, I think it's out. I am granting it. I'm granting that motion.
Defense counsel: What we also indicated earlier was that endangering the welfare is based on the DUI charge with a minor. If the corpus delicti isn't established for [DUI], [the Commonwealth has not] established [it] for the endangering the welfare [of a minor charge] either.
The Court: I agree.
***
The Commonwealth: I would ask for a brief recess to determine if the Commonwealth intends to appeal this.N.T., 5/25/2021, at 67-68.
After a recess, in chambers, the trial court reiterated:
The [c]ourt is of the opinion, based upon the facts within the record, [] that Trooper Hull's testimony up until now has been credible. No question as to the credibility [] as to the trooper's testimony so far as to the events that occurred. [] But, even with all that testimony presented by Trooper Hull, that the Commonwealth would not be permitted to admit the statements of the [d]efendant, and that with that there is no establishment of operation or control of the motor vehicle and that the motor vehicle was ever on a public roadway or highway.Id. at 72-73. The Commonwealth responded that, "[b]ased upon the [c]ourt's ruling, the Commonwealth does certify that the [c]ourt's order would terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution [and immediately] filing a notice of appeal" with the trial court's clerk of courts. Id. at 73.
As such, the trial court found:
that with the Commonwealth now asserting that the matter is substantially handicapped that they are filing [n]otice of [a]ppeal to the Superior Court, that this is going to divest this [c]ourt of jurisdiction.
The [c]ourt is now prepared to go on the record and discharge the jury and thank them for their service in this case and now we go forward with the appellate process in this case.Id. at 75. The trial court discharged the jury, telling them that the trial was essentially terminated. Id. at 75-76. This appeal resulted.
The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal with the trial court on May 25, 2021. Because there was no written order filed by the trial court, this Court entered an order directing the trial court to enter on the trial court docket an order of court from the May 25, 2021 proceeding. The trial court complied and entered an order on August 16, 2021, stating:
[] Defendant's motion to prevent the Commonwealth to introduce the statements of [d]efendant to establish that 1.) [d]efendant operated the motor vehicle, and 2.) did so on a traffic way or highway is GRANTED. The Commonwealth cannot introduce [d]efendant's statements to prove those facts given the lack of other evidence to establish the facts in question under the [c]orpus [d]elicti [d]octrine.Trial Court Order, 8/16/2021. On May 26, 2021, the trial court ordered the Commonwealth to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The Commonwealth complied timely. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on July 16, 2021.
On appeal, the Commonwealth presents the following issue for our review:
A. Whether the [trial] court erred when it found the Commonwealth did not meet its burden under corpus delicti and ruled the defendant's statements could not be introduced?Commonwealth's Brief at 4.
Before addressing the Commonwealth's claim, we must examine whether we have jurisdiction to do so. It is well-settled that, "an appeal lies only from a final order, unless permitted by rule or statute." Interest of L.V., 209 A.3d 399, 411 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Generally, a final order is one that disposes of all claims and all parties. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P 311(d), however, "[i]n a criminal case, under circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will substantially handicap the prosecution." Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). Because the operation of Rule 311(d) concerns our jurisdiction, we may address it sua sponte. See Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d 211, 212-213 (Pa. 1985).
Our Supreme Court has determined:
[appellate courts] must, to the extent practicable, construe the Rules of Criminal Procedure in consonance with the rules of statutory construction, which are set forth in the Statutory Construction Act of 1972. The object of all interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the drafters, a task that is best accomplished by considering the plain language of the provision(s) at issue. However, when the words are not explicit, then the court must consider various other indicia of intent, such as the object and necessity of the rule and the mischief meant to be remedied. The rules should be construed to give effect to all their provisions, and a single rule should not be read in a vacuum, especially where there is an apparent interrelationship among rules.Commonwealth v. Far, 46 A.3d 709, 712 (Pa. 2012). In this case, the plain language of Rule 311(d) does not set forth when, or at what stage of the proceedings, the Commonwealth may take an interlocutory appeal as of right. As such, we examine precedent to determine the intent behind the rule.
"[T]he application of Rule 311(d) [] is limited to circumstances in which a pretrial ruling results in the suppression, preclusion or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence." Commonwealth v. Shearer, 882 A.2d 462, 467 (Pa. 2005) (internal citation and quotations omitted; emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Jordan, 125 A.3d 55 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc), appeal denied, 134 A.3d 55 (Pa. 2016) (Pennsylvania law makes clear Rule 311(d) applies when the court actually makes a pretrial ruling to preclude or exclude the Commonwealth's proposed evidence). As our Supreme Court has explained:
The roots of [] Rule [311(d)] are planted in the fundament of constitutional law: the Commonwealth has a never shifting burden to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Constitutional due process requires that the government prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof never shifts but rests with the prosecution throughout. It is the continuing presumption of innocence that is the basis for the requirement that the state has a never-shifting burden to prove guilt of each essential element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
When a pretrial motion removes evidence from the Commonwealth's case, only the prosecutor can judge whether that evidence substantially handicaps his ability to prove every essential element of his case. Additionally, only the prosecutor can judge whether he can meet his constitutional burden of proving his case without that evidence.Commonwealth v. Cosnek, 836 A.2d 871, 874-875 (Pa. 2003) (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).
The Cosnek Court ultimately concluded:
The Commonwealth's ability to take an interlocutory appeal as of right from the suppression or exclusion of its own evidence is rooted in the particular burden which it bears to prove its case. The defense, in contrast, carries a particular privilege to retain control over its own evidence. Both interests are protected when [courts] limit the application of Rule 311(d) to those
circumstances provided by law in which a pretrial ruling results in the suppression, preclusion or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence.Id. at 877 (quotations omitted; emphasis added).
More recently, this Court was called upon to determine whether the Commonwealth could take an immediate "appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) from an order declaring a mistrial after a jury deadlocked[.]" See Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951, 957 (Pa. Super. 2011). Examining our Supreme Court's decisions in Shearer and Cosnek, as cited above, this Court determined "[o]ur Supreme Court has consistently held that [Rule 311(d)] applies to pre-trial rulings that result in the suppression, preclusion, or exclusion of Commonwealth evidence." Andre, 17 A.3d at 956 (emphasis added). We ultimately observed that "Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) has been limited to pre-trial rulings precisely because to hold otherwise would permit the Commonwealth to appeal mid-trial from adverse rulings entered by the trial court that might hamper the prosecution." Id. at 957.
We note that the record does not support a conclusion that the trial court declared a mistrial in this matter. Instead, the record reflects that the trial court concluded the proceedings and dismissed the jury after the Commonwealth declared that it intended (and actually did) file an appeal, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed. Even if a mistrial were declared, as discussed below, our case law would not permit a Commonwealth appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). See Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951, 957 (Pa. Super. 2011).
The challenged ruling in this case was not a pre-trial determination. By the time the trial court issued its ruling barring the admission of Falbo's statements to Trooper Hull, the jury had been sworn, impaneled, and seated. In addition, the Commonwealth had called Trooper Hull as its first witness and began its examination. Jeopardy had attached and the case was no longer in the pre-trial posture. See Commonwealth v. Hallman, 67 A.3d 1256, 1261 (Pa. Super. 2013) ("In a criminal jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn."). The Commonwealth's effort to invoke Rule 311(d) as the basis of appellate jurisdiction over a challenge to an interlocutory order mid-trial is unavailing, as demonstrated by the prior decisions by this Court and our Supreme Court. To hold otherwise would permit the Commonwealth to appeal from adverse evidentiary rulings made at trial. Both this Court and our Supreme Court have determined that Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) does not permit such challenges. As such, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.
Because we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we offer no opinion as to whether or not the trial court properly excluded Falbo's incriminating statements to Trooper Hull under the corpus delicti rule. See Commonwealth v. Lambert, 466, 884 A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. 2005) ("Without jurisdiction, [an appellate court] simply do[es] not have the legal authority to address substantive claims.")
Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.