Opinion
15-P-144
04-15-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. JAMES EDWARDS (and ten companion cases).
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Following an evidentiary hearing, a Boston Municipal Court judge allowed the defendants' motions to suppress. On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that the motion judge erred in finding that the information provided by a confidential informant (CI) to police was insufficient under Aguilar-Spinelli. We reverse.
See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969).
First, the Commonwealth claims the search warrant affidavit established the CI's basis of knowledge based on firsthand observations and subsequent police corroboration. We agree. Here, the CI provided firsthand knowledge, gleaned from personal observations of the defendant James Edwards "handling a black 'semi-automatic' style firearm" in his apartment within seventy- two hours of the search warrant application. See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 134 (2012), quoting from Commonwealth v. Allen, 406 Mass. 575, 578 (1990) ("[F]irst-hand receipt of information through personal observation satisfies the basis of knowledge prong"). Moreover, the CI provided a detailed physical description of Edwards, his address, and the layout of the apartment "consistent with the kind of firsthand knowledge through personal observation that has repeatedly been held to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong." Commonwealth v. Mendes, 463 Mass. 353, 365 (2012). After receiving this information, the police were able to corroborate that Edwards was the individual the CI identified as "Jimmy," that he lived at 47 Topliff Street, apartment 1, Dorchester, and that he was not licensed to possess a firearm. The police further corroborated the CI's information and bolstered his credibility by determining that Edwards had provided his Topliff Street address to police when he reported an armed home invasion in 2011. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 403 Mass. 163, 166 (1988) ("[I]ndependent police corroboration can compensate for deficiencies in either or both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test"). Taken together, the CI demonstrated sufficient firsthand knowledge to satisfy the basis of knowledge requirement. See Commonwealth v. Desper, 419 Mass. 163, 164-165 (1994) (police corroboration of detailed CI report, taken together, satisfied basis of knowledge requirement).
The Commonwealth next argues that the CI's veracity was established, as set forth in the affidavit, by previous instances where the CI furnished accurate information. See Commonwealth v. Perez-Baez, 410 Mass. 43, 45 (1991) (supporting affidavit stating CI had provided accurate information on two prior occasions satisfied veracity test). We agree. The CI's previously provided reliable information, which led to arrests and the seizure of narcotics and firearms, sufficiently established his reliability. See Mendes, 463 Mass. at 364-365.
The Commonwealth's search warrant affidavit stated that the CI had provided "reliable information which has resulted in the arrest of a suspect for drug and firearm related offenses, as well as the recovery of an illegal firearm and various illegal narcotics, including heroin. [The CI] has also provided separate information leading to the recovery of another illegal firearm."
Accordingly, the motion judge's allowance of the defendants' motions to suppress is reversed.
Although the defendants Jesus Gonzalez, Roberto Gonzalez, and Jesor Brown contend that there are additional grounds supporting suppression of contraband found on their persons and in their bedrooms, no evidence was taken during the motions to suppress hearing and, therefore, those issues are not properly before this court.
Order allowing the defendants' motions to suppress reversed.
By the Court (Meade, Wolohojian & Maldonado, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: April 15, 2016.