Opinion
J-S62032-15 No. 552 WDA 2015
01-12-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. JULIAN DAVIS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 16, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012198-2014 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Julian Davis, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Pleas, following his convictions of firearms not to be carried without a license, persons not to possess firearms, altered, forged, or counterfeit documents and plates, driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked, and general lighting requirements—no rear light. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106, 6105(a)(1), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7122(3), 1543(a), and 4303(b), respectively.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them. Procedurally, on October 24, 2014, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with firearms not to be carried without a license, persons not to possess firearms, altered, forged, or counterfeit documents and plates, driving while operating privilege suspended or revoked, general lighting requirements—no rear light, and conspiracy—firearms not to be carried without a license. Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion on January 26, 2015, in which Appellant sought to suppress the firearm recovered from the vehicle during the traffic stop. On March 16, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant's suppression motion, after which the court denied the motion. That same day, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial; the court found Appellant guilty on all counts. Appellant waived the pre-sentence investigation ("PSI") report, and the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of three (3) to six (6) years' imprisonment. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on April 2, 2015. On April 8, 2015, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and Appellant timely complied on May 7, 2015.
The Commonwealth withdrew the conspiracy charge against Appellant on November 6, 2014.
The court's order on April 8, 2015, gave Appellant thirty days to file his Rule 1925(b) concise statement.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT [APPELLANT] DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SEARCH OF HIS AUTOMOBILE WHERE HE WAS CHARGED WITH A POSSESSORY OFFENSE, WAS
OPERATING THE VEHICLE, AND PROVIDED A SALES AGREEMENT TO POLICE UPON REQUEST?(Appellant's Brief at 4).
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED [APPELLANT'S] SUPPRESSION MOTION WHERE HE WAS RESTRAINED AND UNABLE TO ACCESS THE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT OF THE VEHICLE AND THE PRIMARY PURPOSES OF THE OFFICERS' SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE WAS INVESTIGATORY IN NATURE?
Our standard of review of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence is as follows:
An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where...the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on the appeal court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.Commonwealth v. Jones , 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa.Super. 2015) (internal citation omitted).
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section [8] of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee individuals freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures." Commonwealth v. El , 933 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa.Super. 2007). "The concept of standing in a criminal search and seizure context empowers a defendant to assert a constitutional violation and thus seek to exclude or suppress the government's evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rules under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution." Commonwealth v. Bostick , 958 A.2d 543, 550-51 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 604 Pa. 702, 987 A.2d 158 (2009). "A defendant moving to suppress evidence has the preliminary burden of establishing standing and a legitimate expectation of privacy." Commonwealth v. Maldonado , 14 A.3d 907, 910 (Pa.Super. 2011). Importantly,
The traditional formulation for standing requires a defendant to demonstrate one of the following personal interests: (1) his presence on the premise at the time of the search and seizure; (2) a possessory interest in the evidence improperly seized; (3) that the offense charged includes as an essential element of the prosecution's case, the element of possession at the time of the contested search and seizure; or (4) a proprietary or possessory interest in the searched premises.Bostick , supra at 551 (internal citation omitted). "[G]enerally under Pennsylvania law, a defendant charged with a possessory offense has automatic standing to challenge a search." Maldonado , supra at 910.
To prevail on a suppression motion, however, the defendant must show as a preliminary matter that he had a privacy interest in the area searched. Id. at 910-11. In the context of the search of an automobile, where the defendant produces no evidence that he owns the vehicle, has permission from the owner to use the vehicle, or any other connection to the vehicle, the defendant fails to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle searched. Commonwealth v. Millner , 585 Pa. 237, 888 A.2d 680 (2005). When a defendant fails to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, "there [is] no need for the Commonwealth to establish the lawfulness of the police entry into the [area] and the seizure of the [item in question]...." Id. at 258, 888 A.2d 692. The court need not address a defendant's claim that the police engaged in unlawful conduct, if the evidence establishes the defendant has no privacy interest. Commonwealth v. Enimpah , ___ Pa. ___, 106 A.3d 695, 702 (2014). See also Commonwealth v. Peterson , 535 Pa. 492, 636 A.2d 615 (1993) (holding when defendant lacks reasonable expectation of privacy in area searched, he has no right to challenge search, and court need not address defendant's claim that police conduct was unlawful).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Joseph K. Williams, III, we conclude Appellant's first issue on appeal merits no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed June 1, 2015, at 3) (finding: Appellant failed to make necessary showing that he had reasonable expectation of privacy in vehicle searched; vehicle was not registered in Appellant's name, and Appellant presented no evidence at suppression hearing that he owned vehicle; Appellant failed to introduced into evidence at suppression hearing sales agreement Appellant allegedly gave to police officers when vehicle was stopped; even though there was mention of sales agreement at suppression hearing, court was unable to know what information that document provided because sales agreement was not introduced; further, Appellant presented no evidence at suppression hearing that Appellant had permission from owner to use vehicle; Appellant failed to establish he had reasonable expectation of privacy in vehicle because Appellant did not show any personal connection to vehicle; thus, Appellant cannot challenge manner in which firearm was recovered from vehicle). The record supports the court's sound reasoning. See Millner , supra.
Additionally, the sales agreement Appellant allegedly gave to the police at the time of the traffic stop is not contained in the certified record. Further, Appellant made no attempt at the suppression hearing to explain the content of the sales agreement. Because Appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, we need not address Appellant's second issue, in which he complains the police engaged in unlawful conduct when they searched the vehicle. See Enimpah , supra; Peterson , supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/12/2016
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