Opinion
18-P-1087
04-29-2020
COMMONWEALTH v. Robert CROWLEY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Robert Crowley, appeals from an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on the misconduct of Annie Dookhan at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton Laboratory). He claims that the motion judge, who was not the plea judge, abused her discretion in denying the motion because she failed to apply the holding of Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465 (2015) (Bridgeman I ), and declined to issue findings and rulings. We affirm.
A full discussion of the misconduct at issue is set forth in Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 337-342 (2014). We need not repeat the details here.
The defendant's appeal from the order denying his motion for findings and rulings has been consolidated with this appeal. Additionally, a motion to stay was granted pending a decision in Commonwealth v. Camacho, 483 Mass. 645 (2019) ; that decision issued December 10, 2019.
On April 19, 2012, the defendant pleaded guilty to a number of drug charges that had been reduced as part of a plea agreement (2012 plea). In June 2013, he filed, among other things, a motion to vacate the plea based on the misconduct of Dookhan. On February 26, 2014, with the assent of the Commonwealth, the plea judge allowed the defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea. The defendant then pleaded guilty to a single count of unlawful distribution of a class A controlled substance (2014 plea). Three other charges were dismissed.
The indictments stemmed from an undercover investigation during which more than ninety grams of heroin and more than eighty grams of cocaine were seized.
As part of the 2014 plea, the defendant, with the advice of counsel, signed and executed two forms pertaining to the waiver of his rights. One was titled "waiver of defendant's rights," and the other was titled "waiver of defendant's rights pursuant to plea agreement." This second form, which the defendant signed and initialed, included a provision where the defendant waived his "right to file a motion to vacate [the] guilty plea based on information that may come to light in the future about the [Hinton] laboratory," as well as his right to otherwise appeal or vacate the 2014 plea. On the first form, the defendant verified that the waiver of his rights was not the result of force or threats.
On March 14, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his 2014 plea, contending that the plea was not voluntary. He asserts that he was coerced to plead guilty and threatened by the prosecutor with the prospect of facing enhanced charges and a higher sentence if he insisted on going to trial after the guilty plea was vacated. Additionally, the defendant contended that Bridgeman I, which was decided fifteen months after the 2014 plea, should apply notwithstanding that the terms of the 2014 plea were more favorable to him than the 2012 plea. The motion was denied, and this appeal followed.
In pertinent part, the Supreme Judicial Court held that in cases where a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea as a result of Dookhan's misconduct and the motion is allowed, the defendant "cannot be given a more severe sentence than that which originally was imposed." Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 477.
We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only to "determine whether there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 476 Mass. 1, 5 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 47 (2015). A judge has the discretion to allow a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "only ‘if it appears that justice may not have been done.’ " Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 387 Mass. 481, 482 (1982), quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 378 Mass. 900 (1979). "[T]he motion judge must make ‘such findings of fact as are necessary to resolve the defendant's allegations of error of law.’ " Commonwealth v. Henry, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 446, 451 (2015), quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).
Here, the record belies the defendant's contentions. He signed two waiver of rights forms in connection with the 2014 plea and received a far more favorable deal. The defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the plea colloquy. Instead, he argues that Bridgeman I requires vacatur because the Commonwealth threatened him with a more severe penalty if he chose to go to trial. In support of his claim, the defendant submitted affidavits from himself and plea counsel. To the extent that the defendant argues that the purported threats made the plea involuntary, the motion judge was free to assign the weight, credibility, and impact of the assertions regarding the plea negotiations, even where undisputed, Commonwealth v. Grace, 370 Mass. 746, 752 (1976), and find that the plea was "free from coercion, duress, or improper inducements." Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 345 (2014).
Both forms indicate that his guilty plea "is not the result of force, threats, assurance[s] or promises." And the Hinton Laboratory specific waiver of rights form states that "I am also waiving, after discussion with my lawyer, the right to file a motion to vacate this guilty plea based on information that may come to light in the future about the state laboratory," and "I am giving up and waiving ... the right to seek to vacate this guilty plea, and also the right to appeal from a conviction after trial."
Among other things, plea counsel's affidavit described the defendant's "desperat[ion] to get out" of prison, the advice he gave the defendant based on the law at the time, and that he would have advised the defendant of the holding of Bridgeman I had it "existed at the time of" the 2014 plea. The defendant's affidavit set forth his understanding that the offer that resulted in the 2014 plea included an agreement from the Commonwealth to file a nolle prosequi on ten of the eleven indictments, and that the sentence would be reduced resulting in the defendant's release in "a few months beyond the time served." The defendant explained his family situation and his goal to be released short of the additional seven years of incarceration that he believed he faced. The defendant averred that he accepted the plea agreement because he "feared retaliatory sentencing and juror trust in prosecutors."
The defendant's claim that he was entitled to the relief provided in Bridgeman I fairs no better. The terms of the 2014 plea did not violate the rules announced in Bridgeman I, as the plea resulted in a single conviction with a shorter period of incarceration than originally imposed. Commonwealth v. Camacho, 483 Mass. 645, 646 (2019). "Where ... a defendant negotiated his ... second plea agreement in the shadow of the original charges, but ultimately was not convicted of more severe charges and did not receive a harsher punishment, the defendant is not entitled to withdraw the second guilty plea on the basis of ... Bridgeman." Camacho, supra. Thus, on this record, the denial of the defendant's motion was not "an abuse of discretion that produce[d] a manifestly unjust result." Commonwealth v. Pingaro, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 48 (1997).
With the assent of the Commonwealth, ten convictions carrying ten concurrent sentences of three- to five years in State prison were vacated. The 2014 plea resulted in a sentence of one and one-half years to two and one-half years in State prison, with credit for 777 days already served.
--------
Finally, with respect to the defendant's request for findings and rulings, the record supports the motion judge's conclusion, and the lack of findings is not fatal. See Commonwealth v. Preston, 393 Mass. 318, 322 n.4 (1984) ; Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 392 Mass. 583, 586 n.2 (1984). There was no error.
Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.
Order denying motion for findings and rulings affirmed.