Opinion
20-P-1089
06-23-2021
COMMONWEALTH v. James P. COLOSI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Convicted of negligent operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a ), the defendant appeals, arguing that the judge should have allowed his motion for a required finding of not guilty because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle. We affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), the evidence at trial established the following facts. At approximately 1:00 P.M. on July 8, 2018, the victim was driving on Peabody Street, a paved, two-lane residential road in Middleton, when a red utility truck (truck) traveling in the opposite direction crossed into his lane. The truck struck the rear driver's side of the victim's vehicle, causing it to roll over and land upside down in the middle of the road. After crawling out of his vehicle, the victim saw "the other driver" and the truck in the woods on the side of the road. The victim and "the other driver" asked each other if they were "okay" and then returned to their vehicles.
Middleton police Sergeant Ronald Carpenter arrived and saw the defendant sitting on a rock "beyond the truck." The defendant told Sergeant Carpenter that he "didn't remember much ... just got involved ... got in an accident and ... couldn't remember." Because the defendant had slurred, slow speech, Sergeant Carpenter asked him to take field sobriety tests. The defendant passed the "walk and turn" test and the "one-legged stand" test but failed the "alphabet test" after two attempts.
The standard for reviewing the denial of the defendant's motion for a required finding is "whether the Commonwealth produced enough evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, to satisfy any rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that each element of the crime was present." Commonwealth v. Hilton, 398 Mass. 63, 64 (1986). Here, the Commonwealth was required to "prove that the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) upon a public way, (3) (recklessly or) negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered." Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 921 (2004). The defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence of the second and third elements, and so we focus our discussion on whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the first element, that he operated a motor vehicle.
"To survive a motion for a required finding, it is not essential that the inferences drawn are necessary inferences. It is enough that from the evidence presented a [fact finder] could, within reason and without speculation, draw them." Commonwealth v. Beltrandi, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 196, 198 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 255, 257 (1999). "This principle is no less true in a case like this in which proof of an essential element of the offense (operation) rests entirely on circumstantial evidence." Beltrandi, supra. "That an item of evidence reasonably supporting operation may not be compelling does not render it fatally ambiguous or unduly speculative, especially when considered with other equally reasonable inferences tending to the same conclusion." Commonwealth v. Manning, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 22 (1996).
Here, the relevant circumstantial evidence permitted an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the operator of the truck. The victim testified that he spoke to "the other driver" and then both parties returned to their respective vehicles, after which the police arrived and found the defendant sitting near the truck. Sergeant Carpenter testified that the accident took place in a residential area surrounded by woods and that the defendant was the only person in the general area of the truck other than police officers. See Commonwealth v. Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (2006), citing Commonwealth v. Cromwell, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 436, 439 (2002) (circumstantial evidence of defendant's operation included lack of evidence "tending to indicate that someone other than the defendant was operating the car"); Commonwealth v. Congdon, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 782, 783 (2007) ("no evidence that anyone but [the defendant] was in the vicinity"). The defendant told the police that he had been in an accident and then submitted to a series of field sobriety tests. See Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 420 Mass. 630, 632 (1995) ("finder of fact could infer operation from the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident and from the defendant's cooperation with field sobriety tests"); Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 52 (circumstantial evidence of defendant's operation included compliance with field sobriety tests). See also Congdon, supra at 783-784 (defendant's "behavior was entirely consistent with her having been the operator"). "[W]here, as in this case, an inference that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle is both possible and reasonable, our responsibility to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth requires that the [fact finder] be permitted to ‘determine where the truth lies.’ " Beltrandi, 89 Mass. App. Ct. at 202, quoting Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 401 (2003). Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty was properly denied.
Judgment affirmed.