Opinion
No. 1437 MDA 2006.
Filed: August 8, 2007.
Appeal from the Order Entered July 11, 2006, Court of Common Pleas, Centre County, Criminal Division at No. CP-14-CR-0000635-2006.
BEFORE: HUDOCK, KELLY, and JOHNSON, JJ.
¶ 1 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the Commonwealth) appeals from the trial court's order granting Christopher M. Collins's pre-trial suppression motion. The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in finding that the officer did not have the requisite suspicion necessary to approach an already parked vehicle and question the occupants. The Commonwealth argues that since the car was already stopped when the officer came upon it, the officer's ensuing questioning was a mere encounter and did not require any level of suspicion prior to the questioning. After study, we find no merit in the Commonwealth's argument. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.
¶ 2 The trial court set forth the relevant underlying facts:
On the evening of February 13, 2006, Trooper Joshua Walton of the Pennsylvania State Police was on routine patrol, in full uniform and in a marked patrol unit, traveling southbound on State Route 150 in Howard Township, Centre County, Pennsylvania. At approximately 7:00 p.m., he noticed a vehicle parked at the Bald Eagle Overlook off of State Route 150. This is an area specifically designed for use by people who wish to park and enjoy the scenic overlook. The vehicle was parked legally and did not appear to be in distress. However, Trooper Walton felt it was unusual for a car to be parked at the overlook after dark, and he decided to stop and check its status. He turned his patrol car around and pulled off the highway and onto the overlook, stopping about 20 feet to the right of the parked vehicle. The headlights of the patrol car shined in the passenger compartment of the parked vehicle. Trooper Walton turned on his [flashlight] and observed three males in the vehicle. He exited his patrol car and walked over to the front passenger-side window, flashlight in hand. The front passenger, [Collins], rolled down his window. Trooper Walton shined his flashlight in the car and asked whether everything was alright. The driver said they were "smoking pot." Trooper Walton also smelled marijuana and saw a bong between the seats. [Collins] claimed possession of the bong.
Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 8/29/06, at 1-2. The Commonwealth charged Collins by summons with Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. On June 6, 2006, Collins filed a pre-trial suppression motion arguing the seizure of the bong was illegal. The Honorable Bradley P. Lunsford agreed, finding Trooper Walton's interaction with Collins was an investigative detention that was not supported by any reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or criminal activity. By an order dated July 11, 2006, the trial court suppressed the evidence.
¶ 3 The Commonwealth now appeals, raising a single issue for our review:
I. DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE THE REQUISITE SUSPICION NECESSARY TO APPROACH APPELLEE'S VEHICLE AND ASK TO SPEAK TO THE OCCUPANTS?
Brief for Appellant at 4.
¶ 4 When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, our Court's standard of review is as follows:
[W]e consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. We must first ascertain whether the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court, and then determine the reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn therefrom. The suppression court's factual findings are binding on us and we may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Tucker, 883 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, since Collins did not present any witnesses during the suppression hearing, we consider only the Commonwealth's evidence, Trooper Walton's testimony.
¶ 5 The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred when it found that Trooper Walton's initial approach to the vehicle constituted an investigative detention not supported by reasonable suspicion. Brief for Appellant at 9. The Commonwealth argues that this was not an investigative detention but "a mere encounter which requires no level of suspicion at all." Brief for Appellant at 9.
¶ 6 Initially, we note that "[b]oth the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures." Commonwealth v. Plante, 914 A.2d 916, 921 (Pa.Super. 2006). "To secure the right of citizens to be free from such intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens as those interactions become more intrusive." Commonwealth v. Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa.Super. 2000). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has identified three forms of interaction between police officers and citizens: a mere encounter, an investigative detention, and a custodial detention. See Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987 (Pa. 2006).
¶ 7 "A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry by the officer of a citizen." Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). "The hallmark of this interaction is that it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond." Id. (citation omitted). To the contrary, "[a]n investigative detention, unlike a mere encounter, constitutes a seizure of a person and thus activates the protections of Article [I], Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution." Id. An investigative detention, which derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny, carries with it "an official compulsion to stop and respond." Plante, 914 A.2d at 921. "This type of detention is temporary, unless it results in the officer's formation of probable cause for arrest, does not possess the coercive conditions present with a formal arrest, and requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity." Id. "To determine if an interaction rises to the level of an investigative detention, i.e., a Terry stop, the court must examine all the circumstances and determine whether police action would have made a reasonable person believe he was not free to go and was subject to the officer's orders." Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Pa.Super. 2003).
¶ 8 Here, the Commonwealth contends that Trooper Walton's interaction with the occupants of the vehicle was a mere encounter and did not need to be supported by any suspicion because he was merely attempting to determine whether the passengers of the vehicle needed assistance. Brief for Appellant at 9-10. The Commonwealth points to the fact that Trooper Walton parked approximately twenty feet to the right of the vehicle in which Collins was a passenger, used only his own vehicle's headlights and his flashlight to illuminate the vehicle, and asked the occupants of the vehicle if they were okay. Brief for Appellant at 9-10. The Commonwealth relies exclusively on Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556 (Pa.Super. 2004), to demonstrate that Trooper Walton's stop and subsequent questioning was a mere encounter and not an investigative detention.
¶ 9 In Johonoson, a police officer noticed the defendant driving his vehicle on a rural road at approximately 3:00 a.m. at a speed substantially slower than the posted speed limit with his hazard lights flashing. See id. at 558-59. The defendant then pulled his vehicle, which had been previously damaged in an accident, off to the side of the road without any prompting by the officer. See id. at 559. The officer pulled in behind the defendant, activated his overhead lights and noticed severe damage to both sides of the defendant's vehicle. See id. After the officer alighted from his vehicle and came face-to-face with the defendant, he "immediately noticed indicia of intoxication: a strong odor of alcohol on [defendant's] breath and within the vehicle; glassy, bloodshot eyes; and labored speech." Id. The officer arrested the defendant after he failed a field sobriety test. See id. The defendant filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the roadside stop was an investigative detention which was not supported by reasonable suspicion. See id. The trial court denied the motion because it was untimely. See id. The defendant was subsequently convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. See id. at 560. On appeal, our Court also found the defendant's pretrial motion was untimely. See id. at 561. However, in dicta, our Court reached the merits of the motion and found that the initial stop was a mere encounter as the officer did not seize the defendant when he turned on the overhead lights. See id. The Court reasoned that where a driver reasonably believes an officer may attempt to render aid, such as when the car is disabled, the lights would signify official assistance and would come as a relief to the driver. See id. at 562. The Court found that the encounter did not become an investigative detention until the officer and the defendant met "face to face." Id. at 563.
¶ 10 Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances found in the case at bar, we find the Commonwealth's reliance on Johonoson to be misplaced as Trooper Walton admitted that he observed nothing to indicate that the vehicle in which Collins was an occupant required assistance. See Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 7/11/06, at 10-11. Indeed, subsequent case law has limited the holding in Johonoson to cases where the occupants of a vehicle would reasonably expect an officer to render assistance. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 874 A.2d 1214, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2005) (distinguishing Johonoson in finding officer, who stopped behind a fully functional pickup truck and activated his overhead lights, initiated an investigative detention where the driver of a stationary vehicle had no reason to believe that a police officer would stop to render aid); see also Commonwealth v. Krisko, 884 A.2d 296, 300 (Pa.Super. 2005) (finding the reasoning of Johonoson did not apply and the stop was not a mere encounter where police stopped a vehicle because of the driver's hazardous driving and not as part of an assistance effort).
¶ 11 We find this case to be controlled by Commonwealth v. Mulholland, 794 A.2d 398 (Pa.Super. 2002). In Mulholland, the police officer noticed a van parked in a lighted parking lot with its running lights on. See id. at 399. The officer did not observe any violation of the Motor Vehicle Code or any criminal activity. See id. Deciding to check on the van, the officer parked his cruiser in front of the van, thereby blocking its means of leaving the lot. See id. Before exiting the cruiser, the officer turned on the vehicle's alley lights so that they shined in the direction of the van. See id. The officer approached the van on foot and asked the driver if everything was alright. See id. While speaking to the driver, the officer noticed the odor of burnt marijuana. See id. The driver admitted to smoking marijuana but there were no outward signs that the driver was impaired or had recently used it. See id. A subsequent search of the driver's person revealed a pill bottle which was later found to contain cocaine. See id. at 400. The driver filed a motion to suppress which the trial court granted based upon the finding that the officer's interaction with the driver was an investigative detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion of any wrongdoing. See id. Our Court affirmed, finding that the fact that the officer was in full uniform and in a marked police car, the stop took place in a parking lot, there was no indication of a traffic violation or criminal activity, the cruiser was parked so as to make it difficult for the driver to leave, and the officer shined his alley lights at the van demonstrated that the driver's interaction with the police was an investigative detention. See id. at 401-02.
¶ 12 Similarly, in the case at bar, we conclude that the testimony presented at the suppression hearing supports the trial court's finding that Trooper Walton's interaction with the occupants of the vehicle was, from its inception, an investigative detention which was not supported by reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity or traffic violations. See Commonwealth v. DeHart, 745 A.2d 633, 638 (Pa.Super. 2000) (stating a police officer does not need to officially stop a vehicle to effectuate an investigative detention). Unlike the driver in Johonoson, who was driving his previously damaged vehicle at a low speed at 3:00 a.m. on a rural road with his hazard lights activated, here, the vehicle in question was merely parked at an overlook designed for use by people to enjoy the scenery. N.T., 7/11/06, at 4. The vehicle was not parked illegally or on a roadway. N.T., 7/11/06, at 10. Further, the vehicle was not damaged or in disrepair. N.T., 7/11/06, at 10-11. The trooper stated that he had no information that there was any illegal activity occurring in the vehicle at the time he stopped. N.T., 7/11/06, at 11. Trooper Walton, seeking to investigate, parked his police cruiser to the right of the vehicle in question. N.T., 7/11/06, at 4. Trooper Walton positioned the cruiser perpendicular to the vehicle so that his headlights shined directly into the passenger compartment of the vehicle. N.T., 7/11/06, at 5. The vehicle would have had to back out of its parking spot to leave the overlook and avoid Trooper Walton. N.T., 7/11/06, at 15. Thereafter, Trooper Walton alighted from the cruiser, leaving the headlights on, and approached the passenger side window with his flashlight to aid in further illuminating the interior of the vehicle. N.T., 7/11/06, at 5-6. Upon reaching the passenger window, Trooper Walton asked the occupants of the vehicle if everything was okay to which the driver of the vehicle stated that they were smoking marijuana. N.T., 7/11/06, at 12. Trooper Walton also stated that he smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle but did not indicate whether this was before or after the questioning. N.T., 7/11/06, at 6.
¶ 13 Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to drive away or refuse to answer the trooper's questions. Trooper Walton had not witnessed any violation of the Motor Vehicle Code or any criminal activity. There was no evidence to suggest that the passengers in the vehicle would have expected a police officer to render aid as the vehicle was legally parked and not disabled. Moreover, while the police cruiser did not block the vehicle's path as in Mulholland, the positioning of the marked cruiser perpendicular to the vehicle so that its headlights were aimed directly into the passenger compartment would make it difficult for a reasonable driver to believe he was free to terminate the encounter and drive away. Finally, when the trooper, in full uniform, alighted from his marked vehicle, as its headlights continued to illuminate the passenger compartment, and walked toward a vehicle that was legally parked, not disabled and had otherwise broken no laws, and asked if everything is okay, a reasonable occupant of the vehicle would not believe they were free to leave. See Mulholland, 794 A.2d at 401-02; DeHart, 745 A.2d at 637-38 (finding reasonable person would not feel free to decline an officer's questions or terminate the encounter where state troopers, in a police cruiser, pulled up to a vehicle which was stopped of its own accord, asked the occupants of the vehicle "what's going on here" from the cruiser, then alighted from the cruiser and approached the vehicle); see also Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 608 A.2d 1030, 1032-34 (Pa. 1992) (finding an unlawful investigative detention occurred where troopers stopped a car after observing the vehicle parked at night partially on a berm of a road and partially in a church parking lot and observing furtive movements by the occupants of the vehicle because the troopers lacked evidence that a parking violation occurred, that the vehicle was disabled, or that criminal activity was afoot).
¶ 14 As such, Trooper Walton's encounter with Collins was an investigative detention to which the trooper would need reasonable suspicion of a crime or traffic violation to justify his interaction with Collins. As Trooper Walton did not articulate any reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop, a fact the Commonwealth does not dispute, we conclude that the trial court properly suppressed the drug paraphernalia.
¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order.
¶ 16 Order AFFIRMED.
¶ 17 HUDOCK, J. files a Dissenting Opinion.
¶ 1 I must respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority that the initial interaction between the State Trooper and Appellee, which is at issue in this case, rose to the level of an investigative detention. Rather, I conclude that the investigating police officer initiated a "mere encounter" with Appellee.
¶ 2 The quoted factual findings of the trial court do not indicate that the State Trooper activated his overhead lights or that he used his police siren at any time. Appellee's vehicle was parked when the Trooper observed it. The Trooper did not stop Appellee's car nor did he place his own vehicle in a position to prevent Appellee from leaving. The trial court found that the State Trooper parked his car twenty feet to the right of Appellee's vehicle, and that Appellee was not blocked in, but could have backed out of his parking spot and driven away. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/29/06, at 2, 7. Moreover, the record is clear that the Trooper did not approach Appellee's vehicle because he suspected that criminal activity was afoot. Rather, the Trooper observed a vehicle parked in an unusual location under odd circumstances: i.e., Appellee's car was parked at a scenic overlook in the Bald Eagle State Park, after dark, and in the middle of the winter (February 13, 2006). It would have been irresponsible for the State Trooper to observe the presence of a vehicle in that anomalous position and not stop to inquire whether the vehicle was experiencing a mechanical difficulty or whether some other problem existed. The Trooper did not inquire "what's going on here" or even "what are you doing?" He merely asked whether everything was "okay," a legitimate question under the circumstances. N.T., 7/11/06, at 12. Appellee's response that he was "smoking pot" was a non sequitur reply to the Trooper's query.
¶ 3 In Commonwealth v. Plante, 914 A.2d 916 (Pa.Super. 2006), a police officer observed a car parked in an odd location at an unusual time and went to investigate why the vehicle was there. Initially, the police officer merely asked what the men associated with the vehicle were doing in that location at that time. They explained that they had stopped to urinate, and the officer told them to leave. We found that this level of investigation was a "mere encounter" and that it did not require reasonable suspicion or probable cause because the officer was merely ascertaining if anything was "wrong" and was not investigating a suspected crime. (The officer stopped the men later on, but that was deemed to be a second encounter and was analyzed under different standards.)
¶ 4 I conclude that the circumstances of the present case are similar to those at issue in the first police contact in Plante and that the State Trooper in this case initiated a "mere encounter" with Appellee for the purpose of ascertaining whether a problem existed. I cannot agree that the Trooper conducted an investigative detention. Thus, I would reverse the trial court's order granting suppression and would remand the case for trial.