Opinion
No. 1962 C.D. 2013
07-17-2014
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Craig Campbell, Appellant
OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION
Craig Campbell appeals pro se from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County that dismissed his summary appeal and entered judgment against him in the amount of $100, plus costs. We affirm.
Common pleas' opinion, in its entirety, can be found in the Reproduced Record (R.R.) at pages 91-94a (page two of the opinion is missing from the appendix to Campbell's brief).
In May 2013, the code enforcement officer for the Borough of Wilkinsburg (Borough) instituted a private criminal complaint against Campbell alleging four violations of the Borough's Ordinance at Chapter 210, Article I, Sections 210-1 - 210-5, pertaining to tenant registration obligations for property owners. A magisterial district judge found Campbell guilty of the violations and he appealed the conviction to common pleas. Following an October 2013 de novo trial, common pleas dismissed Campbell's summary appeal. Campbell's timely appeal to this Court followed.
Section 210-1 sets forth the requirement for tenant registration and the $10 per-unit registration fee. Section 210-2 requires notification to the Borough of a change in tenancy and Section 210-3 sets forth the required notification information. Section 201-4 sets forth a notification time limit and Section 210-5 is the violations and penalties provision. Commonwealth Exhibit 1; R.R. at 96-98a.
Campbell raises a plethora of issues on appeal. To the extent that we can interpret them and that he has preserved them, we will address them. We turn first to Campbell's assertions that common pleas' conduct of the de novo hearing compromised his constitutional rights and his defense of the action.
Once a defendant has appealed a summary conviction, "the case shall be heard de novo by the judge of the court of common pleas sitting without a jury." Pa. R. Crim. P. 462. At the trial de novo, the judge must determine facts and enter a verdict. Commonwealth v. Toner, 663 A.2d 202, 204 (Pa. Super. 1995). In the course of "adjudicating the appellant's culpability," id. at 205, the judge ensures that the trial flows in an orderly manner so as to afford the litigants their day in court. Specifically, the judge is required to advance the proceedings: 1) to permit the orderly presentation of evidence, with the attendant opportunities for cross examination; and 2) to afford the litigants the opportunity to present legal arguments, based on the evidence presented. During the trial, the judge may be required to rule on motions and objections and, generally, to determine the admissibility of evidence. In summary, the judge guides the litigants, be they attorneys or pro se defendants, along a well-established path designed to elicit the necessary facts in order to render a verdict. In the present case, there is no indication that the judge did not afford Campbell a fair day in court.
At the trial, the judge addressed Campbell's concerns regarding the manner in which the judge was requiring him to question witnesses and to present evidence. For example, the judge explained to Campbell why he was refusing to permit Campbell to persist in soliciting legal conclusions from the Borough's code enforcement officer on cross examination. October 22, 2013 Trial, Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 10-12, 16. In addition, the judge explained to Campbell why he did not want Campbell to read the ordinance provisions into the record after the judge had already admitted the Ordinance into evidence. Id. at 19; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 49a. Regarding Campbell's concern that he was intimidated by the sheriff in the courtroom, it was within the clear purview of the judge to maintain order in the courtroom and to ensure the security of all of the participants. From the transcript, it is clear that the sheriff became more attentive only after Campbell persisted in pursuing a course contrary to the judge's rulings. Id. at 19-20; R.R. at 49-50a. As for the judge's denial of Campbell's pre-trial motion for discovery, we note that pre-trial discovery procedures are not applicable to summary appeals. Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 960 (Pa. Super. 2002). As the judge summarized, Campbell's "complaints about several aspects of the conduct of the hearing ... stem[med] from his misunderstanding of orderly trial procedures." Common Pleas' Opinion at 2-3; R.R. at 92-93a. Accordingly, we reject Campbell's arguments that the judge's conduct of the hearing or rulings deprived Campbell of any rights or compromised his defense.
We have not included reproduced record page number references for certain portions of the transcript in that some pages have been omitted from the reproduced record.
Turning next to Campbell's arguments concerning the constitutionality of the tenant registration requirement, we note that he has preserved only a very general argument that the Borough's provisions are unconstitutional. In briefly addressing his arguments, we are mindful that ordinances are presumed to be constitutional and that a heavy burden is placed on one who challenges them on constitutional grounds. Crews v. City of Chester, 35 A.3d 1267, 1270 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
In paragraph four of his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, Campbell asserted as follows: "4. The court deferred and Wilkinsburg counsel ... conferred to [sic] ALL Constitutional challenges to appeal to Commonwealth Court. This is in the transcript [at] page 12[,] line[s] 10-18." Concise State of Errors Complained of on Appeal at 2; R.R. at 84a. On page twelve, which was omitted from the reproduced record, the judge paraphrased Campbell's constitutional argument as follows: "You're saying that they cannot institute or create an ordinance to collect these fees." N.T. at 12. --------
Section 210-1 of the Ordinance, the principal provision at issue, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[E]very person owning property within the Borough of Wilkinsburg which is rented, in whole or in part, for residential or commercial purposes, shall certify to the Borough, on forms which may be obtained in the Borough Office, the name, mailing address and telephone number of the owner and all tenants occupying the rental property. . . . [T]he annual certification shall be accompanied by a filing fee of $10 per unit (whether occupied or not).R.R. at 96a.
Addressing Campbell's argument that the tenant registration fee constitutes an illegal revenue-generating tax, common pleas concluded that the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the Borough's police power in that it used the names and addresses to provide effective emergency medical and safety services. In addition, common pleas found that the $10 fee was directly related to the cost incurred by the Borough to update its records. As Campbell argues, however, the judge improperly relied on Borough counsel's statements at trial as evidence for these determinations. Counsel for the Borough was at the hearing as an attorney representing his client and not as a witness. Notwithstanding the judge's improper reliance on counsel's statements, there is support in the record for the judge's determination that the tenant registration fee at issue is not an illegal revenue-generating tax.
At trial, Campbell paraphrased the code enforcement officer's testimony regarding the purpose of the tenant registration provisions: "She stated that the registration fee was for their keeping track of tenants." October 22, 2013 Trial, N.T. at 20; R.R. at 50a. While it is true that the code enforcement officer testified that she did not know what happened to the fees after collection, she did testify as to what the Borough does with the information collected. Her testimony was as follows:
Once we receive the application we enter it into our permit system, and from there it's given over to our finance department, and I can't speak for what they do once it's been processed. But we have a data base of all the papers and forms that we've received up until this date.Id. at 17-18; R.R. at 45-46a.
Moreover, after the code enforcement officer professed ignorance as to what the Borough does with the fees, Campbell then had an opportunity to ask that question of the Borough's director of code enforcement, who also testified. When afforded the opportunity, Campbell did not ask the director how the Borough applied the fees, instead asking him whether the law applied to all property owners within the Borough. It was Campbell's burden to establish that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, Crews, and that the license fee was unreasonable, Stark v. Commonwealth, 494 A.2d 44, 45 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). This Court has held that a valid license fee, where the amount collected is commensurate with the expense of administering the license, is constitutional. Thompson v. City of Altoona Code Appeals Bd., 934 A.2d 130, 133 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) ($40 annual residential rental unit licensing fee not impermissible and unconstitutional tax); Simpson v. City of New Castle, 740 A.2d 287, 292 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (biennial permit fee of $30 imposed by ordinance requiring landlords to register and obtain permits for residential rental properties not an improper revenue-raising tax). Mindful that, "[m]unicipalities are afforded reasonable latitude in fixing license fees to cover the cost of enforcement, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the reasonableness of the fee[,]" Stark, 494 A.2d at 45, we conclude that the judge did not err in determining that the fee was reasonable and did not constitute an illegal revenue-generating tax.
Campbell next argues that the Ordinance denies him equal protection under the law because the Borough does not require owners of owner-occupied properties to comply with the tenant registration requirement. In McSwain v. Commonwealth, 520 A.2d 527, 531 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), we rejected the appellant's argument that the ordinance's distinction between rental property and owner-occupied property constituted an equal protection violation. In addition, we note that the tenant registration provision at issue applies to "every person owning property within the Borough of Wilkinsburg which is rented, in whole or in part, for residential or commercial purposes . . . ." Section 210-1 of the Ordinance; R.R. at 96a. The Borough's director of code enforcement emphasized the applicability of the tenant registration provision, testifying as follows: "It is a borough ordinance, and it is enacted upon all property owners that fall into that criteria of rental property." October 22, 2013 Hearing, N.T. at 38; R.R. at 67a. Accordingly, we reject Campbell's equal protection argument.
Finally, Campbell's argument that the Ordinance improperly deprives him and his tenants of their right to privacy is similarly without merit. In Berwick Area Landlord Association v. Borough of Berwick, 48 A.3d 524, 538 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), we stated that, where the stated purpose of an ordinance is to promote the general welfare of its citizens and the legislative body exercises its police power in a reasonable and nonarbitrary manner, we will not invalidate the ordinance. Campbell has not established in the present case that the Borough's tenant registration requirement constitutes an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of its police power.
Accordingly, we affirm. Judge Brobson dissents. PER CURIAM ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of July, 2014, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is hereby AFFIRMED.