Opinion
19-P-556
04-02-2020
COMMONWEALTH v. Justice K. AMOAKO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Justice K. Amoako, was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, two counts of possession of a class B substance (subsequent offense), four counts of possession of a class E substance (subsequent offense), and one count of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license as a habitual traffic offender. See G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32A (c ), 34 ; G. L. c. 90, § 23. A judge allowed the defendant's motion to suppress evidence after concluding that the results of a police officer's license plate inquiry did not justify the investigative stop. We conclude that in the absence of any information that the car was legally operable, reasonable suspicion of a civil motor vehicle violation justified the stop, and we reverse. However, we remand for a determination on the issue of the legality of the subsequent exit order, which the judge did not reach.
We reject the defendant's argument that the issues are moot due to the defendant's deportation. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, "[t]hat respondents have been deported likewise does not remove the controversy involved. Following a reversal of the [lower court], there would be a possibility that respondents could be extradited and imprisoned for their crimes, or if respondents manage to re-enter this country on their own they would be subject to arrest and imprisonment for these convictions." United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 581 n.2 (1983).
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Discussion. In Massachusetts there are two kinds of vehicle inspection failures. A vehicle bearing a red rejection inspection sticker, indicating a failure due to a safety defect, may not be lawfully operated until the safety-related equipment defect has been corrected; and in addition, "[f]ailure to have the vehicle reinspected within sixty days subjects the vehicle's registration to suspension." Commonwealth v. Rivas, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 210, 215 (2010). Accordingly, information that a vehicle has failed inspection for a safety defect provides reasonable grounds to stop. Id. at 218. The justification to stop on the basis of a failed safety inspection exists even if the vehicle appears repaired and to have no visible defects. Id.
By contrast, a vehicle bearing a black rejection inspection sticker, indicating a failure due to an emissions defect, may be operated for up to sixty days from the date of inspection before the vehicle becomes legally inoperable. See Rivas, 77 Mass. App. Ct. at 215 & n.5. However, "unless the information is available by computer in the police car, [an] officer cannot know if the sixty-day grace period has expired. Therefore, there are reasonable grounds to allow the stop," even if the officer has no information that the sixty days has lapsed. Id. at 218 n. 10. This logic is equally applicable to the license plate verification provided to the officer here.
The computer inquiry apprised the officer of an inspection failure but, because it failed to indicate what type of defect had given rise to the inspection failure, the officer could not know, even if the inspection failure was less than sixty days old, whether the vehicle was legally operable. Therefore, as in Rivas, the officer had "reasonable grounds to [conduct a] stop" to discern which color sticker the car bore. Id. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) ("the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time"). Accordingly, we reverse the motion judge's decision to the contrary.
Once the officer reached the vehicle, he ordered the defendant out of the car. Generally, the authority to conduct a traffic stop does not justify an exit order. See Commonwealth v. Barreto, 483 Mass. 716, 722 (2019). Under some circumstances, the totality of additional observations can provide a legal basis for an exit order. See Commonwealth v. Stampley, 437 Mass. 323, 326-328 (2002). To justify an exit order the Commonwealth must establish that "(1) police are warranted in the belief that the safety of the officers or others is threatened; (2) police have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; or (3) police are conducting a search of the vehicle on other grounds." Barreto, supra.
Finding the initial stop unjustified, the motion judge did not, however, reach the issue of the exit order. We are in no position to do so on appeal. Accordingly, we remand the matter for findings and a decision on the justification, if any, for the exit order, and we express no opinion on whether there is a need for further testimony.
So ordered.
Reversed and remanded