Opinion
Case No. 03-CV-71060-DT.
March 17, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter having come before the Court on Defendants' motions for summary judgment [Doc. Nos. 12 14];
The Court having reviewed the pleadings submitted herein, and being otherwise fully informed in the matter;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Labor Management Relations Act claim shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED; and
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's collusion claim shall be, and hereby are, GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Colin Combs ("Combs"), Sheryl Schmidt ("Schmidt") and Richard Tremblay ("Tremblay") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed their four-count Complaint against Defendants International Union United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("UAW"), Local Union No. 400 ("Local 400"), Ford Motor Company ("Ford") and Visteon ("Visteon"). The Court previously granted the unopposed portions of Defendants' motions for summary judgment and thus dismissed Plaintiffs' claims of age discrimination and defamation. Accordingly, only two claims remain. In Count I, Plaintiffs assert that the Union Defendants breached their duty of fair representation pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("Section 301"). See Complt. at ¶¶ 26, 28. Count I also alleges that Ford and Visteon "conspired with [the Union Defendants] to permit Plaintiffs' removal from their position as Health and Safety Representatives and Job Security Representatives and to permit that removal to stand although [there] was no specific cause for the removal. . . ." Complt. at ¶ 26. Additionally, in Count IV, Plaintiffs allege that Visteon and Ford "colluded" with the Union Defendants "to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights and positions under the [CBA]." Complt. at ¶ 52.
For sake of brevity, and where applicable, Defendants UAW and Local 400 shall be collectively referred to as the "Union Defendants."
Specifically, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges claims for: (1) Breach of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("Section 301"); (2) age discrimination in violation of Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2101-37.2804; (3) defamation under Michigan common law; (4) "collusion" to violate Plaintiff's rights under the collective bargaining agreement.
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs were hired as hourly employees of Ford at its Chesterfield plant. Additionally, the Plaintiffs were members of the UAW and Local 400. As the parties recognize, Visteon was formed as a division of Ford and was incorporated in January 2000. Subsequently, in April 2000, certain assets and employees, including the Chesterfield Plant, were transferred from Ford to Visteon. See, e.g., Defs.' Ex. F, Cristal Martin Aff. at ¶ 2. The parties agree that the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs' employment was governed by the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between Visteon and the UAW.
Visteon assumed Ford's obligations under the 1999 CBA.See Defs.' Ex. F, Cristal Martin Aff. at ¶ 3. Martin represents that Visteon managers exclusively made all decisions regarding Plaintiffs' June 2002 discipline; Ford managers were not involved in the disciplinary decisions. See Martin Aff. at ¶ 2. Plaintiffs have no evidence to contradict Martin's assertion.
The CBA created several "special purpose" union representative positions including a "Unit Health and Safety Representative" and "Job Security Representative." See CBA at Art. VI, Sec. 8 Appendix M; Union Def.'s Ex. 4, Frank Di Giorgio Aff. at ¶ 2. The CBA sets forth the job duties and responsibilities for these positions. See CBA at Art. IV, Sec. 8 Appendix M. The undisputed record evidence before this Court establishes that the special purpose representatives are appointed exclusively by the UAW and not Ford or Visteon. See Union Defs.' Br. at 2; Colin Combs Dep. at 29-32; Sheryl Schmidt Dep. at 24, 28, 232-33; Richard Tremblay Dep. at 35, 37.
In the present case, Plaintiffs were appointed to special purpose positions. Specifically, Combs was appointed as a Job Security Representative in 1999. See Combs Dep. at 29-31. Schmidt was appointed as Unit Health and Safety Representative in 1997. See Schmidt Dep. at 25, 27; Defs.' Ex. G, UAW letter dated January 6, 1997. Tremblay was appointed as Unit Health and Safety Representative in 2002. See Tremblay Dep. at 34-35; Defs.' Ex. H, UAW letter dated January 14, 2002. Pursuant to the CBA, Ford provided Combs, Schmidt and Tremblay with computers to perform their job duties. See CBA at p. 109; Di Giorgio Aff. at ¶ 2; Combs Dep. at 35-37; Schmidt Dep. at 31-33; Tremblay Dep. at 29.
Ford initially issued a computer use policy on June 7, 1999, which provides, in relevant part:
Users are expected to exercise the same care and judgement in the preparation and transmittal of electronic mail ("E-Mail") communications that they use in preparing other written communications.
These systems are to be used for business purposes only. Information transmitted or stored in Company E-Mail systems is the property of Ford Motor Company. The Company may monitor E-Mail transmissions and notelogs without prior notice to the users, except when notice is require by local regulations or agreements. Misuse could result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.
Defs.' Ex. I. Visteon issued a similar "Technology Resources Policy" via a May 7, 2001 e-mail communication which states, in pertinent part:
Violations of this Policy may result in disciplinary action, including possible termination, and potential civil and criminal liability. Use of the Technology Resources is a privilege that may be limited or revoked at any time, with or without cause and without notice, in the sole discretion of Visteon.
1. No Expectation of Privacy.
Users understand and agree that:
a) Visteon retains the right, with or without cause or notice to the User, to access or monitor the Computer Information, including User e-mail and Internet usage. Please keep in mind that anything created or stored on the Technology Resources, including the Computer Information, may, and likely will, be reviewed by others and that even deleted files may be recovered;
b) Users have no expectation of privacy of any kind related to their use of the Technology Resources or any Computer Information; and
c) Users expressly waive any right of privacy or similar right in their use of the Technology Resources or any Computer Information.
. . . . Internet Monitoring. Visteon has software and systems in place that are capable of monitoring and recording all Internet usage. For each User, these security measures are capable of recording each Web site visited, each chat, newsgroup, or e-mail message, and each file transfer into and out of Visteon's networks, and Visteon reserves the right to conduct such monitoring and recording at any time. . . . Users have no expectation of privacy as to their Internet usage.
Defs.' Ex. I (emphasis in original).
Additionally, Visteon has a "zero tolerance" anti-harassment policy that, in relevant part, strictly prohibits "written or graphic materials, such as sexually suggestive or obscene documents, pictures, cartoons or photos. . . ." Defs.' Ex. K, No Harassment Policy at no. 1. This policy also states that "employees are strictly prohibited from sending electronic messages during work time or on Visteon equipment which contains offensive material. . . ." Defs.' Ex. K, No Harassment Policy at no. 3.
It is uncontroverted that in May 2002, Visteon reviewed the e-mail accounts of all Chesterfield Plant employees. Visteon discovered that twelve employees, including Plaintiffs, exchanged "e-mails which contained pictures of sexually suggestive and naked individuals." Defs.' Ex. B, Patrick Quinn Aff. at ¶ 4. Plaintiffs do not challenge that they sent the e-mails upon which their suspensions were based. In fact, Plaintiffs executed statements concerning the offending e-mails during the course of Visteon's investigation. Patrick Quinn ("Quinn"), Visteon's Labor Relations Manager, along with Visteon's human resources manager, determined that the nude and suggestive pictures exchanged by these twelve employees "violated Visteon's No Harassment Policy and warranted corrective action." Quinn Aff. at ¶ 4. Accordingly, Quinn imposed a thirty day suspension for all twelve employees, some of whom were salaried employees and some of whom were hourly. See id.
According to Quinn, some of the e-mails exchanged by these employees incorporated inappropriate jokes with the visual pictures. See Quinn Aff. at ¶ 2.
Plaintiffs filed grievances protesting the thirty-day suspensions. The parties agree that Visteon denied the grievances at each level. See, e.g., Defs.' Ex. L. Although a hearing with an umpire was scheduled, Frankie Savalle ("Savalle"), the UAW Servicing Representative, withdrew the grievances because he believed, based on the facts, the grievances were not meritorious. See Defs.' Ex. N, Frankie Savalle Dep. at 51-52.
At some point during the grievance process, Gerald Bantom ("Bantom"), the UAW's Vice-President, was informed of Plaintiffs' thirty-day suspensions. See Defs.' Ex. O, Gerald Bantom Dep. at 11-15. According to Bantom's affidavit, he reviewed Plaintiffs' statements, and based solely on Plaintiffs' statements, decided to remove Plaintiffs from their special purpose positions with the Union. See Union Defs.' Ex. 6, Gerald Bantom Aff. at ¶ 5. Bantom determined that a separate investigation was unnecessary "[b]ecause they [Plaintiffs] admitted to the alleged misconduct." Bantom Aff. at ¶ 5. Plaintiffs appealed Bantom's decision to remove them from their special purpose positions via the UAW's internal union appeal procedure. Their appeals were denied at all levels. Quinn, Visteon's Labor Relations Manager, stated that he "was not involved in the UAW's decision to remove the Plaintiffs from their Union appointed position[s]. That is a UAW issue in which Visteon had no involvement." Quinn Aff. at ¶ 7. Conversely, the Union Defendants did not participate in Visteon's decision to impose a thirty-day suspension for these employees. See Quinn Aff. at ¶¶ 4 6.
Defendants indicated that other than the thirty-day suspensions, Plaintiffs remained employees of Visteon. Plaintiffs voluntarily opted, however, to retire under an early retirement program. See Defs.' Br. at 8, n. 3. On March 17, 2003, Plaintiffs filed their federal lawsuit with this Court. Currently before the Court are the remaining portions of Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants seek summary judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). Motions for summary judgment require the Court to look beyond the pleadings and evaluate the facts to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that warrants a trial. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment if all the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. at 325. Thus, this Court determines "whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Hinchman v. Moore, 312 F.3d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). This Court does not weigh the evidence but determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial, viewing the record as a whole and viewing all the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578 (1986).
In order to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party must have set out sufficient evidence in the record to allow a reasonable jury to find for him at trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 256; accord, Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 709 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to avoid summary judgment). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. See Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Hybrid § 301 Claim — Count I
The Union Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim that they violated the LMRA's § 301 by breaching their duty of fair representation. Ford and visteon also seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim that they conspired with the Union Defendants "to permit Plaintiffs' removal from their [special purpose positions.]" Complt. at ¶ 26. Although Plaintiffs Complaint is not a model of clarity, the Court construes Count I as a § 301 hybrid claim. The Sixth Circuit explains that a § 301 hybrid claim:
[C]onsists of two distinct causes of action, one against the employer for violating the collective bargaining agreement under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and one against the union for breaching its implied duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act. . . . Because an employer's violation of the collective bargaining agreement is ordinarily only enforceable by the union, however, the employee can prevail in either suit only by prevailing in both; the employee must show both that the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement and that the union breached its duty of fair representation.Driver v. United States Postal Serv., Inc., 328 F.3d 863, 868 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Federal law unambiguously holds that "a union breaches its duty of fair representation if its actions are either `arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.'" Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 15 F.3d 573, 584 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991)). The Supreme Court explains that "a union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a `wide range of reasonableness' . . . as to be irrational."O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 67 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the "union must . . . undertake reasonable investigation to defend a member from employer discipline. A union does not, however, have to exhaust every possible remedy requested by a member facing disciplinary action." Black, 15 F.3d at 584-85 (citations omitted). In sum, the Sixth Circuit holds that "a union acts arbitrarily only if `it handles a grievance in a "perfunctory" manner, with caprice or without rational explanation.'" Linton v. United Parcel Serv., 15 F.3d 1365, 1370 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Poole v. Budd Co., 706 F.2d 181, 183 (6th Cir. 1983)). The Supreme Court stresses that "[a]ny substantive examination of a union's performance . . . must be highly deferential." O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 78 (citation omitted).
In the present case, Plaintiffs' § 301 hybrid claim against the Union Defendants is twofold. Plaintiffs first contend that the Union Defendants breached their duty of fair representation by treating Plaintiffs differently than other union employees. In particular, Schmidt testified "that the health and safety rep at the Utica plant was found guilty of fraud. He was not given 30 days off. He may have been given 30 days off, but he was not removed from his position." Schmidt Dep. at 78. Plaintiffs thus contend that the Union Defendants deviated from their past discipline practice and suggest that an improper motive resulted in their removal from their special purpose positions. Plaintiffs also assert that the Union Defendants breached their duty of fair representation because Savalle withdrew the Plaintiffs' grievances concerning the thirty-day suspensions. It appears, therefore, with respect to the fair representation claim, the Plaintiffs actually present two distinct claims. The Court will address the claims separately.
1. Visteon's Decision to Impose Thirty-Day Suspension
Plaintiffs submit that Ford and Visteon conspired to violate the CBA by imposing a thirty-day suspension on Plaintiffs for violation of the computer use policy. This Court finds that Plaintiffs have utterly failed to present any evidence that either Ford or Visteon breached the CBA; an independent element required in a hybrid § 301 claim. See Driver, 328 F.3d at 868. The following record evidence before this Court, discussed in detail above, is undisputed: (1) Visteon had the right to monitor and to review all employees' (including Plaintiffs') use of the company-provided computers; (2) Visteon prohibited certain types of computer usage (e.g., sexually offensive words or pictures); (3) Plaintiffs admittedly violated Visteon's computer use policy; (4) Visteon applied equal treatment to all twelve employees who violated the computer use policy (i.e., thirty-day unpaid suspensions); (5) Visteon's treatment of Plaintiffs was in compliance with the CBA; and (6) Visteon played no role in the UAW's decision to remove Plaintiffs from their special purpose positions.
Additionally, as noted earlier in this Order, Visteon imposed a zero tolerance anti-harassment policy on its employees.
Although Plaintiffs admit that they sent the offending e-mails, they complain that they were unaware that they were violating Visteon policy because they do not recall receiving the e-mails setting forth the policy. See Schmidt Dep. at 32-35; Combs Dep. at 37-40; Tremblay Dep. at 30-33. Nevertheless, Visteon submitted uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiffs received the e-mail communications setting forth the computer use policy. See Defs.' Ex. J. The fact that Plaintiffs may have exercised questionable judgment by failing to read the e-mails sent by their employer and/or do not recall reading the policy, does not excuse their failure to comply with Visteon's written computer use policy.
The Court notes that the CBA includes a management rights clause which authorizes Visteon to discipline employees and implement work policies, such as the computer use policy and anti-harassment policy. See CBA, Art. IV, Sec. 3.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs can not demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether Ford or Visteon violated the CBA. Because Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claim that their employer violated the CBA, Plaintiffs' § 301 hybrid claim must fail. See Driver, 328 F.3d at 868. Accordingly, all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this basis. 2. Grievances for Thirty Day Suspensions
As set forth below, summary judgment is also appropriate based on Plaintiffs' failure to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Plaintiffs' claim that the Union Defendants breached their duty of fair representation.
Plaintiffs additionally suggest that the Union Defendants breached their duty of fair representation because, in their view, Savalle's decision to cease pursuing the grievances was not based on Savalle's evaluation of the merits, but rather, on his belief that Visteon's decision was futile. See Linton v. United Parcel Serv., 15 F.3d 1365, 1372 (6th Cir. 1994).
The parties agree that the CBA required Visteon to supply computers to Plaintiffs. See CBA attachment dated Oct. 9, 1999, "Funding for Joint Programs Computers" at p. 111. Significantly, the CBA specifies that with respect to the computers supporting Joint Program activities, "[t]he Grievance procedure set forth in Article VII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement has no application to, or jurisdiction over, any matter related to this letter." Id. All Defendants argue that this provision should be interpreted to mean that Plaintiffs' thirty-day suspensions, imposed by authority of this letter attached to the CBA, are not subject to the CBA's grievance procedure. Defendants argue that because the Union Defendants could not grieve these suspensions, the Union did not violate its duty of fair representation when it decided to withdraw the grievances when they reached the umpire.
Although this Court finds merit to Defendants' argument, the Court will nonetheless assume that the Union could grieve (or at least attempt to grieve) the suspensions. Even assuming that the grievance system was available, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that Local 400's decision to cease pursing the grievance when it came before the umpire was neither "`arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.'" Black, 15 F.3d at 584 (citation omitted). Savalle testified that he ultimately withdrew the grievance because "based on the facts of the grievance" he concluded that "the grievance isn't meritorious." Savalle Dep. at 51-52. In sum, he testified that based on the evidence and the policy letters, "[t]here was nothing to support me going any further." Savalle Dep. at 26. Savalle's decision to withdraw the grievance was reasonable, and premised solely on the facts of the cases.
As Defendants set forth in their briefs, Savalle read both the disciplinary files and Plaintiffs' statements. See Savalle Dep. at 23. He also interviewed the Plaintiffs. See id. Based on his review, he found: (1) Plaintiffs' admitted, in their statements, that they sent the e-mails for which they received their suspensions; (2) all twelve Visteon employees were subjected to the same discipline; and (3) at the preliminary steps in the grievance process, Visteon refused Savalle's request to reduce the penalty. See, e.g., Savalle Dep. at 25, 51, 53.
Under federal labor law, an individual employee does not have the right to compel the arbitration of his or her grievance.See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). Unions are permitted to evaluate the merits of a grievance and conclude it is not worthy of pursuit. See, e.g., Whitten v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d at 1335, 1341 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 981 (1976). Unions are not, however, permitted to forgo arbitration simply because the company's position, right or wrong, is intractable. See Linton, 15 F.3d at 1372.
Here, the undisputed facts conclusively demonstrate that Saville, on behalf of the Union, elected not to proceed with a hearing with the umpire based on the lack of merit of Plaintiffs' claims. Simply put, Savalle concluded that the claims lacked merit because Visteon treated all offenders equally, irrespective of whether they were hourly or salaried employees. Because no evidence exists from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that the Union's decision to withdraw the grievances was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to submit evidence that the Union breached its duty of fair representation when it decided to withdraw the grievances. Accordingly, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on this aspect of Plaintiffs' duty of fair representation claim. 3. Removal from Special Purpose Positions
Plaintiffs suggest that a statement made by Local 400's President, Tony Pinelli, illustrates that his purported animus towards Tremblay and Schmidt "was a driving force in supporting Plaintiffs' removal from their appointed positions as well as the force behind the Union's failure to process Plaintiffs' grievances." Plfs.' Br. at 9. Plaintiffs' subjective belief is insufficient to compel this Court to reach a different conclusion in this case when the unrebutted record evidence in this case overwhelmingly establishes that Savalle, without guidance or discussion with any other Union representative, made the decision to withdraw Plaintiffs' grievances and that Bantom, in his sole discretion, and without consultation with any other source, determined that Plaintiffs' violation of Visteon's computer use policy warranted their removal from their special purpose positions.
Plaintiffs argue that the Union Defendants acted arbitrarily because Plaintiffs were removed from their special purpose positions when, in the past, a union member purportedly found guilty of fraud was not removed from his special purpose position. Plaintiffs fail, however, to identify this person. Furthermore, the Court finds that what an unnamed UAW representative decided regarding an employee who engaged in fraudulent conduct is not relevant to Plaintiffs' treatment in this case. In the present case, Bantom removed all persons who held special purpose positions from these posts as a result of the violation of Visteon's computer use policy. Bantom's decision was thus evenly applied to all Plaintiffs. Furthermore, the undisputed record evidence establishes that the UAW policy letters dated 1992, 1998 and 2002 provide that the director of the UAW Ford/Visteon Department has the sole discretion to determine whether to remove a special purpose representative from his or her position. See, e.g., Bantom Aff. at ¶ 3 Exs. 11-14. Thus, Bantom did not violate the CBA when he determined that based on a review of Plaintiffs' statements, that Plaintiffs' violations of Visteon's computer use policy warranted their removal from their special purpose positions. See, e.g., Bantom Aff. at ¶ 5; Bantom Dep. at. The Court additionally notes that Plaintiffs' removal from these positions did not result in a reduction of their wages. See Bantom Aff. at ¶ 4. This Court finds that Bantom acted in a reasonable manner and thus rejects Plaintiffs' contention that Plaintiffs' removal from their special purpose positions constituted a breach of the UAW's duty of fair representation.
The Court also rejects Plaintiffs' suggestion that the UAW breached its duty of fair representation by not providing Plaintiffs with representation to appeal Bantom's decision to remove them from their special purpose positions. First, contrary to Plaintiffs' suggestion, the Court does not find that the Union Defendants and Ford and Visteon adopt contradictory arguments. Ford and Visteon simply contend that Plaintiffs' removal from their special purpose positions was not subject to grievance under the CBA. See Defs.' Br. at 16. As the Union Defendants point out, Plaintiffs had the ability to appeal Bantom's decision, under a mechanism distinct and separate from the CBA's grievance procedure. See Union Defs.' Ex. 8, Gary Bryner Aff. at ¶¶ 1-3. The undisputed record evidence establishes that although Plaintiffs may retain representation in an appeal, the Union is not obligated to provide representation over a Union decision. See Bryner Aff. at ¶¶ 2-3 Ex. 1, UAW Constitution Art. 33, Sec. 4(f); CBA at Article VI, Sec. 16. Accordingly, the Court finds no merit to Plaintiffs' contention that the UAW was obligated to provide representation in an appeal of Bantom's decision to remove Plaintiffs from their special purpose positions. For the reasons articulated above, the Court thus finds that summary judgment is appropriate on this remaining portion of Plaintiffs' duty of fair representation claim. Thus, as expressed in Section A of this Order, the Court grants all Defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to Count I of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
B. Collusion — Count IV
Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for collusion. The Court first notes that there is no cause of action for collusion. Whether the Court construes Plaintiffs' claim as a civil conspiracy claim under Michigan law or a conspiracy claim under the LMRA, Plaintiffs' claim fails. Plaintiffs suggest that Ford and Visteon conspired with the Union Defendants to remove Plaintiffs from their special purpose positions. There is a lack of any record evidence that Ford and/or Visteon had any influence over the UAW's decision to remove Plaintiffs from their special purpose positions. To the contrary, Plaintiffs fail to rebut Bantom's testimony that as UAW vice-president, he was the sole decision maker for the determination to remove Plaintiffs from their special purpose positions. See Bantom Aff. at ¶ 5. Visteon's Labor Relations Manager, Quinn, similarly state that Visteon had no involvement in Bantom's decision. See Quinn Aff. at ¶ 7. Similarly, Plaintiffs fail to rebut Defendants' record evidence that the Union Defendants did not participate in Visteon's decision to impose a thirty-day suspension on all twelve employees who violated the computer use policy. See Quinn Aff. at ¶¶ 4 6. Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to show, either directly or by inference, that Visteon's decision was motivated by union animus; the unrebutted record evidence establishes that the discipline was imposed on all twelve employees, "regardless of whether the employee was a salaried or hourly employee." Quinn Aff. at ¶ 4. Accordingly, the Court finds that all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count IV of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED and Plaintiffs' Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.