Opinion
D.D. No. 87-14
Decided March 16, 1988.
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — One-year suspension — Knowingly making false accusations about a judge — Handling legal matter without adequate preparation.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Bar.
Relator, Columbus Bar Association, filed a complaint against respondent, Leda M.C. Hartwell, on November 12, 1986, alleging two counts of misconduct. Respondent answered the complaint on February 12, 1987, admitting all but two of the factual allegations. A hearing was held before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Bar on May 14, 1987. Respondent stipulated to the remaining factual allegations at the commencement of that proceeding.
Count I of the complaint alleged violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice); DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on one's fitness to practice law); and DR 8-102(B) (knowingly making false accusations about a judge). The evidence presented showed that respondent was representing James Parrish in an action before the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County and that the court had granted summary judgment against her client. Respondent subsequently met with Parrish in her office to advise him of the court's ruling and to discuss an appeal. Parrish became angry and asked why the case had been lost. Respondent replied that the judge had been "paid off."
Parrish thereafter told another attorney of what respondent had said. The attorney asked Parrish to record Parrish's next meeting with respondent. Parrish agreed to do so.
Parrish met with respondent again on or about June 3, 1986 and recorded a portion of their conversation. The transcript of the recording reveals the following colloquy in connection with the aforementioned summary judgment:
"Parrish: `Why didn't the judge give me a chance to even say my piece?'
"Hartwell: `My dear man, because he must have been paid, I'm trying to tell you that.'"
The preceding statement was made in the context of respondent's explanation that "this is the method that defense lawyers all the time use * * *." To cite an example, respondent referred to another case where a Franklin County judge had dismissed an action on summary judgment. Respondent then told her client, "I want you to know the technique that judges use and that defense lawyers use."
The record shows that before bringing the matter to relator's attention, the attorney who had suggested recording respondent's remarks also told the judge involved about respondent's conversation with Parrish. Respondent was asked to come to the judge's chambers. Upon inquiry, respondent denied having made the statement concerning the payoff. Respondent later apologized to the judge, although apparently not until after she discovered that her discussion with Parrish had been recorded.
Count II of the complaint charged respondent with violations of DR 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter without adequate preparation under the circumstances) and DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting a legal matter entrusted). The record reflects that respondent was retained to represent Cheryl Newsome in the fall of 1985. Newsome was involved in both a divorce action in the Franklin County Domestic Relations Court and a collection matter in the Franklin County Municipal Court. The latter action involved a $277 claim against Newsome and her former husband for their children's medical expenses. The issue of whether the husband or the wife would be responsible for these expenses was pending in the domestic relations proceeding.
Apparently in an effort to prevent the municipal court case from being decided before the domestic relations court resolved the question of who was responsible for paying for the children's medical expenses, respondent attempted to delay having to answer the creditor's complaint. Respondent filed a motion to extend the answer date to October 10, 1985, but did not file an answer by that date. On October 29, 1985, the municipal court granted respondent leave until November 15, 1985 to file an answer. Again, the answer was not filed. On December 3, 1985, respondent moved to have the court allow her to answer within ten days. The court granted this motion on December 6, 1985 and thereafter set the matter for trial on February 6, 1986. On January 6, 1986, the plaintiff moved for default judgment because respondent had not yet answered the complaint. When respondent failed to answer by the February 6 trial date, the municipal court rendered a default judgment. Respondent filed a motion to vacate the default judgment on February 18, 1986. The municipal court overruled the motion and also awarded attorney fees in the amount of $450 against respondent's client pursuant to a co-defendant's motion. Respondent satisfied the judgment out of her own funds.
After reviewing the evidence and pleadings submitted, the board concluded that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 8-102(B), 6-101(A)(2), and 6-101(A)(3). Before making its recommendation, the board considered respondent's advanced age, seventy-seven, and the testimony of several character witnesses offered in her behalf. It also considered that respondent regretted making the remarks about the common pleas judge and that she could not explain why she had made them. Respondent stated that she did not believe that a payoff had occurred. Finally, the board considered that respondent was suffering from a shoulder injury and anemia while representing Cheryl Newsome and that a definite strategy, albeit of dubious merit, had caused her failure to file an answer in Newsome's municipal court case. Nevertheless, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months and that the suspension be followed by a period of probation not to exceed two years.
Thomas M. Tyack Associates, Thomas M. Tyack, Ransier Ransier and Frederick L. Ransier III, for relator.
Charles W. Kettlewell, for respondent.
This court finds that respondent violated the aforementioned Disciplinary Rules indicated by the board. Respondent's conduct, particularly with respect to Count I, however, requires a more severe sanction than that recommended. Such conduct undermines the integrity of the judicial system. Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year. Costs taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.