Opinion
Jan. 16, 1973.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Page 392
Simon, Eason, Hoyt & Malone, P.C., Richard L. Eason, Englewood, for plaintiff-appellant.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Del J. Ellis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendants-appellees Banking Board of the State of Colorado, Harry Bloom, State Bank Commissioner and their Successors in office.
Rothgerber, Appel & Powers, A. Frank Vick, Denver, for defendants-appellees Andrew I. McCroskie, John E. Wren, John R. Toops, Merrill O. Dart and Robert W. Hatch.
ENOCH, Judge.
On June 22, 1971, five individuals (Applicants) jointly filed an application for a bank charter with the State Bank commissioners pursuant to 1967 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 14--9--9. The proposed bank was listed as the Frontier Bank and was to be located in the vicinity of East Evans Avenue and Monaco Parkway in Denver. A public hearing was held pursuant to C.R.S.1963, 14--9--10, in September 1971, at which the Columbine State Bank along with another local bank appeared to protest the application. The Banking Board granted the application, and Columbine sought review in the Denver District Court pursuant to C.R.S.1963, 14--2--7. The District Court affirmed the order of the Board, and Columbine now appeals to this court. We affirm.
Columbine first contends that the Board lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing. The basis for this contention is the alleged failure of Applicants to complete properly the bank charter application. Columbine argues that the area was not properly defined, all of the board members were not identified, and required information in regard to bank quarters was not supplied.
The statute requires that the address of the proposed bank be included in the application, but if the exact location is not then known, the area within a radius of one-half mile in which the proposed bank will be located shall be designated. 1967 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 14--9--9(1)(c). On the application the Applicants named the 'vicinity' of the intersection of Evans and Monaco in lieu of a specific address. Columbine charges that this language is vague and insufficient. The form clause in the application immediately preceding Applicants' general location description refers to an area with a one-half mile radius. By reading the printed words, together with those filed by the Applicants, it is clear that the proposed location of the bank is to be in the vicinity of the named intersection within an area limited to a one-half mile radius. Such a designation of location is adequate compliance with the statutory requirement.
The statute also requires that all directors and executive officers be named on the application. 1967 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 14--9--9(1)(c). Columbine asserts that Applicants failed to comply with this provision. There was testimony at the hearing from a Larry Fredrick that it was understood that he was to be a director and officer of the bank. Fredrick had not been listed on the application as an officer or director. On redirect examination he revealed that he had misstated the finality of his relationship with Frontier as of the time of the submission of the application and that, in fact, at the time the application was submitted he had only been approached as a possible director and officer. The Board, as trier of fact, is the proper body to resolve this inconsistency, and its finding that all application requirements were fulfilled will not be disturbed by this court when supported by substantial competent evidence. Goldy v. Henry, 166 Colo. 401, 443 P.2d 994.
In answer to one question on the application Applicants stated that '(c) omplete details with respect to the quarters and equipment will be provided . . .' before the date of the public hearing. This information was not provided prior to the hearing and detailed information was not known at the time of the hearing. There was, however, oral testimony as to the general nature of the quarters and equipment contemplated by Applicants.
The applicable statute provides that in addition to the specific information set out by the legislature to be included in the application, the Board may require such other information as may reasonably be needed to determine whether the charter should be issued. 1967 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 14--9--9(1)(c). Information in regard to quarters and equipment is not part of the specific data listed by the statute. It is information that the Board May require in its discretion. It would be error for the district court or for this court on review to require that the Board consider factors other than those specified by the clear provisions of the statute. Academy Boulevard Bank v. Banking Board, 30 Colo.App. 331, 492 P.2d 76. The lack of such other information does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the application.
Columbine's other arguments can be consolidated into the contention that the findings of the Board were not based upon substantial competent evidence. We find this claim without merit. Applicants examined many witnesses and submitted numerous exhibits at the hearing. Although there were some conflicts within Applicants' evidence, and Columbine presented some evidence of its own in opposition to the application, the record is clear that there was substantial competent evidence upon which the Board could base its ultimate findings. Therefore, this court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finding authority. Academy Boulevard Bank v. Banking Board, Supra.
Judgment affirmed.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and PIERCE, JJ., concur.