Opinion
No. 70-460
Decided November 23, 1971.
Funds of estate of mental incompetent that were derived from loan against incompetent's insurance policy were held by probate court to be exempt and not available to pay claim of state hospital. State appealed.
Affirmed
1. EXEMPTIONS — Statute — Applicable — Estate of Mental Incompetent. The exemption provisions of C.R.S. 1963, 77-2-2, are applicable to the assets in the estate of a mental incompetent and insurance proceeds in such an estate are thus exempt from an approved claim of the state mental hospital.
Appeal from the Probate Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable David Brofman, Judge.
Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General, John P. Moore, Deputy, Richard D. Robb, Assistant, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Martin I. Steinberg, Davis R. Lass, for defendant-appellee.
This appeal presents the question of whether the exemption provisions set forth in C.R.S. 1963, 77-2-2 are applicable to assets in the estate of a mental incompetent, James Butler, who was hospitalized in 1951 and restored by an order of competency in June of 1969. Prior to restoration, the conservator, with approval of the probate court, borrowed $2500 on Butler's insurance policy. The Colorado State Hospital (Hospital) then initiated an action against Butler's estate (Estate) to recover costs of hospitalization. The probate court allowed the Hospital's claim of $2772.19 as a claim of the 5th class and then ruled that the insurance loan proceeds of $2500 which the conservator had borrowed were exempt and not available for payment of the claim. We affirm.
The Hospital's position is that under 1965 Perm. Supp. C.R.S. 1963, 71-7-1, it has the right to impose liability on Butler for the costs of his hospital care, and this liability may either be reduced to judgment by allowance as a claim in the estate of the mental incompetent, or, if there is no estate, by litigation pursuant to the filing of a civil complaint. The Hospital contends that only in the latter procedure, where enforcement of the judgment would be by levy and sale under a writ of attachment or writ of execution, is the judgment debtor entitled to the exemptions specified in C.R.S. 1963, 77-2-2.
"Property exempt. — (1)(a) The following property shall be exempt from levy and sale under writ of attachment or writ of execution:
. . . .
(m) The avails of policies or certificates of life insurance to the extent five thousand dollars.
The Hospital contends that, as in the case at hand, where the Hospital's claim has been filed and allowed against the Estate, the enforcement of the claim is governed exclusively by C.R.S. 1963, 153-12-5(2) and 153-14-4. C.R.S. 1963, 153-12-5(2) provides that "no execution shall issue upon any judgment against a . . . mental incompetent, but such judgment shall be filed, allowed, classified and paid in the same manner as any other claim against said estate." C.R.S. 1963, 153-14-4 provides for the enforcement of the payment of claims against the conservator.
The Hospital further contends that the enforcement of a claim filed in the estate of a mental incompetent and subsequently reduced to judgment is governed by C.R.S. 1963, 153-14-4, which in effect prohibits execution on judgments against a mental incompetent and sets forth exclusive enforcement remedies as to the allowed claims. Therefore, it concludes the exemption statute, C.R.S. 1963, 77-2-2, is unavailable to conservators of mental incompetent estates because claimants are specifically denied the right of enforcement by execution and attachment on the conservators. No authority is cited in support of this interpretation and we find none.
The Hospital is able to arrive at its conclusion only by ignoring 1965 Perm. Supp. C.R.S. 1963, 71-7-9(2), quoted infra, which the Hospital considers as "mere surplusage."
Historically, Colorado has, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, placed the burden of the hospital expense of a mental incompetent on the State and not the individual. In re Estate of Randall, 166 Colo. 1, 441 P.2d 153. Over the years the legislature has seen fit to impose varying degrees of liability on the individual and relatives with certain limitations. The current legislation, 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 71-7-1, gives the hospital the authority to collect its costs from the patient, his spouse and his parents. This right is, however, limited by several restrictions set forth in the same statute, one of which is 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 71-7-9(2), which reads as follows:
"All property of said persons shall be subject to application to said claims irrespective of its origin, composition, or source subject to the exemptions set forth in 77-2-2 Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963." (Emphasis added.)
It is quite clear that the legislature intended that an incompetent's estate be give the benefit of the same exemptions afforded to a normal judgment debtor. Where the language used is plain, its meaning clear, and no absurdity is involved, the statute must be enforced as written, Jones v. Board of Adjustment, 119 Colo. 420, 204 P.2d 560. To interpret the statute in question as the Hospital suggests would require omitting part of the statute and injecting a meaning quite different from that which clearly appears from the wording of the statute. People v. Horkans, 109 Colo. 177, 123 P.2d 824.
[1] We hold that the exemption provisions of C.R.S. 1963, 77-2-2, are applicable to the assets in the estate of a mental incompetent and the insurance proceeds in the estate are exempt from the approved claim of the Hospital.
Judgment affirmed.
JUDGE DWYER and JUDGE DUFFORD concur.