Opinion
1:22-cv-00224-DCN
08-04-2022
CORY ALLAN COLLINSON, Plaintiff, v. HALEY JEAN ROSE; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; MIKAYLA DESJARLAIS; and POST FALLS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE
David C. Nye, Chief U.S. District Court Judge
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Cory Collinson's Complaint as a result of Plaintiff's status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. The Court now reviews the Complaint to determine whether it should be summarily dismissed in whole or in part under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed.
1. Pleading Standards and Screening Requirement
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Under modern pleading standards, Rule 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Iqbal/Twombly “facial plausibility” standard is met when a complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more than ... unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant's liability,” or if there is an “obvious alternative explanation” that would not result in liability, the complaint has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678, 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bare allegations that amount to a mere restatement of the elements of a cause of action, without adequate factual support, are not enough.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that the Court review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, as well as complaints filed in forma pauperis, to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. The Court must dismiss any claims that do not have adequate factual support or are frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A.
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq.
The Court also must dismiss claims that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. These last two categories-together with claims that fall outside a federal court's narrow grant of jurisdiction-encompass those claims that might, or might not, have factual support but nevertheless are barred by a well-established legal rule.
The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims was expanded by the PLRA, giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims, sua sponte, before or after opportunity to amend). Moreover, even if a complaint meets the pleading requirements, dismissal under §§ 1915 and 1915A is still appropriate if an affirmative defense is an “obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (“IDOC”). Plaintiff alleges that, while he was on parole, his parole officer “acted in conjunction” with a Post Falls police officer and forced Plaintiff “to spray empty four cans of air-duster that [Plaintiff] had just purchased at Wal-Mart.” Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2. Plaintiff states that he was forced to spray away the air-duster “in an attempt to cause [his] incarceration” and that the police officer lied about having seen Plaintiff inhaling the airduster.
Plaintiff's parole officer allegedly had him arrested “and lied in order to violate [Plaintiff's] parole.” Id. at 2-3. Evidently, Plaintiff's parole was revoked and he was returned to prison.
Plaintiff has sued police officer Mikayla Desjarlais and parole officer Haley Jean Rose, as well as the Post Falls Police Department and the IDOC. He asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-the federal civil rights statute-and claims that Defendants unlawfully seized his property, used excessive force against him, and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment.
3. Discussion
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to proceed with the Complaint. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 60 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following.
A. Standards of Law
To state a plausible civil rights claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Governmental officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.
However, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists ... a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.'” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A plaintiff can establish this causal connection by alleging that a defendant (1) set in motion a series of acts by others that violated the Constitution, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of such acts, which the supervisor “knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury”; (2) knowingly failed to act or acted improperly “in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates”; (3) acquiesced in the constitutional deprivation; or (4) engaged in “conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1205-09 (internal quotation marks omitted).
To bring a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity, such as a police department, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against such an entity are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001).
An unwritten policy or custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).
A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff's injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
B. Claims Relating to a Criminal Conviction or Parole Revocation
At least some of Plaintiff's claims appear to be barred by the doctrine announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that a § 1983 claim cannot be maintained if the plaintiff's success on the claim would “render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Id. at 486-87. Thus, if a favorable verdict in a civil rights action “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of the plaintiff's conviction, the plaintiff must first show that “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 487. As the Supreme Court later clarified,
a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit
(state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
Heck applies to claims of improper parole revocations. See id. at 82 (holding that an inmate may initiate a § 1983 action to seek invalidation of “state procedures used to deny parole eligibility ... and parole suitability,” but he may not seek “an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release into the community.”); Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a § 1983 claim was noncognizable because a “judgment in favor of [plaintiff] on his illegal seizure claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation of his probation and parole”). Plaintiff claims that Defendants' actions resulted in his parole revocation and incarceration. Because these claims, if successful, would appear to imply the invalidity of that revocation, Heck prohibits the Court from considering them.
Plaintiff may amend his Complaint in an attempt to show that his claims are not barred by Heck. Plaintiff must set forth how the alleged constitutional violations relate to his current incarceration. If Plaintiff believes that his claims, if successful, would not imply the invalidity of his conviction or parole revocation, he must set forth detailed allegations regarding that conviction and revocation and explain his position.
C. Claims against the IDOC
Plaintiff's claims against the IDOC are implausible because the IDOC is a state entity. A state or state entity is not considered a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Additionally, the IDOC is immune from suit in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1890); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-44 (1979) (holding that § 1983 does not constitute a waiver of state sovereign immunity). Thus, Plaintiff should omit the IDOC from any amended complaint.
D. The Complaint Fails to State a Plausible Civil Rights Claim
In addition to the above problems, the Complaint also fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as explained below.
i. Seizure of Property Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unlawfully seized his property when he was forced to empty the cans of air-duster. This appears to be a due process claim that Plaintiff was unconstitutionally deprived of property.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. However, the right to due process is “not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (emphasis omitted)). Moreover, even the intentional deprivation of personal property by prison officials will not support a due process claim under § 1983 if the prisoner has an adequate remedy under state law. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
Idaho has adopted the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”), Idaho Code § 6-901, et seq., to provide a remedy for citizens injured by the tortious acts of governmental entities, officials, and employees. As a general rule, “every governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties.” Idaho Code § 6-903(1). One exception to this rule is that “any law enforcement officer,” acting “without malice or criminal intent and without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct,” shall not be liable for a claim that “[a]rises out of the detention of any goods or merchandise.” Idaho Code § 6-904B(1). This exception clearly does not immunize police officers from liability for acts that are grossly negligent, reckless, or willful and wanton.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has an adequate state law remedy for his claims that Defendants intentionally forced him to dispose of the air-duster in an attempt to send him back to prison. Thus, the Complaint does not state a plausible due process claim.
ii. Excessive Force Claims
Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to excessive force, evidently when he was arrested. Claims of excessive force during the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. This “reasonableness” standard requires “balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on a person's liberty with the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the “quantum of force” must be assessed. Second, the governmental interests at stake must be analyzed in light of the following factors: (1) the severity of the crime for which the plaintiff was arrested; (2) whether the plaintiff posed a threat to the safety of the officers or others; (3) whether the INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee; and (4) the availability of alternative methods of subduing the plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff has offered no allegations whatsoever about the circumstances surrounding his arrest and, therefore, has not stated a plausible excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff must describe such circumstances and allege facts relating to the above reasonableness factors.
iii. Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners against cruel and unusual punishment and guarantees prisoners the right to minimally adequate conditions of confinement. However, because Plaintiff was not a prisoner at the time of the events giving rise to his claims, he has not stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim.
iv. Claims against Post Falls Police Department
Plaintiff's claims against the Post Falls Police Department are implausible for the additional reason that the allegations in the Complaint do not support a reasonable inference that the police department has a policy or custom of forcing arrestees to dispose of property or of using excessive force against arrestees, as required by Monell. Plaintiff may attempt to cure these deficiencies in an amended Complaint.
v. Potential State Law Claims
In addition to § 1983 claims, Plaintiff purports to assert state law claims, though Plaintiff does not identify any such claims. Compl. at 1. Because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any such state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Court will reconsider the issue of supplemental jurisdiction if (1) Plaintiff is allowed to proceed on a federal claim in an amended complaint, (2) he identifies state law claims in that amended complaint, and (3) his state law claims are plausible.
4. Standards for Amended Complaint
If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging that the elements of the violation are met; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. In addition, Plaintiff must include facts showing that Plaintiff can meet the Monell requirements if Plaintiff includes the Post Falls Police Department as a defendant.
Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff's allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as nonexistent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint).
Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff's name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court.
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within 60 days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”).
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has 60 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if Plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this case. 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state a claim upon relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. 3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) 14 is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint.