Opinion
No. 96 M.D. 2013
10-31-2013
Legend Collins, a minor, Enshatel Sparrow, a minor, Galord Sparrow, a minor, Mikel Collins, a minor, by their mother, Denise Collins; Saleem Bradley Capps, a minor, Adam L. Jackson, a minor, by his grandmother, Vanessa J. Miller; Quadin Williams, a minor, by his mother, Andrea Fiqueroa; Tyjuwon Scott, a minor, Jamal Scott, a minor, Kareem Scott, a minor, Felisha Scott, a minor, by their mother, Lasheena White; Kal'el Carr, a minor, by his mother, Rachel Melton; DeSean Gay, a minor, by his mother, Gervone Elliot; Taja Wilson, a minor, by her mother, Cinquetta Howard; all individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Petitioners v. State of PA, Pennsylvania Department of Education, The School District of Philadelphia, The City of Philadelphia, and The School Reform Commission, Respondents
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI
Before this Court in its original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Department of Education (Department) (collectively, Commonwealth); the School District of Philadelphia (District) and the School Reform Commission (Commission) (collectively, School Respondents); and the City of Philadelphia (City) to an Amended Petition for Review filed by several special needs' students enrolled in the District and their parents and/or guardians (Students). Students seek declaratory relief, an accounting and injunctive relief with respect to actions allegedly taken by School Respondents in connection with the implementation of the District's long-range Facilities Master Plan. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the action with respect to the Commonwealth, and transfer Students' claims against School Respondents and the City to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County because we lack original jurisdiction over those parties.
At issue in this case is the implementation of the District's long-range Facilities Master Plan. The District began developing the Facilities Master Plan in 2010 to "standardize grade configurations, increase school utilization and reduce excess building capacity." http://webgui.phila.k12.pa.us/offices/f/facilities-master-plan. Following numerous public hearings, community engagement meetings and submission of proposals from principals, students, parents and community organizations, the Commission approved the Facilities Master Plan on March 7, 2013. Id. Implementation of the Facilities Master Plan will result in several program relocations, mergers and consolidations, personnel cuts, and the closure of 23 schools in the District at the end of the 2012-2013 academic year.
On February 28, 2013, Students filed a pro se Petition for Review in this Court's original jurisdiction seeking equitable relief against the District and Commonwealth. This Court directed Students to obtain counsel, and on June 10, 2013, Students' counsel filed an Amended Petition for Review (Amended Petition) against the Commonwealth, School Respondents and the City.
The Amended Petition claims that the proposed school closures, personnel reductions and cuts in "related services" resulting from the Facilities Master Plan and proposed 2013-2014 District budget (1) are discriminatory and (2) will deprive the District's special needs' students of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by denying them services provided for in their Individualized Education Programs (IEP). The Amended Petition alleges that the Facilities Master Plan violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment; Article I, Section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1983; the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§1401 - 1487; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12101 - 12213; and the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA), 20 U.S.C. §§6301 - 7941.
The Amended Petition alleges that the Facilities Master Plan violates federal and state law by "providing for the immediate and arbitrary closure of multiple ... schools with large populations of children with Special Needs ... which are located primarily and disproportionately in non-white communities." (Amended Petition at ¶121).
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires that for a state to receive federal assistance thereunder, it must provide a child with disabilities a "free appropriate public education" based on the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. §1412; D.Z. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 2 A.3d 712, 716 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). The IDEA establishes minimum requirements for the education of children with disabilities. Id. To implement those requirements, the Commonwealth, through the Department of Education, promulgated the Pennsylvania Special Education Regulations and the Pennsylvania Special Education Standards. Id. Pursuant to state regulations, a school district must develop an IEP tailored in accordance with certain procedures for each child with a disability. Id.
The Amended Petition repeatedly refers to the "13th Amendment Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the United States." Because there is no such clause, we will infer that Students are claiming a violation of the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
The Amended Petition also claims that Respondents' actions violated Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). However, because the NCLBA reauthorized and amended the ESEA in 2002, we will consider Students' ESEA and NLCBA claims as one cause of action. Additionally, Paragraph 5 of the Amended Petition cites to numerous other federal statutes which are merely prior versions of current statutes or are not further addressed in the Amended Petition. We will not consider those claims.
Students seek the following relief: (1) a declaration that the actions of School Respondents in adopting and initiating the Facilities Master Plan and the 2013-2014 budget are unconstitutional and in violation of federal and state law; (2) an order directing Respondents to provide an accounting of various information relating to special needs' students, budgets and funding for special education beginning with the 2011-2012 academic year; (3) a preliminary injunction halting Respondents' implementation of the Facilities Master Plan and 2013-2014 budget, pending receipt of and a hearing on the requested accounting information and a final determination by this Court; (4) a permanent injunction precluding implementation and enforcement of the Facilities Master Plan and 2013-2014 budget; and (5) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
The Commonwealth, School Respondents and the City each filed preliminary objections to the Amended Petition. Both the Commonwealth and School Respondents raised improper service of process, in addition to several other preliminary objections. Students admitted that service to these parties was improper, but asserted that the Amended Petition was served on School Respondents on June 12, 2013, and that the defect was correctable with respect to the Commonwealth. Accordingly, by order dated August 14, 2013, this Court overruled the preliminary objection of School Respondents raising improper service, and sustained in part the preliminary objection of the Commonwealth relating to service, ordering Students to serve the Amended Petition on the Commonwealth within 14 days. Before this Court are the remaining preliminary objections of the Commonwealth, School Respondents and the City.
Students served the Commonwealth on August 28, 2013, in compliance with this Court's August 14, 2013 Order.
In considering preliminary objections, we must accept as true all well-pled allegations of material fact and all inferences reasonably deducible from those allegations. Brendley v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, 926 A.2d 1276, 1280 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). We need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations or expressions of opinion. Id. The Court will sustain preliminary objections when it appears with certainty that the law permits no recovery. Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Industry, 958 A.2d 1050, 1053 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
I.
The Commonwealth has filed preliminary objections seeking to dismiss the Amended Complaint, alleging that:
• Students' state law claims are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity;
• This Court lacks jurisdiction because Students failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA, ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act;
• Students failed to state a claim under the IDEA, ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act;
• Students failed to state a claim under the NCLBA;
• Students failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983; and
• Students failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1981.
The Commonwealth also filed a preliminary objection based on improper service. Students initially filed their pro se Petition for Review on February 28, 2013, but did not properly serve it upon the Commonwealth. However, after this Court ordered Students to obtain counsel, they properly served the Amended Petition, and we will deny that preliminary objection on that basis.
The Commonwealth also filed a preliminary objection based on improper service. Students initially filed their pro se Petition for Review on February 28, 2013, but did not properly serve it upon the Commonwealth. However, after this Court ordered Students to obtain counsel, they properly served the Amended Petition, and we will deny that preliminary objection on that basis.
A.
The Commonwealth asserts that Students' claims for a declaratory judgment, accounting and injunctive relief under Article I, Section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides that "[n]either the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right," are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Pa. Const. art. I, §26. Sovereign immunity's source is Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: "Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct." Pa. Const. art. I, §11.
We note that under Pa. R.C.P. No. 1030, immunity from suit is an affirmative defense that must be pled in a responsive pleading under the heading new matter, not as a preliminary objection. Smolsky v. Pennsylvania General Assembly, 34 A.3d 316, 321 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). However, courts have permitted a limited exception to this rule and have allowed parties to raise the affirmative defense of immunity as a preliminary objection where the plaintiff has not objected. Id. Here, Students have raised no objection to the Commonwealth raising sovereign immunity on preliminary objections.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars claims against a "Commonwealth party" which is defined as "a Commonwealth agency and any employee thereof, but only with respect to an act within the scope of his office or employment." Section 8501 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §8501. The legislature specifically waived sovereign immunity in nine areas. See Section 8522(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §8522(b). None of those nine areas are applicable here. Moreover, the General Assembly has not waived immunity for equitable claims seeking affirmative action by way of injunctive relief. Bonsavage v. Borough of Warrior Run, 676 A.2d 1330, 1331 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). Finally, this Court has previously held that there is no indication in the text or legislative history of Article I, Section 26 indicating that the legislative intent was to have that section operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity. McElwee v. Department of Transportation, 373 A.2d 1163, 1165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977).
Title 1 Pa. C.S. §2310 provides, in relevant part:
Pursuant to section 11 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.
The nine exceptions to sovereign immunity are: (1) vehicle liability; (2) medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody or control of personal property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody and control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines.
The Commonwealth and Department are clearly "Commonwealth parties" and, thus, protected by sovereign immunity. Because none of the exceptions to sovereign immunity apply here, and Article I, Section 26 does not operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity, Students' claims for relief arising under that section are dismissed with respect to the Commonwealth.
B.
The Commonwealth next alleges that this Court lacks jurisdiction of Students' claims under the IDEA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA because Students failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
It is a "long-settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." PennMont Securities v. Frucher, 586 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 2009). The IDEA provides for impartial administrative due process hearings to resolve disputes between parents and schools regarding the special education services schools must offer under the Act. 20 U.S.C. §1415(f); N.A. ex rel. D.A. v. Gateway School District, 820 F.Supp.2d 649, 651 (W.D. Pa. 2011). In Pennsylvania, a hearing officer first conducts an initial hearing, and the parties may subsequently appeal the officer's findings to the Pennsylvania Special Education Due Process Appeals Review Panel. Millersburg Area School District v. Lynda T., 707 A.2d 572, 576 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998); Gateway School District, 820 F.Supp.2d at 651. A party aggrieved by the findings of the administrative agency then has the right to bring a civil action in state or federal district court. 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(A).
A primary purpose of requiring administrative exhaustion prior to filing a civil suit in the IDEA context is to develop the factual record and resolve evidentiary disputes concerning, for example, evaluation, classification and placement. W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 496 (3d Cir.1995). In addition, use of the administrative process supports Congress' view that the needs of special education students are best accommodated by having the parents and the local education agency work together to formulate an individualized plan for each child's education. Komninos ex rel. Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Board of Education, 13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1994).
The IDEA exhaustion requirement may be excused where (1) exhaustion would be futile or inadequate; (2) the issue presented is purely a legal question; (3) the administrative agency cannot grant relief; or (4) exhaustion would work "severe or irreparable harm" upon a litigant. Id. In order to show "severe and irreparable harm," a plaintiff must provide a sufficient preliminary showing that the child will suffer serious and irreversible mental or physical damage (e.g., irremediable intellectual regression) by providing affidavits from competent professionals, along with other hard evidence that the child faces irreversible damage if the relief is not granted. Id. at 779.
Here, Students concede that they have not sought to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA. However, they contend that the circumstances of this case warrant a waiver of the exhaustion requirement because it would "defeat the objective of the statute to require each and every special need[s] student in Philadelphia County to file an individual administrative appeal addressing this district-wide elimination of essential service personnel impacting all special needs students and their right to an appropriate IEP." (Students' September 13, 2013 Opposition Brief at 12).
This argument has been rejected by the federal courts. In Blunt v. Lower Merion School District, 559 F.Supp.2d 548 (E.D. Pa. 2008), current and former disabled and African-American students, their parents and two advocacy organizations brought a putative class action against the school district alleging disability and race discrimination under the IDEA and several other federal statutes. In dismissing the plaintiffs' IDEA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court explained:
We note that while decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on the courts of this Commonwealth, we may accept them as persuasive authority. Goldman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 57 A.3d 1154, 1170 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
[T]he overwhelming focus of plaintiffs' Amended Complaint against the School District defendants is on the individualized circumstances of the named students and the School District defendants' failure to provide these students with the FAPE to which they are entitled. ... Plaintiffs cannot overcome the clear emphasis on the claims of the individual students by including conclusory allegations of some systemic deficiencies.Id. at 559. More recently, in Gateway School District, parents of autistic students brought an action alleging that the school district violated the IDEA by failing to provide special education services and misrepresenting the students' educational progress and, therefore, denying them a FAPE. The Court, citing the above language from Blunt, also dismissed plaintiffs' IDEA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 820 F.Supp.2d at 653. Moreover, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they did not need to exhaust their administrative remedies where they sought relief on behalf of a class because "the named plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies." Id.
Here, the Amended Complaint similarly contains conclusory allegations of "systemic deficiencies" resulting from the implementation of the District's Facilities Master Plan. Given the similarities between the allegations here and those in Blunt and Gateway School District, we find those cases persuasive and reject Students' argument that they should be excused from exhausting their administrative remedies because the Facilities Master Plan will affect all Special Needs' students in the District.
However, Students argue that if the requested injunctive relief is not granted and they are forced to exhaust their administrative remedies, the entire Special Needs' student population in the District will suffer permanent and irreparable harm because, by that time, the essential service personnel will not be available. In making this argument, Students make only vague and conclusory allegations about the negative psychological and emotional effects that implementation of the Facilities Master Plan will have on them. Because such general allegations simply are not sufficient to demonstrate that the District's Special Needs' students will suffer "irreversible damage" unless they are excused from first exhausting their administrative remedies available under the IDEA, Students' IDEA claims are dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
For instance, the Affidavits submitted by the parents/guardians all state that Students are "being subjected to further emotional and psychological trauma and upset by the abrupt, destabilizing removal from their existing program(s) and school(s) and/or as a result of the ongoing anxiety about the availability of any future community based program suitable for their special needs and circumstances." (Exhibit 1 of Amended Petition).
C.
For the same reasons we dismiss Students' IDEA claims for failing to exhaust their administrative remedies, we also dismiss their claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Section 1415(l) of the IDEA provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, ... title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.20 U.S.C. §1415(l) (citations omitted). In other words, "a party who brings a claim that seeks relief also available under [the] IDEA must first exhaust [the] IDEA's administrative remedies." Jeremy H. by Hunter v. Mount Lebanon School District, 95 F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 1996). Because Students' Section 504 and ADA claims were based on the same allegations as their IDEA claim and sought relief that would be available under the IDEA, they were also subject to the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. See Blunt, 559 F.Supp.2d at 560-61; Gateway School District, 820 F.Supp.2d at 654. Therefore, Students' claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are also dismissed.
Because we are dismissing Students' IDEA, Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we need not address the Commonwealth's preliminary objections relating to Students' failure to state a claim under those statutes.
D.
The Commonwealth alleges that Students' NCLBA claims must be dismissed because there is no private right of action under that statute. The Commonwealth is correct. In Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 456 n.6 (2009), the United States Supreme Court explained:
[The] NCLB[A] does not provide a private right of action. ... Without statutory intent, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute. Thus, NCLB[A] is enforceable only by the agency charged with administering it.(Citations omitted). Therefore, Students' NCLBA claims are barred.
E.
The Commonwealth next argues that Students cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that states and state agencies are not "persons" for purposes of Section 1983. See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 ("neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under §1983."); Warren v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 616 A.2d 140, 142 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (Department of Corrections not "person" subject to suit under Section 1983); Ziccardi v. Department of General Services, Bureau of Buildings and Grounds, 527 A.2d 183, 188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (Commonwealth is not a "person" subject to a suit for damages under Section 1983). Because neither the Commonwealth nor the Department of Education is a "person" under Section 1983, Students cannot state a claim against the Commonwealth under Section 1983.
F.
Finally, the Commonwealth argues that Students cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1981. Section 1981(a) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.42 U.S.C. §1981(a).
While Section 1981 guarantees extensive rights, it does not create a private right of action against state actors. Rather, "the express cause of action for damages created by §1983 constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in §1981 by state governmental units." McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 116-117 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Because Students cannot state a claim against the Commonwealth under 42 U.S.C. §1983, they have no remedy available for alleged violation of their Section 1981 rights.
Accordingly, the Amended Petition is dismissed as to the Commonwealth.
Finally, we note that the Amended Petition does not delineate any specific causes of action, counts or factual allegations against the Commonwealth. Because the Amended Petition lacks any allegations of class-based intentional discrimination or deprivation of due process against the Commonwealth, to the extent Students are alleging 14th Amendment violations by the Commonwealth, those claims are dismissed.
II.
School Respondents also filed numerous preliminary objections, several of which repeat the arguments made by the Commonwealth. School Respondents first allege that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the District and the Commission because neither of those parties are "Commonwealth parties," and the actual Commonwealth parties are not indispensable. We agree.
Section 761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §761(a)(1), provides that the Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction over all civil actions or proceedings against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof acting in his or her official capacity. Section 102 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §102, defines "Commonwealth government" as:
The government of the Commonwealth, including the courts and other officers or agencies of the unified judicial
system, the General Assembly and its officers and agencies, the Governor, and the departments, boards, commissions,, authorities and officers and agencies of the Commonwealth, but the term does not include any political subdivision, municipal or other local authority, or any officer or agency of any such political subdivision or local authority. (Emphasis added).That section defines "Commonwealth agency" as "any executive agency or independent agency." Id. Under 1 Pa. C.S. §1991, the District is a political subdivision and, therefore, not a part of the Commonwealth government. Similarly, the Commission, as an "instrumentality of a school district of the first class," is a political subdivision and not a part of the Commonwealth government.
That section defines "political subdivision" as "[a]ny county, city, borough, incorporated town, township, school district, vocational school district and county institution district."
Section 696 of the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, added by the Act of April 27, 1998, P.L. 270, as amended, 24 P.S. §6-696. That section provides, in relevant part:
(a) Within thirty (30) days of a declaration by the Secretary of Education that a school district of the first class is distressed under section 691(c) ... a School Reform Commission shall be established consisting of four members initially appointed by the Governor and one member initially appointed by the mayor of the city coterminous with the school district. The School Reform Commission shall be an instrumentality of a school district of the first class, exercising the powers of the board of school directors. The Governor shall appoint a chairman of the School Reform Commission. At least three of the commission members, including the member appointed by the mayor, must be residents of the school district. (Footnote omitted).
While the Amended Petition also includes Commonwealth parties over which this Court clearly has original jurisdiction, "[i]t is well established that merely naming the Commonwealth or its officers in an action does not conclusively establish original jurisdiction of this Court." Village Charter School v. Chester Upland School District, 813 A.2d 20, 25 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). This Court has original jurisdiction in a suit against a Commonwealth party and non-Commonwealth parties only when the Commonwealth party is indispensable. Id.
In general, an indispensable party is "one whose rights are so connected with the claims of the litigants that no relief can be granted without infringing upon those rights." Id. "[A] Commonwealth agency should not be declared an indispensable party unless meaningful relief cannot conceivably be afforded without the involvement of the sovereign itself." Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 686 A.2d 1380, 1385 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
Here, the claims in the Amended Petition are all related to the Facilities Master Plan created by the District and the Commission. To the extent that Students are entitled to any relief, they could obtain this relief from the District and Commission, the only parties responsible for the creation and implementation of the Facilities Master Plan. Accordingly, the Commonwealth is not an indispensable party to this action, and, therefore, this Court does not have original jurisdiction over School Respondents.
Accordingly, School Respondents' preliminary objection for lack of jurisdiction is sustained, and Students' claims with respect to School Respondents are transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
III.
The City filed a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 1028(4) stating that the allegations in the Amended Petition are legally insufficient with respect to the City. The City argues that it is not a proper party to the action because it is a separate entity from the District, plays no role in managing the affairs of the District, and has no duty to develop educational plans for Special Needs' students under any of the federal laws cited by Students. However, we need not address that argument because, for the same reasons stated in the previous section with respect to School Respondents, we lack original jurisdiction over the City.
The City did not raise lack of jurisdiction in their preliminary objections. However, "questions of jurisdiction can never be waived, and may be raised at any time by the parties or sua sponte by an appellate court." Pennhurst Medical Group, P.C. v. Department of Public Welfare, 796 A.2d 423, 425 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). --------
Accordingly, Students' claims with respect to the City are transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 31st day of October, 2013, the preliminary objections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Department of Education are sustained and the Amended Petition for Review is dismissed as to them. The claims in the Amended Petition for Review against the School District of Philadelphia, the School Reform Commission and the City of Philadelphia are transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge