Opinion
No. 04-04-00200-CV
Delivered and Filed: May 4, 2005.
Appeal from the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 1999-CI-15915, Honorable John J. Specia, Jr., Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lawrence Collins, Jr., appeals the decision of the trial court denying his application for writ of garnishment. Collins raises four issues for review. We overrule all four issues and affirm the decision of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
This is an appeal from an order denying writ of garnishment. Lawrence Collins, Jr., had obtained a default judgment against Jill Guilfoyle, an active-duty sergeant in the United States Army Reserves, in the sum of $2,000.00, together with interest and costs. In an attempt to satisfy this judgment, Collins requested that the court institute proceedings against the United States Department of the Army ("Army") to garnish the military pay of Guilfoyle. The trial court denied Collins' application for writ of garnishment, and this appeal followed.
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT
In four issues, Collins contends that the trial court erred in denying his application for writ of garnishment against the Army. Garnishment is a remedial statutory means by which a judgment creditor may enforce the collection of a money judgment from the nonexempt property of a judgment debtor in the hands of a third party. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 63.001 (Vernon 1997); Orange County v. Ware, 819 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Tex. 1991); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Texas Moline Ltd., 96 F.Supp.2d 644, 645-46 (5th Cir. 2000); see generally 2 WILLIAM V. DORSANEO III, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 42 (1989). However, it is well-settled that, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States and its agencies cannot be garnished by persons having claims against government obligors. See Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 255-56 (1999); Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. 20, 20-21 (1846); Arnold v. United States, 331 F.Supp. 42, 44 (5th Cir. 1971). Additionally, in Texas, current wages for personal service are constitutionally exempt from garnishment. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28; see also Sloan v. Douglass, 713 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (explaining the purpose of the exemption for current wages is to defray living expenses); Davidson Texas, Inc. v. Garcia, 664 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex.App.-Austin 1984, no writ) (holding this exemption should be liberally construed in favor of the wage earner and applied regardless of whether the compensation is called "wages" or "salary").
Of course, federal employees, including members of the Army, are not immune from garnishment proceedings for alimony or child support. See 42 U.S.C. § 659; see, e.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 822 (1984). However, no such claim is involved here.
As under federal law, garnishment for the purpose of enforcing court-ordered child support or spousal maintenance payments is excepted from this exemption. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.
Here, Collins specifically requested that the court garnish current wages due to Guilfoyle under her employment with the Army. Because the Army is immune from this proceeding and current wages for personal service are exempt from garnishment, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Collins' application for writ of garnishment. Accordingly, we overrule all issues on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all issues, we affirm the decision of the trial court.