Opinion
2024-CA-0484
08-08-2024
ELISA KNOWLES COLLINS v. LESLIE RICARD CHAMBERS, HON. MARCUS L. HUNTER, AND NANCY LANDRY IN HER CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
David Mark Bienvenu, Jr. Anthony J. Lascaro BIENVENU FOCO & VIATOR, LLC Michael Paul Bienvenu Kolby P. Marchand KINCHEN WALKER BIENVENU BARGAS REED & HELM, LLC COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT Alesia M. Ardoin R. Gray Sexton LAW OFFICES OF R. GRAY SEXTON, Willie Hunter, Jr. LAW OFFICE OF WILLIE HUNTER, JR., Daniel J. Hunter THE HUNTER &HUNTER LAW FIRM, LLC, Shauncey Hunter Rideway CHRISTIAN AND SMALL, LLP COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT EAST BATON ROUGE NO. C751318, "24-B" Honorable Donald R. Johnson, Judge
David Mark Bienvenu, Jr. Anthony J. Lascaro BIENVENU FOCO & VIATOR, LLC
Michael Paul Bienvenu Kolby P. Marchand KINCHEN WALKER BIENVENU BARGAS REED & HELM, LLC COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Alesia M. Ardoin R. Gray Sexton
LAW OFFICES OF R. GRAY SEXTON, Willie Hunter, Jr. LAW OFFICE OF WILLIE HUNTER, JR., Daniel J. Hunter THE HUNTER &HUNTER LAW FIRM, LLC, Shauncey Hunter Rideway CHRISTIAN AND SMALL, LLP COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEE
(Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Rachael D. Johnson, Judge Karen K. Herman, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott)
Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase recused herself from this case.
The redistricting was enacted to settle a suit by the Justice Department under the Voting Rights Act.
BELSOME, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.
LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART FOR THE REASONS ASSIGNED BY JENKINS, J.
JENKINS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
RACHAEL D. JOHNSON JUDGE
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AUGUST 8, 2024, AT 1: 26 PM
Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1409(F) provides that "[j]udgment [by the court of appeal in an action objecting to candidacy] shall be rendered within twenty-four hours after the case is argued. The court of appeal shall indicate the date and time rendered on the judgment." Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1413 states that "[c]omputation of all time intervals in this Chapter shall include Sundays and other legal holidays. However, if the time interval ends on a Sunday or other legal holiday, then noon of the next legal day shall be deemed to be the end of the time interval."
We need not and should not guess whether Ms. Chambers testified truthfully and acted in good faith. This sort of determination falls squarely in the province of the trial court. Short of finding manifest error in that determination, this court should let that finding stand.
This is an election suit concerning whether Appellees, Leslie Richard Chambers (“Ms. Chambers”) and Marcus L. Hunter (“Judge Hunter”), should be disqualified as candidates for the upcoming election for the office of Associate Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court for District Two (“Associate Justice, Dist. Two”). Appellant, Elisa Knowles Collins (“Ms. Collins”), seeks review of the July 31, 2024 trial court judgment, overruling her objections to Ms. Chambers' and Judge Hunter's qualifications for candidacy for Associate Justice, Dist. Two. Upon review of the facts and applicable law of the matter sub judice, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 17, 2024, Ms. Chambers and Judge Hunter each filed a notice of candidacy with the Louisiana Secretary of State seeking election to the office of Associate Justice, Dist. Two. On July 19, 2024, Ms. Chambers amended her notice of candidacy to update her email and phone number. Then, on July 26, 2024, Ms. Collins filed a petition challenging Ms. Chambers' and Judge Hunter's qualifications to run as candidates for Associate Justice, Dist. Two. Trial occurred on July 30, 2024. At the commencement of trial, the trial court considered a motion to strike filed by Ms. Collins, as well as a motion to strike and an exception of no case of action filed by Judge Hunter.
Judge Hunter is currently a Judge on the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit.
In pleadings, Ms. Chambers alleged that the domicile requirement, as applied here, violated the Equal Protection of Law provisions of the United States Constitution. That issue was mooted in the analysis of the majority and it is not necessary to reach it in this dissent.
Ms. Collins moved to strike all constitutional challenges presented by Ms. Chambers as it pertains to Ms. Chambers' residency or domicile requirements. Ms. Chambers raised constitutional challenges to Act 7 of the 2024 Regular Legislative Session enacted on May 1, 2024 ("Act 7"); La. Const. art. 5 § 24; and La. R.S. 18:451. Ms. Collins argued that a court cannot declare a statute unconstitutional in the context of a summary proceeding. Ms. Collins further argued that Ms. Chambers had almost three months to file an ordinary action in federal or state court to challenge the statute as being unconstitutional but chose not to do so. Ms. Chambers argued that she was not presenting a constitutional challenge to the requirements of residency in order to assert a claim, but instead was raising the issue as a defense to the challenge of her candidacy. In particular, she cites nationwide jurisprudence to avoid an unconstitutional application of the one-year residency requirement in which reapportionment has resulted in the loss of a district. The trial court denied Ms. Collins' motion to strike.
On May 1, 2024, the Louisiana State Legislature enacted Act 7. Act 7 provided for the redistricting of Louisiana Supreme Court districts. Act 7 enacted La. R.S. 13:101.2 and 101.3 and repealed La. R.S. 13:101, 101.1 and 312.4.
Judge Hunter's motion to strike and exception of no cause of action asserted that Ms. Collins' pleadings were legally deficient and did not meet the necessary evidentiary requirements. Judge Hunter argued that Ms. Collins failed to produce self-authenticated documents in her initial pleadings to support her argument that Judge Hunter did not file his federal taxes in 2022 and his state taxes in 2021, 2022, and 2023. Ms. Collins countered that to defeat a no cause of action claim, a plaintiff only needs to show that if the allegations presented in their petition are assumed to be true, there is relief that can be provided to the plaintiff. The trial court denied Judge Hunter's motion to strike and exception of no cause of action.
The trial court heard testimony from Ms. Collins, Ms. Chambers, and Rosie Harper ("Ms. Harper"), a certified public accountant and Judge Hunter's tax preparer. In support of her challenge to Ms. Chambers' and Judge Hunter's candidacies, Ms. Collins testified that she has lived in East Baton Rouge Parish since October 1983. From 1983 to 2016, she resided on Lanier Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. She currently lives on East Caprice Avenue, Baton Rouge, Louisiana because her property on Lanier Drive flooded and was subsequently demolished. Ms. Collins intends to move back to her property on Lanier Drive at some point. Ms. Collins is registered to vote and her voter registration card, which she received on June 3, 2024, was submitted into evidence. Her voter registration card indicated that she resides within District Two as defined by Act 7. The voter registration card also shows that she has been registered to vote in her ward or precinct for almost forty years.
Ms. Chambers testified that she resides in Prairieville, Louisiana, which is in Ascension Parish. She further testified that since she became an attorney in May 2009, she has been a part of the legal community in East Baton Rouge Parish. She acknowledged that she did not reside in District Two when she filed her initial notice of candidacy on July 17, 2024, and her amended notice of candidacy on July 19, 2024. Ms. Chambers also acknowledged that she is not a registered voter in District Two and has never been a registered voter in East Baton Rouge Parish. While working in East Baton Rouge Parish, Ms. Chambers resided in St. Helena Parish for the first few years and now currently resides in Ascension Parish. While practicing law part time, Ms. Chambers would use her Ascension Parish address as the address for her law practice.
Ms. Chambers testified that she filed her 2021, 2022, and 2023 taxes through a third-party application called TurboTax. For her 2022 tax return filed through TurboTax, Ms. Chambers received a report from TurboTax showing her name, address, bank account number, and her bank routing transit number. In addition to this, the report showed that she was due a refund of $4,958.00. Ms. Chambers testified that she checked on the status of her tax return when she went to the Louisiana Department of Revenue's website, and the only feedback she received was that no information had been processed. She stated that she believes it takes about four to six weeks to process the returns so she did not find it unusual that she had not received her refund. As of the July 30, 2024 hearing, Ms. Chambers averred that she had not received her $4,958.00 refund.
Ms. Harper testified that she has been a certified public accountant since 1995, and Judge Hunter has been her client since 2019. Ms. Harper serves as Judge Hunter's tax preparer for his personal taxes and his company. Ms. Harper testified that on July 12, 2024, she and Judge Hunter communicated over text to discuss information she needed to file his 2022 and 2023 tax returns. Judge Hunter provided the documents and information she requested. On July 16, 2024, Ms. Harper electronically filed Judge Hunter's 2022 and 2023 state and federal income tax returns. Ms. Harper testified that the IRS accepted Judge Hunter's 2021 tax return on July 18, 2022. Ms. Harper also confirmed that she personally prepared and handled Judge Hunter's tax returns for 2018, 2019, and 2020 by going online and receiving an account transcript from the IRS. Ms. Harper subsequently wrote letters to Judge Hunter confirming the filing of his tax returns from 2018 through 2023. On July 27, 2024, Ms. Harper discovered that the IRS rejected Judge Hunter's tax returns that she filed for 2022 and 2023 because the IRS temporarily required an IP pin. Ms. Harper notified Judge Hunter of this rejection on the same day.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court determined that Ms. Chambers and Judge Hunter were qualified to run for Associate Justice, Dist. Two. Accordingly, on July 31, 2024, the trial court rendered judgment, denying Ms. Collins' petition to disqualify Ms. Chambers and Judge Hunter from the election. The judgment also denied the aforementioned motions to strike and the exception of no cause of action. This timely appealed followed.
On appeal, Ms. Collins raises four assignments of error: (1) the trial court committed legal error in denying her motion to strike regarding Ms. Chambers; (2) the trial court committed legal error in judicially nullifying the domicile requirements for election to judicial office set forth in La. Const. art. 5 § 24, La. R.S. 18:451 and Act 7, thus allowing Ms. Chambers to seek election in District Two despite not being domiciled in District Two at the time of qualification and for one year preceding her election; (3) the trial court committed legal and manifest factual error in applying a legally erroneous standard of proof by not disqualifying Ms. Chambers for falsely certifying that she had filed her 2022 Louisiana state income tax return; and (4) the trial court committed legal and manifest factual error in applying a legally erroneous standard of proof by not disqualifying Judge Hunter for falsely certifying that he had filed his 2022 federal income tax return and his 2021, 2022, and 2023 Louisiana state income tax returns.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a manifest error standard of review, and issues of law are reviewed for determination of whether the interpretive decision is legally correct." Jefferson Fin. Fed. Credit Union v. New Orleans Libations &Distilling Co., 22-0123, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/31/22), 351 So.3d 783, 785 (citing Smith v. Charbonnet, 17-0634, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So.3d 1055, 1059). In addition, the determination of domicile made in the trial courts are subject to a manifest error standard of review. Schindler v. Russ, 22-0533, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/8/22), 346 So.3d 309, 317, writ denied, 2022-01214, p. 1 (La. 8/11/22), 343 So.3d 703, 704 (quoting Suarez v. King, 210458, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/3/21), 366 So.3d 315, 318).
"The person objecting to the candidacy of a person bears the burden of proof." La. State Bd. of Ethics v. Garrett, 06-0263, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/21/06), 929 So.2d 176, 180 (citations omitted). "[O]nce the party bearing the burden of proof has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present sufficient evidence to overcome the other party's prima facie case." Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, p. 8 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 542. "Generally, the legal term 'burden of proof' 'denotes the duty of establishing by a fair preponderance of the evidence the truth of the operative facts upon which the issue at hand is made to turn by substantive law.'" Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)).
DISCUSSION
La. R.S. 18:492, entitled Grounds for an objection to candidacy, provides in pertinent part:
A. An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) The defendant failed to qualify for the primary election in the manner prescribed by law. ....
(3) The defendant does not meet the qualifications for the office he seeks in the primary election. ....
(7) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2), or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.Ms. Collins' Motion to Strike
Ms. Collins argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to strike because a court may not declare a statute unconstitutional during a summary proceeding. Ms. Collins further argues that under La. R.S. 18:1406(C) and La. R.S. 18:1409(A)(1), the challenge to Ms. Chambers' and Judge Hunter's candidacies was tried as a summary proceeding. After review of the record, we determine that Ms. Chambers was not asking the trial court to declare Act 7, La. Const. art. 5 § 24, and La. R.S. 18:451 are unconstitutional. Instead, Ms. Chambers argued that Ms. Collins sought an unconstitutional application of Act 7; La. Const. art. 5 § 24; and La. R.S. 18:451 in this case. Thus, we affirm the trial court's denial of Ms. Collins' motion to strike.
La. R.S. 18:1406(C) states in pertinent part:
The defendant shall be served with citation directing him to appear in court no later than 10:00 a.m. on the fourth day after suit was filed, subject, however, to the provisions of R.S. 18:1408(D). The defendant is not required to answer the petition, but if he answers, he shall do so prior to trial.
La. R.S. 18:1409(A)(1) states in pertinent part:
Actions objecting to the calling of a special election, objecting to candidacy, contesting the certification of a recall petition, or contesting an election shall be tried summarily, without a jury, and in open court. The trial shall begin no later than 10:00 a.m. on the fourth day after suit was filed.
Tax Return Challenge
Ms. Collins argues that Judge Hunter and Ms. Chambers should be disqualified for the election for Associate Justice, Dist. Two because they failed to file their federal and/or state tax returns for the five previous tax years. To disqualify Judge Hunter and Ms. Chambers as candidates for the election of Associate Justice, Dist. Two, Ms. Collins needed to establish a prima facie case for disqualification. See Cranch v. Wicker, 20-0716, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/13/20), 311 So.3d 384, 386. Ms. Collins established her prima facie case by providing public record request results from the Louisiana Department of Revenue ("LDR") regarding the filing of tax returns for Judge Hunter and Ms. Collins. LDR reported that Judge Hunter failed to file a federal tax return in 2022 and Louisiana state income tax returns for 2021, 2022, and 2023. LDR reported that Ms. Chambers failed to file a Louisiana state income tax return in 2022.
According to La. R.S. 18:492 (A)(7), if a "defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and state income tax returns," there are grounds for an objection to the defendant's candidacy. When interpreting La. R.S. 18:492 (A)(7), the secretary of LDR is allowed to provide us guidance. Clark v. Bridges, 23-00237, p. 6 (La. 2/22/23), 356 So.3d 990, 993-94. Pursuant to La. R.S. 47:1511, "the secretary [of LDR] is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this Title and the purposes of any other statutes or provisions included under the secretary's authority. These rules and regulations ... will have the full force and effect of law." La. Admin. Code Title 61, pt. I, § 4911(B)(4) provides practical guidance as to what it means to file tax returns for the purposes of La. R.S. 18:492 (A)(7). La. Admin. Code Title 61, pt. I, § 4911(B)(4) states that an electronically filed tax return is deemed filed "on the date transmitted to the department or to a third party acting as the department's agent."
Ms. Collins argues that Judge Hunter failed to show that he filed his 2022 federal and state tax returns by the extended due dates of October 15, 2023 and November 15, 2023. The record reflects that Judge Hunter filed his 2022 and 2023 tax returns the day before he filed his notice of candidacy on July 17, 2024. Ms. Collins further argues that Judge Hunter failed to provide evidence that his income tax returns were accepted by July 17, 2024, and that relying on his CPA tax preparer is not a valid defense to a false certification when a filing fails to meet the requirements of La. R.S. 47:1511.
Ms. Harper, Judge Hunter's CPA tax preparer, testified that she transmitted his tax returns electronically. She testified that on July 16, 2024, she electronically filed Judge Hunter's 2022 and 2023 state and federal income tax returns. Ms. Harper further testified that Judge Hunter's 2021 tax return was accepted on July 18, 2022. During trial, multiple text messages and letters between Judge Hunter and Ms. Harper were introduced that showed that Judge Hunter relied on Ms. Harper to file his federal and state tax returns. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Bridges made it clear that a transmission to a third party acting as a defendant's agent constitutes filing for purposes of filing a tax return electronically. The court in Bridges stated:
The regulation provides that a return filed electronically is deemed filed on the date of transmission to the LDR or on the date of transmission to a third party acting as its agent. The standard set forth
in the regulation is not determined by the date on which the LDR receives the tax return electronically, but, rather, the date on which the filing party has transmitted the tax return either to the LDR or to the third party acting as the LDR's agent. Transmission by the taxpayer is the operative event for electronic filing.23-00237, p. 7, 356 So.3d at 994.
On July 16, 2024, and July 27, 2024, Ms. Harper communicated to Judge Hunter in writing that his 2022 and 2023 tax returns had been filed. Although there was testimony that Judge Hunter's taxes had been rejected and needed to be filed in an alternate manner, we find that the rejection does not amount to a failure to file. Once the CPA transmitted the returns electronically and communicated the same to Judge Hunter, he complied with the filing requirements set out in the notice of candidacy. Judge Hunter satisfied his burden to rebut the prima facie case of Ms. Collins' objection to his candidacy. After review of the record, we find that Judge Hunter satisfied his burden of proof showing that he filed his taxes for each of the five previous tax years.
On July 27, 2024, Judge Hunter was notified that the IRS received his 2022 and 2023 electronically filed taxes but they were rejected. The 2022 and 2023 tax returns were rejected because the IRS temporarily required an IP pin.
Ms. Collins then argues that Ms. Chambers failed to meet her burden of proof by failing to provide evidence of transmission showing that she electronically filed her 2022 state income tax return. We agree. In Wicker, the First Circuit Court of Appeal held that "uncorroborated and self-serving testimony" was not enough to meet the burden of proof to rebut the plaintiffs' prima facie case. 200716, p. 4, 311 So.3d at 386. Without affirmative documentary proof showing that her tax return had been filed, the First Circuit Court of Appeal determined that the candidate was disqualified for falsely certifying that all of her state returns for the last five years had been filed when she signed her notice of candidacy. Id. at p. 9, 311 So.3d at 389.
The TurboTax document Ms. Chambers provided as evidence does not provide proof of transmission of her 2022 Louisiana state tax return to a third party. The TurboTax document only provides that if Ms. Chambers were to file her 2022 Louisiana state tax return, she would be owed a refund in the amount of $4,958.00. The TurboTax document gave her instructions on how to file her 2022 Louisiana state tax return by mail and electronically, which implies that she had not yet submitted her 2022 Louisiana state tax return. This is further supported by her testimony when she attempted to view the status for her 2022 tax return on the LDR's website, the only feedback she received was that "no information had been processed." Ms. Chambers did not provide any other documents showing that she transmitted her 2022 Louisiana state tax return. Without affirmative documentary proof of transmission, Ms. Chambers relied on her own self-serving testimony. As established in Wicker, self-serving testimony does not meet the burden of proof to show that Ms. Chambers filed her taxes. Thus, Ms. Chambers failed to meet her burden of proof to rebut the prima facie case established by Ms. Collins in her objection to Ms. Chambers' candidacy.
Domicile Challenge
As we find that the objection to Ms. Chambers' candidacy for the upcoming election for the office of Associate Justice, Dist. Two has merit because she failed to demonstrate that she filed her state taxes in 2022, the domicile issue is moot. "It is well established that appellate courts will not render advisory opinions from which no practical results can follow." Whitney Nat'l Bank of New Orleans v. Poydras Ctr. Assocs., 468 So.2d 1246, 1248 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). "As a result, Courts have established the rule that moot questions will not be considered on appeal." Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, we will not consider the issue of Ms. Chambers' domicile.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the July 31, 2024 trial court judgment in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court's overruling the objection to Judge Hunter's candidacy. However, we reverse the trial court's overruling the objections to Ms. Chambers' candidacy and sustain the objection to Ms. Chambers' candidacy.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART
RDJ
TFL
DLD
RML
PAB
DNA
KKH
NEK
RLB
BELSOME, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.
I agree with the majority regarding its holding as to Mr. Hunter, but I disagree with respect to Ms. Chambers and, for the reasons that follow, I would affirm the trial court's judgment in full.
One-year domicile requirement.
Ms. Chambers, lived in what had been District 5 for the Supreme Court under the district configuration before the amendment1 of La. R.S. § 13:101.2 that became effective May 1, 2024. (For the sake of brevity, I will refer to the prior configuration as "Old District 5".) Her address, as of the time she qualified, was in Prairieville, which is not part of District 2 post re-apportionment. (Again for brevity, I will refer to District 2 as presently constituted as "New District 2".) The election for which Ms. Chambers qualified is for New District 2. A review of the redistricting statute shows that part of Old District 5 is now included in New District 2.
Ms. Collins alleges here that Chambers is not eligible because she does not live in New District 2. In the re-districting act, the legislature did not specify how the one-year residency eligibility rule would be handled. Because New District 2 did not exist prior to the effective date of the amendment, it was not possible that any of the contenders for the seat to have lived in the district for more than a year as required by La. R. S. 18:451. In Nicholson v. Grisaffe, 438 So.2d 550 (La.1983) the court modified and extended a re-apportionment exception based on La. Const. art. III, § 4, which provides:
B) Domicile; Special Provisions. However, at the next regular election for members of the legislature following legislative reapportionment, an elector may qualify as a candidate from any district created in whole or in part from a district existing prior to reapportionment if he was domiciled in that prior district for at least one year immediately preceding his qualification and was a resident of the state for the two years preceding his qualification. The seat of any member who changes his domicile from the district he represents or, if elected after reapportionment, whose domicile is not within the district he represents at the time he is sworn into office, shall be vacated thereby, any declaration of retention of domicile to the contrary notwithstanding.
Ms. Collins argues correctly that this exception specifically addresses "members of the legislature." It is noteworthy that in Nicholson, the court applied the exception to a parish council election. Ms. Collins attempts to distinguish Nicholson from this case on the basis of the office sought by the defendant in that litigation. Ms. Collins argues that that the parish council seat sought by the candidate in Nicholson was legislative in nature and is properly covered by La. Const. art. III §4 for that reason. I disagree with that argument.
The doctrine espoused in Nicholson is a pragmatic extension of a constitutional protection that is designed to ensure fairness in opportunity for candidates who might otherwise be "orphaned" by the re-apportionment of their historical district. The domicile exception in La. Const. art. III §4 specifically addresses itself to "members of the legislature", not members of any generic legislative body.
Nothing in Nicholson lends itself to a distinction that would restrict its application to the judiciary. If anything, Nicholson applies more forcefully here because the Supreme Court is much less a representative body than the legislature. The law that will be applied by whichever candidate is elected, will be based on legal concepts unfettered by allegiance to any particular group of people or geographical interests. The Nicholson rationale was followed to permit a limited exception to the one-year domicile requirement in McCarter v. Broom, 377 So.2d 383 (La.App. 1st Cir.1979); and Norris v. Gould, 2003-1876 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/5/03), 854 So.2d 448. It does not appear that there is any reported case in which the Nicholson exception is rejected.
Ms. Chambers has made a career for herself as an attorney in the New District 2. Under Nicholson, which has stood the test of time for over 40 years, she is entitled to run in that district with the understanding that if she succeeds, she must establish a domicile in New District 2 before she takes office.
Tax filing certification.
These two candidates are both affected by the notice of candidacy provisions in slightly different ways. The majority factually distinguishes Ms. Chambers' case from Mr. Hunter's. I cannot find a logical distinction between the two cases. With regard to the filing of income tax returns, both candidates believed, in good faith, that he or she had complied with La. R. S. 18:451 by filing income tax returns as required. In Mr. Hunter's case, he received notice from his accountant that his taxes were filed electronically. In fact, that notification was incorrect. The accountant had transmitted the subject returns but they were not accepted by the Louisiana Department of Revenue ("LDR") for technical reasons.
Similarly, Ms. Chambers testified that she had filed her tax returns electronically for the years 2019 through 2023. Her testimony contains a thorough explanation of her filing process which lends credence to the certification on her notice of candidacy:
My experience with the system has been to enter the information from my employers, the W- 2 forms, and any other relevant tax formation into Turbotax as-as they outlined in the various tabs. 2022 taxes were no different. Once I got to the end to submit my filing electronically which is how I always prefer, I submitted said tax
information after being asked what was my preference to mail them or to submit them electronically. I selected to submit them electronically. Following that I received a prompt that recognized that I would be receiving a refund from the state. And I was asked how did I want to receive my refund to which I then entered by account information, my personal account information, and I requested that the refund be sent electronically.
No one has contested the proposition that TurboTax is a third party authorized to make electronic tax filings to LDR. Ms. Collins agreed that Ms. Chambers had made appropriate filings for every year except 2022. Ms. Chambers testified that she transmitted her 2022 return in June, 2024. As she testified, she used the same procedure for her 2022 return as she had used in her successful transmissions for the other years in question. At trial, Ms. Chambers introduced the return generated by TurboTax as well as a coversheet that she believed constituted a receipt for filing. It is worth mentioning that TurboTax calculated that Ms. Chambers was due a refund of nearly $4600 from LDR based on the information she supplied. Therefore, she believed it would have significantly inured to her benefit to make a sincere effort to file the return. 2 Her demonstrated consistency in filing procedure coupled with the natural human instinct to recover money owed make Ms. Chambers testimony more than mere self-serving testimony.
The majority cites Clark v. Bridges, 2023-0237 (La. 2/22/23), 356 So.3d 990, the discussion of its affirmation of the trial court judgment regarding Mr. Hunter. However, I believe the majority errs in its interpretation of La. R. S. 18:451 and 18:492. The majority looks to Clark for guidance on what actions constitute "filing" of a tax return. I suggest here that La. R. S. 18:492 makes truthfulness in certification the guiding principle in this case. Requiring a candidate to meet Clark's definition of filing adds a requirement for candidacy that does not exist in the statute.
The principles and rationale by which the majority found Mr. Hunter's certification of tax filing to be acceptable must lead to the same conclusion regarding Ms. Chambers. I also hope to shed light on the fact that the legislation establishing the notice of candidacy and its related enforcement provisions (La. R. S. 18:451, et seq.) are procedural in nature. They create a process for qualification that is overlaid onto our constitution. In so doing, the certification provisions make a trap from a procedure that should be benign.
The qualifications for Supreme Court Judges are listed in our Constitution as follows:
(A) A judge of the supreme court .. shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least the number of years specified as follows:
(1) For the supreme court or a court of appeals--ten years. ...
(B) He shall not practice law. La. Const. art. V § 24
The enforcement provisions of La. R. S. 18:492(A)(7) allows a candidate to be dis-qualified even when he or she is in point of fact qualified as that word is defined by the Louisiana Constitution. The enforcement statute provides for disqualification of an otherwise qualified candidate if:
The [candidate] falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2), or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both. La. R. S. 18:492(A)(7). (Emphasis added.)
In effect, this legislation adds a de facto qualification that is not found in our constitution. If a candidate runs afoul of the notice of candidacy provisions, she can be eliminated from the race. This places the procedure of a formal announcement of candidacy above the substance of constitutional qualifications. When met with the same set of circumstances, the United States Supreme Court decided that compliance with the U.S. Constitution is the only qualification that may be imposed on a candidate. See, e. g. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995). While this edict does not bind us as a matter of state or federal constitutional law, the wisdom of the decision is evident in that it honors the primacy of the constitution over mere legislation.
We are not called upon, in this case, to rule on the constitutionality of La. R. S. 18:451, et seq.3 I make these observations in order to provide perspective on the proper treatment of the notice of candidacy provisions. They should not be an end in and of themselves. When viewed in the light of the constitutional qualifications of a candidate for our Supreme Court, we should not be misdirected by legislation whose legitimate purpose is solely to provide a process by which a qualified candidate may give notice that she intends to offer herself for election. If that candidate has failed to file tax returns or owes money to the Board of Ethics, that should be fodder for the campaign trail in a democratic process.
That should hold even more weight here where two candidates were at risk of disqualification when they believed that they had complied with the very statutes that are now used in an effort to end their candidacy before it begins.
Even pretermitting the Constitutional primacy argument, these two candidates should not be eliminated as candidates based on the clearly understood wording of La. R. S. 18:492(A)(7). The statute allows for disqualification only when a candidate falsely certifies that she has filed tax returns.
The lower court found both of these defendant candidates were truthful in their testimony. Without the element of intent to deceive, a certification cannot be false by any common usage of the term "false". By eliminating the guilty knowledge requirement of the definition, the court would be adding yet another extra- constitutional qualification for these candidates. If good faith compliance is inadequate to comply, the necessary result is that candidates may only stand for election if they have actually filed their tax returns rather than certifying truthfully that they filed them. This follows logically because when one mistakenly certifies that she has filed a return she is disqualified even though her certification was truthful but in error. To put a gloss on this statute that requires actual filing rather than good faith certification of filing is not true to the rules of statutory interpretation and defies the time-honored rule of law that strongly favors permitting candidacy rather than preventing it. Russell v. Goldsby, 2000-2595, 780 So.2d 1048 (La. 9/22/00).
For the reasons above, I would overrule the objection to Ms. Chambers' candidacy. To that extent only, I dissent from the majority.
JCL
LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART FOR THE REASONS ASSIGNED BY JENKINS, J.
SCJ
JENKINS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
I concur with the majority to reverse the trial court and sustain the objection to Ms. Chambers' candidacy. I dissent, however, in the majority's decision to affirm the trial court in maintaining the candidacy of Judge Hunter for the reasons that follow.
The majority incorrectly concludes that Judge Hunter overcame the prima facie evidence presented by the plaintiff that he had not filed his taxes for each of the five previous tax years. I do not agree that once the CPA transmitted the returns electronically and communicated the same to Judge Hunter, this constitutes compliance with the filing requirements set forth in the notice of candidacy. The process of a tax preparer electronically filing a tax return does begin with transmission, however the act of uploading the requisite tax documents and pressing submit or send does not automatically result in the filing of a tax return.
The majority relies exclusively on Clark v. Bridges, 2023-00237 (La. 2/22/23), 356 So.3d 990 in its holding that Judge Hunter satisfied his burden of proof showing that he filed his taxes for each of the five previous tax years. There is a glaring distinction between Bridges's successful transmission of her tax return compared to the attempt by Judge Hunter to file his tax returns. First, Judge Hunter filed no objective evidence to establish that he satisfied the obligations to qualify as a candidate, specifically, that he filed tax returns the previous five years leading up to qualifying for elective office. Judge Hunter did not present what Bridges presented at her trial: (1) Tax returns transmission; (2) tax returns filed and (3) tax returns received.
In Bridges, the tax preparer testified that she transmitted the tax return on the morning of January 25, 2023. She further testified she received confirmation, on January 26, 2023 that the tax return had been transmitted to LDR. There was no intervening act by the tax preparer "between transmission and receipt: the objective evidence confirms that transmission, the operative event, was successful because LDR received the filing." 2023-00237, pp. 8-9, 356 So.3d at 994-95. The court declared the law does not require anything more than this. Id., at p. 9, 356 So.3d at 995.
Bridges also testified on her own behalf. She testified that her tax preparer gave her a letter dated January 25, 2023 stating that her 2021 State and Federal tax returns where filed electronically. Bridges admitted the letter into evidence. Bridges also made her own public records request as to the filing of her 2021 taxes. At trial, LDR confirmed that in response to Bridges request, LDR was able to provide Bridges with written confirmation that the 2021 taxes were filed on February 6, 2024.
Bridges was able to meet her burden of proof by establishing successful transmission to LDR, and eventually receipt of her tax returns by LDR. Judge Hunter on the other hand introduced no evidence of receipt of his delinquent tax returns by LDR. In fact, Judge Hunter's CPA, Rosie D. Harper, testified that the transmission of the tax returns had not been received by LDR as of the date of the hearing and admitted that on July 27, 2024 she received notice of rejection of the tax returns she attempted to transmit on behalf of Judge Hunter. Ms. Harper also shared in her testimony that from the time she attempted the transmission, July 16, 2024, the status message was "pending." It was pending until the close of qualifying on July 19, 2024. On cross examination, Ms. Harper testified that she kept Judge Hunter updated on the status of actions in processing his tax returns but she never confirmed that she had proof of acceptance/transmittal of the returns.
Another distinction between Bridges and Judge Hunter is that Judge Hunter was required to provide a valid Identity Protection Personal Identification Number for his tax return to be accepted. This necessitates an additional operative event to occur for Judge Hunter's tax return to be successfully accepted; whereas in Bridges there was no additional step taken subsequent to the electronic transmission of the tax return.
Finally, as stated in Bridges, the candidate was able to produce evidence that LDR received her tax return; this is not the case for Judge Hunter. Judge Hunter cannot prove that transmission was successful because he presented no evidence that LDR received the filing. The only proof that Judge Hunter presented at trial as it relates to the acceptance of his tax returns was through the testimony of his tax preparer who testified that up until July 27, 2024, the transmission status was "pending," but on July 27, 2024, LDR rejected the transmission of the returns.
Accordingly, I find that Judge Hunter has not met his burden to overcome the plaintiff's prima facie case. The trial court's judgment overruling the objection to Judge Hunter's candidacy should be reversed.
I concur in all other aspects of the opinion. I agree with the majority that Ms. Chamber's failed to meet her burden of proof to rebut the prima facie case of the plaintiff's objection to her candidacy.