Opinion
A03A0249.
Decided April 15, 2003
Writ of certiorari. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Hancock.
Larry D. Wolfe, Mark Yurachek, for appellant.
Charles G. Hicks, William J. Linkous III, Allison L. Byrd, Sam L. Brannen, Sonja M. Cox, for appellees.
Demetrius Collier was convicted in Dekalb County Recorders Court of violating Dekalb County Code § 16-45.2, which prohibits loitering for drug related purposes. Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Collier appealed his conviction by petitioning for a writ of certiorari to the superior court. The superior court found the evidence sufficient and dismissed Collier's petition. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
See Smith v. Gwinnett County, 246 Ga. App. 865, 867(1)(b) ( 542 S.E.2d 616) (2000) ("[T]he proper procedure for appealing decisions from a county's recorder[s] court is by certiorari to the superior court."); OCGA §§ 5-4-3, 15-6-8.
We granted Collier's application for discretionary appeal on August 7, 2002.
On appeal, Collier asserts that the superior court applied the wrong standard of review. He further argues that, under any appellate standard, the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of loitering for drug related purposes. We do not reach these issues, however, because Collier's petition for writ of certiorari is fatally and fundamentally flawed.
Although a recorders court may take judicial notice of a local ordinance, neither the superior court nor this court may take such notice. Thus, a certiorari petitioner challenging the sufficiency of evidence presented in recorders court to prove an ordinance violation must provide the relevant ordinance to the reviewing court. The petitioner need not submit an exact copy of the ordinance, but he must set forth the provision's substance so that the reviewing court can "`determine the offense charged.'" As our Supreme Court has explained, "to compare evidence with the terms of an ordinance, the substance of the ordinance, if not its letter, must be before the court."
See Hill v. Atlanta, 125 Ga. 697, 698 (54 S.E.354) (1906); Reed v. State, 229 Ga. App. 817, 818(a) ( 495 S.E.2d 313) (1997); Bateman v. City of Atlanta, 51 Ga. App. 10(1), (2) (179 S.E.303) (1935).
See Childrey v. City of Atlanta, 62 Ga. App. 107, 108 ( 7 S.E.2d 919) (1940); Wright v. City of Atlanta, 61 Ga. App. 650(1) ( 7 S.E.2d 215) (1940).
Childrey, supra. See also Crowe v. City of Atlanta, 75 Ga. App. 67, 70 ( 42 S.E.2d 160) (1947); Bateman, supra at 10(3); Wright, supra.
Davis v. City of Rome, 89 Ga. 724 (15 S.E.332) (1892). See also Williamson v. City of Tallapoosa, 238 Ga. 522, 525 ( 233 S.E.2d 777) (1977) (because relevant ordinance did not appear in petition or elsewhere in record, superior court could not review petitioner's allegation that evidence did not authorize his conviction in recorders court); McClure v. State, 218 Ga. App. 365, 366 ( 460 S.E.2d 884) (1995) (Court of Appeals cannot review sentence handed down under county ordinance that is not in the record).
Collier's petition does not recite the provisions of Dekalb County Code § 16-45.2. Furthermore, we have not found, and Collier has not referenced, any other portion of the record setting forth the substance of this ordinance. The record only discloses its title — loitering for drug related purposes. Because we do not know the elements of this offense or what constitutes a violation, we have no context within which to review the evidence. Consequently, "it is impossible to determine whether . . . any error was committed by the recorder in finding [Collier] guilty."
Compare Ayers v. City of Atlanta, 236 Ga. 543, 544 ( 224 S.E.2d 392) (1976) (because municipal court judge recited applicable ordinance provision on the record, superior court erred in concluding that petitioner failed to establish the terms of the ordinance).
In a brief filed with the superior court, Collier set forth the provisions of Dekalb County Code § 16-68, which prohibits creating a hazardous or physically offensive condition. On appeal to this court, however, Collier concedes that he was convicted of violating Code § 16-45.2, and he seeks reversal of that conviction.
Bateman, supra. See also Williamson, supra; Davis, supra.
We recognize that the trial court did not base its decision on this fundamental, procedural flaw. But the county raised it as a ground for dismissal below, and "where the [superior] court is right for any reason, its judgment will be affirmed." Accordingly, the trial did not err in dismissing Collier's petition.
(Punctuation omitted.) Police Benevolent Assn. of Savannah v. Brown, 268 Ga. 26, 28(2) ( 486 S.E.2d 28) (1997). See also Williams v. State, 91 Ga. App. 124(1) ( 85 S.E.2d 91) (1954) ("If the judgment of a superior court dismissing or overruling a certiorari is correct for any reason, the judgment will be affirmed.").
Judgment affirmed. Smith, C. J., and Miller, J., concur.