Summary
In Coley, the plaintiff raised § 1983 claims with regards to her alleged arrest and detention for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
Summary of this case from Matheis v. FrittonOpinion
00-CV-0373E (Sr)
February 23, 2001
Edward J. Dinki, Esq., c/o Nicholas, Perot Strauss, Akron, NY, ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFF.
Michael P. McClaren, Esq., c/o Webster Szanyi, Buffalo, NY, ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANT.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
Plaintiff filed the Complaint herein asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Ricky Harmer, the Orleans County Sheriff's Department and the County of Orleans for allegedly having deprived the plaintiff of her Constitutional rights. Presently before the undersigned are defendants motion to dismiss and for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP"). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's action will be dismissed but the motion for sanctions will be denied.
Apostrophe improperly omitted in caption.
A motion under FRCVP 12(b)(6) must be granted when it appears beyond any doubt "that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In reviewing such motion, this Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the Complaint, considers all documents attached thereto or incorporated therein by reference and draws therefrom all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff. Cooper v. Parksky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998); see also FRCvP 10(c) ("A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes."). This Court may also consider matters of which judicial notice may be taken under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
According to Rule 201(b), "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." It further provides that "[a] court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information." Rule 201(d). For example, "courts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts * * * to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings" when considering a motion to dismiss. Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991).
According to the Complaint, plaintiff took possession of a 1987 Pontiac Grand Am automobile from Shelby Auto Sales May 1, 1998 after tendering such dealer $700 and giving it a $2,800 promissory note which was payable over ten months. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 12-14. Sixty days later, however, the operator of Shelby Auto Sales, Michael Houghton, filed a "false Supporting Deposition with Defendant Ricky Harmer, an Investigator of the Orleans County Sheriff's Department, against the Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiff had committed the crime of Unauthorized Use of A Motor Vehicle * * *." Compl. ¶ 18. Between July 1, 1998 and July 2, 1998, Harmer investigated the circumstances of the transaction that took place between the Plaintiff and Houghton but, because said investigation was improperly and negligently done, Harmer actively assisted the prosecution of the charge against the Plaintiff when he knew or should have known, through a proper investigation, that the charge was based upon false statements. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 30, 34.
Michael Houghton, a previously named defendant herein, was dismissed from this action by Stipulation of Discontinuance dated October 23, 2000. The same day, an Order was entered which amended the caption to reflect this deletion.
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 14, 1999, she was "arrested pursuant to the above complaint by the Village of Medina Police Department on the warrant issued by Defendant Orleans County Sheriff's Department and taken into custody." Compl. ¶ 20. After her arraignment before the Town of Shelby Justice Court, plaintiff was held in the Orleans County Jail until January 26, 1999, at which time "her family was able to post bail to secure her release." Compl. ¶¶ 20-21. Plaintiff further states that "on or about the 5th of August, 1999 all charges relating to the above arrest and subsequent incarceration of Plaintiff were dismissed by [the] Town of Shelby [Court] * * * after the complainant, * * * Harmer * * * [,] withdrew the charge." Compl. ¶ 23.
Section 1983 states, in relevant part, that "[e]very person who, under color any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State[,] * * * subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress * * *." Inasmuch as section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights and provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights created elsewhere, a proper section 1983 claim requires that plaintiff allege that defendants were acting under color of state law and that such actions deprived plaintiff of a federal right. Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff claims that defendants subjected her to false arrest, imprisonment and malicious prosecution, in violation of her rights as protected under, inter alia, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. To prevail on her claims of false arrest or false imprisonment, plaintiff must establish that "(1) the [defendants] intended to confine [her], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged." Broughton v. New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456-457 (1975). To prevail on her claim of malicious prosecution, as made actionable under section 1983, plaintiff must show "(1) that the defendant initiated a prosecution against the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant lacked probable cause to believe the proceeding could succeed, (3) that the defendant acted with malice, * * * (4) that the prosecution was terminated in the plaintiff's favor" — Posr, at 417 — and that there was "(5) a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights." Rohman v. New York City Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000).
Claims brought under section 1983 are guided by the tort law of the forum state. Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff's Dep't, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1996). "In New York, the tort of false arrest is synonymous with that of false imprisonment." Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1991).
See footnote 3, supra.
Assuming of all the plaintiff's allegations to be true, as tempered by consideration of additional facts of which judicial notice may be taken, the undersigned finds that the Complaint has not stated any federal claim made actionable by section 1983 and that this action must be dismissed. Briefly stated, defendants have proffered for the undersigned's review certified records from the Town of Shelby Justice Court which show that plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the Village of Medina Justice Court based on charges of criminal impersonation, petit larceny and theft of services. See McClaren Aff. Exs. B C. Conspicuously absent from these judicial records is any indication that such warrant was executed on the basis of unauthorized use a motor vehicle. Furthermore, these records indicate that plaintiff was remanded to the custody of the Orleans County Sheriff, in lieu of bail, on the charges on criminal impersonation, petit larceny and theft of services. Moreover and while in custody of the Orleans County Sheriff, plaintiff was arrested January 15, 1999 pursuant to a warrant issued by the Justice Court for the Village of Albion on a charge of issuing a bad check. Id. Ex. D. Plaintiff pled guilty January 25, 1999 to the theft of services charge and was then found guilty January 26, 1999 of issuing a bad check, for which crime she was sentenced to "time served" — i.e., the eleven days that she spent in the custody of the Orleans County Sheriff from January 14, 1999 to January 26, 1999. Although these same records also indicate that — after the aforementioned warrant for her arrest had been executed — plaintiff was subsequently arraigned on the charge of unauthorized use of a vehicle, the facts remain that (1) plaintiff was arrested and remanded — by judicial order — into the custody of the Orleans County Sheriff on a warrant not precipitated by any defendant and (2) plaintiff was ultimately sentenced to incarceration for the same period she now claims to have been falsely imprisoned — viz., January 14, 1999 through January 26, 1999. In light of these facts, it is plain that — at the very least — plaintiff cannot demonstrate that confining her in the Orleans County Jail was not otherwise privileged. Her false arrest/false imprisonment claims therefore fail. Insofar as plaintiff has alleged a malicious prosecution claim, this claim fails for two reasons. Firstly and as previously indicated, she can allege no sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint which implicates her Fourth Amendment rights. Secondly, she cannot show that the prosecution was terminated in her favor. In this regard, the "Certificate of Disposition" which is attached to the Complaint shows only that the charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle was dismissed by the complainant. See Compl. Ex. C. It does not state — nor does the Complaint indicate — that the prosecution was actually terminated in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., Campbell v. Giuliani, No. 99-CV-2603 JG, 2000 WL 194815, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000) (stating that "the bare allegation of dismissal, absent any explanation on the basis on which the case was dismissed, is insufficient to meet the favorable termination requirement" of a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim).
To the extent that plaintiff has alleged an action for conspiracy under section 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants acted in concert to deprive her of her constitutional rights. Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). However and because plaintiff cannot demonstrate that defendants violated her constitutional rights, the conspiracy claim therefore fails. Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995). Likewise, respondeat superior/municipal liability under section 1983 will not attach because (1) plaintiff has not shown the existence of any official policy or custom that deprived her of rights, privileges or immunities secured by federal law or the United States Constitution — Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) — and (2) "a claim of municipal liability under § 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory body * * * [where there is no] finding of a constitutional violation by the persons supervised * * *." Klendshoj v. City of Buffalo Police Dep't, No. 97-CV-884A(H), 1998 WL 1051792, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1998). In short, plaintiff has no valid section 1983 claims.
Insofar as defendants have asked for sanctions in this action, such request is denied. FRCvP 11(c)(1)(A) explicitly states that a "motion for sanctions shall be made separately from other motions or requests." (Emphasis added). Defendants, however, have brought the instant motion for sanctions as part of the motion to dismiss. Consequently, their motion for sanctions pursuant to FRCvP 11 is not properly before this Court and the undersigned declines to consider such application.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and that defendants' motion for sanctions is denied.