Opinion
2015 CA 0759
04-15-2016
JAMES COLEMAN v. SHERYL M. RANATZA PAROLE BOARD CHAIRMAN
James Coleman Jonesboro, LA Plaintiff-Appellant In Proper Person Jonathan R. Vining Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant-Appellee James M. LeBlanc, Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
Docket Number 632,690 Honorable R. Michael Caldwell, Judge James Coleman
Jonesboro, LA Plaintiff-Appellant
In Proper Person Jonathan R. Vining
Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for
Defendant-Appellee
James M. LeBlanc, Secretary of
the Louisiana Department of
Public Safety and Corrections BEFORE: GUIDRY, HOLDRIDGE, AND CHUTZ, JJ. GUIDRY, J.
The appellant, James Coleman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for judicial review as untimely. For the following reasons, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand this matter for further consideration.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 25, 2010, Coleman filed administrative remedy procedure (ARP) No. WNC-2010-926 with the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPSC), contesting the DPSC's calculation of the amount of "good time" to which he was entitled as a result of earning certain Certified Treatment Rehabilitation Program credits. According to the record before us, the ARP was denied on the first step review, but appears to have been granted on the second step review, which was completed on March 30, 2011.
See La. R.S. 15:571.3(B).
In some of his pleadings and in his brief to this Court, Coleman also refers to the credits as "education credits."
Over three years later, on June 10, 2014, Coleman filed a letter with the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court (26th JDC) in Webster Parish, contending that as a result of his electing to receive "good time" in lieu of incentive wages, his incarceration from July 10, 1992 to April 9, 2011, on a conviction of armed robbery, plus credit for the 24 months served in the Webster Parish Jail prior to his being sentenced to 40 years imprisonment on the conviction, made him "eligible for a Certificate of Release of my completion of ... Parole." Interpreting Coleman's letter as contesting "the computation of his sentence ..., discharge, good time dates, or any action concerning parole," the 26th JDC, in a ruling signed July 9, 2014, denied the relief requested by Coleman in his filings and directed him to file a petition in East Baton Rouge Parish in accordance with La. R.S. 15:571.15.
We observe that the letter filed with the 26th JDC on June 10, 2014, is addressed to DPSC Secretary James M. LeBlanc, Orlando Beene, who Coleman indicates is with the Division of Probation and Parole, and Sheryl M. Ranatza.
On August 13, 2014, Coleman filed a "Petition for Judicial Review" with the Nineteenth Judicial District Court (19th JDC), naming Sheryl M. Ranatza, in her capacity as chairman of the Louisiana Parole Board, as defendant. In the petition for judicial review, Coleman indicated that he sought review of ARP No. WNC-2010-926. He also included a "Memorandum of Newly discovered evidence of Good Time Contract," wherein he asserted an additional claim that based on the good time option contract he had signed, as well as La. R.S. 15:571.3 and DPSC regulations B-04-001 and B-04-003, he had served and completed his parole time and was entitled to immediate release from DPSC custody.
The record before us contains several assertions by Coleman that he was being "detained" in the Bayou Dorcheat Correctional Center in Minden, Louisiana, but the record contains no explanation for Coleman's detention. Although it could be surmised that Coleman's detention likely stemmed from an alleged violation of the terms of his early release (diminution of sentence), see La. R.S. 15:571.5, Coleman attached a copy of a document titled "Notice of Preliminary Hearing," dated February 25, 2014, to his appellate brief, wherein it is stated that "[o]n February 19, 2014, Coleman was arrested by the Ruston Police Department for committing the offense of Simple Burglary." We recognize, however, that we cannot consider the document for purposes of deciding this appeal, as it is not found in the record before us. See Niemann v. Crosby Development Company, L.L.C., 11-1337, p. 7 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/3/12), 92 So. 3d 1039, 1045.
On September 9, 2014, a commissioner with the 19th JDC ordered Coleman to file written proof of exhaustion of ARP No. WNC-2010-926 in accordance with La. RS. 15:1172, 15:1184, and 19th JDC rules to avoid dismissal of his suit. When Coleman failed to timely respond, the commissioner ordered that Coleman's petition be served on the secretary of the DPSC, James LeBlanc, in order to obtain information on the final disposition of the ARP. In response to Coleman's petition for judicial review, Secretary LeBlanc filed a motion to dismiss Coleman's petition for failure to timely seek judicial review of ARP No. WNC-2010-926 in accordance with La. R.S. 15:1177(A)(1). Along with his motion, Secretary LeBlanc submitted a copy of a document titled "ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY PROCEDURE & PROPERTY CLAIMS INPUT SCREEN" that listed the receipt, acceptance, and disposition dates of step one and step two for ARP No. WNC-2010-926, as well as a disposition code for each step. According to that document, the step two disposition date for ARP No. WNC-2010-926 was March 30, 2011.
The office of commissioner of the 19th JDC was created by La. R.S. 13:711 to hear and recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising out of the incarceration of state prisoners. The commissioner's written findings and recommendations are submitted to a district court judge, who may accept, reject, or modify them. La. R.S. 13:713; Harvey v. Stalder, 07-1595, p. 3 n.3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/2/08), 991 So. 2d 54, 56 n.3.
In his petition for judicial review, the appellant named Ranatza as the defendant in this action, but in processing the petition, the district court served the petition on James LeBlanc, in his capacity as secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. Although the petition names Ranatza, as shown in the suit caption, the proper party defendant is the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. See La. R.S. 15:1177(A)(1)(b); Martinez v. Tanner, 11-0692, p. 1 n.1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/11), 79 So. 3d 1082, 1082 n.1, writ denied, 11-2732 (La. 7/27/12), 93 So. 3d 597. --------
Thereafter, the commissioner issued a report wherein she found that because Coleman sought judicial review of ARP No. WNC-2010-926 in his petition, and based on the information provided by Secretary LeBlanc that showed that the final decision on ARP No. WNC-2010-926 was issued on March 30, 2011, she agreed that Coleman's petition for judicial review was untimely. The commissioner therefore recommended that Secretary LeBlanc's motion to dismiss be granted and that Coleman's petition for judicial review be dismissed without prejudice. In accordance with the commissioner's recommendation, the 19th JDC granted Secretary LeBlanc's motion to dismiss and dismissed the petition for judicial review of ARP No. WNC-2010-926 without prejudice, for failure to timely seek judicial review in accordance with La. R.S. 15:1177, in a screening judgment signed on January 26, 2015. It is from this judgment that Coleman appeals.
DISCUSSION
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1177(A) provides, in pertinent part, that "ja]ny offender who is aggrieved by an adverse decision ... by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections ... rendered pursuant to any administrative remedy procedures ... may, within thirty days after receipt of the decision, seek judicial review of the decision only in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court." (Emphasis added.) The record before us does not contain any information indicating when Coleman had receipt of the DPSC's second step decision on ARP No. WNC-2010-926. The input screen document offered by Secretary LeBlanc only establishes when the second step decision was made; it does not indicate when or even if the decision was received by Coleman. In his brief on appeal, Coleman denies ever having received the second step review decision, opining that this omission likely occurred because he was released from DPSC custody on April 9, 2011, shortly after the date of the second step decision.
In Stemley v. Descant, 03-662 (La. App. 3d Cir. 11/5/03), 858 So. 2d 841, the appellate court vacated a judgment sustaining a peremptory exception filed by the DPSC, whereby the inmate's petition for judicial review was dismissed as untimely, and remanded the matter for further review. In vacating the trial court's judgment, the Third Circuit found the trial court erred in sustaining the DPSC's exception, because it was not apparent from the face of the record that the inmate had failed to seek timely review of his complaint, as the record did not contain a copy of the ruling complained of in the inmate's petition for judicial review or the date of the signing of the ruling. Stemley, 03-662 at p. 1, 858 So. 2d at 842. Later, in a subsequent appeal of the judgment rendered following remand, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the inmate's petition for judicial review, finding that the appellate record following remand then contained proof of the date that the inmate received a written copy of the ruling that he complained of in his petition for judicial review, and based on that evidence, it was proven that the inmate's petition for judicial review was untimely. Stemley v. Descant, 06-716, p. 4 (La. App. 3d Cir. 11/2/06), 943 So. 2d 597, 599, writ denied, 07-0268 (La. 11/2/07), 966 So. 2d 598.
While the record before us does contain evidence indicating the date the DPSC rendered its second step review decision for ARP No. WNC-2010-926, it does not contain a copy of the actual ruling nor any proof of when, if ever, Coleman received a copy of the ruling. In the absence of such evidence, we must vacate the 19th JDC's judgment of dismissal and remand this matter to the district court for further review, but only as it pertains to review of the complaint raised in ARP No. WNC-2010-926. For the following reasons, we find no error in the district court's dismissal of the additional claim asserted by Coleman in his petition for judicial review.
As emphasized by Coleman in his appellate brief, review of ARP No. WNC-2010-926 was only part of the complaint asserted in his petition for judicial review. The other complaint, or, as Coleman refers to it, the "gist" of his complaint was that in serving 20 years of his 40-year sentence for armed robbery and by signing the Good Time Option Contract, he should be deemed to have completed his sentence for armed robbery, he should not have been subject to parole supervision on his release in diminution of his sentence, and he is now entitled to be released from incarceration for the remainder of his 40-year sentence. As Coleman acknowledges, this additional complaint was not the subject of ARP No. WNC-2010-926. As such, the 19th JDC lacked jurisdiction to consider that complaint in the context of its judicial review of ARP No. WNC-2010-926.
The administrative remedy procedures promulgated by the DPSC provide the exclusive remedy available to an offender for any and all complaints or grievances, including challenges to rules, regulations, policies, or statutes, as well as complaints regarding time computations, even if urged as a writ of habeas corpus. See La. R.S. 15:1171(B).
In Robinson v. Parole & Probation Division, Department of Public Saftey & Corrections, 00-1574 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/01), 819 So. 2d 1031, an inmate sentenced to incarceration for 12 years was released after serving only six years of his sentence as a result of good time earned. The inmate's parole was later revoked upon his return to Louisiana following an arrest in Phoenix, Arizona. Following the revocation of his parole, the inmate filed a writ of habeas corpus, contending that he should be released from custody and reinstated to parole. Robinson, 00-1574 at p. 2 and n.2, 819 So. 2d at 1032 and n.2.
This court observed that as a parolee, the inmate remained within the legal custody of the DPSC at the time he was detained in Arizona, and therefore, the inmate's application for writ of habeas corpus constituted a complaint or grievance against the State that arose while the inmate was an offender within the custody of the DPSC. Robinson, 00-1574 at p. 4, 819 So. 2d at 1033. As state courts should not entertain an offender's grievance or complaint that falls within the purview of the administrative remedy procedure unless and until the offender has exhausted the remedies provided, this court found that the inmate's application for a writ of habeas corpus should have been processed through administrative channels before being reviewed by the commissioner and trial court at the 19th JDC. Robinson, 00-1574 at pp. 3-4, 819 So. 2d at 1033. Citing La. R.S. 15:1171(B) and 15:1172(A), this court recognized that the administrative procedures adopted by the DPSC are the exclusive remedy available to offenders for the purpose of preserving any cause of action against the DPSC. Robinson, 00-1574 at p. 3, 819 So. 2d at 1033.
Similarly, we find that Coleman's failure to seek administrative review of the additional complaint raised in his petition for judicial review deprived the 19th JDC of jurisdiction to consider this additional claim. See Robinson, 00-1574 at p. 3, 819 So. 2d at 1032-33. Moreover, even if Coleman had properly pursued and exhausted available administrative remedies regarding his additional complaint prior to filing his petition for judicial review, an inmate may not seek judicial review of more than one ARP in the same petition for judicial review. See Lightfoot v. Stalder, 97-2626, p. 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/98), 727 So. 2d 553, 554-55. Thus, we find that the 19th JDC's dismissal of the additional complaint raised in Coleman's petition for judicial review was proper.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the 19th JDC to the extent it dismissed Coleman's petition seeking judicial review of ARP No. WNC-2010-926 and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings regarding Coleman's complaint raised in the ARP. As for the remaining complaint raised in Coleman's petition for judicial review, we affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $519.00 are apportioned one-half to the appellant, James Coleman, and one-half to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMANDED.