Opinion
Case No. 16-CV-02941-LHK
09-02-2016
CINDY COLEMAN-ANACLETO, Plaintiff, v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., Defendant.
ORDER RE SEALING MOTIONS
Re: Dkt. No. 24, 26, 28
Before the Court are administrative motions to seal filed by Plaintiff Cindy Coleman-Anacleto ("Plaintiff") and Defendant Samsung Electronics America, Inc. ("Defendant"). ECF Nos. 24, 26, 28. The parties seek to seal briefing and exhibits filed in connection with Plaintiff's motion to remand, ECF No. 13, and Defendant's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 16.
"Historically, courts have recognized a 'general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.'" Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)). Thus, when considering a sealing request, "a strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Parties seeking to seal judicial records relating to motions that are "more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action," Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 809 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016), bear the burden of overcoming the presumption with "compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings" that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79. Compelling reasons justifying the sealing of court records generally exist "when such 'court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,' such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets." Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). However, "[t]he mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant's embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records." Id.
Records attached to motions that are "not related, or only tangentially related, to the merits of a case," are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099; see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 ("[T]he public has less of a need for access to court records attached only to non-dispositive motions because those documents are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Parties moving to seal records attached to motions unrelated or only tangentially related to the merits of a case must meet the lower "good cause" standard of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1098-99; Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179-80. The "good cause" standard requires a "particularized showing" that "specific prejudice or harm will result" if the information is disclosed. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). "Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning" will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992).
Pursuant to Rule 26(c), a trial court has broad discretion to permit sealing of court documents for, inter alia, the protection of "a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G). The Ninth Circuit has adopted the definition of "trade secrets" set forth in the Restatement of Torts, holding that "[a] trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972) (quoting Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b). "Generally [a trade secret] relates to the production of goods. . . . It may, however, relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the business. . . ." Id. (ellipses in original). In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that sealing may be justified to prevent judicial documents from being used "as sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing." Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
In addition, parties moving to seal documents must comply with the procedures established by Civil Local Rule 79-5. Pursuant to that rule, a sealing order is appropriate only upon a request that establishes the document is "sealable," or "privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law." Civ. L. R. 79-5(b). "The request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material, and must conform with Civil L.R. 79-5(d)." Id. Civil Local Rule 79-5(d), moreover, requires the submitting party to attach a "proposed order that is narrowly tailored to seal only the sealable material" and that "lists in table format each document or portion thereof that is sought to be sealed," as well as an "unredacted version of the document" that "indicate[s], by highlighting or other clear method, the portions of the document that have been omitted from the redacted version." Id. R. 79-5(d)(1).
The parties seek to seal briefing and exhibits submitted in connection with Plaintiff's motion to remand, ECF Nos. 24, 28, as well as briefing and exhibits submitted in connection with Defendant's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 26. Although Plaintiff's motion to remand does not address the merits of Plaintiff's claims, the Ninth Circuit recently held that motions to remand are considered "dispositive" motions. See Flam v. Flam, 788 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting, in context of magistrate jurisdiction, that "the effect of a remand order is to end all federal proceedings," which necessarily is dispositive of all relief sought by the party "put out of federal court"). Defendant's motion to dismiss is also a dispositive motion. Accordingly, requests to seal in connection with Plaintiff's motion to remand and Defendant's motion to dismiss are governed by the "compelling reasons" standard. See In re PPA Products Liability Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that motions to dismiss are typically treated as dispositive motions); Benedict v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2014 WL 233827, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (applying "compelling reasons" standard to motions to seal information in connection with a motion to dismiss).
With this standard in mind, the Court rules on the instant motions as follows:
| Motionto Seal | Standard | Document | Ruling |
|---|---|---|---|
| 24 | CompellingReasons | Defendant's Oppositionto Plaintiff's Motion toRemand | DENIED as to the following proposedredactions:• page i, ln 9: "Members"• page i, ln 11: "More Than"• page i, ln 14: "Up to"• page 2, ln 3: "wall mounts inCalifornia"• page 8, ln 8: "Members"• page 8, ln 9: "Ultra Slim wall mounts"• page 11, ln. 17: the first two wordsOtherwise GRANTED. |
| Motionto Seal | Standard | Document | Ruling |
|---|---|---|---|
| 24 | CompellingReasons | Declaration of Ilhyun Ryuin Opposition toPlaintiff's Motion toRemand, ¶¶ 2-6 | GRANTED as to the following proposedredactions:• page 1, ln 18: the last word• page 1, lns 19, 20, 21• page 1, ln 22: the specific number ofUltra Slim wall mounts sold• page 2, ln 1: except for the last word• page 2, lns 3-9, 13-17• page 2, ln 10: except for "Ultra SlimWall Mounts sold"• page 2, ln 11: the last three words• page 2, ln 12: the first five words• page 2, ln 20: the last word• page 2, ln 21: the specific number ofUltra Slim wall mounts sold• page 2, ln 22: the estimate of theamount of money• page 2, ln 24: words 8-14• page 2, ln 27: the last wordOtherwise DENIED. |
| 26 | CompellingReasons | Plaintiff's Opposition toDefendant's Motion toDismiss | DENIED as to the following proposedredactions:• page 7, ln 23: "100"• page 7, ln 24: "percent"• page 16: "100 percent", "millions"Otherwise GRANTED. |
| Motionto Seal | Standard | Document | Ruling |
|---|---|---|---|
| 28 | CompellingReasons | Plaintiff's Reply inSupport of Plaintiff'sMotion to Remand | DENIED as to the following proposedredactions:• page 4, ln 14: "every single model ofevery single"• page 4, ln 20: "100 percent"• page 5, ln 25-26: "best estimation ofactual retail price . . . based on"• page 6, lns 3-4: "best estimation ofactual retail price is based on"• page 6, ln 7: "actual retail price"• page 7, ln 17: "(net quantity sold inCalifornia", "times suggested retailprice for the WMN1000C"Otherwise GRANTED. |
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 2, 2016
/s/_________
LUCY H. KOH
United States District Judge