Opinion
No. CV01-0168331 S
February 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #125
On October 29, 2001, the plaintiff, Brian Colangelo, filed a complaint against the defendant, David Heckelman, seeking damages for negligence. The plaintiff alleges that he "was a pedestrian standing in the Torrington Honda Dealership garage" when the defendant allegedly operated a Dealership motor vehicle and that vehicle "lurched forward pinning the plaintiff pedestrian between the car and a work bench," causing him to sustain injuries and losses.
On October 2, 2002, Torrington Honda filed a motion to intervene as a co-plaintiff. Torrington Honda's motion was granted. Torrington Honda's intervening complaint seeks reimbursement for the amounts paid, and those it may become obligated to pay, for Brian Colangelo's medical care under the terms of the Workers' Compensation Act.
On September 4, 2003, the defendant filed an amended answer and special defenses. By way of special defense, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' action is barred by General Statutes § 31-293a. On January 22, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The defendant, in his memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment, first argues that plaintiff's action does not fall within the motor vehicle exception set forth in General Statutes § 31-293(a) the Workers' Compensation Act. Second, the defendant argues that the plaintiff was a fellow employee with the defendant and was not in "operation of a motor vehicle" at the time of the loss.
In its memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff, Colangelo, argues that there remains a question of fact as to whether his co-employee, the defendant, was operating the motor vehicle which struck him and caused his injuries. The plaintiff also asserts that: the undisputed facts of this case represent "a generic motor vehicle accident;" "the special hazards of employment analysis has been employed only where a piece of equipment extraneous to the motor vehicle itself has been the mechanism of injury;" and, therefore, this case falls squarely within the motor vehicle exception of the Workers' Compensation Act.
DISCUSSION
"Practice Book § [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material fact which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaynor v. Payne, 261 Conn. 585, 590-91, 804 A.2d 170 (2002).
There is no dispute between the parties that Brian Colangelo and David Heckelman were co-employees, were employed by Torrington Honda Dealership as automotive technicians and were engaged in their employment at the time of the accident. Furthermore, there is no dispute that Colangelo was injured while he and Heckelman were in a repair bay within the Torrington Honda facility, ready to together perform a 30-point inspection of a new Honda Accord. Finally, Colangelo is claiming that his injuries were caused by Heckelman's negligence.
Because Colangelo is claiming that his injuries occurred while he was in the course of his employment and that his injures were caused by the negligence of his fellow employee, his exclusive remedy, as a matter of law, is found in the Workers' Compensation Act. General Statutes § 31-293a. The plaintiff, however, argues that his claim falls into the exception found in § 31-293a. Section 31-293a states, in pertinent part: "If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependent and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14-1." Specifically, Colangelo claims that his "action is based on [his] fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle . . ."
It has been repeatedly observed in decisions on the interpretation of the motor vehicle exception that although the legislative history of 31-293a is not especially revealing, there is some evidence that the intention was to distinguish `simple negligence on the job' from negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle. Unlike the special hazards of the work place, the risk of a motor vehicle accident is a common danger to which the general public is exposed. Particular occupations may subject some employees to a greater degree of exposure to that risk. The nature of the risk remains unchanged, however, and in many employments it is no greater than for the general public. The legislature has chosen, therefore, not to extend the immunity given to fellow employees by 31-293a to accidents having a less distinct relationship to the hazards of the employment. At the same time it has accorded the injured employee, in addition to workers' compensation, the same remedy he would have against a member of the general public who caused a motor vehicle accident. Dias v. Adams, 189 Conn. 354, 359-60, 456 A.2d 305 (1983).
It is this court's determination that the plaintiff, Colangelo, "subjected himself to the special hazards of the workplace." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fields v. Giron, 65 Conn. App. 771, 775, 783 A.2d 1097, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936, 785 A.2d 230 (2001). In making this determination, this court is assisted by the reasoning of the Fields case. In Fields v. Giron, the plaintiff and defendant worked for a landscaping company. Id., 772. In attempting to remove a fallen tree, the defendant tied a rope around the tree, fed it through a block and tackle and attached the rope to the back of his company vehicle. Id., 773. As the defendant depressed the accelerator pedal, the rope snapped because of the tension and the block and tackle struck the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff sued his co-worker, the defendant, claiming that the defendant's negligence caused his injury. Id. The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the Workers' Compensation. Act was the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. Id. The plaintiff replied by arguing that General Statutes § 31-293a provides an exception to the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act by permitting an employee to assert a tort claim against a fellow employee when the claim involves the fellow employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Id. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike and the plaintiff appealed. Id.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision on the ground that "[t]he risk of injury [the plaintiff] faced was not that risk of a motor vehicle accident faced by the general public as a common danger. Clearly, the accident . . . had a distinct relationship to the hazards of employment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 775. The appellate court further reasoned that "[t]he general public is not exposed to the risk entailed in removing a fallen tree by using a rope that is fed through a block and tackle and then attached to a truck. This accident clearly had a distinct relationship to the hazards of employment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 775-76.
Similarly, in the present case, the general public is not exposed to the risk entailed in working in an automotive repair bay performing 30-point test inspections on vehicles. The plaintiff "was not facing the hazards encountered by the general public as motorists . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 775. Instead, the plaintiff, as part of his employment at Torrington Honda Dealership, was expected to perform rigorous inspections of cars destined for purchase, in the confined area of a mechanics bay. As a result, it is submitted that § 31-293a is not an applicable exception to the Workers' Compensation Act under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, it is also submitted that Heckelman is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the Workers' Compensation Act is Colangelo's exclusive remedy for the injuries he incurred while in the course of his employment.
Alvord, J.