Opinion
2002-01422
Submitted January 30, 2003.
May 5, 2003.
In an action for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff is not obligated to defend and indemnify its insured, Desert Storm Construction Corp., in an action entitled Petrou v. Sklias, pending in the Supreme Court, Queens County, under Index No. 7510/99, the defendants Stella Sklias, a/k/a Stella Repapinos, John Repapinos, a/k/a John Rapp, Quick Casual Restaurants, Inc., Corona W., Inc., and Corona Silver, Inc., appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jonas, J.), entered August 17, 2001, as granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment making the declaration, and denied their cross motion for summary judgment declaring that the plaintiff was obligated to indemnify the defendant Desert Storm Construction Corp. in the underlying action.
Jones Hirsch Connors Bull, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Steven H. Kaplan and Warren A. Herland of counsel), for appellants.
Stuart M. Herz, Garden City, N.Y., for respondent.
Donohue, McGahan Catalano, Jericho, N.Y. (Michael Belitsis of counsel), for defendants Georgios Petrou and Despina Petrou (no brief filed).
Before: NANCY E. SMITH, J.P., GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, SANDRA L. TOWNES, WILLIAM F. MASTRO, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment making the declaration and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court erred in determining that the appellants lacked standing to challenge the timeliness of the plaintiff's disclaimer (see Abate v. All-City Ins. Co., 214 A.D.2d 627; see also Watson v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 246 A.D.2d 57).
The Supreme Court further erred in determining that the plaintiff's disclaimer was timely as a matter of law. Written notice of a disclaimer must be given "as soon as is reasonably possible" after the insurer first learns of the grounds for disclaimer of liability (Insurance Law § 3420[d]; see McGinnis v. Mandracchia, 291 A.D.2d 484). This rule applies even where the insurer was not given prompt notice of the accident underlying the claim (see Wasserheit v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 271 A.D.2d 439; Matter of Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steiner, 199 A.D.2d 507). "[T]he question whether a disclaimer has been issued with reasonable promptness is, in all but extreme cases, a question of fact" (Murphy v. Hanover Ins. Co., 239 A.D.2d 323, 324; see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gross, 27 N.Y.2d 263, 270; Astoria Chemists v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 278 A.D.2d 349; Lancer Ins. Co. v. T.F.D. Bus Co., 286 A.D.2d 375). Under the circumstances of this case, whether the disclaimer was issued within a reasonable time "constitutes an issue of fact for trial" (Dunn v. State Farm Ins. Co., 205 A.D.2d 489; see Murphy v. Hanover Ins. Co., 239 A.D.2d 323).
In a letter to this court dated September 3, 2002, the defendants Georgios Petrou and Despina Petrou request relief. However, they did not appeal and are not entitled to relief. Affirmative relief is generally not given to a nonappealing party (see 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty, 98 N.Y.2d 144, 151, n 3; Hecht v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 57). "An exception exists only for those cases where granting relief to a nonappealing party is necessary to give meaningful relief to the appealing party" (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty, supra at 151), which is not the situation here.
SMITH, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, TOWNES and MASTRO, JJ., concur.