Summary
In Cohen, a juror had an equally innocuous conversation in the hall, following an adjournment, with an officer of the condemnor.
Summary of this case from Morrissey v. CommonwealthOpinion
April 24, 1967.
May 24, 1967.
Appeals — Review — Refusal of new trial — Complaints about jury — Juror related to counsel — Eminent domain case — Expert witnesses — Qualifications — Appellate review.
1. The fact that a juror is a relative by marriage to the brother of counsel does not disqualify the juror. [443]
2. A party may not remain silent as to the possible disqualifications of a juror which he knows about and gamble on a verdict, then, after he loses, obtain a new trial when he has failed or refused to ask for the withdrawal of a juror. [443]
3. Where it appeared that before any evidence was taken, a juror briefly conversed in the corridor of the courthouse with an assistant director of the defendant but this was known to plaintiff's counsel who stated his willingness to proceed with the trial of the case, it was Held that the plaintiff could not thereafter use this incident as a ground for a new trial.
4. The grant or refusal of a new trial will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. [442-3]
5. It was Held that appellant's objections to the qualifications of defendant's expert witnesses on value were without merit.
Mr. Justice COHEN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Before BELL, C. J., MUSMANNO, JONES, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
Appeal, No. 200, Jan. T., 1967, from judgment of Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, June T., 1965, No. 83, in case of J. Stanley Cohen v. Redevelopment Authority of the City of Lancaster. Judgment affirmed.
Appeal by property owner from award of viewers.
Verdict for plaintiff and plaintiff's motion for new trial dismissed, opinion by JOHNSTONE, JR., J. Plaintiff appealed.
Robert Ruppin, with him Marshall M. Cohen, for appellant.
Frank Edward Roda, for appellee.
The Redevelopment Authority of the City of Lancaster condemned appellant's property. The Board of View awarded him $50,400. He then appealed and, at the jury trial, the jury rendered a verdict in his favor for $50,000. Appellant appeals the judgment which was entered on the verdict, after the Court below had denied his motion for a new trial.
" 'The grant or refusal of a new trial by the lower Court will not be reversed by this Court in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case: [citing cases].' " Firestone v. Schmehl, 420 Pa. 644, 647, 218 A.2d 324.
Appellant first contends that the verdict was contaminated and should be set aside because the daughter of one of the jurors was married to a brother of the defendant's attorney, a fact which was not discovered until after the verdict. We do not regard a verdict as tainted because a juror is a relative by marriage to the brother of counsel for the defendant.
Defendant next complains that the verdict was tainted and should be set aside because, following an adjournment and before any evidence was taken, a juror briefly conversed in the corridor of the Court House with an assistant director of the condemnor. These two persons were friends and members of the same church. While their conversation was unwise, it was undoubtedly innocuous. On this subject the lower Court, in its Opinion, said: "Counsel did appear the following morning and the court was advised by counsel for the plaintiff that they were satisfied nothing improper had been discussed by the juror and the defendant's assistant director, and that they were satisfied to proceed with the trial of the case with the jury already selected. The only request by counsel for the plaintiff was that the court again admonish the jury to refrain from discussing the case with anyone or doing anything which might give the appearance of improper conduct. This was done and the trial proceeded to a verdict."
Having known of the possible disqualification of a juror and gambled on the verdict or any result which might follow, appellant cannot now complain: Nyce v. Muffley, 384 Pa. 107, 112, 119 A.2d 530.
Lastly, appellant asserts that the condemnor's expert witnesses were entirely unqualified or poorly qualified by knowledge and experience of real estate values in this neighborhood; moreover, they had not adequately examined the premises, had not sufficiently examined other pertinent sales, and their views on value had an amazing unanimity. These witnesses had a long and wide experience in their field and are what is called in the law "expert" witnesses. Appellant's objections really go only (a) to the weight to be given to their testimony and (b) their credibility. These were questions for the jury, which were adequately instructed thereon by the trial Judge. We feel there is no necessity for our repeating here what we so recently said upon the subject of expert testimony in eminent domain cases in Morrissey v. Department of Highways, 424 Pa. 87, 225 A.2d 895.
We find no merit in any of appellant's contentions, nor any abuse of discretion or error of law.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice COHEN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.