Opinion
# 2014-039-398 Claim No. 121149
02-06-2014
CLARENCE COFFIN v. STATE OF NEW YORK
Clarence Coffin, pro se Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman Attorney General of the State of New York By: Belinda A. Wagner Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Following a trial, the Court finds that claimant has failed to establish his claim of negligence against defendant. The State does not dispute that claimant, an inmate, was a passenger in a State "crew bus" that collided with a parked vehicle. However, claimant has failed to prove that he suffered a serious injury pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 as a result of the motor vehicle accident and has failed to prove that his alleged injuries were proximately caused by the collision.
Case information
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ ¦UID: ¦2014-039-398 ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant(s): ¦CLARENCE COFFIN ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant short name: ¦COFFIN ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Footnote (claimant name) : ¦ ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Defendant(s): ¦STATE OF NEW YORK ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Footnote (defendant name) : ¦ ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party claimant(s): ¦ ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party defendant(s): ¦ ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Claim number(s): ¦121149 ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Motion number(s): ¦ ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Cross-motion number(s): ¦ ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Judge: ¦James H. Ferreira ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Claimant's attorney: ¦Clarence Coffin, pro se ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦ ¦Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦Attorney General of the State of New York¦ ¦Defendant's attorney: ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦By: Belinda A. Wagner ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦Assistant Attorney General ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Third-party defendant's attorney:¦ ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Signature date: ¦February 6, 2014 ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦City: ¦Albany ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Comments: ¦ ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Official citation: ¦ ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦Appellate results: ¦ ¦ +---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------¦ ¦See also (multicaptioned case) ¦ ¦ +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ Decision
Claimant Clarence Coffin, appearing pro se, filed the instant claim with the Clerk of the Court of Claims on April 10, 2012, alleging that on November 16, 2011, defendant "negligently and carelessly" operated a New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (NYSDOCCS) vehicle "causing serious injury to claimant, who was a passenger in said vehicle" (Claim, ¶ 4). At the time of the accident, claimant was an inmate at Washington Correctional Facility in Comstock, New York, and was being transported in a State vehicle to a work assignment when the State vehicle collided with a parked car. Claimant avers that the collision "caus[ed] claimant to strike his head on the metal panel at the rear of the bus . . . violently jerking and snapping the claimant[']s neck and back causing serious injury" (Claim, ¶ 5). Issue was joined and a unified trial was held on November 21, 2013 at the Court of Claims in Albany, New York. Claimant testified and proffered several documents in support of his claim. Defendant called no witnesses and offered no evidence.
The claim states that the date of the accident was November 16, 2012. In another part of the claim, claimant alleges that the accident occurred on January 16, 2012. At trial, claimant testified that the date stated in the claim was erroneous and the accident at issue occurred on November 16, 2011.
Defendant does not contest that a vehicular accident occurred on November 16, 2011, that claimant was a passenger in the State "crew bus" driven by a State correction officer, and that the State vehicle collided with a parked vehicle. The issue before the Court is whether claimant has proven by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he sustained a "serious injury" as set forth by Insurance Law § 5102(d), and whether the injuries allegedly suffered were proximately caused by the collision.
Claimant, age 42, a community college graduate and military veteran, testified that he has been employed since August 2013 by General Electric Company (hereinafter GE) in Schenectady, New York, as a utilities operations generalist. In this position, he works primarily as a boiler operator. He had previously worked for GE as an intern after graduating Hudson Valley Community College (hereinafter HVCC) in May 2013, with a degree in heating, ventilation and air conditioning. Claimant entered NYSDOCCS custody in 2009 following two DWI offenses. On the morning of November 16, 2011, while incarcerated at Washington Correctional Facility in Comstock, New York, claimant was a passenger in a van that was transporting claimant and three other inmates to a work assignment outside the facility. Claimant was seated at the rear of the van on the end of a bench, with his back to the side of the van. While in a parking lot on State property, the correction officer driving the van backed into a parked vehicle "with a pretty good amount of force." Claimant did not see the parked vehicle before impact and was unable to brace for the collision. He testified that, upon impact "[his] neck snapped back [and] banged the rear metal plate of the bus and [his] torso kind of twisted and turned." An Unusual Incident Report was prepared the day of the incident and was received into evidence without objection (see claimant's exhibit 2). The report states "lump to back of [claimant's] head noted, size of a half dollar." After the collision, the inmates remained in the van and the facility's "fire and safety officer" came to the accident site, took notes and talked to the inmates. The van then proceeded to the work site. A short time later, the van returned to the facility and the inmates were sent to the facility medical infirmary. Later that evening, claimant submitted a sick call request after feeling "aches and pains." The next morning, he was seen by a nurse and given Motrin; claimant states he was "not physically examined." Claimant testified that, after submitting the Contact Slip on November 28, 2011, he was seen by a doctor and x-rays were ordered (see claimant's exhibit 3). Claimant stated that in early December 2011 he was taken to a hospital outside the facility for further testing and x-rays (see claimant's exhibit 3).
Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from the electronic audio recording of the trial.
Over defense counsel's objection, the Court received into evidence nine pages of claimant's exhibit 3 comprised of several NYSDOCCS Medical Service Request slips, a Contact Slip, and a Sick Call Request Form all completed by claimant at Washington Correctional Facility between November 16, 2011 and February 5, 2012 and referring to head, back and neck pain. Upon additional review, the Court also receives into evidence from claimant's exhibit 3, a one-page NYSDOCCS Health Services System Request and Report of Consultation form, which is a computer-generated report dated 12/2/11,confirming a referral for claimant to have additional medical testing performed.
Claimant stated that he sustained "neck and lower back injuries" from the collision. He testified that he had "headaches, dizziness, [and] severe pain in [his] neck and back radiating down [his] right leg on the right side," and that he received physical therapy for his lower back pain. He stated that the injuries had a "profound effect" on him, making it difficult to get in and out of bed, to sleep, to bend over, to lift things, and to turn his head. He stated that he had "a lot of stiffness," "limited mobility," "constant pain for months," and is "still hampered from physical strenuous activity." Claimant was released from the facility on April 2, 2012. He stated that he was out of work from April 2, 2012 until August 26, 2013 (the date he began work in his current position at GE) because he was hurt from the incident.
During cross-examination, claimant testified that he had sustained injuries to his upper back prior to his incarceration. He also stated that he had seen a chiropractor following an automobile accident in Albany in 1997, and that he had alleged to have suffered neck and back injuries as a result of that accident. He acknowledged that he had incurred "numerous injuries" to his knees, ankles, collarbone and shoulder prior to entering NYSDOCCS custody during his time in the military as a parachutist with the Airborne Division. He also stated that, while incarcerated and before the accident, he recalled having pain in his knees and his ankles, and general soreness and stiffness, which he attributed to being in a "seven day a week" six month "shock" boot-camp program, which involved "extensive" physical and strenuous activity. He recalled complaining about a growth on the back of his head before the accident, which was later removed in the summer of 2012 at the Veteran's Affairs Hospital in Albany. He affirmed that he enrolled at HVCC in the fall of 2012 and completed his degree in May 2013.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that at trial it reserved decision as to the admissibility of several medical records contained in claimant's exhibit 3. Upon further review, the Court finds that the documents comprised of medical reports from various medical providers are not admissible as business records absent evidence the documents were certified, or evidence that foundational requirements for their admissibility were met (see Matter of Columbia County Support Collection Unit v Demers, 29 AD3d 1092, 1093 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 708 [2006]). Here, claimant's medical records, consisting of hospital reports, doctor reports, and reports of independent medical evaluations, were not admissible without any witness providing foundation testimony (see People ex rel. Saafir v Mantello, 163 AD2d 824, 825 [4th Dept 1990] [laboratory test results not admissible as business record where agency failed "to produce a witness to lay a proper foundation for admission of the report"]; CPLR 4518[a]). Nor were the reports admissible as business records absent proper certification or authentication by the head of the hospital or laboratory, or by a qualified physician (see Shafi v Motta, 73 AD3d 729, 730 [2d Dept 2010] [hospital laboratory reports and city health department records not admissible because documents "were neither certified nor authenticated, and thus were not in admissible form"]; compare Dhillon v Bryant Assoc., 26 AD3d 155, 156 [1st Dept 2006] [hospital records properly admitted into evidence where "the appropriate certification was attached" to the records]; CPLR 4518[c]).
Even if the Court considered claimant's medical records, claimant has failed to prove that he suffered a "serious injury" as required by statute. Section 5104 (a) of the Insurance Law provides, in pertinent part, that:
"Notwithstanding any other law, in any action by or on behalf of a covered person against another covered person for personal injuries arising out of negligence in the use or operation of a motor vehicle in this state, there shall be no right of recovery for non-economic loss, except in the case of a serious injury, or for basic economic loss . . ." (emphasis added).
Section 5102 (d) of the Insurance Law defines the types and categories of serious injury recognized under the statute:
" 'Serious injury' means a personal injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member; significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment."
"It is well established that a plaintiff seeking to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident is required to plead and prove that he or she has sustained a 'serious injury' as defined in Insurance Law §§ 5102(d) and 5104(a)" (O'Hare v St. Louis, 23 Misc 3d 1108[A] [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2009]; see Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230 [1982];Gutt v Bryan, 21 Misc 3d 1121[A] [Sup Ct, NY County 2008]). In order to satisfy the "serious injury" requirement, claimant must proffer at trial "legally sufficient evidence" of a qualifying injury (Rodriguez v Schickler, 229 AD2d 326, 327 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 810 [1997]; accord Cabrera v Mulligan, 9 Misc 3d 139[A] [App Term 1st Dept 2005]), and such proof must consist of "sufficient, objective medical evidence" (Skellham v Hendricks, 270 AD2d 619, 620 [3d Dept 2000]; see Apuzzo v Ferguson, 20 AD3d 647, 647-648 [3d Dept 2005]; Rice v Hale, 9 AD3d 845, 846 [4th Dept 2004]; Fein v Carli Cab Corp., 3 Misc 3d 127[A] [App Term 1st Dept 2004]; Jones v Davis, 307 AD2d 494, 495 [3d Dept 2003], lv dismissed, 1 NY3d 566 [2003];see also Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d at 350). "[S]ubjective complaints of pain" alone are not sufficient (Marotta v Mastroianni, 273 AD2d 206 [2d Dept 2000]; compare Jones v Davis, 307 AD2d at 495; Harwood v Hinds 295 AD2d 949, 951 [4th Dept 2002]), and neither are "minor, mild or slight limitations in range of motion" (Parks v Miclette, 41 AD3d 1107, 1109 [3d Dept 2007]; see Scheer v Koubek, 70 NY2d 678, 679 [1987]; Apuzzo v Ferguson, 20 AD3d at 647-648; Jones v Davis, 307 AD2d at 495). The statutory requirement that proof of a serious injury be established in cases brought under the No-Fault Law reflects the " 'legislative intent . . . to weed out frivolous claims and limit recovery to significant injuries' " (Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345, 350 [2002], quoting Dufel v Green, 84 NY2d 795, 798 [1995]).
Here claimant offered no such competent medical proof. Absent testimony from medical professionals who treated or examined claimant, the medical records alone do not provide a competent medical basis for a finding that claimant suffered a "serious injury" as that term is defined by statute. Claimant never articulated the § 5102 (d) serious injury category applicable to his injuries. In any event, whether it was the permanent loss of use category, the significant limitation of use category, or the category concerning a "medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person" from performing usual and customary activities for 90 to 180 days after the injury, no persuasive medical proof of a "serious injury" was presented (see Cheek v State of New York, UID No. 2011-041-510 [Ct Cl, Milano, J., Oct. 4, 2011]; Henderson v State of New York, UID No. 2009-015-511 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Jan. 14, 2009]; Stith v State of New York. UID No. 2007-041-508 [Ct Cl, Milano, J., Aug. 23, 2007]).
Finally, claimant must offer sufficient medical proof at trial demonstrating that the motor vehicle accident at issue caused the injuries alleged in his claim (see Fallon v Esposito, 35 AD3d 1067 [3d Dept 2006]; Prescott v Le Blanc, 247 AD2d 802 [3d Dept 1998]; Andre v Seem, 234 AD2d 325 [2d Dept 1996]), and "even where there is objective medical proof [of a serious injury], when additional contributory factors interrupt the chain of causation between the accident and claimed injury--such as a gap in treatment, an intervening medical problem or a preexisting condition--summary dismissal of the complaint may be appropriate" (Kwitek v Seier, 105 AD3d 1419, 1420 [4th Dept 2013], quoting Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 572 [2005]; accord Shackett v Nappi, 75 AD3d 709, 710-711 [3d Dept 2010]). Here, no competent medical testimony or evidence was proffered by claimant establishing a causal connection between the vehicular collision and the injuries claimant described at trial (see Bradshaw v State of New York, UID No. 2009-010-040 [Ct Cl, Ruderman, J., Nov. 30, 2009]; Daniels v State of New York, UID No. 2002-001-501 [Ct Cl, Read, J., Apr. 16, 2002]). Moreover, claimant's own testimony regarding his service in the military and his participation in the "shock" program before the accident raises a legitimate issue as to whether claimant had a preexisting condition that may either be a sole or contributing factor to the pain or limited mobility he alleges in his claim and testified to at trial.
In sum, based upon the aforementioned legal principles and their application to the facts presented here, and after weighing the evidence proffered at trial, including the exhibits received into evidence and the testimony and demeanor of the claimant, the Court finds that claimant has not proven negligence against defendant by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Claimant did not offer at trial competent medical evidence showing he sustained a serious injury as defined by Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Nicholas v C & F Trading Co., 107 AD3d 769, 771 [2d Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 852 [2013]; Nunez v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 96 AD3d 917, 919 [2d Dept 2012]). Further, claimant failed to prove that any of his injuries qualified under any particular category of injury set forth in § 5102, instead offering only subjective complaints of pain, and failed to establish a causal connection between the injuries he alleges and the van accident.
Therefore, as claimant failed to prove a serious injury, as required and defined under Article 51 of the Insurance Law, claimant's cause of action alleging motor vehicle negligence is dismissed in its entirety. Any motions upon which the Court had previously reserved or which remain undecided are hereby denied.
The Clerk of the Court of Claims is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
February 6, 2014
Albany, New York
James H. Ferreira
Judge of the Court of Claims