Opinion
Case No.: 5:20-02188-CJC (SPx)
11-25-2020
ROGER COFFELT, Plaintiffs, v. EQUITY LIFESTYLE PROPERTIES, INC., MHC OPERATING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, MHC THOUSAND TRAILS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, MHC NAC, LLC, and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND CASE TO RIVERSIDE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT [Dkt. 10]
I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
This case concerns the accessibility of various campgrounds for people with disabilities. To understand the context of the matter before the Court, one must return to October 2018, when Plaintiff Roger Coffelt brought a case substantially similar to this one together with his wife Jeannie ("Mrs. Coffelt"). Coffelt v. Equity, Case No. 5:18-cv- 02186-CJC-SP (hereinafter the "Original Case"). Mrs. Coffelt fell in the shower in a restroom at one of Defendants' campgrounds, and she and her husband alleged that the shower failed to comply with ADA standards because there was not enough clear space, there was no grab bar, and the water drain cover was not fixed in place. (Id. ¶¶ 62-65.) The complaint in the Original Case asserted claims for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), violation of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act (the "Unruh Act"), and other state law claims. (Original Case Dkt. 1.) Plaintiff and his wife therefore alleged that the Court had both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.)
Mrs. Coffelt passed away in September 2019. In February 2020, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint in the Original Case, eliminating all claims except the Unruh Act claim. (See Original Case Dkt. 35 [FAC]; Dkt. No. 26-2 [stipulation regarding filing of FAC].) After Mr. Coffelt filed the first amended complaint, which asserted only an Unruh Act claim, Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Original Case Dkt. 40-1.) They argued that the Court lacked federal question jurisdiction because the FAC asserted only a single state-law claim, and that the Court also lacked diversity jurisdiction because most of the Defendants are California citizens. (Id.) The Court agreed that there was no federal jurisdiction over Plaintiff's complaint, and remanded the case to state court. (Original Case Dkt. 43.)
Based on the Court's ruling, Plaintiff filed the same complaint in state court. More specifically, the state court complaint consists of (1) the procedural history laid out above, and (2) a copy of the exact complaint this Court dismissed. (See Dkt. 1-1.) Surprisingly, Defendants removed. Defendants do not contend that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case. Rather, Defendants argue—contrary to their position in the Original Case—that the Court has federal question jurisdiction because "Plaintiff makes several statements relating to or based on the Americans with Disabilities Act," which, according to Defendants, means that "the Complaint alleges ADA claims." (Dkt. 11 [Opposition] at 2.) Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court and to award attorney fees. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing set for December 7, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. is hereby vacated and off calendar.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," possessing "only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant may remove to federal district court a civil action brought in state court, but over which a federal court may exercise original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). By statute, federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," and diversity jurisdiction over suits where more than $75,000 is in controversy if the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from that of each defendant. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a).
The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Indeed, "[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Id. If the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the action shall be remanded to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction falls on the party asserting it—here, the defendant. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2001). "Nothing is to be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction." United States v. Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Whether the Court Has Jurisdiction
As explained, the complaint Plaintiff filed in state court is the exact same complaint he filed in the Original Action. (Dkt. 1-1.) Defendants previously argued that the Court did not have federal question jurisdiction over that complaint, which asserts a single state-law claim. (Original Case Dkt. 40-1.) Nevertheless, Defendants now argue that the same complaint "[a]s currently worded" creates federal jurisdiction, not because Plaintiff asserts any federal claim, but because the Complaint "makes several statements relating to or based on" the ADA. (Opp. at 2.) The Court is not persuaded.
When Defendants argued that the Court should dismiss the Original Case complaint for lack of jurisdiction, they argued that the Court should apply the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 2002). In that case, the plaintiff asserted disability discrimination claims under the ADA and California's Disabled Person's Act ("DPA"). Id. at 858. Like the Unruh Act, the DPA makes an ADA violation a violation of the DPA. Cal. Civ. Code Id. § 54.1(d). During litigation, the defendant divested ownership of the relevant property, mooting the ADA claim (which only provides for injunctive relief). The plaintiff argued that the district court still had jurisdiction, though, because he contended that "the DPA's incorporation of the ADA presented a federal question." Wander, 304 F.3d at 858. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, explaining that "Congress intended that there be no federal cause of action for damages for a violation of Title III of the ADA." Id. at 858. The court therefore affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the fact that the DPA made a violation of the ADA a violation of the state law did not create federal jurisdiction. Id. ("Federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim is not created just because a violation of federal law is an element of the state law claim.").
The same is true here. Defendants point out that Plaintiff "premises his [Unruh Act] claim exclusively under the ADA." (Opp. at 2-5.) But Defendants well know that there is a very simple reason the Complaint in this case makes so many references to the ADA: the Unruh Act provides that a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). And just because the Unruh Act makes an ADA violation an Unruh Act violation does not mean that this case "aris[es] under" a federal law. Wander, 304 F.3d at 859.
B. Whether the Court Should Award Fees
Plaintiff requests an award of attorney fees for filing this motion. (Mot. at 10-11.) Congress authorized courts remanding cases to state court to "require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Supreme Court explained that courts should award fees under this section "only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal." Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).
The Court finds that Defendants lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal, and that awarding fees is justified. See id. Defendants' motion to dismiss in the Original Case shows they clearly knew and understood the rule regarding federal jurisdiction over Unruh Act claims premised on ADA violations, yet deliberately chose to disregard it. Indeed, their motion to dismiss in the Original Action could not be clearer:
Ninth Circuit authority is clear that you cannot establish federal question jurisdiction based solely on an Unruh Act claim, even one that is based solely on a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002).(Original Case Dkt. 40-1 at 1.)
Defendants did get new counsel in the time since they filed the motion to dismiss in the Original Case. But their new counsel knows the clear state of the law on the issue presented here just as well. Indeed, numerous courts have remanded cases where the attorneys representing Defendants made exactly the arguments presented here. See, e.g., Lawal v. Patagonia Glob. LLC, 2020 WL 6681859, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2020) (explaining that where a plaintiff alleges the defendant violated the Unruh Act by violating the ADA, "courts in the Central District, following binding Ninth Circuit precedent, have ordered a remand"); Mosley v. Hastings Vill. Inv. Co., L.P., 2020 WL 6119300, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2020); Martinez v. QVC, Inc., 2020 WL 4192259, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2020); Portillo v. W.E.R.M. Investments, LLC, 2020 WL 1243782, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2020); Martinez v. Pioneer Elecs. (USA) Inc., 2020 WL 1846791, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2020); Castillo v. Tamara Mellon Brand, Inc., 2020 WL 703693, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020); Rendon v. Bracketron Inc., 2020 WL 65075, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2020); Castillo v. Lundt & Sprungli USA Inc., 2019 WL 6910354, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2019); Thurston v. Spectrum Wine Auctions, LLC, 2019 WL 6622844, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2019); Mejico v. Minneapolis Rag Stock Co., 2019 WL 6169918, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019); Martinez v. Greatcollections.com, LLC, 2019 WL 4742299, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2019); see Rutherford v. La Jolla Riviera Apartment House LLC, 2019 WL 6125255, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019) (explaining "district courts have consistently rejected th[e] argument" that a complaint asserting an Unruh Act claim based on a violation of the ADA creates federal jurisdiction). Even this Court explained to Defendants' counsel just five months ago why an Unruh Act claim premised on an ADA violation did not present a federal question. Mosley v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 2020 WL 3120906, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2020). Yet Defendants' counsel still chose to remove this case.
Because of that choice, Plaintiff had to spend time and money meeting and conferring with Defendants' counsel and filing a motion to remand. (Mot. at 9-10.) The remand process wasted time and money for both parties, and also wasted the Court's valuable resources. See Martin, 546 U.S. at 140 ("The process of removing a case to federal court and then having it remanded back to state court delays resolution of the case, imposes additional costs on both parties, and wastes judicial resources.").
Plaintiff requests $4,500 in fees, representing 10 hours of work at an hourly rate of $450. The Court finds that the hourly rate and the time spent are reasonable, and will award that amount.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand and for attorney fees is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded $4,500 in attorney fees. This case is hereby REMANDED to Riverside County Superior Court. DATED: November 25, 2020
/s/_________
HON. CORMAC J. CARNEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE