Opinion
A165136 A165137 A165158
10-25-2024
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CATHERINE RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant. ROGER S., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CATHERINE RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant. S.S., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CATHERINE RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Alameda County Super. Ct. Nos. RG20083496, RG20084105, RG20081610)
GOLDMAN, J.
Catherine Rodriguez appeals from two civil harassment restraining orders and a workplace violence restraining order entered against her pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 527.6 and 527.8, respectively.After several days of testimony, the trial court concluded that Rodriguez had engaged in a "course of conduct" that involved harassment and "credible threats of violence" by emailing, calling, and appearing at Alameda County (County) employees' work locations and residences to protest their involvement in the conservatorship of her aunt, Mildred. When Mildred was placed in a conservatorship, Rodriguez asked to be her conservator but her request was denied. The County Public Guardian was appointed Mildred's conservator instead. Rodriguez believed that the County employees overseeing the conservatorship did not ensure that Mildred was adequately cared for and ultimately caused her to die.
Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Following California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we will use an abbreviated format in referring to the protected parties and will refer to Mildred by her first name only.
Rodriguez contends that she never threatened County employees. Instead, she argues, she engaged in lawful protests of the conservatorship system and otherwise communicated with County employees in a manner protected by the First Amendment. She also asserts that the trial court was biased and committed a series of procedural errors. Neither of the individual County employees who obtained civil harassment restraining orders against Rodriguez-S.S. and Roger S.-filed opposition briefs here. The County argues that substantial evidence supports the workplace violence restraining order entered pursuant to section 527.8; that Rodriguez's various communications were threats not protected by the First Amendment; and that her other claims of error fail. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background A. The Conservatorship
In 2018, the elderly Mildred was placed in a conservatorship. Her niece, Rodriguez, had petitioned for the conservatorship and sought appointment as Mildred's conservator, but Mildred chose the County Public Guardian instead. Roger S. was appointed as Mildred's attorney in the conservatorship proceedings, and S.S. was assigned as lead investigator for the County. John P. took over as Mildred's attorney in 2020.
Initially, Rodriguez was cooperative, but over time conflict arose as she disagreed with the County's choices for Mildred's care. County employees testified to their interactions with Rodriguez over the course of the conservatorship and after Mildred died on November 18, 2020.
B. Rodriguez's Communications with County Employees
S.S. testified that once Rodriguez felt that the County was not moving Mildred quickly enough out of Rodriguez's cousin's home, she started "constantly calling, sending e-mails, and stating that [County employees were] not doing [their] job." As S.S. was moving Mildred out of the cousin's home and into a new placement, Rodriguez arrived and "was very hostile." She took pictures of S.S., Mildred's cousin, and Mildred as Mildred was settling in. A short while later, S.S. attempted to investigate a possible fire at Mildred's home. When S.S. arrived, the door was open; he announced his presence and, when no one responded, walked in, continuing to announce. An angry Rodriguez emerged and forced him to leave.
Rodriguez also sent S.S. angry emails. One stated that Rodriguez knew S.S.'s home address and accused him of "ripping families apart for the love of power, money, [and] control." She wrote that it was time "for all of you [County employees] to be set free" and "to get a taste of [you]r own medicine." Another email called S.S. a murderer and said he was killing Mildred. Rodriguez finished the email with "see you soon."
Rodriguez confronted County Counsel Jessica W. outside the courthouse after a hearing. Rodriguez "was hostile, aggressive, and . . . upset. She was . . . angered to the point of tears and she kept pursuing" Jessica W. and "falsely accusing" her. Jessica W. asked Rodriguez to contact her via email and tried to walk away. Eventually Jessica W.'s colleague intervened. Jessica W. felt "trapped and cornered," noting that "typically parties and counsel will confer about cases in the court hallway" with law enforcement present.
A couple of months later, Jessica W. and a colleague were walking outside their office. Jessica W. heard someone shout her name and saw Rodriguez across the street. Rodriguez quickly approached and "again [was] making false allegations . . . in an aggressive and hostile manner." As Jessica W. walked away, Rodriguez pursued her.
Rodriguez repeatedly emailed other County employees. One email to Jessica W. said, "Jesus's will is coming. It's coming," and "I'm going to take you down and expose your lies." Other emails stated that Jessica W. had hurt the elderly and that she would reap what she sowed. "Let me tell you," the email continued, "I'm powerful and anointed. I fear no evil because God is with me. No weapon form against me will prosper. Mark my words. You will see the power of God come down and take this and shame those who are hurting the elderly and the children. It's coming!!!!" John P. received the same email. The language felt threatening and ominous to Jessica W. In further emails, Rodriguez repeated the "reap what you sow" language; stated, "[i]t's time for all of you to be set free" and that after hurting families "it's now time" for County employees "to get a taste of [their] own medicine"; and noted that Rodriguez had the employees' home addresses and would be protesting. Another email said, "I pray that you all get a taste of what you did to my aunt who did not deserve to die the way you let her die."
Lori C., Director of the Alameda County Social Services Agency, received emails from Rodriguez after meeting with her about Mildred's case. The emails included those accusing S.S. of killing Mildred and mishandling her case. They were angry in tone and escalating.
F.B., Assistant Director at the County Department of Adult and Aging Services, was included on Rodriguez's emails and spoke with her on the telephone. Rodriguez accused S.S. of being dishonest and incompetent, and of misappropriating funds for the elderly. Rodriguez's emails repeated the allegations and accused F.B. of being responsible for Rodriguez's niece giving up her child when F.B. worked in a different County agency. Rodriguez indicated that F.B. "would be held responsible or get what was coming to [her]" for that.
C.T. was a County investigator. He completed property work orders, like fixing or selling conservatees' property. He was assigned to conduct a search and inventory of the fire-damaged home of another County conservatee. That conservatee's son, Brian Nevarez, who also lived at the property, prevented him from completing the work order. Brian threatened to murder C.T., declaring that he would be the next homicide in Oakland. When C.T. returned to his office, he had missed calls and a voicemail from Rodriguez. Rodriguez said she was an advocate for Nevarez, that C.T. was being watched, that he should not enter the property, and that "[w]e will be fighting against you guys."
S.S.'s supervisor, A.O., also received a voicemail from Rodriguez. In the voicemail, Rodriguez said she would not let the County take control of the Nevarez property; that County employees were taking property and finances from the elderly; and that she and other advocates were "going to be coming against you" and would "protest, protest, protest until each and every one of you are taken down and lose your jobs because what you are doing to the elderly is evil." A.O. had never in his 27 years in public service received a similar voicemail. The day after Mildred's death, Rodriguez left A.O. a second voicemail, accusing County employees of killing Mildred and calling them murderers. She warned that "a protest [is] coming, and it is going to be in front of your house. And your neighbors are going to know exactly what you do for a living." Rodriguez's tone was "intimidating."
C.T. and John P. viewed a social media interaction between Nevarez and Rodriguez. They were commenting about their relatives' conservatorship cases and Mildred's recent death. Nevarez wrote, "[t]he butcher is back," "[i]t's time to purge" and "I will help you fight."
Emily G. oversaw the conservatorship program. A staff member forwarded her the email stating that County employees would get a taste of their own medicine. Emily G. received other emails directly from Rodriguez stating that employees would reap what they sow, that they were abusing the elderly, and that Rodriguez would protest their actions. Emily G. interpreted the "reap what you sow" and similar language to mean County employees would be mistreated or killed. Rodriguez named Emily G. in the voicemails she left for A.O. and C.T.
C. Protest Activities
Rodriguez went to the homes of several County employees, alone on November 13 and with others on December 5 and 6, 2020. Lori C., John P., and F.B. had never had an employee visited at their residence by a client or a family member in their 20 and more years with the County.
On November 13, Rodriguez went to S.S.'s home; S.S. was not there, but his minor daughter was. His daughter, unsuspecting, opened the door. Rodriguez confirmed it was S.S.'s address and then spoke to S.S.'s daughter about his work. S.S.'s daughter called him, and he told her to close the door. Rodriguez filmed the incident, included a shot of S.S.'s address, and posted it to social media. On the film, Rodriguez stated that S.S. had a wife and two children, indicating that she had investigated his personal life. She re-posted the video a year later.
Rodriguez also visited John P.'s home on November 13. Rodriguez livestreamed John P.'s address number and showed landmarks that would make it "very easy for anybody to find [his] home." She filmed herself stating that John P. lived in Richmond, that he was lying in court documents and defrauding the elderly, and that she would return with others to protest. She scared John P.'s son, who was at home alone.
The same day, Rodriguez went to Roger S.'s home and filmed the interaction. Roger S. answered the door. Rodriguez accused Roger S. of isolating, stealing from, and killing the elderly, and said she would return with others to protest and "tell all [his] neighbors what [he] really do[es] for a living." She filmed wine bottles in his recycling container and called him an alcoholic. She posted the encounter to social media later that day and reposted it a year later. Because of his work as a public defender, Roger S.'s address was kept confidential, but Rodriguez somehow found it. Roger S. also testified that Rodriguez made false complaints about him to his supervisors, the County Board of Supervisors, the state bar, and an attorney in County Counsel's office.
Rodriguez emailed County employees on December 1, writing that she would be going to S.S.'s home to ask where he put Mildred's belongings; she concluded with a winking emoji face.
On December 5, S.S. received a call from his minor daughter, who was frightened by people with signs protesting at their front door. Rodriguez and the other protestors rang the doorbell and hid so that those inside would not see who was there. The group passed a conspicuous "no trespassing" sign, left a poster by S.S.'s door, and stapled fliers on his stairway and along the street. They knocked on neighbors' doors. They were angry and yelling, calling S.S. a murderer, announcing his address over the megaphone, and pledging to return. Rodriguez said that S.S. "would reap the consequences" of "being a killer." S.S.'s daughter and the neighbors called the police. S.S. returned after the police arrived but drove past his home and hid in his car; he did not feel safe with Rodriguez there. Rodriguez posted a video of the incident to social media. Rodriguez frightened S.S., because he knew she always followed through on her statements.
Approximately five or six people came to John P.'s home. John P. was driving with his son when he saw people in or near his driveway. He heard Rodriguez's voice, amplified, saying he had murdered Mildred. Rodriguez was carrying a poster with Mildred's picture. John P. drove past, parked in a shopping area, and called police. When he returned, he saw that fliers had been posted to telephone poles on his street. The fliers looked like "wanted" posters, referenced Mildred's case, and depicted John P., A.O., Donna Z., Lori C., Emily G., and S.S., among other County officials, calling them corrupt and accusing them of abusing the elderly and committing other crimes.
Rodriguez and others appeared at Donna Z.'s house on December 5. Donna Z. worked as County Counsel for more than 20 years. She lived on a private street owned by her condominium association; her neighbors alerted her to the gathering and called the sheriff. Carrying signs, Rodriguez and others spoke on a megaphone, banged on Donna Z.'s door, and stapled fliers to and propped signs against her home. The picture of Donna Z. on the flier was from a social media account but was not her profile picture. Rodriguez refused to leave and repeatedly tapped her foot over the property line, taunting Donna Z. and later bragging about it. Donna Z. believed Rodriguez was trying to provoke a physical confrontation. Afterward, Rodriguez posted a video of the incident on social media, saying they would return.
Rodriguez went to Roger S.'s house on December 5. Roger S. drove by his home after running errands and saw Rodriguez and others there with signs and a megaphone. Rodriguez was posting a flier on a telephone pole. Later, Roger S. saw the flier on other telephone poles in the neighborhood, on car windshields, and on his and his neighbors' doorsteps. The protestors had "an angry confrontation" with a neighbor who pulled down a flier and said he would call the police.
Rodriguez and several others went to Jessica W.'s home on December 6. Rodriguez was speaking through a megaphone, initially talking about Jessica W.'s marriage and other aspects of her personal life, and then calling her a murderer. Rodriguez walked up and down the driveway, leaned items on the garage, and approached the front gate, as close to Jessica W. "as the . . . structure of the home would physically allow." Rodriguez was "[v]ery angry, very aggressive, [and] very hostile" during the 15- or 20-minute interaction and stated: "This is just the beginning. We'll be back. Just because my aunt has died doesn't mean it's over. You're going to be seeing pictures of what she looks like dead." Afterward, Rodriguez posted a video of the incident on social media, including of her yelling Jessica W.'s address. On the video, Rodriguez commented that Jessica W. and her husband had just moved into the home and that Jessica W. drove a specific type of car; Rodriguez filmed the car and its license plate. She also stated the group was protesting Nevarez's case.
Rodriguez appeared at Lori C.'s home the same day. Lori C. heard the doorbell ring and yelling outside. Using a bullhorn, the group accused Lori C. of mistreating the elderly and implied that she had stolen from the elderly to pay for her house. Rodriguez said she would keep returning until things changed, and left a poster at Lori C.'s front door and a flier on her doorstep. The group tacked the flier to neighbors' front doors. Rodriguez would have had to search Lori C.'s social media to find the picture on the flier.
Rodriguez joined multiple Board of Supervisors meetings, typically making vengeful statements and accusing County employees of killing Mildred. In June 2021, Rodriguez appeared at a remote meeting, commenting that County employees were corrupt and had mistreated Mildred and others. After the meeting, Rodriguez posted to social media, naming County employees involved in Mildred's case, and contending that the employees were wicked, corrupt, and abusing and killing the elderly.
The County employees believed that Rodriguez's language and conduct was threatening and showed an escalation in her anger at them. During his testimony, Roger S. described Rodriguez's behavior at trial: She would smirk or smile when County employees testified that her actions made them afraid.
II. Procedural History
The County, Roger S., and S.S. petitioned for temporary restraining orders, which were granted in December 2020. The three petitioners then sought permanent restraining orders.
Rodriguez moved to quash Roger S.'s service on her of the temporary restraining order, and argued that she was not served with other pleadings. Her motion to quash was denied, and service of the remaining materials was deemed adequate. Both parties were granted continuances-to attend mediation, to allow Roger S. to complete service, for Rodriguez to obtain counsel, and due to the pandemic; the trial court denied some continuance requests.
The matters were consolidated and assigned to a different judge for trial. Rodriguez filed an untimely challenge to the judicial assignment.
The trial proceeded over several days, with the trial court granting Rodriguez's request to continue trial due to illness. After closing arguments, the court issued an oral tentative ruling, finding that the petitioners had proven their cases by clear and convincing evidence and that Rodriguez was not credible and did not act for a legitimate purpose. The court later issued a single statement of decision for all three cases and entered civil harassment restraining orders naming S.S. and Roger S. as protected parties, and a workplace violence restraining order on behalf of the County, naming Jessica W., John P., S.S., Lori C., Emily G., Donna Z., A.O., C.T., and F.B. as protected parties.
We consolidated Rodriguez's appeals of the three restraining orders for purposes of argument and disposition.
DISCUSSION
Rodriguez argues primarily that the restraining orders are invalid because she never threatened County employees and her conduct and speech were legitimate and constitutionally protected protests of an abusive public conservatorship system. She also asserts that there is not a sufficient nexus between County employees' workplaces and her protests at their homes, and challenges the orders on procedural grounds.
I. Statutory Context
The court entered the restraining orders here pursuant to sections 527.6 and 527.8. "The Legislature enacted section 527.6 . . . 'to protect the individual's right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.'" (Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 677.) Section 527.8 was enacted later, with provisions parallel to those in section 527.6, "to enable employers to seek the same remedy for its employees as section 527.6 provides for natural persons." (Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 333-334.) Although similar, the statutes have "somewhat different requirements." (Hansen v. Volkov (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94, 104, fn. 5.) The differences include section 527.8's requirement that the threat be one "that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace." (§ 527.8, subd. (a).) Section 527.6, unlike section 527.8, permits the issuance of a restraining order on a finding that the restrained person engaged in harassment, which does not require proof of violence or a credible threat of violence. (Compare § 527.6, subd. (a)(1), (b)(3), with § 527.8, subd. (a), (b)(2).)
II. Standard of Review
Generally, we review for substantial evidence the trial court's findings in support of a restraining order. (City of Los Angeles v. Herman (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 97, 102 (Herman).) To decide whether "substantial evidence support[s] [those] findings, we interpret the evidence in favor of the prevailing party ....This means that we resolve all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the [County], and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's findings." (Ibid.) We" 'must [also] account for the clear and convincing standard of proof .... When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before [us] is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.'" (Technology Credit Union v. Rafat (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 314, 323.)
We review plausible First Amendment issues independently. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 632 (George T.); see, e.g., People v. Peterson (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1067-1068 [stalking conviction premised on alleged threats]; Smith v. Novato Unified School Dist. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1453-1454 [civil challenge to retraction of student's opinion editorial in school paper].) "Independent review is particularly important in the threats context because it is a type of speech that is subject to categorical exclusion from First Amendment protection ....'What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.'" (George T., at p. 634; but see Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 407, 420 [independent review not required in every instance implicating First Amendment interests].) "Independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review . . . . Because the trier of fact is in a superior position to observe the demeanor of witnesses, credibility determinations are not subject to independent review, nor are findings of fact that are not relevant to the First Amendment issue. . . . Accordingly, we will defer to the [trial] court's credibility determinations, but will '" 'make an independent examination of the whole record . . . .'" '" (George T. at p. 634.)
Although Rodriguez did not request independent review of the First Amendment issues in these appeals, the issue is not forfeited. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 36, fn. 12.)" 'In every appeal, the threshold matter to be determined is the proper standard of review-the prism through which we view the issues presented to us.'" (Ibid.)
We review other issues of law de novo. (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 497; see, e.g., Severson &Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 944 [procedural due process].) We review the trial court's discretionary decisions-such as evidentiary and non-substantive procedural rulings-for abuse of discretion. (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 931; People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 508.)
III. Workplace Violence Restraining Order
Section 527.8 allows an "employer . . . whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence . . . that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace . . . [to] seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee ...." (§ 527.8, subd. (a).)
A. Credible Threat of Violence
Rodriguez contends that her speech and conduct did not constitute a "credible threat of violence" and relatedly that it was protected by the First Amendment because she was protesting and communicating with public employees about a flawed public conservatorship system. Because Rodriguez has plausibly raised the First Amendment as a defense, we review these claims independently. (George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 632.)
The First Amendment does not protect credible threats of violence. (USS-Posco Industries v. Edwards (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 436, 445-446.) An unprotected "true threat" is a statement that, "in the entire context and under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would foresee would be interpreted by those to whom the statement is communicated as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm upon that person." (Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists (9th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1058, 1077 (en banc) (Planned Parenthood).) "It is not necessary that the defendant intend to, or be able to carry out [the] threat; the only intent requirement for a true threat is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicate the threat." (Id. at p. 1075.) Section 527.8 incorporates First Amendment protections by permitting a restraining order to issue only upon clear and convincing proof that the restrained person made a credible threat of violence; the First Amendment inquiry, therefore, dovetails with the question whether Rodriguez credibly threatened the County employees.
The evidence showed that Rodriguez engaged in a series of hostile interactions with County employees involved in Mildred's care over the course of more than a year. When things did not go her way in the conservatorship proceedings, Rodriguez twice angrily and in person confronted both Jessica W. and S.S. She began sending County employees angry and ominous emails peppered with statements implying that they would receive retribution for the harm they caused Mildred. Particularly concerning were her statements that County employees had hurt and killed Mildred, followed by proclamations that they would "reap what they sow" and get a "taste of their own medicine," and that "it" was "coming," with emphatic punctuation. When Nevarez directly threatened to kill C.T. for performing his duties, Rodriguez essentially cosigned the threat by leaving angry voicemails for C.T. and A.O. that stated she would be "fighting" or "coming against" County employees on Nevarez's behalf. She then researched the County employees' addresses and personal lives and appeared at their homes, where she confronted them, their family members, and neighbors. Rodriguez stood on the County employees' doorsteps, filming and later posting her visits to social media. After Mildred's death, Rodriguez sent more emails, warning that she would return to their homes to protest.
Upon her promised return, Rodriguez was joined by several other protestors. She used a megaphone, left posters on garages and front doors, and posted fliers around the neighborhoods. The fliers were in a "wanted" format, showing the faces and names of County employees and accusing them of having committed various crimes, including murder. (See Planned Parenthood, supra, 290 F.3d at p. 1063 [wanted poster, in context, constituted an unprotected true threat].) Over her megaphone, Rodriguez yelled "murderer" at County employees, repeated that they would "reap what they sow," passed intentionally conspicuous "no trespassing" signs, and picketed on a private street. She refused to leave Donna Z.'s private property when asked and taunted Donna Z. and bragged about it later. She again filmed and posted her interactions to social media. Throughout her interactions with County employees, she pledged to continue her protests. S.S. knew she always followed up on her promises. County employees consistently testified that Rodriguez's conduct was escalating. And even after the temporary restraining orders were in place, Rodriguez appeared at Board of Supervisors meetings and posted to social media, continuing to accuse the County employees of incompetence and abuse of the elderly.
Certain aspects of Rodriguez's conduct mirror those of the restrained parties in Herman and City of San Jose v. Garbett (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526 (Garbett), who both made threatening statements directed at public employees ostensibly about matters of public business. In both cases, however, the implicit threats were more direct and/or specific than Rodriguez's statements here. In Garbett, the restrained person, Garbett, regularly appeared at public city meetings and spoke during public comment periods, expressing his anger toward and resentment of the respondent city. (Garbett, at p. 530.) When speaking to the city clerk about his efforts to be elected to city government, Garbett made delusional statements, angrily asked," 'What does somebody have to do to change policy around here?'" and then specifically referenced the recent shooting and killing of several individuals at city hall by a similarly situated individual in Missouri whom Garbett called his "friend." (Id. at pp. 531-533.) In Herman, the restrained person also regularly attended city council meetings. (Herman, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 100.) He began directing angry comments at a city attorney, Fauble, whom he perceived to be Jewish; repeatedly announced Fauble's personal address during public comment periods and wrote it on comment cards; drew Nazi and Ku Klux Klan iconography on comment cards, along with "Fuck you Edward Fauble"; and then, at a final city council meeting, was disruptive and while being escorted out, said "loudly and in a threatening manner,""' "fuck you, Fauble. I'm going back to Pasadena [where Fauble lived] and fuck with you." '" (Ibid.) Even without the directness and specificity present in Herman and Garbett, however, we find that context supplies the requisite immediacy and gravity of purpose to conclude that Rodriguez's conduct as a whole conveyed a credible threat of violence. (See George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 637.)
" 'Alleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding events and reaction of the listeners.'" (Planned Parenthood, supra, 290 F.3d at p. 1075; see People v. Pineda (2022) 13 Cal.5th 186, 248-249 [chanting of "rat" and inciting others to join was a threat in prison setting]; United States v. Dinwiddie (8th Cir. 1996) 76 F.3d 913, 925-926 [references to shooting death of abortion-providing doctor, along with context and biblical reference that "[w]homever sheds man's blood, by man his blood shall be shed," was a threat].) In this case, the context includes the lesser First Amendment protection granted to those engaging in intrusive speech at personal residences. (Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 474, 484-488 ["we have repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the government may protect this freedom"]; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 330, 336 ["the United States Supreme Court has described targeting picketing as highly offensive conduct which is not entitled to the same level of First Amendment protection as is more general expression of political or social views"].) Although the question is whether, objectively, Rodriguez's conduct amounted to a threat, her listeners' subjective reactions are relevant. (Planned Parenthood, at p. 1075.) The consensus among County employees, their family members, and their neighbors-several of whom called police after encountering Rodriguez-supports the conclusion that Rodriguez's statements objectively constituted threats.
And while Rodriguez never explicitly threatened to harm the County employees,"' "[t]he fact that a threat is subtle does not make it less of a threat." '" (Planned Parenthood, supra, 290 F.3d at p. 1075; see USS-Posco Industries v. Edwards, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 444-445 [upholding workplace violence restraining order premised on implied verbal threats alone].) When the asserted threats are vague or ambiguous, context becomes more important to the analysis. That multiple employees described Rodriguez's activities as uniquely extreme-that they had never in their more than 20 years of work known a client or family member to appear at personal residences or leave similar voicemails-is further context that underscores the objectively threatening nature of her course of conduct.
Here, it is the combination of multiple factors that objectively establishes Rodriguez's intent to convey a credible threat of violence to the County employees: her extensive course of escalating conduct; her repeated statements implying that County employees should be harmed or die; her efforts to aid another family member who directly threatened to kill County employees; her searches for personal information about County employees; her loud and aggressive picketing at County employees' homes, where she enjoyed less First Amendment protection; her leafletting and social media posts; her willingness to confront minor family members; her refusal to respect legal boundaries; her taunting behavior; and the reactions of those who observed her conduct.
B. Legitimate Purpose
Rodriguez argued to the trial court and urges here that her course of conduct served a legitimate purpose-to reform an abusive conservatorship system and to prevent others from being harmed. "Admittedly, there was evidence that supported [Rodriguez's] version of the events....However, . . . we must defer to the trial court's determinations of credibility." (Harris v. Stampolis, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 498.)
The trial court found that Rodriguez was not credible. She was evasive and refused to answer questions even when ordered to do so, and the trial court found that the aggressive protests and threatening communications with County employees were unlikely to effect legislative change when none of the employees were legislators. Consistent with the trial court's finding that Rodriguez's true intent was to threaten and intimidate the County employees, Roger S. testified to Rodriguez's demeanor at trial, stating that she smirked or smiled when she heard the County employees testify that her actions made them afraid. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Rodriguez did not act with a legitimate purpose.
C. Workplace Nexus
Substantial evidence also supports the trial court's implicit conclusion that Rodriguez's threats could "reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace." (§ 527.8, subd. (a).)
Although some of the most threatening conduct occurred at personal residences, Rodriguez also appeared at Jessica W.'s office and outside the courthouse where she worked, and she confronted both S.S. and C.T. at worksites when they were conducting County business. She appeared many times at Board of Supervisors meetings, emailed the County employees countless times at their work email addresses, and called and left at least three voicemails for A.O. and C.T. on their work cellphones. In each instance, she made similar hostile and accusatory statements wishing retribution on County employees for the harm they had caused. Record evidence also indicated that at least some County employees regularly worked from home. (See Northcoast Condominium Association v. Phillips (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 866, 889 [leaving open the question of what constitutes a "workplace" within the meaning of section 527.8 when a larger proportion of the population works from home].) Given the expansiveness of Rodriguez's course of conduct, there was substantial evidence that she both carried out her threats (though not the conduct implied by her threats) at various workplaces, and that her actions could reasonably be construed to convey an intent to carry out her threats at the County employees' workplaces.
IV. Civil Harassment Restraining Orders
Section 527.6 provides that "[a] person who has suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment ...." (§ 527.6, subd. (a)(1).) "Harassment" is defined in relevant part as "a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose." (Id., subd. (b)(3).) A "course of conduct" excludes constitutionally protected activity and "is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time . . . evidencing a continuity of purpose, including . . . making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including . . . email.'" (Id., subd. (b)(1).) The trial court concluded that Rodriquez's actions "constitute[d] a continuing course of conduct designed to, at the very least, harass [S.S. and Roger S.]." We agree.
As described above, Rodriguez's course of conduct was not constitutionally protected, did not serve a legitimate purpose, and as a whole presented a credible threat of violence. And substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Rodriguez "seriously alarm[ed], annoy[ed], [and] harass[ed]" S.S. and Roger S. with her "pattern of conduct . . . evidencing a continuity of purpose, including, . . . sending harassing correspondence" to S.S. and Roger S. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) With a continuity of purpose- expressing her extreme displeasure for the County conservatorship system- Rodriguez repeatedly called and emailed S.S. and appeared at his home and worksites. In her emails, she accused S.S. of abusing and killing Mildred and other conservatees, and implied that she would deliver retribution for these perceived harms. When she appeared at S.S.'s residence, she made the same accusations, including to S.S.'s minor daughter and to his neighborhood over a megaphone. She posted the interactions to social media and left posters and fliers perpetuating the same allegations at his and his neighbors' homes. Rodriguez similarly harassed Roger S. The record contains less evidence that she contacted Roger S. directly, but she appeared at his home twice, and left fliers and posters behind. She filmed Roger S.'s recycling bin, accused him of being an alcoholic, and published that accusation and his confidential home address to social media. Rodriguez made false complaints about him to his supervisors, to the Board of Supervisors, to the state bar, and to another County attorney.
V. Other Arguments
Rodriguez also challenges the restraining orders on procedural grounds. She argues that her due process rights were violated because she was not properly served with pleadings in the trial court. The record belies her claims; she conceded service of certain documents, and with respect to others no personal service was statutorily required. (§ 410.50, subd. (a) ["A general appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party"]; cf. § 527.6, subd. (q)(1) [no personal service required for restraining order entered after hearing where restrained party appeared and thereby "has received actual notice of the existence and substance of the order"].)
Rodriguez argues that the trial court should have denied some continuances and that the temporary restraining orders were in effect beyond statutory limits as a result. But sections 527.6 and 527.8, subdivisions (p), allow either party to obtain a continuance for good cause and explicitly provide that any temporary restraining order shall remain in place unless the court orders otherwise. Here, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's findings that illness, mediation, pandemic conditions, personal service, and efforts to secure legal representation constituted good cause for the continuances. The court also denied some such requests, evidencing its efforts to limit delay.
Rodriguez argues that the trial court erroneously consolidated the three cases because no party filed a motion for consolidation, citing California Rules of Court, rule 3.350. But "[w]hen actions involv[e] a common question of law or fact," a trial court may consolidate them for trial on its own motion. (§ 1048, subd. (a).)
Rodriguez also challenges the trial court's exclusion of testimony regarding Mildred's conservatorship and her witnesses' motivations for participating in the protests. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings that such testimony was largely cumulative and irrelevant, while allowing for some testimony where reasonably limited to prevent undue delay and confusion of issues. (Evid. Code §§ 350, 352; cf. Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners' Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 731, 733 [court erred by excluding all oral testimony from restraining order trial].)
Sections 527.6 and 527.8 do not confer a right to jury trial in restraining order proceedings (§§ 527.6, subd. (i), 527.8, subd. (j)), and Rodriguez has not shown she was otherwise entitled to a jury trial of these matters. Rodriguez cannot rely here on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.), which govern proceedings in federal, not state, court. Rodriguez's remaining procedural arguments likewise fail, for lack of supporting argument, record citations, and/or authority. (Temple of 1001 Buddhas v. City of Fremont (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 456, 483; L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620.)
VI. Motion to Strike
Because we have concluded that the workplace violence restraining order is valid, we grant in part the County's motion to strike portions of Rodriguez's reply brief filed in Appeal Number A165136. The clerk of this court shall remove the current version of Rodriguez's reply brief from the docket in A165136, redact the addresses included at page 24, line 4, page 25, line 17, page 48, line 20, and page 49, line 1, and refile the redacted version of the brief on the docket. The motion is otherwise denied as moot. The court has disregarded extra-record evidence submitted with, and arguments that Rodriguez improperly raised for the first time in, her reply brief.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: BROWN, P. J., DOUGLAS, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.