Opinion
A166401 A166404
01-29-2024
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALAMEDA COUNTY TAXPAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC. et al., Defendants and Appellants. Alameda County Taxpayers’ Association, Inc. et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. County of Alameda et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, PC, Michael G. Colantuono, Pasadena, John A. Abaci, and Conor W. Harkins, for Plaintiff and Respondent in A166401 and Defendants and Respondents in A166404. Law Offices of Jason A. Bezis, Jason A. Bezis, Lafayette, for Defendants and Appellants in A166401 and Plaintiffs and Appellants in A166404. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation, Jonathan M. Coupal, Timothy A. Bittle, Sacramento, and Laura E. Dougherty for Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants in A166401 and Plaintiffs and Appellants in A166404.
Alameda County Superior Court, Nos. RG20070099 and RG20070495, Hon. Jeffrey S. Brand.
Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, PC, Michael G. Colantuono, Pasadena, John A. Abaci, and Conor W. Harkins, for Plaintiff and Respondent in A166401 and Defendants and Respondents in A166404.
Law Offices of Jason A. Bezis, Jason A. Bezis, Lafayette, for Defendants and Appellants in A166401 and Plaintiffs and Appellants in A166404.
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation, Jonathan M. Coupal, Timothy A. Bittle, Sacramento, and Laura E. Dougherty for Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants in A166401 and Plaintiffs and Appellants in A166404.
BURNS, J.
In these consolidated appeals, the Alameda County Taxpayers’ Association, Inc., Marcus Crawley, Thomas Rubin, Steve Slauson, and Montclair Village Hardware (collectively, the Association) appeal from the trial court’s judgments, which rejected the Association’s attempt to invalidate a citizen’s tax initiative (Measure C) to fund early childhood education and pediatric health care in Alameda County. At the March 3, 2020 primary election, Measure C was approved by a simple majority of county voters. The Association contends that the trial court erroneously rejected its numerous challenges to Measure C, including its argument that the tax initiative required the approval of two-thirds of the voting electorate, pursuant to Proposition 13 (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 4) and Proposition 218 (art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (d)).
Undesignated article references are to the California Constitution.
In the published portion of this opinion, we reject that argument and, additionally, conclude that Measure C does not violate article II, section 12 by "nam[ing] or identif[ying] any private corporation to perform any function or to have any power or duty." In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we reject the Association’s remaining challenges. Finding no error, we affirm.
B ackground
A.
Two years before Measure C’s adoption, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors placed a similar measure on the ballot, Measure A, which sought voter approval of a 30-year, one-half percent sales tax to fund childcare and early education. At the June 2018 election, Measure A failed to receive the two-thirds voter approval that it needed to pass. About a month later, the board considered adopting a slimmed down version—a 20-year, one-half percent sales tax—subject to two-thirds voter approval at the November 2018 election. The board tabled that proposal.
Soon after, a voter initiative emerged, with support from a county official and a county employee. In August 2019, the county’s Registrar of Voters received a "Notice of Intention to Circulate Petition" for a proposed citizens’ initiative, which recommended a 20-year, one-half percent sales tax to fund childcare and pediatric health care. The notice was signed by five proponents, including Wilma Chan, who was a supervisor on the board at the time. Dave Brown, who also served as Chan’s chief of staff, was the principal officer of the campaign committee proposing the initiative. The county submitted evidence that Brown served on the campaign committee in his individual capacity, using vacation time.
After receiving an initiative petition signed by 86,513 voters, the registrar certified that the requisite number of valid signatures had been received to qualify the proposed initiative for the ballot (Elec. Code, §§ 9113-9115, 9118). The board placed the initiative on the ballot for the March 3, 2020 primary election (§§ 1405, subd. (a), 9118, subd. (b)).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Elections Code.
According to the official voter information guide, Measure C sought a vote on the following: "Alameda County Care for Kids. To improve critical early health and education for Alameda County children by: protecting local childrens’ [sic] healthcare safety net and Level 1 Pediatric Trauma Center; and increasing access to high quality, affordable childcare and preschool to improve kindergarten readiness, school success and high school graduation rates; shall a County of Alameda ordinance enacting a 20-year half-percent sales tax providing approximately $150,000,000 annually with citizens’ oversight and mandatory annual audits be adopted?" The guide also included an impartial analysis of Measure C, written by County Counsel, as well as an argument in its favor. No argument against the measure was submitted. The guide included the full text of Measure C. Section 2 sets out the electorate’s findings, including that "[e]arly education and health care are two of the important components" in ensuring the health and success of children; that "[a] child’s health and educational advancement are essential and dependent on one another"; that only 31 percent of the county’s children with working parents had access to licensed child care, preschool, or other early education; and that, in 2017, only 44 percent of the county’s children entering kindergarten were ready. Section 3 states that the purpose and intent of the measure is "to ensure that Alameda County children receive the high quality early education and health care they need to be successful adults." Enactment of the tax, its implementation and collection, along with the use of proceeds, are governed by additional provisions of the ordinance, which we discuss in more detail below.
Measure C passed with more than 64 percent of the votes.
B.
Following the election, the county filed an action to validate Measure C. (Code Civ. Proc., § 860 et seq.; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 7270.5.) Only the Association responded to the summons. The Association also filed its own reverse validation action, under Code of Civil Procedure section 863, contending Measure C was invalid under various theories.
After a joint hearing on the merits of the related actions, the trial court rejected each of the Association’s arguments, concluded Measure C was valid, and entered judgments in the county’s (and its registrar’s) favor.
D iscussion
See footnote *, ante.
B.
The Association insists that the tax imposed by Measure C violates the state constitution—specifically Proposition 13 (art. XIII A, § 4) and Proposition 218 (art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (d))—because it was not approved by a two-thirds vote of the electorate. After independently reviewing the trial court’s construction of constitutional provisions (California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 934, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49 (California Cannabis)), we reject the Association’s argument.
1.
[1] Under our state constitution, "the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum." (Art. IV, § 1.) Voters may use the initiative power to enact legislation at the state, county, and city levels. (Ibid.; art. II, §§ 8, 11, subd. (a).) "A defining characteristic of the initiative is the people’s power to adopt laws by majority vote." (City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in Matter of Proposition C (2020) 51 Cal. App.5th 703, 709, 265 Cal.Rptr.3d 437 (Proposition C); accord, art. II, § 10, subd. (a); § 9122.)
[2, 3] Our Supreme Court affords "extraordinarily broad deference" to the electorate’s power to enact laws by initiative. (Pala Band of Mission Indians v. Board of Supervisors (1997) 54 Cal. App.4th 565, 573-574, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 (Pala Band); accord, California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 934-936, 222 Cal. Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49; Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 688, 695, 711, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 363, 889 P.2d 557 (Rossi).) Califor- nia courts have a duty to " ‘ "jealously guard" ’ " the voters’ exercise of their initiative power, and courts must therefore liberally construe the initiative right, "resolve doubts in favor of [its] exercise … whenever possible," and "narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit the exercise of that power." (California Cannabis, supra, at pp. 934, 936, 222 Cal. Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49.)
[4–6] There are "precious few limits" on the initiative power. (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 935, 222 Cal. Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49.) By design, the initiative power is intended to circumvent the ordinary legislative process. (Id. at p. 934, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49.) Procedural requirements imposed on state and local governments do not apply to initiatives unless there is unambiguous evidence that they were so intended. (Id. at pp. 935, 945-947, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49.) This includes the procedural requirements that Propositions 13 and 218 added to our constitution. (See California Cannabis, at pp. 935, 948, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49; Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 251-253, 279 Cal.Rptr. 325, 806 P.2d 1360 (Kennedy Wholesale).)
[7] Two such requirements are at issue here. Proposition 13 added article XIII A, section 4, which provides (in relevant part): "Cities, Counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district." Proposition 218 added article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d): "No local government may impose, extend, or increase any special tax unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a two-thirds vote."
A special tax is one that earmarks or dedicates its proceeds to a specific purpose. (Bay Area Cellular Telephone Co. v. City of Union City (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 686, 696, 75 Cal. Rptr.3d 839; accord, art. XIII C § 1, subd. (d).) It is undisputed that Measure C qualifies.
[8] Our Supreme Court has examined related provisions of Propositions 13 and 218 and concluded that they apply to taxes imposed by local government (or the state legislature) but not to taxes imposed by voter initiative. (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 931, 936, 222 Cal. Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49 [art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b)’s restriction on local government tax increases does not limit voters’ power to raise taxes by initiative]; Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 248-249, 251, 253, 279 Cal.Rptr. 325, 806 P.2d 1360 [art. XIII A, § 3’s supermajority requirement for taxes enacted by state legislature does not limit voters’ initiative power to raise taxes by majority vote].) In California Cannabis, the court explained that a "contrary conclusion would require an unreasonably broad construction of the term ‘local government’ at the expense of the people’s constitutional right to direct democracy, undermining our longstanding and consistent view that courts should protect and liberally construe it." (California Cannabis, supra, at p. 931, 222 Cal. Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49; see id. at p. 945, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49.) A local tax enacted by voter initiative is not a tax "impose[d]" by "local government" within the meaning of Proposition 218. (Id. at pp. 943-944, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49.)
Proposition 218 provides a single definition of local government: " ‘Local government’ means any county, city, city and county, including a charter city or county, any special district, or any other local or regional governmental entity." (Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (b).)
Following California Cannabis, the California appellate courts have uniformly concluded that the supermajority requirements applicable to special taxes imposed by local government (art. XIII A, § 4; art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (d)) do not limit the electorate’s initiative power. (Alliance San Diego v. City of San Diego (2023) 94 Cal. App.5th 419, 430-434, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 230, review den. Nov. 21, 2023, S281846 (Alliance San Diego); City and County of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in the Matter of Proposition G (2021) 66 Cal. App.5th 1058, 1070, 1075, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 17 (Proposition G); Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 227, 230-237, 274 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, review den. April 28, 2021, S267516 (Howard Jarvis); City of Fresno v. Fresno Building Healthy Communities (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 220, 226, 235-236, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 144, review den. Mar. 30, 2021, S266846; Proposition C, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 708-709, 721, 724, 265 Cal.Rptr.3d 437, review den. Sept. 9, 2020, S263753.)
[9] We agree that, if a local special tax is imposed via citizens’ initiative, only a simple majority vote is required to adopt it. (Proposition G, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 17; Howard. Jarvis, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 237, 274 Cal.Rptr.3d 432; § 9122.)
2.
The Association acknowledges that the foregoing rule is settled but argues that the cases listed above are distinguishable. Those cases, it says, involved bona fide citizens’ initiatives, while Measure C—due to the involvement of a board supervisor and her chief of staff—was merely a " ‘quasi-initiative’ " masquerading as a voters’ initiative. It asks us to declare that, when an initiative campaign is "effectively controlled" by local government in " ‘intentional circumvention’ " of Propositions 13 and 218, the tax was enacted by local government, not by voter initiative, and thus subject to the two-thirds vote requirement. This Division rejected a similar argument in Howard Jarvis, supra, 60 Cal. App.5th at pages 239-242, 274 Cal.Rptr.3d 432. The Association asks us to reconsider that decision. We have taken a fresh look at the issue, but we remain unpersuaded.
First, the Association, rather cavalierly, is asking us to annul a voter initiative by judicial fiat. Measure C was enacted by voter initiative, not by the board. (See California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 934-935, 945, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49 [distinguishing between taxes enacted by initiative and taxes enacted by local government]; see also Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra Madre (2001) 25 Cal.4th 165, 175, fn. 7, 187-190, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 214, 19 P.3d 567 (Sierra Madre) [distinguishing between city councilgenerated initiatives (also known as referenda) and voter-sponsored initiatives].) It was placed on the ballot by voter petition and approved at the March 2020 election by a majority of voters. (See §§ 9118, subd. (b), 9122.) We cannot ignore reality.
The Association makes no serious attempt to explain how we can set aside the votes of 287,027 people (more than 64 percent of total votes cast) while honoring our duty to " ‘ "jealously guard" ’ " the voters’ exercise of their initiative power, liberally construe the initiative right, and "resolve doubts in favor of [its] exercise … whenever possible." (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 934, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49.) Nor does it explain how a court can declare—consistent with separation of powers principles (art. III, § 3; City Council v. Superior Court (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 389, 394-396, 3 Cal.Rptr. 796)—that a county’s board of supervisors enacted a specific tax measure that, in fact, it never voted to enact. (See Rose v. County of San Benito (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 688, 716, 292 Cal.Rptr.3d 678 ["a county acts only through its board of supervisors;" individual officer cannot alone exercise legis- lative function].) Because Measure C was imposed by voter initiative, the tax was not "impose[d]" by local government within the meaning of Proposition 13 and Proposition 218, and the supermajority rules do not apply. (See art. XIII A, § 4; art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (d); California Cannabis, supra, at pp. 943-944, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49; Howard Jarvis, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 231, 237-239, 274 Cal. Rptr.3d 432.)
To be sure, there are important limits on the degree to which public officials may advocate for, or expend public resources on, a voter initiative. (See, e.g., Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206, 223, 130 Cal.Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1; League of Women Voters v. Countywide Crim. Justice Coordination Com. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 529, 548-550, 250 Cal.Rptr. 161.) But the Association is not seeking relief on these grounds. Its purpose, instead, is to invalidate the election result by reclassifying the initiative as a local government enactment, thereby making Proposition 13’s and Proposition 218’s supermajority requirements applicable. Because we reject this approach, we have no reason to consider whether any public official breached any rules.
Second, Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 820 P.2d 1000 (Rider)—which the Association relies on as authority for judicially declaring Measure C to be a special tax imposed by local government, rather than by initiative—has nothing to do with initiatives. The Rider court considered whether Proposition 13 (art. XIII A, § 4) applied to a special tax imposed by a regional financing agency. (Rider, supra, at p. 5, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 490, 820 P.2d 1000.) The case primarily turns on whether the agency was a "special district" under article XIII A, section 4. The agency had been transparently designed to evade Proposition 13 by taking advantage of an earlier Supreme Court case that narrowly construed the term "special district." (Rider at pp. 9-10, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 820 P.2d 1000; see Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal.3d 197, 205-206, 182 Cal.Rptr. 324, 643 P.2d 941.) The Rider court recognized that Richmond had created a loophole, revisited the issue (Rider, supra, at pp. 10-11, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 820 P.2d 1000), and concluded that the "framers of Proposition 13, and the voters who adopted it" intended a broader definition of "special district." (Id. at p. 11, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 820 P.2d 1000.)
Rider is inapposite. Proposition 13 expressly applies to special districts. (Art. XIII A, § 4.) So the Rider court’s holding—that the special district at issue must comply with Proposition 13—fits squarely within the language and intent of the constitutional language. (Rider, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 11, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 820 P.2d 1000.) But our case concerns a voter initiative, and the courts have uniformly concluded that the language and intent of Propositions 13 and 218 do not apply to voter initiatives. (See, e.g., Proposition C, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 708-709, 721, 724, 265 Cal.Rptr.3d 437.) Rider does not cast doubt on those cases, much less give us license to invalidate an initiative. We thus stand by our conclusion in Howard Jarvis: Rider does not apply because "neither the text nor ballot materials provide the requisite ‘unambiguous indication’ that the enactors of Propositions 13 and 218 intended to constrain the initiative power when an official is involved in the initiative process." (Howard Jarvis, supra, 60 Cal. App.5th at p. 242, 274 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, citing California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 945-946, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49; see Proposition G, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1079-1081, 282 Cal. Rptr.3d 17 [following Howard Jarvis].)
We acknowledge that our colleagues in the Fourth District, citing Rider, recently suggested that "too much government in- volvement" could potentially "convert a voter [tax] initiative into a local government initiative." (Alliance San Diego, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447-448, 312 Cal.Rptr.3d 230.) For the reasons stated above, we disagree.
We need not address the Association’s related discovery and pleading arguments.
See footnote *, ante.
D.
Next, the Association argues that Measure C is unconstitutional because its findings identify a private corporation, UCSF Benioff Children’s Hospital, Oakland (Children’s Hospital Oakland), in violation of article II, section 12. This argument also lacks merit.
1.
Article II, section 12 provides: "No amendment to the Constitution, and no statute proposed to the electors by the Legislature or by initiative, that names any individual to hold any office, or names or identifies any private corporation to perform any function or to have any power or duty, may be submitted to the electors or have any effect." (Italics added.)
[10, 11] This constitutional prohibition was "enacted to prevent the initiative [power] from being used to confer special privilege or advantage on specific persons or organizations." (Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 832, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247 (Calfarm).) It applies equally to both "for profit" corporations, and to " ‘nonprofit public benefit corporation[s]’ " (id. at pp. 833-834, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247), such as the Children’s Hospital Oakland. Article II, section 12’s prohibition also applies to county initiatives, just as it does to state initiatives. (Pala Band, supra, 54 Cal. App.4th at pp. 579-583, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 148.)
[12–14] An initiative measure " ‘must be upheld unless [its] unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears.’ " (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 711, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363, 889 P.2d 557.) "If the validity of the measure is ‘fairly debatable,’ it must be sustained." (Calfarm, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 815, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) When a portion of an initiative violates article II, section 12 but is severable, "the rule is clear: the offending part must be stricken from the initiative, and the remainder may take effect." (Calfarm, at p. 836, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.)
2.
[15] The question is whether Measure C violates article II, section 12 by granting a specific "name[d] or identified]" private corporation an exclusive privilege or role that is superior to others. (See Calfarm, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 832, 834, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247; Tain v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (2005) 130 Cal. App.4th 609, 633-634, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 330.) We agree with the county that it does not.
Children’s Hospital Oakland is named in Measure C’s findings, which describe it as a critical provider of pediatric care in the community without assigning it any function, power, or obligation.
The Association focuses on section 2.08.302 A. of the measure, which explains how the board can spend revenue and refers to the "local pediatric hospital": "In each year during the term of this article, the board of supervisors shall, in consultation with the local pediatric hospital and specialty provider representatives, expend monies from the Pediatric Health Care Account based on demonstrated need for any of [three pediatric health care related] purposes," including "[t]o maintain, upgrade, and expand, as needed, a Level 1 pediatric trauma center in Alameda County" and "[t]o assure the financial viability of the local children’s health care safety net." (Italics added.) Section 2.08.302 B. continues: "Monies from the Pediatric Health Care Account may be expended for the purposes set forth herein as direct grants, as contractual or program payments for services and activities, as the nonfederal share of Medicaid payments or other federal program payments through certified public expenditures or intergovernmental transfers, as reimbursement or other compensation for costs, as incentives, or through programs or other vehicles identified or developed in conjunction with the local pediatric hospital and specialty provider representatives." (Italics added.)
The italicized language imposes a duty on the board to consult with multiple experts, including the local pediatric hospital, before spending revenue from the Pediatric Health Care Account. The experts themselves have only a passive role as consultees with no duties and no authority to make decisions—not even an obligation to answer the phone when the board calls. (Cf. Pala Band, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 584-585, 591, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 [initiative violated article II, section 12 when it imposed duties on named private developer to determine and prepare a site plan, secure permits, and consult with various agencies].)
We are not troubled by the passive consultation role. Given that a primary objective of Measure C is to support "a local Level 1 pediatric trauma center" and to "maintain] and expan[d] … specialized staff and facilities … [to treat] complex illnesses and conditions," it is impossible to imagine that the board would not consult the trauma center and other health care experts when deciding how to spend the revenue Measure C raises. As a matter of good governance and fiscal prudence, the board would presumably consult with them regardless of whether Measure C required it to do so. The Association fails to persuade us that this is the kind of special privilege that article II, section 12 was intended to proscribe. (See Calfarm, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 832-833, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247 [discussing legislative history].)
[16] Finally, Measure C’s section 2.08.302 was carefully drafted to avoid naming a specific private corporation in any exclusive role (Calfarm, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 832, 834, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247), instead using the generic terms "the local pediatric hospital and specialty provider representatives." The former term is undefined. As noted, separate findings name Children’s Hospital Oakland without assigning it any function, power, or duty. We agree that, as a matter of logic, they can be linked. But because the initiative keeps them separate, if the hospital is sold during the 20-year life of the tax, Measure C would require the board to consult with (among other experts) the new owners, not Children’s Hospital Oakland. (See Hernandez v. Town of Apple Valley (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 194, 211, 213, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 [finding no article II, section 12 violation where initiative referred to Walmart generically as "developer" or "owner" and gave it no rights superior to others if it sold the property].) Article II, section 12, bars an initiative from assigning functions, powers, and duties to a specific corporation, not a generic owner or developer. (See Hernandez, supra, at pp. 211, 213, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 499; Pala Band, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 587 & fn. 22, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 [striking definition of " ‘[a]pplicant’ " that named a specific private developer but leaving generic references to " ‘[a]pplicant’ " to whom the initiative assigned functions, powers, and duties].)
The Association also observes that some of the revenue from Measure C will support the services Children's Hospital Oakland provides to the community as it is undisputedly the only existing "Level 1 pediatric trauma center" in the county. This nonexclusive benefit (§§ 2.08.301-2.08.302) does not appear to be a duty, power, or function proscribed by article II, section 12. Moreover, by identifying Children's Hospital Oakland in the findings, Measure C provided the voters important information about where some of their tax money will be spent. It is hard to see how withholding this information would serve the underlying constitutional purpose of article II, section 12. (See Calfarm, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 832-833, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) In any event, the Association offers no coherent argument or authority to support the position that this benefit is a function, power, or duty proscribed by that provision. Thus, we do not address it further. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d 681.)
The Association fails to meet its burden to show that the initiative " ‘clearly, positively, and unmistakably’ " violates article II, section 12. (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 711, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363, 889 P.2d 557.) Therefore we must uphold Measure C. (Calfarm, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 814-815, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.)
See footnote *, ante.
D isposition
The judgments are affirmed. The county is entitled to its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P.J.
CHOU, J.