Opinion
A166581
03-04-2024
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. T.O., Defendant and Appellant, J.P., Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HF20081030
RICHMAN, J.
In these proceedings filed by the County of Alameda Department of Child Support Services (Department), the trial court ordered T.O. (Father) to make monthly child support payments to his ex-wife, J.P. (Mother). Proceeding without an attorney, Father appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to issue the child support orders, that the orders themselves were erroneous in a number of respects, and that the proceedings were unfair. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The General Setting
Mother and Father are the parents of J.O., born in March 2017. Mother and Father were previously married. In March 2018, a trial court in China issued a judgment dissolving their marriage, awarding custody of J.O. to Mother (both of whom lived in China at the time), and granting visitation to Father. In addition, Father was ordered to pay 2,500 yuan (approximately $347) per month in child support to Mother (hereafter "Chinese support order"). On June 21, an appellate court in China upheld the judgment.
Father also has a son from another relationship.
Mother eventually remarried. She, her new spouse, and J.O. lived in Michigan in 2019, then moved to New Jersey in 2021.
Father owns residential property in Alameda, California and San Diego, California. The San Diego property was used as a rental property. Father testified that he moved to Nevada in January 2021 and moved back to live in his Alameda home in December 2021.
Mother had a part-time job in Michigan, but that job ended on January 30, 2021. She earned $120.98 in 2021. Father testified that he had worked for a company called OpenText since 2014, where he earned around $10,000 per month, and stopped working there in December 2021.
The Proceedings Below
On November 30, 2020, the Department filed in Alameda Superior Court a complaint against Father to establish child support. On March 16, 2021, Father was personally served with the complaint while he was in Alameda County.
On April 21, 2021 Father filed an answer. He did not dispute parentage, but asserted among other things that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of child support because there was an existing Chinese support order. He also argued the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over him because he had moved to Nevada around January 2021.
On May 17, 2021, the Department filed a motion for judgment with respect to child support. On June 7, 2021, Father filed a response to the motion. In light of Father's jurisdictional challenges, the parties were ordered to submit memoranda of points and authorities on whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the issue of child support and over Father.
The motion, Father's response to the motion, and the order on briefing are not included in the record on appeal, but are referenced in other pleadings that are included in the record.
On September 10, 2021, the Department filed such a memorandum asserting that the court had personal jurisdiction over Father because he owned a home in Alameda County, lived in that home for many years, was personally served with the complaint in Alameda, and had consented to jurisdiction by making a general appearance in this proceeding via filing an answer to the complaint.
The Department argued the court also had subject matter jurisdiction, despite the existing Chinese support order. It first noted that under California law, the superior court has exclusive jurisdiction over child support matters. (Fam. Code, § 200.) The Department then explained that although the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (§ 5700.101 et seq.; UIFSA) provides that a foreign child support order may be recognized in California for enforcement (§ 5700.601), the issuing country (1) must have been declared a reciprocating jurisdiction by either the United States or California; (2) must be found to have laws that are substantially similar to the UIFSA; or (3) enforces the Hague Convention. (§ 5700.102, subd. (5).) The Department argued that China does not meet any of these criteria and, as such, the Chinese support order should not be recognized.
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Family Code.
In response, Father contested jurisdiction, arguing among other things that Mother and J.O. had neither lived nor resided in California; Father had moved to Nevada in January 2021 and became a resident of that state; the Chinese support order was still in effect and the Department therefore improperly filed this action; and Mother was "concealing the child" and denying Father reasonable visitation.
On October 26, 2021, the trial court held a hearing, where Mother and Father, representing themselves, as well as the Department's attorney, appeared remotely. After hearing testimony from Mother and Father and arguments from all parties, the court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of child support. It agreed with the Department that under the UIFSA, "China is not a participating country or a member of the Hague Convention," and thus, the Department was not precluded from filing a complaint to establish child support. Additionally, the court found that Father's ownership of property in California established sufficient minimum contacts with California to support exercising personal jurisdiction over him.
At this and subsequent hearings, Mother had a Mandarin interpreter. Father declined an interpreter.
The court issued a temporary order requiring Father to pay $1,430 per month in child support, effective retroactively on January 1, 2021. The court reserved jurisdiction "back to January 1, 2021" and continued the matter to December 6, 2021 to address Father's claims that he had made direct support payments to Mother. A "Judgment Regarding Parental Obligations" containing the court's orders was filed on November 2, 2021.
Subsequently, the court held hearings on December 6, 2021 and March 21, 2022, at which Mother and Father testified regarding their respective incomes, which they had reported in their income and expense declarations. Mother filed her declaration on June 25, 2021, and Father, on February 18, 2022. At the conclusion of the March 21, 2022 hearing, the court determined the matter needed to be addressed at a long-cause hearing, which it ultimately set for June 29, 2022. The court ordered the parties to submit and exchange updated income and expense declarations, with documentation of earnings from all sources; their 2021 federal tax returns including all schedules and attachments or, if not yet filed, their last filed federal tax returns; any W-2 (wage and tax statement) and 1099 (non-employment income) forms received for 2021; and, if either had self-employment income, a profit and loss statement covering the period of January 1, 2022 through May 1, 2022.
The court also explained that each party would have the opportunity to present their evidence at the long-cause hearing. It then instructed the parties to present any exhibits to the court clerk before the hearing, which exhibits must be placed in a binder and pre-marked for identification in the order that they would be presented.
On June 29, 2022, Mother, Father, and the Department appeared remotely at the long-cause hearing. The Department reported that both parents provided their 2021 federal tax returns, but that they were unsigned and lacked documents such as their 1099 forms. Further, some of the documents that Father provided were redacted. Mother did not submit an updated income and expense declaration.
The Department made the following offer of proof. For the period of January 1, 2021, through December 31, 2021, the Department calculated guideline child support of $1,932 per month. The Department based this calculation on, among other factors, that Father had zero timeshare; filed head of household claiming a child of another relationship as a dependent; and had per month income of $10,530 based on his W-2, dividend income of $865, and rental income of $1,629 based on his 2021 tax returns. The Department offered that, based on Mother's tax returns, Mother had no income and her new spouse had monthly income of $9,491.
Courts are required to implement "the statewide uniform child support guideline" in fixing the amount of child support and allocating the obligation between the parties. (See §§ 4050, 4052, 4053.) The guideline formula for computing child support is contained in section 4055. Factors in the formula include each parent's net income and the amount of time they are physically responsible for their child (i.e., timeshare). (§ 4055.)
For the period starting January 1, 2022, the Department calculated guideline child support of $1,242 per month. It offered that the financial factors for 2021 remained the same in 2022 with some exceptions, namely that Father received $1,950 per month in unemployment benefits and received $3,600 per month in rental income. The only change for Mother was that her new spouse's income was now $8,916 per month.
Following this, the court examined both Father and Mother. The Department cross-examined Father, as did Mother. Mother and Father were each given an opportunity to present their own arguments and evidence.
Following their arguments, the court took the matter under submission, after which Father requested a statement of decision.
On September 12, 2022, the court issued its "Child Support Orders." It was a comprehensive, six-page, single-spaced ruling, which began with a summary of the procedural history. It then recounted the parents' arguments from the hearing, as follows:
"Father continued to argue the court lacks jurisdiction to issue orders. He further alleges the court lacks the ability to order him to pay child support because: 1) Mother is hiding the child and preventing Father from having any visitation; 2) Mother is underemployed and has the ability to work and earn an income; 3) Mother sold a house and failed to report income generated from the sale; and 4) Mother is not credible.
"Mother also contends Father is not credible; he is hiding his income having failed to disclose the amount of rental income received from his Alameda and San Diego Properties...."
Over the next four pages, the court set forth its extensive "Findings," which included the following:
First, the court denied Father's request for a statement of decision as untimely, but that it would nonetheless "attempt to state a basis for its ruling on the assumed controverted issues."
Second, the court "affirmed" its earlier findings that it had jurisdiction over the issue of child support and the parties.
Third, the court established that the effective date of the child support order was March 16, 2021, rather than an earlier date, as urged by Mother.
Fourth, relying on section 3556, the court rejected Father's claim that Mother's alleged concealment of the whereabouts of their child or denial of visitation rights was a defense to the obligation to pay child support.
Fifth, the court set forth the parents' respective incomes and other financial factors to be used in the overall calculation of child support. With respect to Father's income in 2021, it determined that his average monthly income in 2021 was $10,530 based on his final pay stub. In so determining, the court explained:
"[Father's] W-2 form for 2021 shows Social Security and Medicare wages to be $121,247.53. However, the court attempted to compare the earnings to the paycheck receipt presented as evidence . . . but the image on the exhibit reflects that there was a paper overlay on earnings information so it was not visible when copied. In fact, although the paycheck showing earnings through December 15, 2021 was presented, the court views this as an intentional act to obscure information from the court. The only visible information on that check was health, dental and vision expenses. In addition, the court notes on Father's 1040 tax form for 2021, he declares his W-2 wages, tips and salary to be $95,248. Because of these conflicts, the deliberate omission or refusal to provide information ordered by the court to be produced, and insufficient evidence to resolve the conflicts, the court finds that the earnings shown on the summary are accurate and the court will use $10,530 as average monthly gross wages for 2021.
"Nevertheless, the court accepted other entries on Father's 20211040 tax return to be true. A review of the 2021 tax return, 1040 form, establishes additional income as follows for Father." In addition to "qualified dividends" and "taxable interest," the court included "Pensions and Annuities" in the amount of $3,471 in the calculation of child support.
The court next addressed Mother's income in 2021. It considered Father's assertion that Mother had the capacity to earn $2,606 in the United States, due to having obtained a master's degree in business administration (MBA) in China, having worked in a company for over 10 years promoting international trade, having earned over 10,000 yuen, and being able to speak English fluently. The court noted that "to determine a party's earning capacity, [it] must consider the ability and opportunity to earn an income that is reflective of the person's age, health, education, marketable skills, employment history and the availability of employment opportunities." The court found that "[n]o evidence was presented to establish Mother's qualifications and the availability of employment opportunities paying a specific amount of earnings in either Michigan where Mother lived in 2021 or in New Jersey where Mother currently lives. Consequently, the court finds there is no basis to impute earnings to Mother."
Additionally, the court rejected Father's allegation that Mother sold her home in 2021 and failed to report the profit. It found that "[n]o evidence was presented of a sale or even a profit that may be considered as income and relevant to the calculation of child support."
Using the statewide uniform guideline for determining child support (§ 4055), the court calculated Father's child support obligation starting on March 16, 2021, going forward, to be $1,938 per month.
Turning to Father's income in 2022, the court noted Father's testimony that he was not working and his only income in January 2022 to the present was "$1,800 per month in unemployment benefits and dividends of $2,430 a month." The court, however, "question[ed] his credibility," based on the following:
"The amount of unemployment he said he receives is less than the maximum amount and given his income in 2021, the court questions why he would not receive the maximum amount of unemployment. In addition, his Income and Expense Declaration, dated February 18, 2022 but not signed by Father, states he receives unemployment but has not yet received stubs. He reports the same on his Income and Expense Declaration filed with the court May 6, 2022. Yet he never presented any evidence of unemployment benefits received, even failing to present evidence at the long cause hearing on June 29, 2022, despite having been ordered to present documentation showing his income from whatever sources. Nevertheless, despite his failure to comply with court orders, he offered to present evidence at the long cause hearing if . . . the court would continue the hearing to allow him to do so, stating that he had the evidence. He also testified that his tenant is no longer paying rent. Again, no evidence was presented in support of his testimony. Additionally, Father presented evidence that was intended to obscure relevant and critical information, his year-to-date earnings through December 15, 2021. These are some of the reasons why the court questions the credibility of Father's testimony regarding his earnings in 2022.
"The court does not believe Father was confused by court procedures as he was given many opportunities to present the documentation ordered by the court. The court believes that Father's actions and testimony are motivated by an intense desire to not pay child support. The court finds Father wanted to control what evidence he would present from the filing of his answer. He argued his beliefs and asserted that his beliefs should dictate how the court should rule. He refused to accept that the law was contrary to some of his beliefs. Thus, it is clear in this court's opinion, judging his testimony, demeanor and conduct, that he was attempting to delay and/or avoid paying child support.
"In resolving the lack of credibility of Father for 2022, the court finds that [the Department] has met its burden of proof by presenting competent and credible evidence regarding Father's income." Because there was "no reliable or credible evidence to conclude that the financial factors for Father changed in 2022," the court found that the same guideline child support used for 2021 should be used for 2022-$1,938 per month.
Accordingly, the court ordered Father to pay $1,938 per month in child support, effective March 16, 2021, until further court order. It also ordered Father to pay $200 per month towards any arrears that may have accrued.
The Department and Mother filed separate respondent's briefs.
DISCUSSION
Introduction, and Some Comments on the Briefing
We begin by noting that Father is representing himself, as is his right. Doing so, however, he is held to the same standard as an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Self-representation is not a ground for lenient treatment and, as is the case with attorneys, a person who represents himself "must follow correct rules of procedure." (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247 (Nwosu).) The brief here falls far short.
Father's opening brief fails to cite to legal authority to support many of his arguments, in violation of the California Rules of Court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [each argument in an appellate brief must be support by citation to authority if possible].) Father's "failure to provide legal authorities to support arguments forfeits [his] contentions of error. [Citations.]" (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948.)
Also, many of Father's factual assertions are not supported by citations to the record on appeal, again in violation of the Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [factual assertions in an appellate brief must be supported "by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears"]; see Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246 ["' "[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . .the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived. . .' "].) Where Father does provide record citations, many of them are to various memoranda, briefs, and other correspondence filed in the trial court, rather than actual evidence in the record. "Citing points and authorities filed in the trial court is not appropriate support for factual assertions in a brief. Points and authorities are not presented under penalty of perjury. Matters set forth in points and authorities are not evidence. [Citation.]" (Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590.) Where an appellant cites to his or her own points and authorities or other briefs, rather than evidence appearing in the record, as support for an argument, the appellant forfeits the argument. (Ibid.)
Additionally, where Father disputes the trial court's factual findings, he does not present all of the relevant evidence, but rather states only evidence favorable to him. This is improper. An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence must set forth all the material evidence on point, favorable and unfavorable; a brief cannot merely state facts favorable to the appellant. (Foreman &Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman); Hartt v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1402 (Hartt).) Where, as here, an appellant's brief states only the favorable facts, ignoring evidence favorable to respondent, we may treat the challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence as waived (Foreman, at p. 881; Hartt, at p. 1402) and presume the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact. (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887.)
On top of all that, Father's briefing largely rehashes-in conclusory terms-many arguments he asserted below, which disregards the admonition from Division One of this court that he is not to "merely reassert [his] position" below. (Conderback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 664, 687.) Doing so, Father ignores the most fundamental rule of appellate review, that the rulings of the trial court are presumed correct, and appellant must demonstrate the court committed reversible error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 (Jameson).) This, Father has not done.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, we will consider Father's arguments on the merits, as best we understand them, and in a different order than he presents them in his opening brief. Moreover, although Father repeats some of his arguments several times throughout his brief, we note that once we have disposed of an argument, it will not necessarily be considered again in connection with the other arguments.
As for the respondent's brief filed by Mother, who is also representing herself, such brief, too, does not fully comply with the rules of appellate procedure." 'As a general matter," 'a respondent who has not appealed from the judgment may not urge error on appeal."' [Citation.] "To obtain affirmative relief by way of appeal, respondents must themselves file a notice of appeal and become cross-appellants." [Citations.]'" (Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1090, fn. 4.) Among other arguments, Mother claims that the effective date of the child support order chosen by the trial court was incorrect. But Mother did not file a crossappeal from that aspect of the court's ruling. Therefore, her argument is forfeited, and we will not consider it. (Ibid.)
Standard of Review
A child support order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282-283, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1049.) However, "[t]he abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court's ruling under review. The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious." (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711712, fns. omitted.)
To the extent the trial court's decision rests on an interpretation of the child support statutes, such issue presents a legal question that we review de novo. (County of Imperial v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 13, 25.)
Regarding the substantial evidence standard of review, the principles governing the standard are the following:" '[T]he power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,' to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the standard of review so long adhered to by this court." (Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660.) "It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact." (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630 (Howard); accord, Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925-926 (Nestle).) Stated another way, an appellate court does not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise reweigh the evidence. (Barboni v. Tuomi (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 340, 349 (Barboni).) Rather, "we defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility. [Citation.]" (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968 (Lenk); see Barboni, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 349 ["[W]e do not second-guess the calls the trial court made regarding credibility"].)
"If the trial court's resolution of the factual issue is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed." (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) "Our job is only to see if substantial evidence exists to support the [decision] in favor of the prevailing party, not to determine whether substantial evidence might support the losing party's version of events." (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582.)
Authority to Issue the Child Support Orders
Father challenges the trial court's authority to issue the child support orders on two grounds. First, he asserts, the court lacked jurisdiction in this case because the Department did not establish that Mother had valid immigration status. Second, he contends that the trial court was required to enforce the existing Chinese support order, which in turn barred the court from issuing its own orders. We disagree with both contentions.
Aside from general references to federal immigration laws on how an alien may establish "domicile" in the United States, Father does not provide any legal authority supporting his claim that Mother's immigration status had any bearing on, much less precluded, the court's authority to impose a child support obligation on him. As noted, his failure to provide supporting authority forfeits the contention on appeal. (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 948.)
Even if not forfeited, the claim fails on the merits. As an initial matter, Father fails to establish the factual predicate of his assertion that "Mother was a foreign national." He "implies" this conclusion based on Mother's testimony where she stated, "I was not on a tourist visa. I have legal status-immigration status." However, the inference that Father attempts to draw is unreasonable, as it is patently contrary to what Mother testified to.
But regardless of Mother's immigration status, the Department correctly observes that under California law, the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the child support order. Section 3550, subdivision (b) provides that "[a]n obligor . . . or resident in this state has the duty of support [including a duty of child support under section 3900], regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee." In addition, section 5700.401, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a California court "with personal jurisdiction over the parties may issue a support order if: [¶] (1) the individual seeking the order resides outside this state[.]" Personal jurisdiction may be exercised if the person is personally served while present in California (§ 5700.201, subd. (a)(1)); the person submits to California jurisdiction by "consent in a record," either "by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction" (id., subd. (a)(2)); or "there is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of [California] and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction" (id., subd. (a)(8)). Constitutional bases for personal jurisdiction include where the person has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state. (See Burnham v. Superior Court (1990) 495 U.S. 604, 609, 618 (Burnham), citing International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316; Muckle v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 218, 226-227.)
Here, Mother made a general appearance in this case, as did Father, when he filed an answer to the complaint. (See Kriebel v. City Council of San Diego (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 693, 699-700 [filing and service of answer constitutes general appearance even if answer raises issue of jurisdiction as affirmative defense].) Additionally, Father was personally served with the complaint in Alameda County. And as the trial court found, Father had sufficient minimum contacts with Alameda County, as he owned property there. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined it had personal jurisdiction over the parties and thus the authority to issue the child support orders. (§ 5700.401, subd. (a)(1).)
Likewise unavailing is Father's argument that the trial court erred in declining to enforce the Chinese support order. As required by federal law (42 U.S.C. § 666(f)), California adopted the UIFSA (§ 5700.101 et seq.). The UIFSA governs the establishment, enforcement, and modification of child support orders in interstate and foreign country cases. (See Cima-Sorci v. Sorci (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 875, 881 (Sorci) [addressing UIFSA under its predecessor statute, former § 4900 et seq.].) "Together with the Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (. . . 28 U.S.C. § 1738B), the UIFSA ensures that only one forum will have jurisdiction over support at any given point in time. Toward that end, these Acts fix the exclusive jurisdictional situs for support adjudications; and require out-of-state tribunals to recognize and enforce support orders rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction under the Acts. (28 U.S.C. § 1738B(a); . . . §§ 5700.207, 5700.603[, subd.] (c); [In re] Marriage of Crosby &Grooms (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 201, 206; de Leon v. Jenkins (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 118, 124...." (Hogoboom et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 18:725 (Hogoboom).)
Under the UIFSA, "a foreign support order may be registered in [California] for enforcement." (§ 5700.601.) "[A] '[f]oreign support order' means a support order of a foreign tribunal." (§ 5700.102, subd. (6).) A" '[f]oreign tribunal' means a court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity of a foreign country ...." (§ 5700.102, subd. (7).) And a "[f]oreign country" means a country "(A) Which has been declared under the law of the United States to be a foreign reciprocating country; [¶] (B) Which has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this state as provided in Section 5700.308; [¶] (C) Which has enacted a law or established procedures for the issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under this part; or [¶] (D) In which the Convention is in force with respect to the United States." (§ 5700.102, subd. (5); accord, Sorci, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 887-888.)
Preliminarily, we note that no party attempted to register the Chinese support order, which registration is subject to specific procedures under the UIFSA. (See § 5700.602.) In any event, Father fails to establish that the Chinese support order meets any of the above statutory criteria. As the Department notes, China is neither a signatory to the Hague Convention nor a declared reciprocal country by either the United States Department of State or the State of California. (United States Department of Health &Human Services, Office of Child Support Services, International, Child Support Reciprocity, <https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/partners/international> (as of Feb. 1, 2024); California Child Support Services: International Child Support Services, <https://childsupport.ca.gov/international-child-support-services> (as of Feb. 1, 2024) [posting URL link to the United States Department of Health &Human Services's website].) Furthermore, no party presented any evidence that China "has enacted a law or established procedures for the issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under [the UIFSA]." (§ 5700.102, subd. (5)(C).) Accordingly, Father cannot demonstrate that the Chinese support order was entitled to recognition under the UIFSA.
Father's citations to Li Li v. Zhang (2010) 77 Mass.App.Ct. 1110 and In re Marriage of Wang (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 1098 do not assist his position. Li Li v. Zhang is an out of state case and therefore not binding on this court. (Lebrilla v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1077.) Additionally, that case does not address the propriety of registering a foreign support order, and thus has no bearing on the issues in this appeal. "It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered." (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10.) In re Marriage of Wang, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 1098 is also irrelevant since it addresses the validity of registering a foreign custody order under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (§ 3400 et seq.)-an issue not before us.
Nor are we persuaded by Father's assertion that the Department's decision to enforce the Chinese support order in March 2020 required the trial court to also enforce the order. According to Father, "It is unfair and inconsistent that the [Department] would enforce the court order from China, then claim that California courts did not need to accept the court order from China."
The Department concedes that it enforced the Chinese support order for one month.
Father's argument appears to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which prevents a party from asserting a position in a judicial proceeding that is contrary or inconsistent with a position previously asserted in a prior proceeding. (International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen &Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 345, 350.) We question whether Father preserved this argument on appeal. In briefs filed before the long-cause hearing, he asserted that the Department took inconsistent positions. However, he did not raise this argument at the long-cause hearing and did not request a ruling on it. (Cf. People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 813 ["' "[T]he party who objected must make some effort to have the court actually rule. If the point is not pressed and is forgotten, [the party] may be deemed to have waived or abandoned it, just as if he had failed to make the objection in the first place"' "].)
But assuming Father preserved his judicial estoppel-based claim, we may decide that issue here in the first instance as a matter of law, since our review does not call for resolution of disputed facts. (See Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1251; Rayyis v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 138, 150, fn. 10.) And we conclude that the claim fails.
"' "Judicial estoppel is 'intended to protect against a litigant playing "fast and loose with the courts." '" '" (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 181.) The doctrine applies when: "(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake." (International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen &Co., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 351, citing Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 183.) It should be invoked, however, only in egregious cases, where a party misrepresents or conceals material facts. (California Amplifier, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 102, 118; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1018.)
Here, the elements of judicial estoppel are not met, particularly the second and third. There is no indication that the Department's first position-that the Chinese support order should be enforced-was asserted before any judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceeding. Indeed, the decision to enforce that order was made prior to the filing of the complaint in this case. Thus, there was no tribunal that had accepted such a position as true. In short, this case does not involve"' "a litigant playing 'fast and loose with the courts.'" '" (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 181.)
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded it had jurisdiction to issue the child support orders.
Credibility Issues
Father argues that the trial court "may have judicial misconduct [sic] by distorting facts to reach the wrong conclusion that '[Father] desired not to pay child support.'" He also contends that the court should have made adverse credibility findings against Mother, and that its failure to do so indicates it was "covering up" for her and exhibiting "bias" in favor of her. We reject these contentions.
As noted, in discussing Father's income in 2022, the court found "that Father's actions and testimony are motivated by an intense desire to not pay child support." It reached this conclusion based on numerous factors. For example, although Father claimed he was limited to $1,800 in unemployment benefits, the court "questioned" this, noting that Father's 2021 income would have entitled him to more than the $1,800 he claimed to have received. In addition, the court found Father failed to present corroborating evidence of his receipt of unemployment benefits despite being ordered to do so. Further, while Father claimed that he no longer received rental income, the court noted that Father presented no evidence to corroborate his claim. On top of all that, the court found that "Father presented evidence that was intended to obscure relevant and critical information" regarding "his year-to-date earnings through December 15, 2021."
Father disagrees with these findings, arguing that he had "no intention to delay and/or avoid paying child support." With the exception of the court's statement regarding Father's testimony about no longer receiving rental income (which we discuss below), he does not dispute that he misstated the amount of his unemployment benefits in his income and expense declaration; that he did not produce documents that the court had ordered him to produce; and that he did not corroborate some of his testimony or arguments with independent evidence. Instead, he attempts to justify these failures. For example, Father suggests that although he miscalculated the amount of unemployment benefits on his income and expense declaration, it was inadvertent, as he did not have the assistance of a lawyer at the time. He also asserts that he had "nothing to hide," noting that when the court commented at the long-cause hearing on his failure to present required documentation in advance, he responded by offering to present documents, but the court declined his request. Father also does not dispute that he failed to present his unemployment stubs, but argues that the court was "focusing on this very minor matter[.]"
Father's challenges to the trial court's adverse credibility findings against him are nothing more than an attempt to have this court reevaluate and reweigh the evidence in his favor. This, we will not do. As we have stated, when applying the substantial evidence standard of review, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. (Nestle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 925-926; Howard, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.) As the trial court's order indicates, the court had observed firsthand Father's demeanor, attitude, candor-or lack of candor- throughout the proceedings. The trial court was therefore" 'best qualified to pass upon and determine the factual issues presented by [the parties'] testimony.'" (Catherine D. v. Dennis B. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 922, 931.) We thus uphold the court's findings that Father was not credible. (See Lenk, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.)
We also reject Father's claim that the court "fabricated" the evidence when it stated that he testified that his tenant was "no longer paying rent." Although Father claims he never made such a statement, he in fact testified that his tenant "won't pay [rent] in time." He also averred in his May 2022 income and expense declaration that he incurred a loss in rental property income in the amount of $624. And in briefing he submitted before the hearing, Father asserted that "[r]ental income is negative" for 2022.
In short, Father provides no basis for us to disturb the court's credibility findings against him.
Turning to Father's claims about Mother's credibility, he asserts that "Mother intentionally did not file [an] updated [2022 income and expense declaration]" as ordered by the court. He claims that the court "did not take Mother's credibility into consideration." We are unpersuaded. We infer that the trial court found Mother's testimony and declarations about her income to be credible. The trial court was entitled to do so, unless such evidence was "impossible or inherently improbable." (Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 241, 260.) Father has made no such showing, and we do not find, that Mother's testimony and declarations about her income were inherently improbable or impossible. Moreover, even if a contrary finding could be found based on the evidence, this does not require reversal." '" 'Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge . . . to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.'" '" (Bloxham v. Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 750.)
In another attack against Mother's credibility, Father contends that she "submitted a fraudulent tax [return] form." As the Department asserts, Father's arguments are forfeited because he did not include a copy of Mother's 2021 tax return in the record on appeal. (See Bowser v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 587, 610 (Bowser); see also Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 ["' "[I]f the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed."' [Citation.] 'Consequently, [the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].' [Citation.]"].)
But beyond forfeiture, Father's claim fails on the merits. As the court found, there was "no evidence was presented of a sale or even a profit that may be considered as income and relevant to the calculation of child support." "[T]he mere statement of Father does not establish the statement to be true." Father does not address this finding in any meaningful way. As such, he fails to establish the court erred in rejecting his argument.
Lastly, Father's bare assertions that the court "cover[ed] up" for Mother and was "biased" against him are severely misplaced. For the reasons stated above, on this record, the court was entitled to find that Mother was credible, while Father was not. Moreover, "[t]he mere fact that the trial court issued rulings adverse to [Father] on several matters in this case, even assuming one or more of those rulings were erroneous, does not indicate an appearance of bias, much less demonstrate actual bias." (Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674.)
Calculations of the Parents' Incomes
Father also disputes the trial court's calculations of his and Mother's incomes. With respect to his income, he argues the court erred in including "Pensions and Annuities" as income, and determining that his monthly income in 2022 was the same as it was in 2021 ($10,530). As to Mother's income, Father argues the court erred in declining to impute to Mother her new spouse's income or her alleged earning capacity. None of these contentions is persuasive.
Father's Income
Father argues the trial court erred in including the amount he earned in "Pensions and annuities" ($3,471) in his income. He claims that he had never received pension or annuity income, and that the $3,471 noted in his 2021 tax return represented a fee paid towards life insurance. He adds that a review of his tax return will "easily" show that the $3,471 "should not be treated as distribution of taxable income."
In the first place, Father has forfeited these contentions by failing to include a copy of his 2021 tax return in the record on appeal. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609; Bowser, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 610.) The contentions are also unavailing. Father states that the $3,471 he listed as "Pensions and Annuities" on his 2021 federal tax return actually refers to a fee he paid towards life insurance, not income. But Father did not present, and the record does not contain, any evidence to support that claim. The claim is also questionable, given, as the Department notes, that line 5a of the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) Form 1040 falls under the portion of the form reserved for disclosing "Income."
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the 2021 IRS 1040 form. (IRS.gov, "Prior year forms and instructions" <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040--2021.pdf> (as of Feb. 4, 2024); see Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c) [official acts of federal and state legislative, executive, and judicial departments are matters that may be judicially noticed]; id., subd. (h) [also subject to judicial notice are "[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy"].)
Father also states "[t]he court knew clearly that [he] was out of [a] job since December 2, 2021 . . . and [his] only income was unemployment benefit[s]." He then argues that the court "discredited [him]," before finding that his "income in 2022 counted the same as in 2021." Father apparently challenges the court's decision not to credit his claim that his income in 2022 consisted only of unemployment benefits, and no longer other sources of income he had received in 2021, such as rental income. Once again, Father implicitly invites us to reweigh the evidence. We decline his invitation. As mentioned, the court found Father did not present any evidence of unemployment benefits received and that he was understating the amount of those benefits. It also found that Father failed to corroborate his claim that he stopped receiving income from his rental property as of 2022. And he also was found to have intentionally obscured relevant information in his financial documents. The record thus supports court's finding that "there [was] no reliable or credible evidence to conclude that the financial factors for Father changed in 2022." And we may not second-guess this finding. (Lenk, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 968; Barboni, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 349.)
Mother's Income
Father also fails to establish the court erred in declining to impute to Mother the income of her current spouse, as well as her alleged earning capacity.
Child support is calculated using the income of the parents and their respective physical responsibility over the child. (See § 4055.) The use of Mother's new spouse income is prohibited "except in an extraordinary case where excluding that income would lead to extreme and severe hardship to any child subject to the child support award ...." (§ 4057.5, subd. (a)(2); see In re Marriage of Wood (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1067, disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 187.) "[A]n extraordinary case may include a parent who voluntarily or intentionally quits work or reduces income, or who intentionally remains unemployed or underemployed and relies on a subsequent spouse's income." (§ 4057.5, subd. (b).)
Father does not argue that excluding the income of Mother's new spouse would lead to "extreme and severe hardship" to J.O. And although Father asserts that "Mother intentionally remains unemployed or underemployed," he does not explain his position or provide any citation to the record to support it. In any event, and our review of the record reveals no such evidence to support such a claim. Accordingly, the trial court properly declined to impute income to Mother based on her current spouse's income.
Likewise unavailing is Father's assertion that the trial court should have found Mother was capable of earning between $2,100 and $7,822, based on his claim-unsupported by citation to the record-that she had "over 10 years['] work experience, [her] MBA degree, [her] age of 40, and [the] average salary in New Jersey." In determining earning capacity, the court must consider the parent's specific circumstances, to the extent known. (§ 4058, subd. (b)(2).) "Those circumstances include, but are not limited to, the parent's assets, residence, employment and earnings history, job skills, educational attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal record and other employment barriers, and record of seeking work, as well as the local job market, the availability of employers willing to hire the parent, prevailing earnings levels in the local community, and other relevant background factors affecting the parent's ability to earn." (Ibid.)
"The parent seeking to impute income must show that the other parent has the ability or qualifications to perform a job paying the income to be imputed and the opportunity to obtain that job, i.e., there is an available position." (In re Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.) "The party seeking to have income imputed bears the burden of demonstrating opportunity to earn that income: the burden 'cannot be met by evidence establishing merely that a spouse continues to possess[] the skills and qualifications that had made it possible to earn a certain salary in the past-even where it was undisputed that the spouse had voluntarily left that prior position.' [Citation.] It is not sufficient to demonstrate only what the party had been making before the loss of income; the moving party must also adduce evidence of vocational abilities and employment opportunities. [Citation.]" (Mendoza v. Ramos (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 680, 685-686; see, e.g., In re Marriage of LaBass &Munsee (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1335-1336 [the father met his burden to show the mother's ability and opportunity to earn a full-time teaching salary by presenting evidence showing the mother had a teaching credential, the local school district had multiple openings for full-time teachers with the mother's background and experience, and the amount the district would pay a full-time teacher with the mother's level of education and experience].)
Here, as the court found, Father presented no evidence "to establish Mother's qualifications and the availability of employment opportunities paying a specific amount of earnings in either Michigan where Mother lived in 2021 or in New Jersey where Mother currently lives." Father fails to meaningfully address this finding. Accordingly, the court appropriately declined to impute income to Mother based on Father's speculative allegations regarding Mother's earning capacity.
Father's Concealment Defense
Father maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to factor into its child support calculation her purported concealment of J.O. and denial of reasonable visitation. We disagree.
The trial court found that Father's allegations were "speculative at best." We infer from this statement that the court impliedly found there was no credible evidence to support Father's allegations. (See People v. Francis (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 873, 878 [on appeal, we" 'imply all findings necessary to support the judgment, and our review is limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support these implied findings' "].) Substantial evidence supports this implied finding. Although Father asserted that Mother was "hiding" and "abducting" J.O., Mother stated she had given Father opportunities to visit with J.O. virtually for one hour per day, and that she arranged for him to visit J.O. in person, but he did not show up. To the extent there was a conflict in the evidence regarding visitation, the trial court was entitled to resolve the conflict in Mother's favor. (Howard, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 629-630.)
In any event, the trial court correctly concluded that whether Mother interfered with Father's visitation was not "relevant to the calculation of child support." We note that "we in no way approve of [interference of a noncustodial parent's visitation rights] by a custodial parent" (Moffat v. Moffat (1980) 27 Cal.3d 645, 651) and that such interference" 'may provide grounds for a contempt action, for modification of custody, or for other sanctions.'" (County of San Diego v. P.B. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1071.) However, "[t]he law is well settled that one parent's interference with the visitation rights of the other does not affect the duty of support." (Id. at p. 1070, citing § 3556 [" 'The existence or enforcement of a duty of support owed by a noncustodial parent for the support of a minor child is not affected by a failure or refusal by the custodial parent to implement any rights as to custody or visitation granted by a court to the noncustodial parent' "]; see § 5700.305, subd. (d) [in UIFSA proceedings, court "may not condition the payment of a support order issued under this part upon compliance by a party with provisions for visitation"]; Moffat v. Moffat, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 653 ["[T]he enforcement of child support orders shall not be barred by the contumacious behavior of a party to a dissolution proceeding"]; In re Marriage of Condon (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 533, 548, fn. 10 ["We recognize in an ordinary domestic child custody case the supporting parent's duty to pay child support remains even if the other parent fails to obey the custody and visitation provisions of the court's order"]; see also Cooper v. O'Rourke (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 243, 246 ["[e]ven deliberate sabotage of visitation rights does not justify withholding payment of support."].) As explained in In re Marriage of Comer (1996) 14 Cal.4th 504, 517, the "denial of rights to custody and visitation does not affect a parent's obligation to provide child support" because "a child support obligation 'runs to the child and not the parent." (Accord, Moffat v. Moffat, at p. 651 ["Regardless of whether we might view this as an unjust result from the noncustodial parent's point of view, in such circumstances the child's need for sustenance must be the paramount consideration"].)
The cases that Father cites are not to the contrary. For example, In re Marriage of Comer recognizes a very narrowly-defined defense to the collection of child support arrearages where the custodial parent has concealed himself or herself and the child from the noncustodial payor parent until the child reaches the age of majority-a scenario that may estop the custodial parent from collecting child support that accrued during the concealment period. (See In re Marriage of Comer, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 515, fn. 4, citing In re Marriage of Damico (1994) 7 Cal.4th 673, 679-682; accord, Hogoboom, supra, ¶ 7:606.) "Beyond this set of circumstances, however, not even active concealment . . . will affect the noncustodial parent's child support obligation ...." (Hogoboom, supra, ¶ 7:606, citing In re Marriage of Comer, at p. 510.) These cases are distinguishable, as the narrow circumstances described above do not exist here, and Father is asserting a defense to establish an underlying child support obligation, not to a demand for child support arrearages.
Fairness of the Long-Cause Hearing
Father argues that the trial court conducted the long-cause hearing in a manner that was unfair to him in various ways.
Father complains that the trial court was "rude" to him, because the court at times during his examination directed him to provide "yes" or "no" answers, which he claims led him to provide an "incorrect answer." He also takes issue with the court muting his microphone at one point during the hearing. We are unpersuaded.
A trial court has the statutory authority to "provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it," to "control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of . . . persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it," and to "control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice. "(Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subds. (a)(3), (5), &(8).) The court's exercise of that power will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion. (Chambers v. Superior Court (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 893, 903, fn. 7, citing Chronometrics, Inc. v. Sysgen, Inc. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 597, 608; Santandrea v. Siltec Corp. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 525, 530, disapproved on another ground in Baugess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.3d 626, 639, fn. 8.)
Here, the trial court acted within its discretion in conducting the long-cause hearing in the manner that it did. What Father neglects to mention is that the court had admonished him multiple times during the hearing for failing to give responsive answers to questions. The court commented that Father was "taking so much time not answering the questions," so much so that it questioned whether he was "being forthright with the Court." Under these circumstances, the court reasonably instructed Father to focus his answers to directly responding to the questions asked of him.
It was also reasonable for the court to mute Father's microphone at one point during the hearing. Throughout the hearing, Father interrupted either the court, the Department's attorney, Mother, or the interpreter. The court warned Father that it would mute his microphone if he interrupted the proceedings again. During Father's presentation of his case, he argued that the court lacked jurisdiction and brought up custody issues. The court explained to Father that his arguments raised issues not properly before it. Father interrupted the court and tried to reassert his position, at which time the court warned him that if he continued to interrupt, his microphone would be muted. Father also kept repeating his arguments. The court acknowledged his arguments and instructed him to "move onto [his] next point" and to "not repeat the same thing that [he had] already said." Father did not move on to other arguments, and so the court again warned him that he if did not, his microphone would be muted. Father did not follow the court's instruction, and the court thus had his microphone muted, before allowing Mother to present her case. Because of Father's failure to follow the court's admonitions, it was appropriate for the court to mute his microphone momentarily.
Father further claims the "[t]ime allocation was not fair to [him]," because it "gave most of [the] time to [the Department] and Mother" to present their respective cases and evidence. On the contrary, the hearing transcript as a whole reflects that the court gave Father ample opportunity and time to present his arguments and evidence. Further, when the court muted his microphone, it was only for a brief duration-two pages' worth of the transcript. The court then unmuted Father's microphone and gave "him one last opportunity to present any facts or evidence or testimony that he would like." In fact, the court permitted Father, but not the Department, to make final arguments.
Father also raises several challenges against the Department itself, including that it "was biased in . . . questioning both parties" at the long-cause hearing. He asserts that the Department's attorney "questioned [him] a lot, but did not question Mother at all," and therefore "played in unfair, dishonest, and dirty role." To the extent Father is claiming that the Department's attorney committed misconduct during the long-cause hearing, he was required to make a timely and proper objection on that basis before the trial court in order to preserve his claim on appeal. (Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 582, 598.) Father did not do so. Thus, any claim of attorney misconduct is forfeited on appeal.
Forfeiture aside, the Department's cross-examination of Father does not reflect any bias against Father. At the beginning of the hearing, the Department's attorney expressed the same concerns as the court regarding Father's failure to produce requested documents and his redaction of critical information in the documents that he did produce. In light of this, counsel informed the court that she had "some cross-examination questions for [Father]." The questions that counsel asked Father were relevant to the issue of calculating child support and do not disclose any intent to confuse or harass him. Thus, the record reflects that in "question[ing] [Father] a lot," counsel was appropriately attempting to ascertain pertinent information that Father failed to disclose.
Father also asserts the Department was biased in failing to obtain or introducing into evidence Mother's "2020 tax form, 2021 W-2, her husband['s] 2021 W-2, FL-150 Form, and important schedules for 2021 tax forms." But Father fails to establish, much less with any supporting authority, that the Department had an obligation to obtain in discovery or introduce into evidence the documents he refers to. As a general matter, the Department "represent[s] the public interest in establishing, modifying, and enforcing support obligations." (§ 17406, subd. (a).) It does not represent Father or Mother. (See ibid. ["No attorney-client relationship shall be deemed to have been created between the local child support agency . . . and any person by virtue of the action of the local child support agency . . . in carrying out these statutory duties"].) Thus, as the Department asserts, "[i]f Father thought further discovery or examination was needed, that was his task to undertake."
We add that Father's claims of bias ring hollow in light of the fact that he also did not submit his own 2020 W-2 form from his employer.
This leads us to Father's related challenge to the court's denial of his request to admit Mother's 2020 W-2 form. Aside from reciting the discussion at the hearing in which the court declined to consider the evidence, Father presents no argument explaining why it was error for the court to do so. As Father has raised no contention of error regarding this ruling, he has forfeited any such contention. (Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1133, fn. 8.)
In any event, we see no abuse of discretion in excluding Father's requested evidence. (See Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446447 [" 'A trial court's exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence is reviewable for abuse . . .' "].) As Father notes, the court denied Father's request to introduce Mother's 2020 W-2 Form on the grounds that it was not previously marked for identification as an exhibit. As discussed, prior to the long-cause hearing, the court instructed the parties that any evidence to be presented at the hearing must be submitted to the court clerk, placed in a binder, and marked for identification before the hearing. Also, at the long-cause hearing, the court reiterated its earlier orders and stated that evidence submitted after the deadline it had imposed would be inadmissible. Because Father did not follow these procedures with respect to Mother's 2020 W-2 form, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit it.
And even assuming it did, Father fails to demonstrate any prejudice. (See Christ v. Schwartz, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 447 ["Claims of evidentiary error . . . are reviewed for prejudice applying the 'miscarriage of justice' or 'reasonably probable' harmless error standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, that is embodied in article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution"].) Father does not specify the contents of the excluded documents or otherwise support his conclusory claim that Mother "covered up" items in the documents. Nor does he make any argument that admitting the documents would have made a difference in the outcome of the proceedings.
In sum, Father fails to demonstrate that he was denied a fair long-cause hearing.
Failure to Issue Statement of Decision
Finally, we address Father's argument that the trial court erred in denying his request for a statement of decision as untimely. The Department asserts that the court correctly declined to issue a statement of decision with respect to the legal issues in this case. However, it concedes that Father was entitled to a statement of decision as to factual issues, but that the court's failure to issue one was harmless, because its written ruling includes findings that address those issues. We agree with the Department.
Code of Civil Procedure section 632 provides that where a trial takes less than one day or a total of eight hours, a request for a statement of decision "must be made prior to the submission of the matter for decision." (Espinoza v. Calva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1397.) Code of Civil Procedure section 632 also provides that "[t]he request for a statement of decision shall specify those controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision."" 'It is axiomatic that a statement of decision is required only as to issues of fact decided by the trial court ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 632: "upon trial of a question of fact by the court"), not as to issues of law.' [Citation.]" (Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Vernon (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 209, 220-221.)" 'A proper statement of decision is . . . essential to effective appellate review. "Without a statement of decision, the judgment is effectively insulated from review by the substantial evidence rule," as we would have no means of ascertaining the trial court's reasoning or determining whether its findings on disputed factual issues support the judgment as a matter of law.' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Motiska &Ford (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1291, 1300-1301.)
Here, in the month before the long-cause hearing, Father requested a statement of decision addressing (1) whether the Chinese support order should be registered in California; (2) Mother's eligibility to obtain child support due to her immigration status and alleged domicile in China; (3) Mother's alleged concealment of J.O.; and (4) Mother's income. Father's request for a statement of decision was made before the court took the matter under submission and thus timely, contrary to the trial court's determination. This, in turn, required the court to issue a statement on the controverted issues of fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632; Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Vernon, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 220-221.)
Although the court did not issue a statement of decision on the factual issues, such failure does not require reversal unless prejudice is shown. (See F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1102, 1108.) Father does not argue there was any prejudice, and we perceive none. As discussed above, in its written ruling, while the court declined to issue a statement of decision, it noted it would "attempt to state a basis for its ruling on the assumed controverted issues." And the court did so, providing four single-spaced pages setting forth its findings on controverted legal and factual issues in this case, including the issues noted in Father's request for a statement of decision. Therefore, the trial court's written ruling, though not a statement of decision, gives us an adequate" 'means of ascertaining the trial court's reasoning or determining whether its findings on disputed factual issues support the judgment as a matter of law.'" (In re Marriage of Motiska &Ford, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1300-1301.) As such, any error in the court's failure to issue a statement of decision was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's September 12, 2022 orders are affirmed.
We concur: Stewart, P.J., Miller, J.