Opinion
No. 2013–1169 Q C.
2014-08-20
CMP PROTECTIVE AND INVESTIGATIVE GROUP, INC., Respondent, v. Aracelli ANTONGIORGI, Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Cheree A. Buggs, J.), entered March 8, 2013. The judgment, entered pursuant to a decision of the same court dated January 25, 2013, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $7,410.16.
ORDERED that, on the court's own motion, the notice of appeal from the decision dated January 25, 2013 is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the judgment entered March 8, 2013 ( see CPLR 5520[c] ); and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
In this action, plaintiff seeks to recover for investigative services it rendered to defendant. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff's president testified that defendant had met with him on December 5, 2011 and, on that date, had signed a written agreement pursuant to which she agreed to compensate plaintiff for its investigative services. The Civil Court admitted into evidence the written agreement, plaintiff's investigative report and plaintiff's invoice. Plaintiff's president's executive assistant testified that she had been present at the December 5, 2011 meeting and corroborated plaintiff's president's version of what had transpired during the meeting. Defendant admitted that she had not paid plaintiff, but claimed that she did not owe plaintiff any money because plaintiff had not performed any investigative services for her. Following the trial, the Civil Court awarded judgment to plaintiff in the principal sum of $7,410.16.
The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Claridge Gardens v. Menotti, 160 A.D.2d 544 [1990] ). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility ( see Vizzari v. State of New York, 184 A.D.2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v. Kincade, 178 A.D.2d 510, 511 [1991] ). Here, the Civil Court apparently found plaintiff's witnesses' version of the circumstances of this business transaction between the parties to be more credible than defendant's version, and we find no basis to disturb the court's credibility determination.
While defendant contends that, as a self-represented litigant, she was at a disadvantage because she did not understand the “trial protocol,” it is well settled that a litigant who appears pro se does so at his or her own peril and acquires no greater right than that of any other litigant ( see Roundtree v. Singh, 143 A.D.2d 995 [1988]; Nawal v. Silva, 20 Misc.3d 145[A], 2008 N.Y. Slip Op 51875[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008] ).
As to defendant's contention that she had a speech impairment and that the Civil Court made no accommodation therefor, the record shows that defendant made no application to the court for any accommodation. Nor does the record indicate that she has ever questioned the accuracy of the trial transcript.
With respect to defendant's contention that the Civil Court should have considered her counterclaim, the record does not contain a copy of her counterclaim and defendant admitted at trial that she had not served a counterclaim. “A counterclaim is, in essence, a complaint [citation omitted], and the pleader of the counterclaim is a plaintiff in his own right [citation omitted]. An answer containing a counterclaim is a pleading (CPLR 3011) and service shall be in a manner provided for service of papers generally (CPLR 3012[a] )” ( Gildea v. State of New York, 133 Misc.2d 269, 271 [Ct Cl 1986] ). Consequently, it was proper for the Civil Court not to consider defendant's purported counterclaim.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.