Opinion
40483.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 11, 1964. REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 28, 1964.
Action for damages. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Foster from Tallapoosa Circuit.
J. Walter LeCraw, for plaintiffs in error.
Greer, Hall Morris, Paul R. Koehler, Richard G. Greer, contra.
As against a general demurrer mere general allegations of negligence are sufficient.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 11, 1964 — REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 28, 1964.
Nina Rape sued Kenneth D. Close and Olga R. Close jointly and severally for damages allegedly caused by the defendants' negligence. The petition as amended alleged in part as follows: "3. That on or about June 13, 1957 at approximately 12:15 p. m. your petitioner was a passenger in a 1956 Buick automobile being driven by William E. Rape in a southerly direction on South Atlanta Street at or near Roswell, Georgia. 4. That the defendant Kenneth D. Close was driving a 1955 Buick Super Riviera automobile in a southerly direction on said South Atlanta Street following behind the automobile in which petitioner was riding. 5. That the driver of petitioner's car stopped when the car just ahead of it stopped whereupon defendant Kenneth D. Close failed to stop, but instead struck violently the rear of the automobile in which petitioner was a passenger thereby knocking it into the rear of the automobile just ahead of petitioner's automobile. 6. That as the result of said violent collision, petitioner was thrown around inside the vehicle in which she was riding and therefore sustained the following painful and disabling injuries: (1) Severe contusion to the left knee. (2) Twisting, bruising and straining of the muscles, ligaments, blood vessels to the bones of the left knee. (3) Severe aggravation of the entire nervous system. 7. That it was necessary for petitioner to undergo medical treatment for the aforementioned injuries. 8. That said injuries resulting from said accident, to wit: the injuries to the left knee and leg, have caused your petitioner great and excruciating pain in the past, is [sic] causing her great pain at the present and will continue to cause her pain and suffering as long as she lives and petitioner sues for pain and suffering, past, present and future. 9. Petitioner shows that at all times mentioned herein, the aforementioned automobile being operated by Defendant Kenneth D. Close was the property of Defendant Olga R. Close and that Defendant Kenneth D. Close is a member of the family and household of Defendant Olga R. Close with Defendant Olga R. Close providing said automobile for the pleasure, use, convenience and benefit of the members of said family and household and at all times mentioned herein, Defendant Kenneth D. Close was using said automobile with the permission of Defendant Olga R. Close and for the purpose intended. 10. That at the time of and just prior to the collision here involved, Defendant Kenneth D. Close, acting as agent of Defendant Olga R. Close, was negligent in the following particulars: (a) In failing to keep a proper lookout so as to observe the automobile in which plaintiff was riding in time to avoid striking it. (b) In failing to have sufficient control over his said automobile so as to stop before striking the rear of the automobile in which petitioner was riding. (c) In failing to stop before striking the rear of the automobile in which petitioner was riding. (d) In failing to apply brakes in time to stop. (e) In following at a distance closer than reasonable, necessary and prudent behind petitioner's automobile so as to be able to bring defendant's said automobile to a halt in time to avoid striking petitioner's said automobile. (f) In driving at a speed greater than reasonable, necessary and prudent under conditions then and there prevailing. 11. That all of the aforesaid injuries and damages sustained by plaintiff were directly and proximately caused by the aforesaid acts of negligence as set forth in Paragraph 10 on the part of Defendant Kenneth D. Close, acting as agent of Defendant Olga R. Close."
The defendants demurred generally and specially to the petition, the court overruling the general demurrer and each special demurrer except the one to paragraph 8. To the judgment of the court overruling their renewed general demurrers to the petition as amended, the defendants except.
The plaintiffs in error contend that the petition as amended was subject to their general demurrers because it failed to allege such facts as how close the defendants' automobile was being driven behind the automobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger; the legal speed at the place of the collision; the speed of either of the vehicles; the conditions then and there prevailing, including the condition of the roadway; whether any signal was given showing that the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding was about to stop; and what happened to the preceding automobile. The above facts are such as can be elicited by means of special demurrers. "As against a general demurrer mere general allegations of negligence are sufficient." Ogletree v. Kirven, 104 Ga. App. 433 (1) ( 121 S.E.2d 845) and citations; Davis v. Harrell Concrete Products, 105 Ga. App. 785, 787 ( 125 S.E.2d 699) and citations.
There is no assignment of error on the overruling of special demurrers. Cases cited which involve special demurrers are not in point. Neither are such cases as Ingram v. Greyhound Corp., 97 Ga. App. 892 ( 104 S.E.2d 658) wherein the facts alleged negatived liability on the part of the defendant.
The court did not err in overruling the general demurrers to the petition as amended.
Judgment affirmed. Frankum and Pannell, JJ., concur.