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concluding evidence of mental illness did not warrant informal inquiry without evidence the mental illness affected defendant's ability to rationally consult with his lawyer or understand the proceedings against him
Summary of this case from Ware v. StateOpinion
No. 05-15-00025-CR No. 05-15-00027-CR
01-28-2016
SHAWNTALE LAWARREN CLEMENS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F14-71224-I & F14-75976-I
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Stoddart
Opinion by Justice Francis
Shawntale Lawarren Clemens entered open pleas of guilty to two robbery offenses. The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at concurrent ten-year sentences. In one issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to make an informal inquiry into his competence to stand trial. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
Appellant was indicted on charges of robbery and aggravated robbery after stealing cigarettes from clerks at two different Walgreens stores. At trial, the State agreed to reduce the aggravated robbery to robbery. Responding to questions from the trial court, appellant said he could read, write, and understand English, said he had read and understood the paperwork he had signed, and further said his attorney had explained the paperwork, the indictment, and the charges to him. He said he understood the punishment range and was giving up his right to a jury trial. He said he was entering the pleas freely and voluntarily.
Appellant's signed, written judicial confessions, stipulations of evidence, and pleas of true were admitted into evidence. In addition, the State called the two Walgreens clerks, who testified appellant entered their stores in June 2014 and stole cigarettes. In one case, appellant threatened the clerk with a knife; in the other case, he pulled the clerk toward him, snatched the bag with the cigarettes from her hands, and fled.
The defense called appellant's wife, Shounsylia Clemens. Mrs. Clemens testified she met appellant in 2008 and had been married to him for seven months. She described appellant as a "gentle, loving, caring person," but she had observed "some mental" issues. She had seen appellant "[t]alking deep conversation with himself like he was trying to convince whomever whatever he's hearing not to whatever." She also said appellant had anxiety. She took appellant to MHMR, where he was prescribed Buspar and Celexa, and Mrs. Clemens said he "religiously take[s] his medicine." Mrs. Clemens said if appellant was given probation, she would be by his side. She also said appellant was needed to help care for his father, who was in poor health.
On cross-examination, Mrs. Clemens told the court she knew mental health professionals had evaluated appellant "to see if there are any such problems going on" but said she did not know they did not find any of the "disorders" described by her. When asked if "[t]hey saw things differently than you do," Mrs. Clemens replied, "Okay. Well, you have to observe a little bit longer. That's why I'm here to state what I saw over a long period of time."
The trial court admitted two letters into evidence, one that Mrs. Clemens wrote in case she was too nervous to testify and the other written by appellant. Both letters sought leniency. In Mrs. Clemens's letter, she said appellant would wake during the night and ask her if "they" were coming. When she asked "who," appellant responded, "Oh, I thought it was chow time." She also said appellant was afraid that the president "was going to do a head count."
In appellant's letter, he said he was "truly sorry and regretful for what [he] did." He said he was apologizing "not just because I was caught but for the fact that I acted against my better judgment and knowingly committed a crime." Appellant said he was a "good person" who made a "bad decision."
In his sole issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to make an informal inquiry into his competency after evidence was presented that he was "hearing voices" and "under treatment and medication for mental illness."
The prosecution and conviction of a defendant while he is legally incompetent violates due process. Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Although a defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial, he is incompetent if he does not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003 (West 2006).
Article 46B of the code of criminal procedure codifies the constitutional standard for competency to stand trial and describes the circumstances that require, and the procedure for making, a determination of whether a defendant is competent to stand trial. Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). If evidence suggesting a defendant is incompetent comes to the trial court's attention, "the court on its own motion shall suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial" and "shall determine by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(b)—(c) (West Supp. 2015). The threshold requirement for an informal inquiry is a "suggestion of incompetency," and it "may consist solely of a representation from any credible source that the defendant may be incompetent." Id. art. 46B.004(c-1). A further evidentiary showing is not required to initiate the inquiry, and the court is not required to have a bona fide doubt about the competency of the defendant. Id. Evidence suggesting the need for an informal inquiry may be based on observations made in relation to one or more of the factors described by article 46B.024 or on any other indication that the defendant is incompetent within the meaning of article 46B.003. Id. These factors include whether the defendant can (a) rationally understand the charges against him and the potential consequences of the pending criminal proceedings; (b) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and state of mind; (c) engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; (d) understand the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings; (e) exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior; and (f) testify. Id . art. 46B.024(1)(A-F) (West Supp. 2015).
Relying on Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009),) the State argues the evidentiary threshold of a "suggestion" of incompetency is the same as the "bona fide doubt" threshold under the former version of article 4B.004(c). But the legislature amended the statute in 2011 and, as explained above, expressly rejected the "bona fide doubt" standard from the previous statutory scheme. --------
We review a trial court's decision regarding an informal competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d at 426. In making our review, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; rather, we determine whether the trial court's determination was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. Here, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an informal competency inquiry in light of the evidence adduced.
Appellant relies on the testimony of his wife and her letter to show that there was evidence suggesting he was incompetent to stand trial. Assuming Mrs. Clemens's testimony showed that appellant is mentally ill, the fact that a defendant is mentally ill does not by itself mean he is incompetent. See Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 691. It is only when a defendant's mental illness operates in such a way as to prevent him from rationally understanding the proceedings against him or engaging rationally with counsel in the pursuit of his own best interests can he not be made to stand trial consistent with due process. Id.
Here, there was no current suggestion that appellant did not have sufficient ability to rationally consult with his attorney or lacked a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. To the contrary, appellant effectively communicated with the court. Responding to questions, he said understood the charges, the punishment range, and the paperwork he had read. He also affirmed that he wanted to enter pleas of true and pleas of guilty and further affirmed his plea was voluntary. In his letter, appellant was coherent and articulate. He apologized for what he did, explaining that he "acted against" his "better judgment" and "knowingly committed a crime." Finally, trial counsel never asserted appellant had any mental issues that rendered him unable to rationally engage with counsel or incapable of participating in his own defense. Rather, trial counsel engaged in a strategy of presenting evidence from Mrs. Clemens about possible past mental illness in an attempt to mitigate appellant's punishment.
Considering the record, no evidence suggests appellant did not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sua sponte conduct an informal inquiry into appellant's competency to stand trial. We overrule appellant's sole issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgments.
/Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
150025F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1471224-I.
Opinion delivered by Justice Francis; Justices Evans and Stoddart participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered January 28, 2016.
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1475976-I.
Opinion delivered by Justice Francis; Justices Evans and Stoddart participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered January 28, 2016.