Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-10772-RGS.
December 7, 2007
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND EQUITABLE RELIEF
This is the latest chapter in an ongoing labor dispute between Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. (Clear Channel), and the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council No. 35, and International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 391 (collectively, the Union). Clear Channel again seeks sanctions against the Union, this time for breaching a stipulation filed in the court by District Council 35 President Ralph Harriman on September 11, 2007 (the Harriman Stipulation). The stipulation states that the Union "will cease engaging in any picketing activities against Clear Channel at any facility whatsoever, including its billboards." According to Clear Channel, the Union violated this stipulation during the night of October 24, 2007, when it erected an informational picket line at the Lechmere and Savin Hill MBTA stations.
The MBTA is the owner of a number of properties on which Clear Channel, pursuant to a licensing agreement, installs and maintains commercial billboards. The billboards generate substantial revenue for Clear Channel. The relationship between Clear Channel and the MBTA, however, has been strained by the Union's picketing activities. Specifically, the Union has informed the MBTA that it intends to picket against Clear Channel at MBTA locations "on a daily basis for as long as Clear Channel's striker replacements continue to work on MBTA property." The Union has also circulated to MBTA riders so-called "Passenger Safety Alert" fliers, which claim that the MBTA is allowing "poorly trained and inexperienced employees to work above T passengers," and that commuters run the risk of "injury or death" as a result. In a September 14, 2007 letter to Clear Channel, the MBTA described these activities as a "continuing disruption" and a violation of the licensing agreement. As a result, the MBTA has barred Clear Channel from some of its properties and has threatened to seek injunctive relief if Clear Channel does not take steps to avert future disruptions by the Union.
In an effort to reassure the MBTA, Clear Channel informed it of the Harriman Stipulation and the court's September 13, 2007 Temporary Restraining Order. Nonetheless, on October 24, 2007, five union members carrying picketing signs stood "in front of and around" the exit through which busses leave the MBTA garage at the Lechmere station. The picketers "forc[ed]" the buses to "slow down or stop, before moving out of the way." MBTA police officers were forced to secure the exit. That same night, picketers at the Savin Hill station allegedly "intercepted" a flagman and turned him away after a brief confrontation. The flagman has since refused to work at the Savin Hill site. Citing these incidents in a letter dated November 1, 2007, the MBTA spurned Clear Channel's assurances and stated that it was considering a complete suspension of the licensing agreement. On November 12, 2007, Clear Channel filed this motion seeking sanctions and equitable relief.
The flagman's union representative, Local 489 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, notified the MBTA that it "cannot and will not advise its members to place themselves in harm's way in the context of a labor dispute at the workplace."
The September 13, 2007 restraining order directs the Union to "cease and refrain from any acts that would constitute criminal offenses," including, among other things, "blocking access to or egress from . . . property owned by third parties on which Clear Channel billboards are located." Clear Channel does not allege any conduct on the part of the Union that would violate the terms of the restraining order. Rather, Clear Channel urges the court to enforce the Harriman Stipulation, in which the Union promised to cease all picketing. However, the Harriman Stipulation was not approved by the court, incorporated into the restraining order, or otherwise adopted as a binding order. Compare RTA Transit Servs., Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 22, 50 Fed. Appx. 455 (1st Cir. 2002) (district court adopted and enforced parties' stipulation that it would not engage in work stoppages in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and that it would submit all complaints to arbitration); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (district court approved joint stipulation); Inversiones Financieras C. Por A. v. Hitachi Sales Caribe, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 54 (D.P.R. 1971) (district court entered a stipulation in lieu of issuing an injunction). As the court noted during the proceedings, the Harriman Stipulation "goes far further than the Court could go in restricting the right of a union to picket in a labor dispute." Moreover, while the court was "impressed" with the Union's willingness to cease all picketing against Clear Channel, the purpose and intent behind the September 13 order was not to bar lawful picketing, nor could it.
THE COURT: I understand all this, but we're going back to Mr. Feinberg's point, which is we're not here now on a contempt proceeding. The court, perhaps unwisely, although Mr. Harriman seems to have gotten the message, proceeded on the assurances that were given that the spirit and terms of the restraining order would be observed and it would not be necessary for the Court to issue such draconian a measure as a preliminary injunction in a labor dispute. I'm sensitive to the fact that there is nothing illegal about picketing. It's just picketing that begins to take on the character of becoming a blockade or an obstruction of people's right to enter and exit their property that . . . exceeds the right to conduct a peaceful picket. But today we are here to determine what the scope, if any, of any order that issues of a prospectively binding nature would be.
Sept. 13, 2007 Hearing Tr., at 75.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's request for sanctions isDENIED without prejudice should a showing of criminal conduct on the part of the Union be made.
The court's acknowledgement of the fact that it lacks the power under the circumstances to enforce the Harriman Stipulation should not be interpreted as approval in any sense of the Union's conduct in breaching a representation made to the court with the presumed intention of influencing the court's action.
SO ORDERED.