Opinion
5:21-cv-335-MTT-MSH
04-29-2024
EARNEST BARNARD CLAYTON, Plaintiff, v. Sgt. EDWARD FLOYD, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 200). For the reasons explained below, it is recommended that the motion be granted.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The procedural history of this case is tortuous, so the Court will keep it brief. At various points, Plaintiff Earnest Barnard Clayton has asserted numerous claims against numerous Georgia prison officials arising out of his incarceration at Baldwin State Prison (“BSP”) in Milledgeville, Georgia, and Hancock State Prison (“HSP”) in Sparta, Georgia, including conditions of confinement, excessive force, due process, and retaliation claims. Following preliminary screening of his second amended complaint and motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust, the only claim pending in this case is a due process claim against Defendants Sergeant Edward Floyd and Deputy Warden Ivey related to Clayton's placement in administrative segregation. Order 1, Apr. 19, 2023, ECF No. 167. Essentially, Clayton claims Ivey and Floyd falsified disciplinary charges and/or documents and placed him-or caused him to be placed-in administrative segregation in retaliation for filing grievances against them. 2d Am. Compl. 7-8, ECF No. 57-1; see Compl. 5, 9, Clayton v. Ivery, No. 5:21-cv-389-TES-CHW (“Clayton II”) (M.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2021), ECF No. 1; Order & R. 13-14, Clayton II, Nov. 24, 2021, ECF No. 5. Ivey and Floyd answered the second amended complaint on May 2, 2023, and moved for summary judgment on January 11, 2024 (ECF Nos. 169, 200). Plaintiff timely responded (ECF No. 207). Defendants' motion is ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986). A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, or that the movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 324-26. This evidence must consist of more than conclusory allegations. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). In sum, summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
II. Undisputed Material Facts
The Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDC”) has established “Administrative Segregation” procedures to handle offenders who require greater management to ensure the “safety, security, and orderly operation of GDC facilities, or protection of the public.” Ivey Attachs. 65, ECF No. 200-4.Administrative Segregation is “utilized for those offenders who are removed from general population, serving disciplinary sanctions, pending disciplinary hearing, pending reclassification, pending transfer, pending Protective Custody review, and pending investigation.” Id. Further, it is “limited to those circumstances that pose a direct threat to the safety of persons or a clear threat to the safe and secure operations of the facility.” Id. All GDC facilities have Administrative Segregation units. Ivey Decl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 200-4. In addition, some-but not all-GDC facilities have a “Tier Program.” Id. The Tier Program was “established to protect staff, offenders, and the public from offenders who commit violent, disruptive, predatory, or riotous actions, or otherwise pose a threat to the safe and secure operation of its prisons.” Id. ¶ 12. The Tier Program is stratified into three separate tiers: Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III, with Tier I being the least restrictive and Tier III the most restrictive. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 15. Tier I is equivalent to administrative segregation. Id. ¶ 16. During the time relevant to this case, BSP had an Administrative Segregation unit but not the Tier Program, while HSP had the Tier Program. Id. ¶ 17; Floyd Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 200-5.
Because Ivey's declaration and exhibits were filed together as one document instead of separate attachments, the Court cites to Ivey's declaration by paragraph number and to the exhibits by using the document number and electronic screen page number shown at the top of each page by the Court's CM/ECF software as opposed to any other page number that may appear on the exhibits.
GDC Standard Operating Procedures (“SOP”) provide procedures for an offender's placement in Administrative Segregation and Tier I. An inmate may be placed in Administrative Segregation by the Classification Committee, Deputy Warden/Assistant Superintendent/Unit Manager, or-in an emergency-the Warden/Superintendent if the offender's presence in general population poses a serious threat to the safety or security of the facility. Ivey Attachs. 66. The Classification Committee consists of 1) Chairperson: the deputy warden of care and treatment or Chief Counselor; 2) Care and Treatment Member: selected based on experience/ability; 3) Security Member: sergeant or higher rank; and 4) Other staff who may be assigned to the committee. Id. at 19. An inmate may be involuntarily assigned to Administrative Segregation by the deputy warden/assistant superintendent/unit manager/duty officer, or in the absence of one of these, by the shift supervisor with notification and approval of the duty officer. Id. at 69-70. Within twenty-four hours of placement, the deputy warden/assistant superintendent/unit manager/duty officer will review the placement and determine if the inmate is to remain in Administrative Segregation. Id. at 70. The reviewer shall not have been involved in the initial placement. Id. If the inmate is retained in Administrative Segregation, the Classification Committee shall have ninety-six hours to complete a formal hearing. Id. at 72. At the hearing, the inmate may request a willing employee to be his or her advocate and may request that witnesses be called, which will be left to the discretion of the Classification Committee. Ivey Attachs. 72-73. If the Classification Committee determines the inmate should stay in Administrative Segregation, the inmate may appeal to the Warden/Superintendent within three days. Id. at 73. The Warden/Superintendent's decision is final. Id. The SOPs provide for the Classification Committee's continued review of an inmate's placement in Administrative Segregation. Id. at 80.
An inmate may be involuntarily placed in Tier I by the Warden or Superintendent. Id. at 40. In the absence of one of these, the senior officer present-with the notification and approval of the duty officer-may place an inmate in Tier I for not more than seventy-two hours, and the Warden/Superintendent shall be notified upon his or her return to the facility. Id. at 45. An inmate may be placed in Tier I if he or she is a threat to the safety and security of the facility; is awaiting a disciplinary hearing; is being investigated for a violation of facility rules or regulations; is involved in excessive destruction of state property; is subject to a pending criminal investigation or is awaiting trial; has requested protective custody or the staff has determined it is necessary for the inmate's protection; is awaiting transfer or is a holdover during the transfer process; or has not been classified due to arrival at a facility. Ivey Attachs. 40. Following involuntary placement, the Warden/Superintendent shall ensure the Classification Committee holds a formal hearing within ninety-six hours. Id. at 44. The Classification Committee for purposes of Tier I shall consist of the unit manager, Tier I officer-in-charge, assigned counselor, and, if applicable, the inmate's assigned mental health counselor. Id. at 42. As with Administrative Segregation hearings, the inmate may request an employee advocate at the formal hearing and may request that witnesses be called, which is in the Classification Committee's discretion. Id. at 45. The Classification Committee will make a recommendation that the inmate either remain in Tier I, return to general population, or be assigned to Tier II. Id. at 54. The inmate may appeal the assignment to the Warden/Superintendent, whose final decision completes the appeal. Id. at 46. Thereafter, the Classification Committee shall conduct a review of the inmate's assignment to Tier I and determine if he or she is to remain, be returned to general population, or assigned to Tier II. Ivey Attachs. 49. The inmate may appeal the thirty-day review decision to the Warden/Superintendent. Id. at 50.
Beginning on March 1, 2019, Defendant Floyd was employed at BSP as a Correctional Officer II on the CERT Team. Floyd Decl. ¶ 3. On April 11, 2019, Clayton was transferred from Georgia State Prison to BSP. Ivey Attachs. 100. Floyd worked at BSP on the CERT Team until April 30, 2021, when he transferred to HSP to work as a Security Threat Group (“STG”) Investigator. Floyd Decl. ¶ 3. Following his arrival at BSP, Clayton was in and out of Administrative Segregation, but at the time Floyd left BSP on April 30, 2021, Clayton was not in segregation. Ivey Attachs. 98-99. However, on May 3, 2021, Clayton was placed in Administrative Segregation. Id. at 98. According to GDC case notes, the reason for Clayton's placement was that he was “pending investigation.” Id. at 144. At some point afterward, though, Clayton was released from Administrative Segregation because case notes and his movement history show him being returned to BSP Administrative Segregation on June 4, 2021, or June 9, 2021. Id. at 98, 143. The case notes also show a 96-hour segregation hearing held on June 10, 2021, at which time the BSP classification committee determined Clayton would remain in segregation “pending investigation.” Id. at 143. Clayton remained in Administrative Segregation at BSP until his transfer to HSP on June 29, 2021. Ivey Attachs. 98; Pl.'s Dep. 30:6-11, ECF No. 2003.
Upon Clayton's arrival at HSP, he was placed in Tier I. Ivey Decl. ¶ 34. On July 1, 2021, the Tier I Classification Committee conducted a 96-hour hearing. Id. ¶ 38; Ivey Attachs. 118, 143. According to the case notes, Clayton had not been classified due to his arrival at a new facility. Ivey Attachs. 143. Following the hearing, the Classification Committee decided to retain Clayton in Tier I. Ivey Decl. ¶ 38; Ivey Attachs. 143. While the case notes do not explain why the Committee decided to retain Clayton in Tier I, Clayton complained to his counselor that the Committee had based it on his participation in a disturbance at BSP, which he denied. Ivey Attachs. 143. Clayton gave the counselor an appeal form, but it was apparently denied because he remained in segregation. Ivey Decl. ¶ 39; Ivey Attachs. 98, 142-43. The Classification Committee conducted a 30-day review on July 29, 2021, and decided Clayton should remain in Tier I. Ivey Decl. ¶ 40; Ivey Attachs. 142. The case notes confirm Clayton's retention in Tier I was for participation in a disturbance at BSP. Ivey Attachs. 142. Clayton appealed the decision on July 30, 2021. Ivey Decl. ¶ 41; Ivey Attachs. 141-42. On August 6, 2021, Clayton was released from Tier I segregation. Ivey Decl. ¶ 42; Ivey Attachs. 98.
On August 12, 2021, Lieutenant Ulysses Floyd-not the Defendant-issued a disciplinary report to Clayton for using profanity, threatening the Warden, and refusing instructions, so Lieutenant Wilhelmina Franklin ordered that he be placed in Administrative Segregation. Ivey Decl. ¶¶ 45, 48; Ivey Attachs. 98, 150-51. As a result Clayton was placed back in Tier I. Ivey Decl. ¶ 49. While Ivey was present during the incident leading to the placement, he did not initiate the disciplinary action. Ivey Decl. ¶ 46. Floyd was not present. Floyd Decl. ¶ 17. On August 15, 2021, Ivey, who was the Deputy Warden of Security at HSP, conducted a 72-hour review and determined Clayton would remain in segregation pending the 96-hour formal hearing before the Classification Committee. Ivey Decl. ¶¶ 3, 51-52; Ivey Attachs. 150. The formal hearing was held on August 16, 2021, and the Classification Committee determined Clayton would remain in Tier I. Ivey Decl. ¶ 53; Ivey Attachs. 141. Clayton appealed his assignment on August 23, 2021. Ivey Decl. ¶ 54; Ivey Attachs. 140. The Classification Committee conducted a 30-day review hearing on September 9, 2021, and decided Clayton would remain in Tier I segregation. Ivey Decl. ¶ 55; Ivey Attachs. 140. Clayton again appealed. Ivey Decl. ¶ 56; Ivey Attachs. 139. Clayton remained in Tier I at HSP until November 22, 2021, when he was released. Ivey Decl. ¶ 62; Ivey Attachs. 98, 136.
Floyd does not know why Clayton was placed in BSP Administrative Segregation in June 2021, adding he was not even employed there at the time. Floyd Decl. ¶¶ 12, 19. Floyd avers that as a correctional officer at BSP, he had no role or authority to place inmates in Administrative Segregation, though his duties included escorting inmates to Administrative Segregation. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. He was not on the Classification Committee at BSP. Id. ¶ 5. Floyd also does not recall Clayton filing any grievances against him at BSP, noting if he had been named in a grievance, he would have been required to provide a statement. Id. ¶ 11. He also did not know Clayton had filed a lawsuit against him in March 2021, noting he was never served. Id. ¶ 18; see Clayton v. Edward, 5:21-cv-81-TES-TQL (M.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2021). Regarding Clayton's incarceration at HSP, Floyd had no role in his assignment to Tier I at any time or appeals of such assignment. Floyd Decl. ¶¶ 14-15, 23-25.
Ivey notes he did not work at BSP, and he does not know why Clayton was placed in Administrative Segregation there. Ivey Decl. ¶¶ 35-36, 67. Regarding HSP, Ivey states he was not on the Classification Committee, and as Deputy Warden of Security, he had no role in determining inmate housing assignments, though his duties included escorting inmates to Administrative Segregation. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. He denies having any role in determining the duration of Clayton's placement in Tier I upon his arrival to HSP. Id. ¶ 44. He states his only involvement in determining the duration of Clayton's placement in Tier I was conducting the August 15, 2021, initial review and authorizing his stay in Tier I until the 96-hour formal hearing in front of the Classification Committee. Id. ¶¶ 51-52, 64. Otherwise, all other decisions regarding the duration of Clayton's placement in Tier I were made by the Classification Committee. Id. ¶ 64. He declares he had no role in Clayton's appeals of his segregation assignment, stating that was processed through counselors and decided by the Warden. Id. ¶¶ 43, 63. Floyd and Ivey deny placing or causing Clayton to be placed in BSP Administrative Segregation or HSP Tier I as retaliation for filing grievances or lawsuits, and they deny his placement in HSP Tier I was based on false documents or information. Ivey Decl. ¶¶ 67-69; Floyd Decl. ¶¶ 18-22, 2728.
Under GDC SOPs, inmates placed in Administrative Segregation or Tier I have the same opportunities for personal hygiene as those in general population except that an inmate may be limited to showering and shaving three times a week. Ivey Attachs. 47, 75. Visitation rights for Administrative Segregation/Tier I inmates is the same as for general population except when not feasible. Id. at 47, 76. The food quality and quantity is the same as that for general population. Id. Inmates are allowed their personal property when it does not pose a security concern. Id. at 47, 77. Inmates are provided access to counselors and educational, vocational, and rehabilitative programs. Id. Inmates in Administrative Segregation/Tier I are allowed at least five hours of exercise outside of their cells per week unless prevented by security considerations. Id. at 48, 78.
III. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing Clayton cannot show a due process violation because 1) there is no evidence Defendants placed him in segregation, 2) the conditions of Administrative Segregation and Tier I did not constitute atypical and significant hardship such as to implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest, and 3) Clayton received all of the process he was due. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 12-19, ECF No. 200-1. In addition, Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 19-20. Because Clayton has not shown Defendants were responsible for his placement in Administrative Segregation or Tier I and has not shown the conditions of his placement constituted atypical and significant hardship, the Court recommends Defendants be granted summary judgment for these reasons and declines to address their other grounds.
A. §1983 Procedural Due Process Claim Standard
“To prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate both (1) that the defendant deprived [him or] her of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law and (2) that such a deprivation occurred under color of state law.” Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). “To make out a denial-of-procedural-due-process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally inadequate process.” Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730 Fed.Appx. 738, 743 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)). Regarding the first element, an inmate has a liberty interest in avoiding imposition of “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).As for the third element, minimum due process requirements for an inmate deprived of a liberty interest for disciplinary reasons “are (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) a written statement of the reasons for the disciplinary action taken; and (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals.” Nolley v. McLaughlin, No. 5:15-cv-00149-TES-CHW, 2018 WL 9538757, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2018).
The second element is not at issue in this case.
When an inmate is assigned to administrative segregation, periodic review is also required, though “[t]his review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the submission of any additional evidence or statements.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483. “Rather, prison officials may base their decisions on ‘facts relating to a particular prisoner,' their ‘general knowledge of prison conditions and tensions,' and other ‘administrative considerations.'” Quintanilla v. Bryson, No. 6:17-cv-4, 2020 WL 1441405, at *11 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2020) (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 874 n.9).
B. Clayton Cannot Show Defendants Caused a Constitutional Violation
Defendants have presented evidence that for each placement in Administrative Segregation or Tier I, Clayton was provided notice and a formal hearing with the right to challenge the accusations. In his almost-indecipherable response to the summary judgment motion, however, Clayton appears to deny the adequacy of the administrative procedures. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 2, 4, ECF No. 207. While it is questionable Clayton's response is sufficient to create a factual dispute as to inadequate process, the Court need not resolve the issue because Clayton has a much more fundamental problem. “A § 1983 claim requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the defendant's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222, 1232 (11th Cir. 2021). Here, Clayton cannot show that for whatever inadequate process he may have experienced, Floyd or Ivey were in any way responsible.
Initially, the Court notes it allowed his due process claim to proceed solely in connection with his transfer from BSP and placement into HSP Tier I segregation in June 2021. Order & R. 3-4, 13-14, Clayton II, Nov. 24, 2021. However, Clayton has presented no evidence Ivey or Floyd were responsible for this. Significantly, when Clayton was placed in Administrative Segregation at BSP prior to the transfer, neither Ivey nor Floyd even worked there. Ivey Decl. ¶ 36; Floyd Decl. ¶ 12. After Clayton arrived at HSP, the only evidence in the record shows his initial placement in Tier I was based on him being a new arrival who had not yet been classified. Ivey Attachs. 143; Ivey Decl. ¶ 70; see Ivey Attachs. 40 (allowing involuntary placement in Tier I for an offender who has not been classified due to their arrival at a facility). Moreover, the evidence shows the decision to keep Clayton in HSP Tier I was made by the Classification Committee on July 1, 2021, following his 96-hour hearing. Ivey Decl. ¶ 38; Ivey Attachs. 118, 143. Neither Ivey nor Floyd were on the HSP Classification Committee, and any final appeal of Clayton's placement went to the Warden, not the Defendants. Ivey Decl. ¶¶ 6, 43; Ivey Attachs. 46; Floyd Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8. So, whatever deficiencies Clayton may perceive in the administrative process regarding the June 2021 segregation, it had nothing to do with Floyd and Ivey.
Even if the Court were to deem Clayton's subsequent August 12, 2021, placement in HSP Tier I encompassed by his complaint, he still fails to show evidence linking a due process claim to Floyd and Ivey. There is no evidence Floyd played any role at all in that placement. The evidence shows it was based on a disciplinary report issued by a different officer named Floyd and initial placement authorized by his supervisor, a Lieutenant Franklin. Ivey Attachs. 151. As for Ivey, the evidence shows he-in his role as deputy warden-merely approved Clayton remaining in Tier I pending the formal hearing where Clayton would receive the due process to which he was entitled. Ivey Decl. ¶ 64; Ivey Attachs. 150. But, again, the process itself was the responsibility of the Classification Committee conducting the formal hearing and the Warden considering the appeal, not Ivey.
From what the Court can glean, Clayton's claims in this case-in addition to conclusory allegations of false disciplinary charges and documents-rely on assertions that 1) Floyd and Ivey at times escorted him to segregation, 2) Floyd and Ivey at times referred to his filing of grievances or lawsuits as a reason he was in segregation, and 3) third parties indicated Floyd and Ivey's involvement in his placement in segregation. Clayton Dep. 28:5-8, 31:17-18, 33:17-22, 56:21-24, 64:20-25, 65:15-23, 66:22-25, 67:3-6, 68:3-70:10. But the fact that Floyd and Ivey-in their role as GDC employees-may have physically placed or escorted Clayton to segregation or instructed other guards to do so, does not mean they were the ones who directed or authorized his assignment there, much less caused a deprivation of due process.
As for the alleged comments about Clayton filing grievances, adverse actions in response to grievances can be evidence of retaliation when there is a temporal proximity. See Holland v. McLaughlin, No. 5:18-CV-178-MTT, 2021 WL 3561227, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2021) (“The Eleventh Circuit has not formally adopted the use of temporal proximity in First Amendment retaliation cases, but it has used temporal proximity to establish causation in other contexts.”). But the evidence here shows Clayton did not even file a grievance at HSP against Ivey and Floyd until September 2021, which is after his placement in Tier I segregation. Ivey Attachs. 178. He also never filed a lawsuit against Ivey until this case. Clayton Dep. 72:5-12. Further, even if Floyd was aware of grievances Clayton may have filed against him at some point at BSP-in addition to a March 2021 lawsuit-the June 2021 placement in BSP Administrative Segregation and subsequent placements in HSP Tier I segregation occurred after Floyd had left BSP, thus obviating any temporal relevance. Floyd Decl. ¶ 3; Ivey Attachs. 143. And more critically, the filing of grievances would only be relevant if Clayton could show some involvement by Defendants in the decision to place and/or retain him in Administrative Segregation or Tier I, but again, there is no evidence they had any such involvement. Clayton only offers rank speculation and unsubstantiated conspiracy claims. Absent evidence of a connection between the grievances and placement in segregation, the alleged comments by Defendants-which the Court assumes for purposes of summary judgment were in fact made-constitute at most an opinion or observation.
Clayton's retaliation claims have been dismissed. Order & R. 16, Mar. 14, 2023, ECF No. 164; Order 1, Apr. 19, 2023, ECF No. 167 (adopting recommendation).
Finally, Clayton's allegations about what third parties might have told him about Ivey and Floyd's role in placing him in segregation is hearsay and without evidentiary value. See Hudson v. Middle Flint Behav. Care, 522 Fed.Appx. 594, 596 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“The district court cannot consider hearsay evidence in ruling on a summary judgment motion, unless that evidence would have been admissible at trial.” (citing Macuba v. DeBoer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 1999))).
As noted, the Court only allowed Clayton's due process claim to proceed in connection to his June 2021 placement in segregation and Tier I. Therefore, despite his second amended complaint alleging acts between January 1, 2021 and March 26, 2022, any placements in segregation outside of the June 2021 placement are not part of this case. 2d Am. Compl. 2. Nevertheless, even if these claims are considered, Defendants are still entitled to summary judgment. The entire crux of Clayton's due process claim in this case has been that Ivey and Floyd filed false disciplinary charges, caused false charges to be brought, and/or caused false information or documentation about misconduct to be placed in his inmate file. Compl. 5, 9, Clayton II; Second Am. Compl. 7-8; Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 2; Pl.'s Decl. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 207-1; Pl.'s Dep. 37:18-38:5, 43:15-16, 47:13-19, 63:1-19, 68:8-11. But Clayton has not submitted a single piece of evidence to show Floyd or Ivey filed, caused to be filed, or had placed in his prison file a false disciplinary report or document, whether at BSP, HSP, or anywhere else. What specific disciplinary report, charge, or document does he contend is false? What evidence does he have that it was false? What evidence does he have that Floyd or Ivey were responsible for any false charges or documentation? The Court is left with nothing but vague, non-specific allegations. While these allegations may have been barely sufficient to survive preliminary screening, the Court considers evidence at the summary judgment stage, not conclusory, unsubstantiated declarations. See Avirgan, 932 F.2d at 1577 (“The evidence presented cannot consist of conclusory allegations or legal conclusions.” (citing First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968))). And Clayton has produced no evidence to contradict Floyd and Ivey' contentions they had no knowledge of false charges or false documentation. Floyd Decl. ¶¶ 19-20; Ivey Decl. ¶ 69. Because there is no evidence Defendants were responsible for a violation of Clayton's due process rights, the Court recommends they be granted summary judgment.
Defendants argue the filing of false accusations alone is insufficient to support a due process claim. Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 18. It is true that “prison inmates have no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from a false or wrongful accusation of conduct even if the accusation could result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.” Gordon v. Baxter, No. 5:20-cv-688-LSC-GMB, 2022 WL 453747, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2022) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 982 (1988)), recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 450815 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2022). However, this is qualified by a requirement that minimum procedural due process requirements are met and “some” evidence supports the prison body's decision in a disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 4-5 (citing O'Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). Because the Court concludes there is no evidence Defendants filed false charges against Clayton or were otherwise responsible for his placement in Administrative Segregation or Tier I, it need not decide if he received minimum due process in his hearings before the Classification Committee.
C. Clayton Cannot Show Atypical and Significant Hardship
“[T]he Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. However, “a liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from state policies or regulations.” Id. at 222. “[T]he touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'” Id. (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). Thus, to establish a liberty interest, an inmate must show “restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
Here, Defendants have introduced evidence showing restrictions that have previously been found insufficient to show a state-created liberty interest. See Turner v. Warden, GDCP, 650 Fed.Appx. 695, 700 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (finding no state- created liberty interest for inmates housed in the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison's special management unit where the conditions were similar to the general population, including regular meals, five hours of outdoor recreation per week, showers three times a week, possession of personal property, and visitation). In response, Clayton has again offered only vague and conclusory statements about the conditions of Administrative Segregation/Tier I compared to general population. The closest he comes to specifics in response to the summary judgment motion are allegations in a declaration he was denied drinking water and further allegations in an unverified statement of facts that he was also denied out-of-cell exercise, and certain other privileges.Pl.'s Decl. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts 1, 3, 7, ECF No. 207-2. However, it appears-to the extent his handwriting can be understood-these deprivations were for a relatively short duration, which is insufficient to implicate a liberty interest. See Smith v. Deemer, 641 Fed.Appx. 865, 868 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (finding no atypical and significant hardship for complaints which “though numerous, [were] neither severe enough nor of such duration as to constitute violations of a protected liberty interest” and mostly “amount[ed] to mere inconveniences, especially viewed in light of their short duration”). In his deposition, he stated he did not get drinking water for ten days. Pl.'s Dep. 75:21-23. Otherwise, his deposition testimony about limitations in Administrative Segregation/Tier I compared to general population mainly focused on rodents and ventilation issues, which he admitted were also present in general population though “worse.” Id. at 75:3-78:5. Therefore, the Court concludes Clayton has failed to show atypical and significant hardship sufficient to establish a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.
Clayton also argues his placement in segregation affected his parole eligibility. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 1. The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, “that the Georgia parole system does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, since ‘the substantial discretion reserved by the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole belies any claim to a reasonable expectation of parole.'” Delgiudice v. Primus, 679 Fed.Appx. 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994)).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 200) be granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy hereof. Any objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED