Opinion
2001-03397
Argued May 21, 2003.
August 18, 2003.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cohalan, J.), entered March 14, 2001, which, inter alia, granted the motion of the defendants George O. Guldi and Anne C. Leahey to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.
Michael Konopka, New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Thomas T. McVann, Jr., Westhampton Beach, N.Y. (George O. Guldi pro se of counsel), for respondents.
Before: ANITA R. FLORIO, J.P., NANCY E. SMITH, GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, SANDRA L. TOWNES, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
We agree with the Supreme Court that this action is barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to an action to foreclose a mortgage ( see CPLR 213). The filing of the summons and complaint and lis pendens in an action commenced in 1992 accelerated the note and mortgage ( see Albertina Realty Co. v. Rosbro Realty Corp., 258 N.Y. 472, 476; City Sts. Realty Corp. v. Jan Jay Constr. Enterprises Corp., 88 A.D.2d 558, 559). The statute of limitations began to run upon acceleration of the mortgage debt ( see EMC Mtge Corp. v. Patella, 279 A.D.2d 604), and expired prior to the commencement of this action in January 2000.
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the dismissal of the 1992 action for lack of personal jurisdiction did not constitute an affirmative act by the lender to revoke its election to accelerate ( see Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Mebane, 208 A.D.2d 892).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
FLORIO, J.P., SMITH, KRAUSMAN and TOWNES, JJ., concur.