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finding deprivation of shower for five days did not state an Eighth Amendment claim
Summary of this case from Ricks v. DavisOpinion
Case No.: 2:10-cv-00591-RLH-RJJ.
January 28, 2011
ORDER (Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment-#12; Motion for Summary Judgment-#16)
Before the Court is Defendant Brian Williams, Sr. (sued as "Warden Williams") Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (#12), filed August 27, 2010. The Court has also considered Plaintiff Michael Clark's Opposition (#15), filed September 22, 2010. Williams did not reply.
Also before the Court is Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment (#16), filed September 22, 2010. The Court has also considered Williams' Opposition (#17), filed September 28, 2010. Clark did not reply.
BACKGROUND
This dispute arises from Clark not receiving a shower for a 5 day period while incarcerated at the Southern Desert Correctional Center. Clark claims that this extended period of time without a shower violated his Constitutional and state law rights and brings this action against Williams, the warden of High Desert Correctional Center, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Williams' motion and denies Clark's motion.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard
A court may dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands "more than labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). "Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citation omitted).
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply when considering motions to dismiss. First, a district court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. at 1949. Second, a district court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1949. Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has "alleged — but not shown — that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When the claims in a complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Finally, pro se complaints are subject to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and should be "liberally construed." Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). This is particularly true in civil rights cases. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that courts must afford pro se plaintiffs "the benefit of any doubt").
II. Analysis
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a mechanism for the private enforcement of substantive rights conferred by the Constitution and federal statutes. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff "must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment, which includes "inhumane conditions of confinement." Morgan v. Mogensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). "[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim," and "only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). While it is a common American custom to shower frequently, it is hardly inhuman or uncivilized to shower less commonly, as any international tourist can attest. The mere failure to provide a shower for a five day period is, therefore, insufficient to state a claim for violating the Eighth Amendment. See Davenport v. De Robertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1316 (7th Cir. Ill. 1988) (holding that the Constitution only requires one shower per week without extenuating circumstances); see also Lipsey v. Schwarzenegger 2009 WL 5030136, at *4 n. 2 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (commenting that four and a half days without a shower was insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim). "The deprivation merely of cultural amenities is not cruel and unusual punishment." Davenport, at 1316.
Further, while Clark claims that state prison regulations required a shower every three days, violation of state law or regulation cannot support a § 1983 claim. Section 1983 is "a method for vindicating federal rights," not rights conferred by the state. Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-394; see also Atkins, 487 U.S. at 48. Therefore the Court grants Williams' motion and dismisses Clark's complaint with prejudice because no further facts will turn his claim into a possible constitutional violation.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (#12) is GRANTED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (#16) is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to close this case.
Dated: January 28, 2011.