Opinion
FSTCV126015239S
09-22-2017
City of Stamford v. Ismat Rahman et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO OPEN SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT DATED JUNE 2, 2017 (#142.00)
Hon. Kevin Tierney, Judge Trial Referee.
Two judgments were entered by this court in this foreclosure of a Stamford, Connecticut residential blight lien. The first judgment was entered on February 19, 2013. (#109.86). The total debt and attorneys fees due the plaintiff, City of Stamford, was found to be $28,618.75 and the fair market value of the residential real property at 150 Doolittle Road, Stamford, Connecticut was found by the court to be $410,000.00. A judgment of foreclosure by sale was entered and a sale date was set for May 4, 2013. The sale took place. The sale was approved by the court. (#124.86). The closing was held. The appropriate funds were dispersed to the plaintiff. The balance of the funds, being $348,097.16, were paid to the Clerk of the Superior Court.
The second judgment was entered by the court on April 17, 2014 (#139.87). That order stated as follows: " Motion for Supplemental Judgment is granted. The Clerk of the Court is ordered to pay defendant Bank of America a total of $348,097.16, the amount remaining in the trust account. The funds will be paid by the Clerk of the Court after expiration of the 20-day appeal period." No party appealed. The Clerk of the Court paid the $348,097.16 to the defendant, Bank of America, N.A. The defendant, Wells Fargo Bank N.A., on June 2, 2017 filed this instant Motion to Open addressed to the April 17, 2014 Supplemental Judgment " as it was procured by fraud or mutual mistake."
In its Claim for Relief in the Motion to Open Supplemental Judgment, the defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., " respectfully requests that the Court open the April 17, 2014 Supplemental Judgment entered in the above-captioned matter, and order (i) that Wells Fargo is entitled to the excess funds from the foreclosure sale in the amount of $348,097.16, and (ii) that Bank of America must transfer such funds to Wells Fargo."
The parties presented a Stipulation to the court dated August 28, 2017 (#146.00). This court accepts that Stipulation. The issue at hand is between two defendants, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Bank of America, N.A. Both parties, represented by counsel, appeared before this court at the hearing on the Motion to Open Supplemental Judgment on August 30, 2017. Both parties declined to offer any further evidence or testimony. They furnished oral argument on August 30, 2017 and submitted simultaneous briefs on September 13, 2017. (#149.00, #150.00.) No reply briefs were submitted, ordered by the court or requested by the parties.
The court makes the following findings of facts and legal conclusions:
The defendant, Ismat Rahman, was the record title owner of the residential real property at 150 Doolittle Road, Stamford, Connecticut. He acquired title to that property for $780,000 on October 29, 2007. On October 29, 2007 Ismat Rahman obtained a $624,000 loan from World Savings Bank, that was secured by a mortgage on 150 Doolittle Road recorded in the Stamford Land Records in Volume 9187 at Page 347. The plaintiffs, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., is the current holder and owner of that $624,000 note and the mortgage secured thereby.
On April 8, 2008 Ismat Rahman obtained a $417,000 loan from Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP that was secured by a mortgage on 150 Doolittle Road recorded in the Stamford Land Records in Volume 9318 at Page 259. The defendant, Bank of America, N.A., is the current holder and owner of that $417,000 note and the mortgage secured thereby.
On May 2, 2008, Ismat Rahman obtained a $500,000 loan from Washington Mutual Bank that was secured by a mortgage on 150 Doolittle Road recorded in the Stamford Land Records in Volume 9346 at Page 260. The defendant, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., is the current holder and owner of that $500,000 note and the mortgage secured thereby.
Each of the three lenders referred to above at the time of their respective loans expected that their loan would be secured by a first mortgage on the real property at 150 Doolittle Road, Stamford, Connecticut. Ismat Rahman presented to Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP on the April 8, 2008 closing of his $417,000 loan a document entitled Satisfaction of Mortgage purportedly executed by Mortgage Electronic Registrations System, Inc. as nominee for World Savings Bank, (MERS), which purported to release the October 29, 2007 $624,000 mortgage from Ismat Rahman to World Savings Bank. The parties now agree that this Satisfaction of Mortgage was never recorded on the Stamford Land Records and that this Satisfaction of Mortgage is a forgery. Similarly when Washington Mutual Bank issued its $500,000 loan to Ismat Rahman on May 2, 2008 it too was presented with the forged Satisfaction of Mortgage.
As a result Washington Mutual Bank, now known as J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., filed a claim against its title insurance policy issued by the Chicago Title Insurance Company. Chicago Title Insurance Company now known as Fidelity National Title Group is a party defendant in this underlying City of Stamford foreclosure action. Chicago Title Insurance Company in turn filed a lawsuit against Ismat Rahman and on May 11, 2010 filed a certificate of attachment recorded in the Stamford Land Records at Volume 9872 at Page 188. A judgment dated on or about March 17, 2011 in favor of Chicago Title Insurance Company against Ismat Rahman was entered on Count One alleging fraud by Ismat Rahman. The judgment was in the amount of $627,730.67 plus 6.0% per annum postjudgment interest. Chicago Title Insurance Company v. Ismat Rahman and Mizen Rahman, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number FST CV-5013365 S, (March 17, 2011, Tobin, J.T.R.) (#113.00). A judgment lien reflecting these facts was recorded in the Stamford Land Records at Volume 10193 at Page 257 as to 150 Doolittle Road. Neither J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. as successor to Washington Mutual Bank nor Fidelity National Title Group as successor to Chicago Title Insurance Company are making a claim to the $348,097.16 that was formerly on deposit with the Clerk of the Court. The only two parties making that claim are Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Bank of America, N.A.
As of the commencement of this blight lien foreclosure action by the City of Stamford on August 14, 2012 the unreleased mortgages on 150 Doolittle Road, Stamford, Connecticut totaled $1,541,000. 150 Doolittle Road was purchased on October 29, 2007 for $780,000 and was determined by the court to have a fair market value of $410,000 on February 19, 2013, the date of the judgment of foreclosure by sale. (#109.86).
The statute that controls these proceedings is General Statutes § 52-212a: " Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed." There are provisions in the statute for opening judgments based on continuing jurisdiction. The parties are permitted by statute to " waive the provisions of this section or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court." Neither party has waived the provisions of this section or otherwise submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Neither party is claiming that this court has continuing jurisdiction. The parties agree that more than four months have elapsed following the entry of the April 17, 2014 Supplemental Judgment at issue before this court. (#139.87.)
" Whether proceeding under the common law or a statute, the action of the trial court in granting or refusing an application to open a judgment is, generally, within the judicial discretion of such court, and its actions will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its discretion." Nelson v. Charlesworth, 82 Conn.App. 710, 713, 846 A.2d 923 (2004); Simmons v. Weiss, 176 Conn.App. 94, 98, 168 A.3d 617 (2017). Practice Book § 17-43 contains similar language to General Statutes § 52-212a. " Courts have interpreted the phrase, 'unless otherwise provided by law, ' as preserving the common-law authority of a court to open a judgment after a four month period." Nelson v. Charlesworth, supra, 82 Conn.App. 713-14. " It is well established that courts have intrinsic powers, independent of statutory provisions authorizing the opening of judgments, to vacate or open any judgment obtained by fraud, duress or mutual mistake." Simmons v. Weiss, supra, 176 Conn.App. 99; In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 283, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). In this case the moving party, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., is claiming both fraud and mutual mistake. The claim of fraud is the forgery committed by Ismat Rahman in executing the Satisfaction of Mortgage of the World Savings Bank Loan so that he could place $1,541,000 of mortgages on real property that was worth no more than half that amount at the time that those mortgages were placed on 150 Doolittle Road. The claim of mutual mistake is the failure of the three holders of the mortgages to recognize this fraud to appropriately deal with that situation and to notify the trial court at the hearing on the Supplemental Judgment that the submitted Satisfaction of Mortgage was a forgery. For claims of fraud brought in a civil action, our Supreme Court has established the criteria necessary for a party to overcome the statutory time limitation governing a motion to open and set aside judgment. Varley v. Varley, supra, 180 Conn. at 4, 428 A.2d 317. To have a judgment set aside on the basis of fraud which occurred during the course of the trial upon a subject on which both parties presented evidence is especially difficult . . . The question presented by a charge of fraud is whether the judgment that is fair in its face should be examined in its underpinnings concerning the very matters it purports to resolve. Such relief will only be granted if the unsuccessful party is not barred by any of the following restrictions: (1) There must have been no laches or unreasonable delay by the injured party after the fraud was discovered. (2) There must have been diligence in the original action, that is, diligence in trying to discover and expose the fraud. (3) There must be clear proof of perjury or fraud. (4) There must be substantial likelihood that the result of the new trial will be different. Turner v. Commissioner of Correction, 163 Conn.App. 556, 564, 134 A.3d 1253 (2016).
Varley v. Varley, 180 Conn. 1, 4, 428 A.2d 317 (1980) was a family case where a motion to open the contested dissolution judgment was filed on the basis of fraud. The Motion to Open was filed seven years after the contested trial concluded. The Superior Court propounded the four requirements that must be resolved before a marital judgment can be opened based on fraud. In 1991 the Supreme Court eliminated the requirement of a party exercising diligence in discovering a parties' fraud as a condition of opening a dissolution judgment on the fraudulent financial aspects of a dissolution order. Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212, 222, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991) (Citing Varley v. Varley and eliminating the diligence requirement, the second requirement.) The Billington court only abandoned the diligence requirement in the context of marital dissolution actions. Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 107, 952 A.2d 1 (2008); Terry v. Terry, 102 Conn.App. 215, 225, fn. 9, 925 A.2d 375 (2007). The four requirements set forth in Varley v. Varley by our Supreme Court in 1980 are still fully applicable to civil cases (non dissolution cases). Turner v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 163 Conn.App. 564 (" For claims of fraud brought in a civil action, our Supreme Court has established the criteria necessary for a party to overcome the time limitation governing a motion to open and set aside judgment. Varley v. Varley, supra, 180 Conn. at 4."
By their Stipulation dated August 28, 2017 (#146.00), the two litigating parties agree that the defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., is the legal successor to World Savings Bank and is the owner and holder of the $624,000 note secured by the mortgage recorded in the Stamford Land Records in Volume 9187 at Page 347. The parties further agree that the defendant, Bank of America, N.A., is the current owner and holder of the $417,000 note secured by the mortgage recorded in Volume 9318 at Page 259 of the Stamford Land Records originally issued by Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP. The parties also further agree to the specifics of the $500,000 mortgage issued by Washington Mutual Bank now owned by the defendant, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. Although the property was purchased for $780,000 on October 29, 2007 and sold at a fair market value of $400,000 at the time of the foreclosure by sale, the parties agree that the property was appraised in January 2009 for $685,000. The parties agree that the total face amount of the three mortgages aforementioned is $1,541,000. The parties further agree that the amount currently due to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. on its first mortgage as of May 16, 2017 including unpaid principal was $636,578.46. The parties further agree that the Satisfaction of Mortgage mentioned by this court was not signed by anyone authorized to sign. A copy of that Satisfaction of Mortgage was attached to the Stipulation as Exhibit A. The parties further agree that Ismat Rahman used this forged Satisfaction of Mortgage to obtain the subsequent mortgages from Countrywide Bank/Bank of America, N.A. and Washington Mutual/J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. Both parties agree as follows: " Wells Fargo and Bank of America are unaware of any evidence that Bank of America acted fraudulently with regard to the entry of the supplemental judgment in this action."
The first element that must be considered is whether the actions of Ismat Rahman in submitting a forged Satisfaction of Mortgage on behalf of the first loan to World Savings Bank now owned by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. amounts to a fraud as contemplated by General Statutes § 52-212a.
The legislature has statutorily treated the recordation of false information as to a release of mortgage as a Class D felony. General Statutes § 49-8a(h). Mr. Rahman's forgery of the Satisfaction of Mortgage from World Savings Bank may by itself be a felonious act. The Stipulation indicates that neither of the two parties at issue, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. nor Bank of America, N.A., participated in any fashion in the Rahman forgery or the underlying fraud. The defendant, Bank of America, N.A. acting by its agent, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, filed a Special Defense in a prior foreclosure action brought on the $624,000 World Savings Bank mortgage. This Special Defense was based on the forged Satisfaction of Mortgage, attached a copy of the Satisfaction of Mortgage to its Special Defense pleading. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB v. Ismat Rahman, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number FST CV09-6002175 S (#110.00, dated May 5, 2010). The fraudulent act of an attorney acting on behalf of his client has been held to be sufficient fraudulent conduct to open the judgment under General Statutes § 52-212a even though there was no evidence that the client who was affected by the opening of the judgment participated in any fashion with the fraud. Nelson v. Charlesworth, 82 Conn.App. 710, 712, 846 A.2d 923 (2004). The Chicago Title Insurance Company judgment against Ismat Rahman is based on a civil finding that Ismat Rahman committed fraud in his use of the forged Satisfaction of Mortgage. The Bank of America, N.A. Motion for Supplemental Judgment dated February 6, 2014 (#132.00) makes no mention of the forgery or that the Satisfaction of Mortgage was not recorded. It attaches a copy of the Satisfaction of Mortgage to its pleading. The court then requested proof of the Satisfaction of Mortgage having been recorded. (#139.86). In response the Bank of America, N.A. filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Reargument dated April 1, 2014 (#140.00). Buried within was one sentence stating the Satisfaction was not recorded. No mention of the forgery was furnished to the trial judge. There is no evidence before this court that as of April 17, 2014 the trial judge knew that he had been presented with a forged Satisfaction of Mortgage. The trial judge knew of the Satisfaction of Mortgage and that it had not been recorded but possessed no knowledge of the fraud. The court finds the moving party, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., has sufficiently established the element of fraud as contemplated by General Statutes § 52-212a.
Court now turns to each of the four requirements set forth in Turner v. Commissioner of Corrections, supra, 163 Conn.App. 564.
(1) " There must have been no laches or unreasonable delay by the injured party after the fraud was discovered."
The underlying Supplemental Judgment was dated April 17, 2014. The motion before this court to open the judgment filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is dated June 2, 2017. There is no direct evidence that either Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. or the Bank of America, N.A. had knowledge of the Rahman forgery and fraud before June 2, 2017. The total time that elapsed between those two dates is 37 1/2 months. Our legislature has provided for a five-year limitation period within which to challenge the validity of a release of mortgage. General Statutes § 49-9a(a). In effect the essence of this Motion to Open Supplemental Judgment is challenging the legal effect of a Satisfaction of Mortgage. That challenge by the defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., was made well within the five-year period of time. The mere passage of time is insufficient to amount to laches. Fromm v. Fromm, 108 Conn.App. 376, 385-86, 948 A.2d 328 (2008). Two elements must be shown for laches to be a defense. " First, there must have been a delay that was inexcusable, and, second, that delay must have prejudiced the defendant." Id., 385: Caminis v. Troy, 112 Conn.App. 546, 552, 963 A.2d 701 (2009). The Stipulation executed by the parties does not indicate any prejudice to the defendant, Bank of America, N.A., by the passage of those 37 1/2 months or that the Bank of America, N.A. did something irretrievable with that $348,097.16 or relied on the receipt of that $348,097.16 to its detriment.
The Bank of America, N.A. points out that Ismat Rahman defaulted on the $624,000 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. mortgage and thereafter Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. commenced two separate actions against Ismat Rahman seeking foreclosure at 150 Doolittle Road, Stamford, CT: FST CV08-5009298 S commenced November 6, 2008 and withdrawn on March 4, 2010 (#106.00) and FST CV09-6002175 S commenced on October 8, 2009 and withdrawn on October 4, 2010 (#113.00). The first foreclosure was met with a cross claim by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) nominal mortgagee of the $417,000 April 8, 2008 note now owned by Bank of America, N.A. The second foreclosure was met by two Special Defenses filed by BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, predecessor to Bank of America, Inc., also on behalf of the April 8, 2008 $417,000 note claiming that the World Savings Bank $624,000 note had been paid off and the attached Satisfaction of Mortgage granted BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP priority over the $624,000 note. The Second Special Defense alleged the very Satisfaction of Mortgage at issue herein and attached a photocopy thereof to its Special Defense. (#110.00.) Bank of America, N.A. also notes that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. was defaulted in the City of Stamford blight lien foreclosure when it had the opportunity to defend its claimed priority position.
Bank of America, N.A. failed to inform this court, that it too had commenced a foreclosure action on its $417,000 note. That foreclosure action was dismissed on December 21, 2009 (#118.55) having been commenced on November 5, 2008. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Rahman, et al . judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number FST CV08-5009272 S. It is noted that Bank of America, N.A. in its foreclosure action did not claim priority over the Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. mortgage and admitted in its complaint that the $624,000 loan had priority.
Finally the Bank of America, N.A. claims that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. sat on its rights when the priority issue was raised in the 2014 Motion for Supplemental Judgment. Due to the massive and continuing fraud perpetrated on three separate banks, that had the banks scrambling to protect their own interests, it is understandable to this court, that considerable delay and confusion presented itself before Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. had a full understanding of all the facts. It has presented these facts in its June 2, 2017 Motion to Open Supplemental Judgment. (#142.00.)
The Bank of America, N.A. has failed to prove that there is a passage of time that was inexcusable or that there was prejudice to the Bank of America, N.A. that supports a claim of laches. The first of the four requirements has been met by the defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(2) " There must have been diligence in the original action, that is diligence in trying to discover and expose the fraud."
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the holder of the first mortgage that has been recorded first in time. There is no reason for the holder of a first mortgage to be aware of the recordation and/or closing of any other mortgages on the same real property executed and recorded thereafter. No legal authority has been provided to this court to establish that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. had a duty to examine the land records after its mortgage was recorded to determine if other mortgages had been later recorded on the land records for the same piece of property. In this case the forged Satisfaction of Mortgage would not have appeared on the land records since it was not recorded. The Bank of America, N.A. relied on the validity of this Satisfaction of Mortgage in the Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. first foreclosure action when it claimed priority of its second Special Defense and attached a copy of the forged Satisfaction to Mortgage to its Special Defense pleading.
In addition the Certification of Service for both the Motion for Supplemental Judgment (#139.00) and the Motion to Reargue (#140.00) did not demonstrate that notice was given to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Although Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. had been defaulted for its failure to appear November 7, 2012 (#104.86) they were a prior encumbrancer who had chronologically recorded priority and was an indispensable party to the distribution of the excess funds. The failure of notice itself should open the judgment. The supplemental judgment is a separate statutory proceeding and equity requires notice to all encumbrancers even if defaulted in the first part of the foreclosure action. Requirement number two has been proven by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(3) " There must be clear proof of the perjury or fraud."
Ismat Rahman obtained three mortgages in excess of $1,500,000 on a piece of real property that was worth less than half. With two of those mortgages he utilized the forged Satisfaction of Mortgage. No doubt he had to use the same forged Satisfaction of Mortgage to obtain the closing on the third mortgage. Those blatant acts of forgery establish clear proof of Ismat Rahman's fraud. That fraud has been confirmed by the civil judgment in Chicago Title Insurance Company v. Ismat Rahman, FST CV10-5013365 S. The court finds that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. has satisfied this third requirement.
(4) " There must be a substantial likelihood that the result of the new trial will be different." No reason was furnished by the trial court in April 17, 2014 why it granted the Supplemental Judgment in favor of Bank of America, N.A. that was second in line to the recorded Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. $624,000 mortgage. The court order itself contained no reasons or citations. No transcript signed by the trial court was provided. No Memorandum of Decision was filed. This court finds that the first in line was the City of Stamford who had a blight lien. The second in line is Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and its $624,000 mortgage. The third in line is the Bank of America, N.A. The fourth in line is J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. The general rule applicable in determining priorities for motions for supplemental judgment is first in time first in right. Equicredit Corporation of Connecticut v. Kasper, 122 Conn.App. 94, 97, 996 A.2d 1243 (2010). The Stipulation as well as the allegations of the complaint establish that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s mortgage is first in time and has recordation and chronological priority over the Bank of America, N.A. loan. The court finds there is substantial likelihood that the result of the new trial will be different. The fourth requirement has been proven by the defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
All four of the requirements as set forth in Turner v. Commissioner of Corrections, supra, 163 Conn.App. 564 are found in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as the moving party, has satisfied its burden of proof in the motion to open. Trumbull v. Palmer, 123 Conn.App. 244, 257, 1 A.3d 1121 cert. denied 299 Conn. 907 (2010). The court hereby grants the defendant's, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s, June 2, 2017 Motion to Open Supplemental Judgment. (#142.00). Simmons v. Weiss, 176 Conn.App. 94, 101, 168 A.3d 617 (2017).
The court now turns to the Defendant's Motion for Supplemental Judgment dated February 6, 2014 in chief (#139.00).
The court finds that the judgment of foreclosure by sale resulted in the deposit with the Clerk of the Court of $348,097.16. This court having opened the judgment, the issue now before this court is consideration of the underlying Motion for Supplemental Judgment that was acted on by the court on April 17, 2014. No other facts other than the complaint and the dates of recordations as alleged in the complaint and the parties' Stipulation are before this court. The parties have stipulated that the debt to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. exceeds the $348,097.16 then on deposit with the Clerk of the Court.
Our Supreme Court has confirmed first in right and first in time, in a case involving serial recordings of fraudulent releases of mortgages on a single piece of residential property in Greenwich, Connecticut. Hudson Valley Bank v. Kissel, 303 Conn. 614, 35 A.3d 260 (2012). " First American argues that the trial court's decision may be affirmed on the alternate ground that, pursuant to the first in time, first in right principle, First American was entitled to recover all of the surplus proceeds because its mortgage was executed and recorded prior to that of Stewart Title. We agree with First American that the judgment of the trial court may be affirmed on this alternate ground." Id., 626.
This court, having opened the judgment, hereby grants the Defendant's Motion for Supplemental Judgment (#139.00) and orders the Clerk of the Court to pay to the defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the sum of $348,097.16. In the event that the Clerk of the Court does not possess those funds, the defendant, Bank of America, N.A., is ordered to pay to the Clerk of the Court the sum of $348,097.16. Upon receipt of those funds and the passage of the twenty-day appeal period, the Clerk of the Court is then ordered to pay to the defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the sum of $348,097.16. No prejudgment or postjudgment interest shall accrue. The clerk will not tax costs.