Summary
In City of Miami v. Fuller, 54 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1951), a jury verdict for plaintiff was reversed where plaintiff, during the nighttime, drove his automobile over a bulkhead and into Biscayne Bay, when he apparently was distracted by lights from a nearby business, although the roadway itself was clearly marked.
Summary of this case from IRE Florida Income Partners, Ltd. v. ScottOpinion
August 24, 1951. Rehearing Denied October 9, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County, Marshall C. Wiseheart, J.
J.W. Watson, Jr., S.O. Carson, John H. Wahl, Jr., and Walton, Hubbard, Schroeder, Lantaff Atkins, Miami, for appellant.
Dixon, DeJarnette Bradford, Miami, for appellee.
On the evening of December 31, 1948, appellee and a companion fortified themselves with a quart of "Golden Wedding" whiskey and proceeded by automobile to a dance at Dinner Key Base, Miami, Florida. Dinner Key Base was the property of the City of Miami. It was a bulkheaded filled in area adjacent to Biscayne Bay. About midnight appellee and his companion got aboard the automobile and started home but in about three jiffies the car pitched over the bulkhead landing eight feet below on a rock ramp in Biscayne Bay. Appellee was very seriously injured, but his companion received nothing worse than some skin bruises. In an action against the City of Miami for personal injuries appellee secured a judgment for $25,000, from which this appeal was prosecuted.
The City contends that the accident in which appellee was injured was due to the negligence of his companion in operating the automobile, that they were engaged in a joint venture, that the negligence of the companion may be imputed to appellee and that it would amount to an award for folly to let the judgment stand.
The evidence shows that the dance was a "bring your own liquor" affair, that appellee and his companion responded to the call with an ample quota, that they had several drinks while they were at the dance, that they did not have such a good time and left about midnight, that the night was dark but the sky was clear, that the lights and the brakes on the automobile were in perfect condition, that at the speed the automobile was moving when the accident took place it could be stopped within a distance equivalent to its length.
The automobile in which the appellee and his companion were riding belonged to and was driven by the companion. The road to the street and thence to the City was clearly marked and there were from 200 to 500 automobiles parked in the same area with appellee's that night. The one in which appellee and companion were riding appears to have gotten in the light beam from a restaurant across the street and went over the bulkhead. All the others took the street and went home. Large gatherings frequently parked their cars in the same area and went home without accident. This and other circumstances detailed, are at least calculated to raise a suspicion among reasonable men that appellee and his companion were not in full possession of all their faculties when they got in the automobile and thought they pointed it toward home instead of in the direction of Biscayne Bay.
We are confronted with the contention that under such circumstances, whose negligence was responsible for appellee's injury was a question for the jury and that both the jury and the trial court rejected the charge of contributory negligence on the part of appellee. It is true that they were on the ground and had the advantage of a "look" that was not our privilege to have but we cannot escape the conclusion that appellee and his companion were out on a lark"; and imbibed freely.
That appellee was seriously injured is not contradicted but we cannot see that the City was in the slightest responsible for his injury. He was on City property but everyone who traverses the streets does so over City property. He was pleasure-bound but if he and his companion had exercised the same discretion that several hundred others did the same night he would have gone home safely. The road out was plainly marked and every reasonable precaution taken for his safety. To hold the City responsible under the facts revealed would give liberal effect to Jeremy Bentham's quip, "the law is the science of being methodically ignorant of what everybody knows." The mere fact that one is injured is no reason for fastening the responsibility on the City. It must be shown that the City was negligent and that the injured party did not contribute to his injury. We are not yet committed to the doctrine that the public purse must repair one's injury resulting from indulgence in alcoholics.
For these reasons the judgment appealed from must be and is hereby reversed.
Reversed.
SEBRING, C.J., and THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.