Opinion
DA 23-0463
07-02-2024
CITY OF BOZEMAN, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SHEA TARYN SAMPSON, Defendant and Appellant.
For Appellant: Shea Taryn Sampson, Self-represented, Helena, Montana For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Christine Hutchison, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Ashley N. Carroll, Bozeman City Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 5, 2024
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DC-2023-11D Honorable Andrew Breuner, Presiding Judge.
For Appellant: Shea Taryn Sampson, Self-represented, Helena, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Christine Hutchison, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ashley N. Carroll, Bozeman City Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
OPINION
Jim Rice, Justice
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Shea Taryn Sampson appeals the Judgment of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, affirming her conviction and sentence, after a jury trial in Bozeman Municipal Court, for Driving Under the Influence (DUI), per se, under § 61-8-406, MCA, a stated lesser-included offense of Aggavated DUI, for which she was found not guilty by the jury. She seeks plain error review of two instructional issues regarding Aggravated DUI and the lesser-included offense of DUI per se, argues she received insufficient notice of the lesser-included offense, was improperly convicted and sentenced under statutes that were repealed following her arrest, and was improperly sentenced under the Aggravated DUI statute, despite being acquitted of that offense. We affirm.
¶3 Sampson was charged with Aggravated DUI, failure to yield right of way, and unlawful possession of an open alcoholic beverage container arising from an incident on December 23, 2021, in which her vehicle cut off a patrol vehicle driven by Officer Hannah Helsby on a roundabout in Bozeman, causing Officer Helsby to brake suddenly to avoid a collision. Upon making a stop, Helsby noticed that Sampson had glassy eyes, a dazed expression, a strong odor of alcohol and a nearly full red Solo cup that Sampson was attempting to hide. Sampson exhibited motor skill impairment while gathering her registration documents, demonstrated indications of impairment during field sobriety testing, and, ultimately, received a Intoxilyzer BAC reading of 0.217.
¶4 The City served its proposed jury instructions to Sampson and her counsel a week prior to trial, which provided the elements and definitions of Aggravated DUI and lesser-included offenses, including DUI per se, defined therein as operating a noncommercial vehicle with a BAC of 0.08 or greater. The City also provided a proposed verdict form that contained the offense of Aggravated DUI and the lesser-included offenses of DUI and DUI per se. Sampson also provided proposed jury instructions and a verdict form, but did not propose instructions for lesser-included offenses. During settlement of instructions, Sampson withdrew her proposed instruction for Aggravated DUI and did not object to the City's verdict form and instructions addressing lesser-included offenses, agreeing that the City's proposed verdict form was better and that it should be used. The jury was instructed that if "you are unable after reasonable effort to reach a verdict on Aggravated Driving under the Influence, you may consider the lesser included offenses of Driving under the Influence . . . and Operating a Noncommercial Vehicle with an Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or More ...." (Emphasis added.)
¶5 As reflected in the jury's notations on the verdict form, the jury found Sampson "Not Guilty" on the Aggravated DUI charge, but "Guilty" of DUI per se, failure to yield, and unlawful possession of an open alcoholic container in a motor vehicle. The Municipal Court sentenced Sampson to 180 days in jail with all but four days suspended, and a $1,000 fine with $100 suspended for the DUI per se conviction, recommended Sampson be issued a probationary driver's license, and imposed an interlock requirement.
Sampson does not challenge her convictions and sentences for failure to yield and unlawful possession of an open alcoholic beverage container.
¶6 Sampson appealed to the District Court, arguing her conviction of DUI per se was unlawful because § 61-8-406, MCA, was repealed in 2021, yet she was not convicted until October of 2022; that she was not provided adequate notice that she could be convicted of DUI per se; that the Municipal Court erred by instructing the jury on DUI per se because the evidence did not support the charge; and that the Municipal Court had improperly sentenced her under the Aggravated DUI statute. The District Court denied Sampson's arguments on the grounds that the subsequent repeal of the charging statutes did not invalidate her conviction, that she received adequate notice of the lesser-included charge of DUI per se, that she had failed to object to the instructions she challenged on appeal, which were unnecessary to address under plain error review, that her arguments conflated the difference between DUI per se as a lesser-included offense by law and whether there was sufficient evidence for the charge, which the District Court found there was; and that Sampson's sentence was within the parameters of the applicable statute governing her DUI per se conviction, § 61-8-722, MCA (2021).
The DUI statutes governing Sampson's charges were repealed effective January 1, 2022.
¶7 Additionally, the District Court sua sponte raised plain error review of the jury instructions and verdict form as it related to Sampson's conviction of DUI per se, noting that the jury was instructed to consider lesser-included offenses only if it was "unable after reasonable effort" to reach a verdict on Aggravated DUI, but that, to the contrary, the jury had reached a definitive "Not Guilty" verdict on Aggravated DUI, and also on DUI, before considering and concluding that Sampson was guilty of DUI per se. However, reasoning that Sampson's counsel reviewed and consented to the instructions; that DUI per se was supported by the evidence at trial; that the DUI per se guilty verdict was not inconsistent with the Aggravated DUI not guilty verdict; that while it would have been preferable for the instruction to be clearer about the process of moving from the greater to the lesser charge, the instruction was nonetheless consistent with § 46-16-607(3), MCA ("[w]hen a lesser included offense instruction is given, the court shall instruct the jury that it must reach a verdict on the crime charged before it may proceed to a lesser included offense") (emphasis added); and that "it does not appear that the jury engaged in purposeful disobedience to the Court's instructions," but rather "weigh[ed] each charge on its own merit," the District Court concluded that Sampson had suffered no prejudice and that it was not necessary under the standards of plain error review to conclude a manifest miscarriage of justice had occurred. The District Court affirmed the conviction but remanded for correction of the sentencing order to properly reflect the statute under which Sampson was convicted, and the date of the conviction. Sampson appeals.
¶8 "On appeal from a municipal court of record, district courts function as intermediate appellate courts with the scope of review 'confined to review of the record and questions of law. . . .'" City of Helena v. Parsons, 2019 MT 56, ¶ 5, 395 Mont. 84, 436 P.3d 710; §§ 3-5-303, 3-6-110(1), MCA. "On appeal of a lower court judgment following intermediate appeal, we review the record independently of the district court as if appealed directly to this Court without intermediate review." Parsons, ¶ 5 (citations omitted). "Upon our independent review, we review lower court findings of fact for clear error, conclusions of law de novo for correctness, and discretionary rulings for an abuse of discretion." Parsons, ¶ 5 (citations omitted). "Trial courts have broad discretion in formulating jury instructions on the applicable law." Parsons, ¶ 5 (citations omitted). We review jury instructions as a whole for whether they fully, correctly, and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts at issue in the case. Parsons, ¶ 5 (citations omitted).
¶9 Except by plain error review, this Court does not review issues on appeal that were not first raised before the trial court. State v. Abel, 2021 MT 293, ¶ 4, 406 Mont. 250, 498 P.3d 199. We invoke plain error review sparingly on a case-by-case basis, and only when the defendant affirmatively establishes: "(1) a plain or obvious error; (2) that affected a constitutional or other substantial right; and (3) which prejudicially affected the fundamental fairness or integrity of the proceeding." Abel, ¶ 4; State v. Strizich, 2021 MT 306, ¶ 19, 406 Mont. 391, 499 P.3d 575.
¶10 Sampson's arguments on appeal to this Court largely parallel the arguments she raised on appeal to the District Court, except that she also incorporates the District Court's sua sponte analysis regarding the jury not following the instructions that required it first to be unable to reach a verdict on Aggravated DUI prior to considering the lesser-included charges. For this error, she requests that we exercise plain error review and conclude the "guilty verdict on that charge should be quashed." She also requests exercise plain error review of her arguments challenging the instructions given regarding Aggravated DUI. She contends her DUI per se conviction was unlawful because the Legislature subsequently repealed the statutes under which she was charged, that she was not given sufficient notice of the possibility she could be convicted of DUI per se, that the evidence introduced in this case did not support that charge, and that she should not have been sentenced to four days in jail on the ground that "as every criminal defense lawyer and prosecutor in Montana is keenly aware, in cases where it is questionable whether the State can prove that a defendant was driving under the influence, the State will agree to a plea deal in it amends the complaint to DUI per se so that the defendant can plead guilty and avoid jail time."
¶11 We agree with the District Court that Sampson was properly charged and prosecuted under the statutes in effect at the time of the offense, even though they were subsequently repealed and replaced by other similar statutes. We also agree that the DUI per se lesser-included offense was sufficiently noticed and raised by the State before and during the trial, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge, thus permitting the jury to be instructed on it. Sampson's challenges to the imposition of the interlock device condition and four jail days are premised upon the nonmandatory nature of these conditions under the DUI per se statute as compared to the Aggravated DUI statutes, but, as the District Court reasoned, while nonmandatory, they remained permissible within the discretion of the sentencing court for a DUI per se sentence. Finally, we likewise conclude it is not necessary to exercise plain error review of the instructions that Sampson challenges on appeal in order to preserve the integrity of the proceeding and soundness of the verdict.
¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent or modify existing precedent. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents questions controlled by settled law or by the exercise of the trial court's discretion, and are resolved by the clear application of applicable standards of review.
¶13 Affirmed.
We concur: MIKE McGRATH, BETH BAKER, JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA, INGRID GUSTAFSON, J.