Opinion
Civil Action 3:22-CV-1225
11-01-2022
ROBERT CIPOLLINI, Plaintiff v. DREW MCLAUGHLIN, Defendant
MARIANI, D.J.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
William I. Arbuckle U.S. Magistrate Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robert Cipollini (“Plaintiff”) is a pretrial detainee housed in the Luzerne County Detention Center. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the assistant district attorney prosecuting him in state court.
Plaintiff's complaint is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) because he is proceeding in forma pauperis. Under this statute, the Court is required to dismiss any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
After reviewing Plaintiff's pleading, the Court finds that he seeks relief from a Defendant who is immune, and that granting leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, it will be RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
(2) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 5, 2022, Plaintiff lodged a complaint in this Court. (Doc. 1). Along with that complaint, Plaintiff requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). Plaintiff omitted information necessary to rule on this request and was directed, on two occasions, to provide a completed form to the Court. (Docs. 6, 7).
On October 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second motion requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 8). Along with this motion, Plaintiff filed a letter to the court, which the undersigned construes as a request to supplement the complaint. (Doc. 9). Plaintiff's request to supplement is granted, and the allegations contained in the letter will be incorporated with the allegations set forth in the complaint for the purposes of this report.
In his “supplement,” Plaintiff alleges that on April 6, 2021, he was placed on house arrest as part of his pretrial supervision for a state court criminal charge. (Doc. 9, p. 1). While on “house arrest” Plaintiff had some disagreements with his parole officers, Morgan Bell and Ms. Hilbert. Id. He alleges that they asked him to quit five jobs, and did not allow him to go to “a few” medical appointments. Id.
In April 2022, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Hillburt and Bell. (Doc. 9, p. 2); see Cipollini v. Hillburt, 3:22-CV-558 (M.D. Pa.).
One week later, Plaintiff was assigned a new probation officer, Robert Sharp. (Doc. 9, p. 2). Plaintiff alleges that he had similar difficulties with Mr. Sharp, and has also initiated a lawsuit against him and Ms. Bell. Id.; see Cipollini v. Sharp, No. 3:22-CV-1000 (M.D. Pa. June 24, 2022).
On June 24, 2022, Plaintiff alleges:
I had a court hearing, and Mr Shar[p] was there and told the judge to revoke my bail due to noncompliance. And that he spoke to Ms Bell and Ms Hilbert about my case before coming to court.
At the same hearing I worked out a plea with ADA Drew McLaughlin. When we went in front of the Judge, Drew McLaughlin wanted to withdraw the plea case he said that he spoke to Ms Bell and Ms Hilbert about my case and was not going to accept my plea.Id. at 2-3.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges:
Ada Drew McLaughlin was notified that I have a lawsuit against Probation officer's Morgan Bell, Robert Sharp, and Hilbert. He went and spoke to them about my case after he was notified that there was a lawsuit and is going to give me an[] excessive sentence at my hearing.(Doc. 1, p. 2).
Plaintiff asserts one legal claim of retaliation against Defendant McLaughlin. As relief he requests money damages, a jury trial, and any other relief this court deems just and equitable. Id.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8: Requirements For A Complaint
A civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which directs that a complaint must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Under this rule, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. It requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); see also Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)).
Furthermore, a document filed by a plaintiff proceeding pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
B. Statutory Screening Obligation Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of complaints brought by a plaintiff who has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis and must dismiss a case sua sponte if: (i) the allegation of poverty is untrue, (ii) the action is frivolous or malicious, (iii) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iv) the complaint seeks money damages from a defendant who is immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
As observed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, “[s]ome form of the IFP statute has been in existence for over a century,” in order to ensure “that no person is barred from ‘pursuing meaningful litigation' solely because of an inability to pay administrative court fees.” Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). In creating this procedure, however, Congress also “recognized that a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Id. (cleaned up). The screening provisions in the PLRA were designed to both “preserve the resources of both the courts and the defendants in prisoner litigation” and “ensure fewer and better prisoner suits.” Id. (cleaned up).
When conducting this screening analysis, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Endrikat v. Ransom, No. 1:21-CV-1684, 2022 WL 4111861 at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2022) (“In dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e), 1915A, and 1997e, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). At this early stage of the litigation, the district court must:
“accept the facts alleged in [a plaintiff's] complaint as true,” “draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in [his or her] favor,” and “ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible . . . claim.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015).Shorter v. United States, 12 F. 4th 336, 374 (3d Cir. 2021). A court need not “credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions,' ” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), and does not need to assume that a plaintiff can prove facts not alleged, Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Furthermore, a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
C. Elements of § 1983 Retaliation Claims
Plaintiff's retaliation claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). “It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To plead a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts that show a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
In this case, Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim that a state actor (Defendant McLaughlin) violated his rights when that actor retaliated against him for engaging in protected conduct (filing a lawsuit). To state a retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege facts in support of the following elements: (1) constitutionally protected conduct; (2) an adverse action by prison officials that is sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim Against Defendant McLaughlin is Barred by Prosecutorial Immunity
Regardless of whether he has pleaded enough facts to state a plausible retaliation claim, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant McLaughlin must be dismissed because Defendant McLaughlin is shielded by prosecutorial immunity.
As another court recently observed:
Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under section 1983 for acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State's case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 43031 (1976); see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 348-49 (2009). Moreover, absolute immunity extends to instances of “soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable cause hearings,” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1465 (3d Cir. 1992), presenting a state's case at trial, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, and appearing before a judge to present evidence, Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020). Prosecutors are not absolutely immune when they are “not acting as ‘an officer of the court,' but . . . instead engaged in other tasks, [such as] investigative or administrative tasks.” Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33). “In determining whether absolute immunity is available for particular actions, the courts engage in a ‘functional analysis' of each alleged activity.” Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 377 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1463).Pumba v. Alvarez, No. 22-2076, 2022 WL 5122906 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2022).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that in June 2022 Defendant McLaughlin decided not to accept a plea agreement after speaking with Plaintiff's probation officers (Bell and Hilbert). He also alleges that Defendant McLaughlin was aware of a lawsuit Plaintiff initiated against Bell and Hillburt several months earlier, in April 2022. He implies that the lawsuit against Bell and Hilbert impacted plea negotiations with Defendant McLaughlin, but does not allege any specific facts to support this belief. Even assuming that these allegations support the existence of a causal connection to support his retaliation claim, Plaintiff's claim against McLaughlin should be dismissed. It is well-established that:
plea bargains are “so intimately associated with the prosecutor's role as an advocate of the State in the judicial process as to warrant absolute immunity.” Cady v. Arenac Cty., 574 F.3d 334, 341 (6th Cir. 2009); See also Cole v. Smith, No. 97-5964, 1999 WL 685940, at *2, 188 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 1999) (table) (“The plea bargain takes the place of a trial. Conduct associated with plea bargaining is clearly not administrative or investigative.”); Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1210 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he negotiation of a plea bargain is an act within a prosecutor's jurisdiction as a judicial officer.”); Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[A] prosecutor's activities in the plea bargaining context merit the protection of absolute immunity. The plea negotiation is an ‘essential component' of our system of criminal justice.”).Jones v. Delaware, No. 20-746, 2021 WL 38275 at *6 (D. Del. Jan 5, 2021); see also McLaughlin v. Henry, No. 19-9451, 2019 WL 2588758 at *4 (D.N.J. June 24, 2019) (finding that a prosecutor is immune from suit for the alleged misconduct in negotiating and presenting a plaintiff's plea agreement in a criminal case); McIntyre v. Centre Cty., No. 3:09-CV-2014, 2010 WL 11531083 at * (M.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2010) (“a prosecutor's decision whether to dispose of a case by plea bargain-because dependent on delicate judgments affecting the course of a prosecution-is protected by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity.”).
B. Leave to Amend Should be Denied As Futile
If a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). In this case, amendment would plainly be futile, as the only named defendant is shielded by prosecutorial immunity. See e.g., Proctor v. Stewart, No. 4:17-CV-1429, 2017 WL 5505869 at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2017) (denying leave to amend where the only defendants were entitled to prosecutorial immunity for the conduct complained of).
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, for the reasons explained herein it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
(2) The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.