Opinion
April 28, 1997
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (McCabe, J.), entered March 6, 1996, as granted the motion of the defendant Ira S. Salk Construction Corp. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and denied his cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The Labor Law § 240 cause of action was properly dismissed as the plaintiff was not injured as the result of a gravity-related hazard within the meaning of that statute ( see, Misseritti v Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 487; Rodriguez v. Tietz Ctr. for Nursing Care, 84 N.Y.2d 841; Dickson v. Fantis Foods, 235 A.D.2d 452; Phillips v. City of New York, 228 A.D.2d 570; Schreiner v Cremosa Cheese Corp., 202 A.D.2d 657).
The Labor Law § 200 cause of action was also properly dismissed as there was no evidence to indicate that the defendant Ira S. Salk Construction Corp. exercised any supervision and control over the work or that it had any notice of a defect ( see, Comes v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494; Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290; Rojas v. County of Nassau, 210 A.D.2d 390). Miller, J.P., Joy, Goldstein and Florio, JJ., concur.