Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-CV-2249.
September 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand. (Doc. No. 3.) For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on May 22, 2002. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-7.) Plaintiff Ronald Ciancaglione ("Plaintiff") was operating a motor vehicle in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania when another vehicle operated by Defendant Marcus J. Sutherlin collided with Plaintiff's vehicle. ( Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the accident, he suffered severe physical trauma, including injuries to his back and wrist; bumps, bruises, abrasions and lacerations about his body; and headaches. ( Id. ¶ 12.) In addition, he asserts that as a result of his injuries, he "has undergone in the past and will in the future continue to undergo great pain and suffering," has "suffered a permanent disability and permanent impairment of his earning power and capacity," and "may in the future incur medical expenses and income loss." ( Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 16.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has brought a claim for negligence against Sutherlin and a claim for negligent entrustment against Mr. Sutherlin's employer, Defendant Central Trucking, Inc. ("Central Trucking"). ( Id. ¶¶ 8-19.) Plaintiff's wife, Ellen Ciancaglione, also asserts a claim against both Defendants for loss of consortium. ( Id. ¶¶ 20-21.)
Plaintiff filed this Complaint on April 26, 2004, in the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff and his wife are residents of Pennsylvania. ( Id. ¶ 3(b)(i).) Central Trucking is incorporated in Indiana and maintains its principal place of business in Indiana. ( Id. ¶ 3(b)(ii).) Plaintiff also alleges that Sutherlin is a resident of Indiana. ( Id. ¶ 3(b)(iii).) Plaintiff seeks damages in excess of $50,000 for each of the three counts in the Complaint. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19, 21.) On May 24, 2004, Defendants timely removed the case to this Court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 1.) On June 8, 2004, Plaintiffs filed this Motion to Remand.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant in a state court action may remove the case to federal court if the federal court could have originally exercised jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000). A case removed to federal court may be remanded to state court "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction" over the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000). When, as here, the parties are citizens of different states, this Court has diversity jurisdiction if the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
The removing party bears the burden of proving that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004). A motion for remand will be denied if defendants can establish to a legal certainty that the plaintiff could recover at least the statutory minimum amount in controversy. Id. at 397 (discussing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 383 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)); see also Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999) ("When it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff was never entitled to recover the minimum amount set by Section 1332, the removed case must be remanded. . . ."); 14C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3725 (3d ed. 1998) (stating that the Supreme Court's legal-certainty test in Red Cab Co. "requires the defendant merely to show that it does not appear to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy falls below the applicable jurisdictional amount"). Because § 1441 is strictly construed against removal, Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990), all doubts about whether a plaintiff satisfies the amount in controversy requirement must be resolved in favor of remand. Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 403.
III. ANALYSIS
In the Motion for Remand, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have not satisfied their burden of establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Doc. No. 3 ¶ 6.) Generally, whether the amount in controversy requirement has been satisfied is determined from the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961) ("The general federal rule has long been to decide what the amount in controversy is from the complaint itself. . . ."). In the instant case, the Complaint does not seek a precise amount of damages. Instead, it asserts that the value of each of the three claims is at least $50,000, without any mention of a maximum possible worth. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19, 21.) For demands of indeterminate value such as the ones made in this case, "the amount in controversy is not measured by the low end of an open-ended claim, but rather by a reasonable reading of the value of the rights being litigated." Angus, 989 F.2d at 146; see also Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 666 (3d Cir. 2002).
$50,000 is the minimum amount required in state court to avoid mandatory referral to arbitration under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Pa. R.Civ. P. 1021, and the Philadelphia Rules of Local Practice, Phila. Civ. R. 1301.
When a complaint does not limit its request to a precise monetary amount, we must make an independent appraisal of the claim's value to determine whether it satisfies the amount in controversy requirement. Angus, 989 F.2d at 146. In doing so, we may look to the notice of removal, stipulations, and discovery evidence, The Bachman Co. v. MacDonald, 173 F. Supp. 2d 318, 323 (E.D. Pa. 2001), including any settlement demands the plaintiff may have made, Broderick v. Dellasandro, 859 F. Supp. 176, 179 (E.D. Pa. 1994). See also Chase v. Shop `N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir. 1997) ("In a case for money damages, . . . the appropriate focus in determining the amount in controversy is on plaintiff's assessment of the value of her case."); In re Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 346 F.3d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 2003) (deciding that a post-complaint settlement offer is relevant evidence of the value of plaintiff's claims); Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (stating that a "settlement letter is relevant evidence of the amount in controversy if it appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's claim"); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that "great weight" should be given to the plaintiff's assessment of a case's value when determining removal jurisdiction).
Although Mr. Ciancaglione and Mrs. Ciancaglione each assert separate claims for damages exceeding $50,000, we are not permitted to aggregate their claims to meet the amount in controversy requirement. See Meritcare Inc., 166 F.3d at 218 ("[T]he rule is long-standing and seemingly well-settled . . . that the claims of several plaintiffs, if they are separate and distinct, cannot be aggregated for purposes of determining the amount in controversy. The rule applies even if the plaintiffs have a community of interest, but fall short of establishing a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest.").
In support of their assertion that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000, Defendants point to a letter by Plaintiff's counsel dated October 2, 2003, before the Complaint was filed, in which counsel for Plaintiffs demanded $201,067.25 to settle these claims. (Doc. No. 4, Ex. A.) The settlement demand included compensation for medical expenses incurred by Ronald Ciancaglione in the amount of $21,267.25, wage losses of $19,800, and additional, unspecified sums to cover Ronald Ciancaglione's potential future injuries and complications arising as a result of the collision, future lost earnings, and pain and suffering. ( Id.) Ultimately, Plaintiffs' counsel valued Plaintiff's case as having a value of $150,000, and made a total demand of $201,067.25 to settle all claims. ( Id.) Counsel concluded the settlement letter by asserting that their demand was "more than reasonable." ( Id.) Counsel has not disavowed the valuations made in the demand letter.
This demand included $10,000 for Ellen Ciancaglione's loss of consortium claim.
We are satisfied that Defendants have met their burden of establishing to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy exceeds the minimum required amount in controversy of $75,000. Plaintiffs' settlement letter documents and details medical expenses for Plaintiff in the amount of $21,267.25, including primary care visits, MRI and EMG tests that resulted in abnormal findings, and numerous physical therapy sessions. ( Id.) It also accounts for Plaintiff's claim for lost wages over a period of eight months in the amount of $19,800 through documentation from his employer. In addition, the demand letter alleges that "plaintiff may have suffered a permanent disability and permanent impairment" (Compl. ¶ 14), which may result in additional medical expenses and reduce his future earning potential. ( Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) To justify this claim, the letter refers to a report from Plaintiff's physician indicating that as a result of the accident Plaintiff suffers from "right central disc protrusions at C5-C6 and to a greater degree at C6-C7," with radiating pain and numbness, and that Plaintiff has "suffered permanent injuries" and "may require additional therapy or ultimately surgical intervention" in the future. (Doc. No. 4, Ex. A.) Finally, Plaintiffs' demand letter discusses pain and suffering in connection with the alleged collision, including recurring headaches, neck and back pain, and numbness in his hand. ( Id.) If the allegations contained in the demand letter are true, and a jury finds Defendants liable for the collision, Plaintiffs could certainly be awarded well in excess of $75,000 in damages. As the Third Circuit has noted, "in personal injuries litigation the intangible factor of `pain, suffering, and inconvenience' constitutes the largest single item of recovery, exceeding by far the out-of-pocket `specials' of medical expenses and loss of wages." Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 1971). Under the circumstances, "a reasonable reading of the value of the rights being litigated," Werwinski, 286 F.3d at 666, leads to the conclusion that the Defendants have met their burden of establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of September, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 3), and all papers filed in support thereof and opposition thereto, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.IT IS SO ORDERED.