Summary
In Faith Temple, the District Court determined that it could not decide whether to grant the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction until it held a hearing on whether the Town's condemnation would violate RLUIPA.
Summary of this case from St. John's United Church v. City of ChicagoOpinion
04-CV-6355L.
January 12, 2005
DECISION and ORDER
Plaintiff, Faith Temple Church ("Faith Temple"), commenced this action against the Town of Brighton, New York ("the Town"), seeking to enjoin the Town from obtaining a certain parcel of land in Brighton through eminent domain. Faith Temple alleges that the Town's actions have violated its rights under the United States and New York State Constitutions, as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.
Defendants — the Town and several town officials who are sued in their official capacities — have moved to dismiss the complaint, primarily on the ground that this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in favor of ongoing state court proceedings concerning the proposed condemnation of the property in question. Defendants also contend that, if the action is not dismissed, Alan Groos, the owner of the land in question, should be joined as a necessary party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, plaintiff has moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Town from continuing with its eminent domain proceedings. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion is denied. The Court reserves decision on plaintiff's preliminary injunction motion pending an evidentiary hearing before this Court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Although the series of events leading up to the present dispute stretches back to the late 1980s, a brief summary is all that is required for purposes of this Decision and Order.
Faith Temple is a religious congregation, which currently owns a church and related buildings on Elmwood Avenue in Brighton. Faith Temple contends that its Elmwood Avenue property is no longer large enough to meet the needs of its congregation, and that it needs a larger site on which to build. To that end, Faith Temple executed a purchase contract in January 2004 to obtain a 66-acre parcel of land owned by Alan Groos ("the Groos parcel") on Westfall Road in Brighton. The Groos parcel is immediately east of a 49-acre parcel of parkland ("the Park") owned by the Town.
In its Master Plan, however, as updated in 2000, the Town had recommended acquiring the Groos parcel in order to permit expansion of the Park. The Town, which claims to have been taken by surprise by Faith Temple's announcement of its contract to buy the Groos parcel, announced on April 13, 2004 its intention to condemn the Groos parcel, which would effectively preclude Faith Temple from consummating the purchase.
Faith Temple, asserting that its purchase contract with Groos vests it with equitable title to the Groos parcel, commenced this action on July 30, 2004. The complaint asserts nine causes of action, the first six of which are: (1) violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violation of the New York State Constitution's guarantees of freedom of worship and religious liberty; (3) violation of Faith Temple's right to free speech under the First Amendment; (4) violation of the New York State Constitution's guarantee of freedom of speech; (5) violation of Faith Temple's right to free association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and (6) violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The final three causes of action allege three types of violations of RLUIPA: (7) imposition of a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious exercise; (8) discrimination on the basis of religion; and (9) application of a land use regulation in a manner that treats Faith Temple on less than equal terms with a nonreligious entity.
Also on July 30, 2004 — though later in the day than it filed the complaint in this action — Faith Temple commenced a proceeding in the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, Fourth Department, challenging the condemnation pursuant to § 207 of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law. It is that proceeding that forms the basis for defendants' abstention arguments in this case.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss A. Younger Abstention
In arguing that the Court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction, defendants rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In this circuit, Younger abstention applies if: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is involved; and (3) the federal plaintiff has an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his constitutional claims during or after the proceeding. Christ the King Regional High Sch. v. Culvert, 815 F.2d 219, 224 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987). See also CECOS Int'l, Inc. v. Jorling, 895 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1990).
Younger abstention "derives from the recognition `that a pending state proceeding, in all but unusual cases, would provide the federal plaintiff with the necessary vehicle for vindicating his constitutional rights. . . .'" Temple of the Lost Sheep, Inc. v. Abrams, 930 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 866 (1991). This "doctrine requires that federal courts abstain from considering section 1983 claims that are the subject of ongoing state . . . civil proceedings which involve vital state interests, when those proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims." DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80, 86, n. 3 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Slekis v. Thomas, 525 U.S. 1098 (1999) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1982)).
Here, it is questionable whether there is an ongoing state proceeding in the appellate division for Younger purposes, since plaintiff commenced the state proceeding after filing the complaint in this action, albeit on the same day. Compare Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 204 (6th Cir. 1986) ("the proper time of reference for determining the applicability of Younger abstention is the time that the federal complaint is filed"); with Anderson v. Schultz, 871 F.2d 762, 764-65 (8th Cir. 1989) (abstention appropriate where federal claim filed the same day as state charges). As to the second prong, plaintiff does not appear to dispute that the state proceeding involves important state interests, and there is authority to that effect from within this circuit. See, e.g., Didden v. Village of Port Chester, 304 F.Supp.2d 548, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("New York eminent domain proceedings always satisfy the first two prongs of Younger").
The main issue, though, is whether the third prong is met, i.e., whether Faith Temple will have an adequate opportunity for judicial review of its federal claims during or after the state proceeding. Where that issue is in dispute, it is the party opposing abstention who has the burden of establishing that the state proceedings do not provide an adequate remedy for the party's federal claims. Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 78 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 2812 (2004); Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 261 F.3d 1154, 1159 (11th Cir. 2001); Joseph A. ex rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1273 (10th Cir. 2002).
I find that plaintiff has carried that burden. The statute providing for judicial review of eminent domain proceedings in the appellate division, Em. Dom. Proc. L. § 207, states in subsection (C) that
[t]he scope of review shall be limited to whether:
(1) the proceeding was in conformity with the federal and state constitutions,
(2) the proposed acquisition is within the condemnor's statutory jurisdiction or authority,
(3) the condemnor's determination and findings were made in accordance with procedures set forth in this article and with article eight of the environmental conservation law, and
(4) a public use, benefit or purpose will be served by the proposed acquisition.
Although the parties disagree about the breadth of the state court's ability to hear federal constitutional claims, the statute on its face makes no provision for a state court to consider claims based on alleged violations of federal statutes. This is particularly important in this case inasmuch as plaintiff's statutory claims under RLUIPA lie at the very heart of this action, and appear to be the chief bases upon which plaintiff seeks relief. Defendants have cited no authority indicating that state courts can consider such claims in a § 207 proceeding, and in fact the cases they have cited all involve federal constitutional claims only. See Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law at 4, n. 2.
For example, plaintiff's memorandum of law in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction devotes about nine pages to its RLUIPA claims, and about two pages to its constitutional claims. See Docket #19 at 9-20.
In reaching this determination, I am not, as defendants suggest, assuming "that the Appellate Division will shirk its responsibilities or fail to apply the law. . . ." Id. at 3. To the contrary, I presume that the state court will decide whatever matters are presented to it that are within the expressly limited jurisdiction conferred by § 207.
In that regard, it should be noted that not only is the appellate division's review limited to the four issues set forth in § 207(C), it is also limited in the sense that the appellate division does not conduct a de novo inquiry into those issues; rather, the court reviews "the condemnor's determination and findings" concerning the public purpose to be served by the proposed project, the choice of location for the project, and the project's general effect on the environment and local residents. N.Y. Em. Dom. Proc. L. §§ 207(A), 204; see also Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 418 (1986) ("This is not a de novo review, . . . either with respect to the public purpose issue, where review of the agency determination is [limited to whether condemnor's determination was `without foundation,' see id. at 425], or as to other issues, where courts . . . should consider whether the [condemnor's] conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record that was before the [condemnor] at the time of its decision"). In addition, "[t]he proceeding shall be heard on the record . . .," N.Y. Em. Dom. Proc. L. § 207(A), and "is a summary proceeding in which the scope of review is expressly limited" to the factors set forth in § 207(C). Waldo's, Inc. v. Johnson City, 74 N.Y.2d 718, 720 (1989). Such a proceeding is hardly conducive to resolving the federal statutory claim now pending before this Court.
This is especially so since it appears that some of plaintiff's claims will need to be addressed at a hearing.
I also reject defendants' argument that subsection (2)'s reference to whether "the proposed acquisition is within the condemnor's statutory jurisdiction or authority" means that Faith Temple could raise its RLUIPA claims in the state court proceeding. There would seem to be little question that the Town has statutory jurisdiction to condemn the property, but that does not answer the question whether the Town has violated or will violate RLUIPA by doing so. See Jackson v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 418 (1986) (§ 207 "limits the scope of review to whether the proceeding was constitutional or within the agency's statutory jurisdiction").
B. Colorado River Abstention
Defendants also contend, in a footnote in their memorandum of law, that abstention is warranted under Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). In Colorado River, the Supreme Court held that a court may sometimes abstain in order to conserve federal judicial resources where the resolution of existing concurrent state-court litigation could result in "comprehensive disposition of litigation." Id. at 813, 817.
The Court cautioned, however, that this should be done only in "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 818. The Court also observed that while duplicative litigation as between federal courts should ordinarily be avoided,
[g]enerally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction. . . . This difference in general approach between state-federal concurrent jurisdiction and wholly federal concurrent jurisdiction stems from the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.Id. at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The rule that permits simultaneous litigation in state and federal court of overlapping and even identical cases is deeply rooted in our system").
After applying the relevant factors, see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1983), I do not believe that Colorado River abstention is warranted here. This forum is equally convenient as the state court, and federal law provides the rule of decision as to plaintiff's claims in this action. For the reasons already stated, I also am not convinced, given the limited scope of the appellate division's review under § 207, that the state forum can adequately serve to protect plaintiff's rights under RLUIPA. Both this action and the state court proceeding are in their early stages, and I see no significant risk of piecemeal litigation. Since "the balance [is] heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction," id. at 16, I conclude that there do not "exist `exceptional' circumstances, [or] the `clearest of justifications,' that can suffice under Colorado River to justify the surrender of [this Court's] jurisdiction." Id. at 25-26.
II. Failure to Join an Indispensable Party
Defendants also contend that Alan Groos is an indispensable party to this action and is therefore subject to compulsory joinder under Rule 19(a). I disagree.
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (I) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action.
It is not clear whether defendants are arguing that Groos should be joined as a plaintiff or defendant, but either way, he is not a necessary party to this litigation. It appears that defendants may contend that Groos should be joined as a defendant, since they state that he "has, on the record, encouraged the Town to proceed with its taking." Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 10. Specifically, they allege that at a public hearing on the Town's proposed condemnation of the property, Groos stated, "I am glad that you are doing the taking. You'll be forced to be honest." Affidavit of John M. Wilson, II (Docket #24), ¶ 10.
In his own affidavit, however, Groos states that while he did make a statement to that effect, he was being sarcastic, and meant to imply that the Town had not been forthright in its prior negotiations with him when the Town was attempting to purchase the property from him. Docket #32, ¶ 8. He states that he would prefer to have Faith Temple purchase the land from him and proceed to develop its church complex there. Id. ¶ 9.
That suggests that Groos's interests are more closely aligned with Faith Temple's, not the Town's. That still does not mean that Groos is subject to compulsory joiner under Rule 19(a), however. First, it does not appear that Groos actually "claims an interest" relating to the subject matter of this action. He certainly seems to have an interest, but that is not enough, and the Town cannot assert an interest on his behalf. See Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1996) ("As to the second part of Rule 19(a), [the defendant's] argument fails here if only because the [non-party] has not `claim[ed] an interest relating to the subject of the action'"); United States for Use and Benefit of Special-Lite, Inc. v. Republic Western Sur. Co., No. CIV. A. 97-7400, 1998 WL 299674, at *3 (E.D.Pa. May 20, 1998) ("Defendant, who has the burden of showing that Town Supply is a necessary party, does not contend that Town Supply claims an interest in this litigation, merely that it has an interest") (citing Peregrine Myanmar, 89 F.3d at 49).
Second, failure to join Groos in this action will not make it impossible to afford complete relief to the current parties, nor will it impair or impede Groos's ability to protect his interest. As to the parties' interests, if the Court rules in favor of plaintiff, the Town will be enjoined from condemning the land, and Faith Temple will be able to purchase the property from Groos. If the Court rules in defendants' favor, the Town will be able to continue its eminent domain proceedings.
As for Groos, his interest in the outcome of this action will be adequately protected by Faith Temple. Although Groos would seem to have no particular interest in whether Faith Temple can build a church complex on the site, he would apparently prefer to sell the land to Faith Temple than to be compensated through eminent domain proceedings. See Groos Aff. (Docket #32). The general rule is that if an absent party's interests are the same as those of an existing party, and the existing party will adequately protect those interests, the absent party need not be joined as a named party to the litigation. See, e.g., Washington v. Daley, 173 F.3d 1158, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1999); Gwartz v. Jefferson Mem. Hosp., 23 F.3d 1426, 1429 (8th Cir. 1994); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 877 F.2d 132, 135 (1st Cir. 1989); National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Mason, Perrin Kanovsky, 709 F.Supp. 411, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Since both Groos and Faith Temple would prefer to proceed with their purchase contract than to see the property taken by the Town, Groos's interest in this action will be adequately protected by Faith Temple.
Because Groos has no apparent interest in the substance of plaintiff's claims, it is also not at all clear what "claim" he could actually assert if he were a named plaintiff. Groos would have no standing to assert RLUIPA or constitutional claims on behalf of Faith Temple. To the extent that Groos might contend that there is some defect in the eminent domain proceeding, the state courts would be the appropriate forum to raise such allegations.
Finally, I am not persuaded by the Town's argument that Groos's absence could leave the Town at risk of "incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of [Groos's] claimed interest." Again, if Faith Temple prevails in this action, Groos and Faith Temple will be able to proceed with the sale of the property, so Groos would have no need to seek any relief against the Town. If the Town prevails, that would mean only that the Town's taking of the Groos parcel did not violate Faith Temple's rights under the Constitution or RLUIPA, and I do not see how the Town could ultimately incur multiple or inconsistent obligations by virtue of such a ruling.
For example, a ruling by the appellate division that the Town's condemnation proceedings were procedurally defective, see Em. Dom. Proc. L. § 207(C)(3), would not be inconsistent with a finding by this Court that Faith Temple's rights had not been violated.
III. Need for a Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
Faith Temple has moved for an order enjoining the Town from condemning the Groos parcel. After reviewing the parties' submissions, I conclude that a factual hearing is necessary before the Court can decide Faith Temple's motion.
"It is settled law in this Circuit that motions for preliminary injunctions should not be decided on the basis of affidavits when disputed issues of fact exist." Kern v. Clark, 331 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Incomco, Inc., 649 F.2d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1981)). "The existence of factual disputes necessitates an evidentiary hearing . . . before a motion for a preliminary injunction may be decided." Commodity Futures, 649 F.3d at 131. See also Fengler v. Numismatic Americana, Inc., 832 F.2d 745, 747 (2d Cir. 1987) ("On a motion for preliminary injunction, where `essential facts are in dispute, there must be a hearing . . . and appropriate findings of fact must be made") (quoting Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications, Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1981)).
In the case at bar, two of the central issues are whether the Town's condemnation of the Groos parcel would "impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person . . . or institution," and, if so, whether the burden imposed "is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). In my view, resolution of those issues requires some inquiry into what alternatives are available both to the Town and to Faith Temple. In particular, it cannot be determined from the present record whether, if the Town succeeds in obtaining the property, suitable alternative sites would be available to Faith Temple for relocation and expansion of its facilities, or how much of a burden that would impose on Faith Temple. Similarly, assuming arguendo that the Town has a compelling interest in expanding the Park, it is unclear at this point whether less restrictive means of doing so are available to it.
As if to underscore the dispute over these issues, both parties have suggested that there are other sites in the immediate vicinity of both the Park and Faith Temple's current Westfall Road property that are available to each other. Faith Temple, for example, contends that it would be willing to convey its existing 40-acre Westfall Road parcel to the Town, thus allowing the Park to be expanded westward, while the Town asserts that Faith Temple could still obtain the Costello property to the south. At the hearing, then, the parties should be prepared to present proof concerning these issues. The Court will issue a decision on plaintiff's preliminary injunction motion following the conclusion of the hearing.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket #21) is denied.
The parties are directed to contact the Court to discuss scheduling the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction.