Opinion
Rehearing Denied July 7, 1930
Hearing Granted by Supreme Court Aug. 7, 1930
Original proceeding by Earle J. Church for mandamus to be directed to the board of supervisors of the County of Fresno and W.A. Collins and others, members of the board.
Peremptory writ granted.
COUNSEL
B.W. Gearhart, Loren A. Butts, and David E. Peckinpah, all of Fresno, for petitioner.
Glenn M. DeVore, Dist. Atty., and Arthur C. Shepard, Deputy Dist. Atty., both of Fresno, for respondents.
OPINION
MARKS, J.
This is an original proceeding instituted in this court whereby the petitioner, who is an attorney duly licensed to practice in all the courts of California, and is a resident and taxpayer of the city of Fresno, seeks a peremptory writ of mandate directed to respondents, who compose the board of supervisors of Fresno county, commanding them to fill the office of justice of the peace of the city of Fresno. The parties hereto have stipulated to all of the facts in this case. The sole issue for us to determine is whether or not, under the provisions of the Constitution and laws of California, and of the charter of the city of Fresno, there is existing the office of justice of the peace of such city.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of the District Court of Appeal have clearly and fully established the rule of laws which must govern us in reaching our conclusions in this case. In re Lovall (Cal.Sup.) 279 P. 452, 453; Proctor v. Justice’s Court of City of Berkeley (Cal.Sup.) 285 P. 312; Robertson v. Langford, 95 Cal.App. 414, 273 P. 150, 154; Kenyon v. Johnson (Cal.App.) 276 P. 110; Frioux v. Johnson (Cal.App.) 276 P. 128. From these decisions it appears that the law is well settled to the effect that if the jurisdiction of the police court of the city of Fresno is equal, joint, and concurrent in all respects to the jurisdiction of the city justice court, were there one that the establishment of a city justice court would not be permitted by law; but if the jurisdiction of the city justice court is greater and extends beyond the jurisdiction of the city police court, then the city justice court exists and the office of city justice of the peace must be filled by respondents. In other words, if cases, actions, or proceedings can be heard in the city justice court, of which the city police court would have no jurisdiction, then the creation of a city police court under the charter of the city of Fresno would not automatically supersede and terminate the city justice court and the office of city justice of the peace.
The determination of this question rests entirely upon the construction to be given to the language of the charter of the city of Fresno authorizing the city police court, and under which this court was created. This charter provides as follows:
"Within the city limits, said court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with township justices courts in all matters and things in which said justice courts now or hereafter may have jurisdiction; and said police court shall have in addition to the special jurisdiction conferred in this article, like authority, power, and jurisdiction in the city as now or hereafter may be conferred upon township justices courts."
In the case of Robertson v. Langford, supra, it was held that under the language of the charter of the city of San José, the jurisdiction of the police judge of such city was equal and coextensive with that which would be exercised by a city justice of the peace, were there one, and that therefore the city justice court was abolished by the provisions of the charter of the city of San Josécreating the city police court. The provisions of this charter were as follows:
"Said police court and police judge shall have all the powers, authority and jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, that are now or may hereafter be conferred by law upon justices of the peace in California."
In the case of In re Lovall, supra, the Supreme Court held that the creation of a city police court under the charter of the city of Stockton did not abolish the city justice court, because the justice court had larger jurisdiction than the police court. The provisions of the charter of the city of Stockton under which the city police court was created, were as follows:
"Said police court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all misdemeanors punishable by fine or by imprisonment *** committed within the corporate limits of the city. *** Said police court shall have jurisdiction in all civil cases, concurrently with the justices’ courts of all actions and proceedings arising within the corporate limits of the city and which might be tried in such justices’ court."
It will be observed that the charter of the city of San Josédid not limit the jurisdiction of the city police court to cases arising within the city limits, while the charter of the city of Stockton did contain such a limitation.
It will be further observed that the charter of the city of Fresno provides that within the city limits the police court shall have the same jurisdiction as a justice’s court in the city. It is necessary for us here to construe the phrases "within the city limits" and "in the city," as used in the Fresno charter. If these phrases are words of limitation of the jurisdiction of the city police court giving the jurisdiction only in cases and proceedings arising within the city limits, the writ of mandate must be granted.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction in California that the courts must construe a statute or law so as to give it full force and effect as far as is possible, so that it may stand in its entirety. Kydd v. San Francisco, 37 Cal.App. 598, 174 P. 88; Hunt v. Manning, 24 Cal.App. 44, 140 P. 39. If the language used will reasonably permit, a construction will be given a statute which will sustain it and will render it valid and operative rather than defeat it. Section 3541, Civ.Code; Glassell Development Co. v. Citizens’ National Bank, 191 Cal. 375, 216 P. 1012, 28 A.L.R. 1427; Cuthbert v. Woodman, 185 Cal. 43, 195 P. 673. The power to adopt a city charter is vested in the electors of the city, subject to the approval of the Legislature of the state. The courts will not hold a law invalid, or a provision of the law inoperative and without effect, unless it is clearly compelled to do so by the circumstances of the case. Bickerdike v. State, 144 Cal. 681, 78 P. 270.
When the people of the city of Fresno adopted the city charter, and used the language "within the city limits" and "in the city" in connection with the jurisdiction of the city police court, we must conclude that they intended to give these words some effect and meaning and used them in their usual ordinary sense. If the police court of the city of Fresno was to be given jurisdiction equal to the jurisdiction of a city justice court, the section of the charter in question could have read as follows:
"*** Said court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with township justices’ courts in all matters and things in which said justices’ courts now or hereafter may have jurisdiction; and said police court shall have in addition to the special jurisdiction conferred in this article, like authority, power, and jurisdiction *** as now or hereafter may be conferred upon township justices’ courts."
With these two phrases under consideration, eliminated from the charter provisions, its effect is exactly similar to the provisions of the charter of the city of San José, which we have quoted. We must conclude that these two phrases were inserted in the charter advisedly and for some purpose, as we cannot conclude that the freeholders who prepared the charter, and the electors who adopted it, would do a useless act. With these phrases inserted, the charter provision is of similar character to the provision of the charter of the city of Stockton which we have quoted. We are of the opinion that the two phrases were used with the definite intention of limiting the jurisdiction of the police court of the city of Fresno to cases, actions, and proceedings arising within the city limits of the city of Fresno, and that therefore the jurisdiction of the police court of the city of Fresno is less than that of the city justice court. The city justice court possesses jurisdiction extending beyond the limits of the city of Fresno, and also possesses jurisdiction to hear and determine certain civil cases, certain criminal cases, and preliminary examinations, where the crimes were committed, or the cause of action occurred outside the city limits. In re Lovall (Cal.Sup.) 279 P. 452; Proctor v. Justice’s Court of City of Berkeley (Cal.Sup.) 285 P. 312; Robertson v. Langford, 95 Cal.App. 414, 273 P. 150; Kenyon v. Johnson (Cal.App.) 276 P. 110; Frioux v. Johnson (Cal.App.) 276 P. 128.
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed for.
We concur: BARNARD, Acting P.J.; OWEN, Justice pro tem.