Opinion
No. 53577
11-14-2013
IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER H., A MINOR, CHRISTOPHER H., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.
An unpublished order shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited as legal authority. SCR 123.
ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND
This is an appeal from a juvenile court order deeming appellant an adult sex offender for purposes of registration and community notification under the 2005 versions of NRS 62F.250 and NRS Chapter 179D. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; William O. Voy, Judge.
Although the juvenile court entered the challenged order in 2009, it proceeded under the 2005 version of the statutory scheme after declaring the 2007 version unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. In State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Logan D.), 129 Nev. ___, 306 P.3d 369 (2013), this court overruled the juvenile court and upheld the constitutionality of the 2007 scheme as applied to juvenile offenders. This court then ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs discussing the impact of Logan D. on this appeal.
Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted in this appeal.
Appellant contends that because he was only 12 years old at the time he committed his offense, he is not subject to the registration and community notification requirements of the 2007 statutory scheme; he asserts that the 2007 scheme applies only to juveniles who were 14 years of age or older at the time of their offense. Appellant relies upon NRS 179D.0559(1)(b) and NRS 179D.095(1)(b) which define an "offender" and a "sex offender" for purposes of NRS Chapter 179D as someone who, after 1956, was or is adjudicated of an offense listed in NRS 62F.200 if the person "was 14 years of age or older at the time" of the crime or offense. Reiving on NRS 62F.220(1), the State counters that registration and community notification are required for all juveniles aged 14 or older who are adjudicated of an offense that would have been a sexual offense if committed by an adult, regardless of the juveniles' age at the time of the offense. We agree with appellant.
NRS Chapter 179D clearly and repeatedly states that juveniles who were 14 years of age or older at the time of the offense are subject to its sex offender registration and community notification requirements. See NRS 179D.010; NRS 179D.035(2) (defining "convicted" to mean juvenile offenders who were "14 years of age or older at the time of the offense"); NRS 179D.0559(1)(b) (defining "offender convicted of a crime against a child" and "offender" to mean a person adjudicated for certain offenses "if the offender was 14 years of age or older at the time of the crime"); NRS 179D.095(1)(b) (defining "sex offender" to mean a person adjudicated for certain offenses "if the offender was 14 years of age or older at the time of the offense"); NRS 179D.441-.490 (subjecting sex offenders, offenders, and persons convicted of a crime against a child to registration and community notification requirements). While NRS 62F.220(1) refers to juveniles who are aged 14 or older at the time of adjudication, the statute does not impose any sex offender registration and community notification requirements on juvenile offenders. The statute merely imposes duties on the juvenile court when a juvenile aged 14 or older is adjudicated for a sexual offense. Therefore, appellant, who was under the age of 14 at the time of his offense, is not subject to the registration and community notification requirements of the 2007 statutory scheme.
The juvenile court erred by declaring the 2007 statutory scheme unconstitutional. Logan D., 129 Nev. ___, 306 P.3d 369. Because the 2007 scheme repealed the statute allowing the juvenile court to deem appellant an adult sex offender, 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 485, § 56, at 2780 (repealing NRS 62F.250), and appellant is not subject to the registration and community notification requirements of the 2007 statutory scheme, the juvenile court was without authority to declare appellant an adult sex offender. Therefore, we
ORDER the judgment of the juvenile court REVERSED AND REMAND this matter to the juvenile court for proceedings consistent with this order.
In light of our disposition, we need not address appellant's contentions regarding the 2005 statutory scheme.
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____________, J.
Gibbons
____________, J.
Douglas
____________, J.
Saitta
cc: Hon. William O. Voy, District Judge, Family Court Division
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division
Eighth District Court Clerk