Opinion
CA. No. 20215
June 23, 2003
Scott G. Wilcox, Esquire, New Castle County Law Dept., New Castle, DE
Richard L. Abbott, Esquire, The Bayard Firm, Wilmington, DE
Dear Counsel:
Pending before the court is Christiana Town Center, LLC's motion for reargument of the court's opinion and order dated June 6, 2003 (the "June 6 Opinion"). For the reasons briefly explained herein, that motion will be denied,
See generally Christiana Town Center, LLC v. New Castle County, 2003 WL 21314499 (Del.Ch. June 6. 2003).
"A motion for reargument will usually be denied unless the Court has overlooked a decision or principle of law that would have a controlling effect or the Court has misapprehended the law or the facts so that the outcome of the decision would be affected." There has been no such misapprehension of the law or the facts, and the court has not overlooked a decision or principle of law that would have a controlling effect on the outcome of this case.
Huntington Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. 706 Investments, 1999 WL 499451 at *1 (Del.Ch. June 30, 1999) (citation omitted).
The June 6 Opinion denied Christiana's request for the entry of a permanent injunction and dismissed the action without prejudice on two grounds: (1) the complaint did not properly invoke this court's equity jurisdiction; and (2) the plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Christiana argues the court erred in both of these respects.
See Christiana Town Center, 2003 WL 21314499, at *1.
As discussed in the June 6 Opinion, Christiana has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. To determine whether Christiana has met this burden, the court must review the allegations of the complaint as a whole to determine the true nature of the claim. After engaging in this exercise, the court concluded that "a plain reading [of the complaint] shows that all Christiana realistically seeks is a declaratory judgment as to the meaning and scope of the UDC Clean Hands Provision."
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Christiana is correct in its conclusion that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not, standing alone, divest this court of equity jurisdiction. Christiana is incorrect, however, when it argues that this court relied exclusively on the Declaratory Judgment Act for its decision. Rather, the court recognized that in some situations a simple declaratory judgment would not amount to an adequate remedy at law, and the Court of Chancery would therefore retain jurisdiction over certain matters. The current dispute, however, involves a situation where a declaratory judgment does provide an adequate remedy at law because "the court must presume that the County will respect any decision rendered by any competent court of this State." Thus, the Court of Chancery lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the current dispute.
10 Del. C. § 6501 et seq.
See Mot. for Rearg. at ¶ 5 (arguing "that the Declaratory Judgment Act may not be relied upon as a `magical close sesame' to the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction over a matter").
Christiana Town Center, 2003 WL 21314499, at *4 n. 19 (noting that "[i]t would be anathema to our form of government to believe, as a baseline principle, that after a court renders a declaratory judgment another governmental agency would not follow that decision. It may be the case that a particular agency does not follow such a judgment, but a party should only seek injunctive relief if that agency actually refuses to comply with the judicial declaration") (emphasis in original).
In its motion for reargument, Christiana also argues that this court must have jurisdiction to hear the claim because the Superior Court does not. Mot. for Rearg. at ¶ 6 The court correctly addressed this issue in the June 6 Opinion when it determined that the Superior Court does have jurisdiction because it can issue a declaratory judgment. Christiana Town Center, 2003 WL 21314499. at *4.
Christiana's final contention is that the court erred by dismissing Christiana's complaint for its failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the June 6 Opinion relied on a letter from the County to Christiana dated after the complaint was filed. The court's decision to dismiss Christiana's complaint in this regard was based on a finding that the availability of a legal remedy (i.e., an administrative appeal) negated Christiana's ability to meet its burden of proving it had no adequate remedy at law. This remedy does not depend on any written decision. Rather, it exists at the moment a party becomes "aggrieved." In the instant case, the jurisdiction of the Planning Board was established on March 18 and 21, 2003 when the denials were issued to Christiana and March 13 and 20, 2003 when the denials were issued to Bertucci's.
Mot. for Rearg. at ¶ ¶ 7-10.
See County Code § 40.31.510 (Any party aggrieved by a final finding, decision or interpretation of a decision maker may appeal such action).
The County was not obligated to provide a formal written decision before Christiana could pursue an administrative appeal. The requirement for issuing a written decision merely establishes a statutory limitations period for pursuing an appeal. Under the Uniform Development Code, an aggrieved party has twenty days to pursue an appeal after a written decision is issued. Other than the obligation that a decision be final, there is no limitation to the pursuit of an administrative appeal before a written decision is issued. The failure to issue a written decision does not somehow divest or negate the administrative jurisdiction over the matter.
See id.
For the foregoing reasons, Christiana's motion for reargument is
DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.